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ABSTRACT.
HOMAGE TO LANCASHIRE: THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1945-65.
This thesis analyzes the fortunes of the U.K.
cotton industry during two sharply contrasting periods: 
1945-51 and 1951-65. Chapters are devoted to government 
policy, investment, labour practices, coljusive 
agreements, and changes in the structure of the 
industry.
During World War Two British cotton textile 
production was concentrated in a nucleus of mills. After 
the war output and exports expanded within the 
constraints set by a chronic shortage of labour. In the
late 1940s the Attlee government regarded cotton as a
spearhead of the national export drive, and the 
temporary elimination of Japanese competition ensured 
that cloth woven in Lancashire was in high demand 
throughout the world.
By the early 1950s Japan's cotton industry was
fully recovered from its wartime depredations, while 
India, Hong Kong, and Pakistan were rapidly emerging as 
major exporters of cotton textiles. Lancashire's fate 
was sealed. Decline continued unabated until the 
remnants of the industry were absorbed by the man-made 
fibre producers during the 1960s.
'Homage to Lancashire' places the decline of the 
cotton industry within the context of British 
de-industrialization. Britain was the technological 
leader in textiles when the industry was established in
iv
the late eighteenth century. By the mid twentieth 
century most countries had access to the same technology 
as Britain. Consequently the centre of gravity of the
cotton industry passed to Asia with its lower labour
costs.
The tragedy is that this did not happen earlier.
200,000 workers were employed in Lancashire"s^mills 
during the 1950s, representing a serious misallocation 
of resources, and illustrating Britain's failure to 
secure an expeditious transfer of factors of production 


















COTTON AND THE DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION 
OF BRITAIN
PLANNING FOR COTTON, 1945-51
LABOUR SUPPLY IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1945-51
TIME AND MOTION: WORKLOADS AND WAGE LISTS 
IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1945-50
INVESTMENT IN THE LANCASHIRE COTTON 
INDUSTRY, 1945-51
DECLINE AND FALL: THE LANCASHIRE COTTON 
INDUSTRY, 1950-70
Appendix I: British exports to W. Africa, 
South Africa, and Australia
Appendix II: An accounting procedure
INVESTMENT IN THE LANCASHIRE COTTON 
INDUSTRY, 1950-65
LABOUR IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1950-65
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE: THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 
PRICE FIXING, AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR 
PROTECTION, 1950-65
CONCENTRATION IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1950-70




2.1 The British cotton and allied textiles 
industry, 1937-50
3.1 Employment and machine activity in cotton 
spinning, 1945-51
3.2 Employment and machine activity in cotton 
weaving, 1945-51
5.1 U.K. output, exports, and imports of ring
spindles, 1937-51
i
5.2 World cotton spinning capacity, 1939-50
5.3 U.K. output, exports, and imports of
automatic looms, 1936-52
5.4 World cotton and rayon weaving 
capacity, 1936-52
5.5 Demand and capacity utilization in the 
British cotton textile industry, 1937-50
5.6 Index of cotton textile shares, 1938-51
5.7 Net profits and textile machinery prices
in the Lancashire cotton industry, 1930-51
5.8 Cost savings from re-equipment, 1948
6.1 The share of U.K. cloth exports in world
trade, 1937-68
6.2 The U.K. cotton and allied textiles
spinning industry, 1950-70
6.3 The U.K. cotton and allied textiles
weaving industry, 1950-70
6.4 U.K. exports of cotton cloth to selected 
markets, 1938-69
6.5 British cloth imports from selected 
countries, 1938-69
6.6 Percentages unemployed and on short-time 
in the cotton industry, 1950-70
6.7 Factors accounting for the decline in 
employment in the U.K. cotton industry, 
1950-70
6.8 Prices of British and overseas cloth in 
the U.K. market, Jan.-Feb. 1962











































Comparative production costs: cotton/ 
polyester shirting cloth, 1967
Cloth exports to British West 
Africa, 1937-69
Cloth exports to South Africa, 1938-70
Cloth exports to Australia, 1938-70
Productive capacity and excess capacity 
in the spinning section, 1950-65
%
Productive capacity and excess capacity 
in the weaving section, 1950-65
Automatic and semi-automatic looms as a 
proportion of all looms in place in 
selected countries, 1939-64
Comparative investment expenditure per 
operative in the cotton industries of 
selected countries, 1954-63
Ring spindles in the course of 
erection, 1951-7
Looms in the course of erection, 1952-8
Cotton textile share prices, 1950-64
Net profits of the leading cotton textile 
combines, 1950-65
Net profits of independent cotton textile 
companies, 1950-65
Export prices of new ring spindles 
and automatic looms, 1950-60
Shuttleless looms as a percentage of all 
looms in selected cotton industries, 1958-68
The case for re-equipment in spinning, 1968
The case for re-equipment in weaving, 1968
Shift systems in the British cotton 
industry, 1954-64
Machine hours worked per year in selected 
cotton industries
Machine complements for Lancashire 
loom weavers, 1948-55





























Prices of raw cotton, yarn, and 
cloth, 1946-64
Rayon cloth prices, 1952-64
U.K. cotton industry: size of firm, 1939-58
Spindles and looms in vertically integrated 
(spinning-weaving) firms as a percentage of 
total spinning and weaving capacity, 1939-56
Five firm concentration ratios in cotton 
and allied textiles, 1959-68
Concentration in industry groups: shares of 










A.E.R.: American Economic Review.
A.W.A.: Amalgamated Weavers' Association.
B.S.D.A.: British Spinners' and Doublers' Association
Cardroom Workers: National Association of Card, Blowing,
and Ring Room Operatives.
C.B.C.: Cotton Board Conference Papers.
C.B.Q.S.R.: Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical Review.
C.J.E.: Cambridge Journal of Economics.
C.M.C.: Cotton Manufacturing Commission.
C.S.M.A.: Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers'
Association.
C.S.O.: Central Statistical Office.
Ec.H.R.: Economic History Review.
E.J.: Economic Journal.
F.M.C.S.A.: Federation of Master Cotton Spinners' and 
Manufacturers' Associations.
G.A.T.T.: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
G.M.R.O.: Greater Manchester Record Office.
I.F.M.C.S.A.: International Federation of Master Cotton
Spinners' and Manufacturers'
Associations.
J.C.C.T.O.: Joint Committee of Cotton Trade
Organisations.
J.E.H.: Journal of Economic History.
J.P.K.E.: Journal of Post Keynesian Economics.
J.R.S.S.: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.
L.R.O.: Lancashire Record Office.
Manchester School: Manchester School of Social and
Economic Studies.
O.E.C.D.: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.
O.E.P.: Oxford Economic Papers.
XOperative Spinners: Amalgamated Association of Operative
Cotton Spinners and Twiners.
P.R.O.: Public Record Office.
Q.J.E.: Quarterly Journal of Economics.
R.W.A.: Rayon Weaving Association.
U.T.F.W.A.: United Textile Factory Workers' Association.
1Chapter 1.
COTTON AND THE DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION OF BRITAIN.
The mills of Lancashire are silent. Little remains
of am industry which once dominated Britain's overseas
trade, and inspired a mixture of horror amd admiration
aimong foreign visitors. Recently, the Bolton steeplejack
Fred DibneLh has become a television celebrity as a
*
result of his skilful demolition of mill chimneys. It is 
a far cry from the days when Britain's bread hung by 
Lancashire's thread.
Although mamy mills have been demolished and others 
stand deserted, a substamtial number have been converted 
to new uses. In Preston, for instance, former cotton 
mills have been transformed into warehouses, engineering 
works, a supermarket, a laundry, a carpet amd furniture 
showroom, a sports centre, housing, amd a depot for a 
large security firm. One mill has been converted into 
industrial units for printing amd clothing firms, while 
the offices of the former Horrockses cotton empire are 
now a branch of a major bank. TodaLy few children in 
Lancashire know anything about the cotton industry 
unless they are taking a C.S.E. or G.C.E. course in 
economic history. As a boy, I remember walking past the 
huge Horrockses mill on New Hall Lame in Preston each 
time I went to see the dentist. It was am awe-inspiring 
amd slightly menacing structure, but I had no idea what 
went on inside. For many people in Lancashire it is 
almost as though there had never been a cotton industry.
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold.
2Firstly, I intend to look at the performance of a major 
industry during the period of the 1945-51 Labour 
government. This is a particularly fascinating epoch of 
British economic history, for during the 1940s Britain 
made its closest approximation to date to a planned 
socialist economy. Secondly, I want to account for the 
collapse of the Lancashire cotton industry during theto
1950s and 1960s, and to relate this episode to the wider 
theme of British de-industrialization. Between 1945 and 
1970 the cotton industry was reduced from a cornerstone 
of Britain's manufacturing sector to a fairly 
insignificant outpost of the man-made fibres industry. 
Cotton was the first of the great staple industries to 
be liquidated; its demise preceded the crises in steel, 
shipbuilding, and coal by several decades. As the 
inexorable decline of the British manufacturing sector 
continues, it is instructive to draw parallels between 
the problems of the cotton industry and those of the 
economy as a whole.
In making the Lancashire cotton industry the focus 
for a wider discussion of economic change, this study 
oan claim some important antecedents. Much of the raw 
material for Marx's analysis of the laws of motion of 
capitalism was drawn from observations of Lancashire, 
the most highly developed capitalist economy of the mid 
nineteenth century.(1) More recently, W.W. Rostow has 
accorded cotton the role of a 'leading sector' in the 
'take-off' of British industrialization in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.(2) In the
3early 1970s Lars Sandberg employed the Lancashire cotton 
industry as a case study in his attempt to rebut the 
critics of Victorian entrepreneurship (3), while William
Lazonick has used material from the spinning section to 
suggest that the structure of authority in the workplace 
is an important factor influencing decisions about the 
installation of new technology.(4) Moreover, social
historians such as John Foster, Patrick Joyce, and 
Neville Kirk have based their respective analyses of 
class consciousness, deference, and working class
reformism on studies of Lancashire textile towns.(5)
Despite this enormous interest in Lancashire and 
its role in the economic and social development of 
modern Britain, remarkably little has been written on 
the fortunes of the cotton industry between 1918 and the 
present day. H.A. Turner's account of the cotton textile 
trade unions is invaluable for studies of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, but does not say much 
about the 1940s and 1950s. (6) J.H. Bamberg's recent 
doctoral thesis has enhanced our knowledge of the 
industry between the wars, while Caroline Miles's 
monograph on the 1959 Cotton Industry Act is a fine 
introduction to the post World War Two scene in 
Lancashire, but Robert Robson's survey of the cotton
industry during the mid 1950s remains the crucial point 
of reference for the postwar researcher.(7) In view of 
such a paucity of serious research into the final stage 
of cotton's decline, there is no need to seek elaborate 
justifications for the present study.
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This brief section outlines the general plan of the 
dissertation. The remainder of Chapter I advances an 
embryonic model of economic decline, which might help to 
explain Britain's current predicament. It includes an 
attempt to place cotton within the overall context of 
British de-industrialization. The rest of the thesis 
falls into two parts. Chapters 2 to 5 deal with the 
period from 1945 to 1951, while Chapters 6 to 10 
consider the 1950s and 1960s.
Chapter II combines an overview of the cotton
industry during the 1940s, with a detailed consideration 
of postwar planning and the relationship between
Lancashire and the Labour government. The labour 
shortage, which was the main constraint on the
industry's output during the period of the Labour
government, will be analyzed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
deals with the complex issues surrounding attempts to 
secure a more efficient utilization of the workforce 
through the introduction of new staffing arrangements. 
Chapter 5 looks at the reasons for the slow progress in 
re-equipment in Lancashire between 1945 and 1951.
Chapter 6 comprises a general account of the
industry's decline in the 1950s and 1960s, and employs 
an 'accounting technique' to identify the immediate 
causes of the decline in employment. In Chapter 7 the 
course of investment between 1950 and 1965 will be
examined. This chapter also considers the crucial 
problem of surplus capacity. Chapter 8 examines the role
5of labour during the 1950s and 1960s, concentrating upon 
the growth of shift-working and the increasing use of 
time and motion techniques. Attempts by the employers to 
arrest cotton's decline, by entering into price-fixing 
agreements and campaigning for import controls, will be 
analyzed in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 examines the merger 
movement in textiles during the 1960s, while Chapter 11 
provides the occasion for some concluding comments about 
Lancashire and the British economy.
II
Some of the most interesting questions falling 
within the province of economics concern the factors 
determining the growth and decline of national 
economies. All the important classical economists, from 
Smith to Marx, were anxious to derive a theory which
would explain this process. Both Smith and Ricardo
believed that economies gravitated towards a point where 
the growth of industrial production would cease. Marx 
went beyond the concept of a stationary economy to
predict that, under a regime of private enterprise,
economic growth would be followed by deepening recession 
and inevitable collapse.
Popular and journalistic accounts of the current 
crisis present economic decline as a punishment for the 
inherent laziness of the British, or else focus their 
attention on other, equally vaporous, failings. In view 
of this confusion in popular discourse, it is 
instructive to recall that as long ago as the eighteenth 
century economists were predicting that British economic
6superiority would be ephemeral. Both David Hume and Sir 
James Steuart regarded international trade as the motor 
of economic development. Hume argued that the desire to 
consume imported luxuries constituted the initial 
impetus for a nation to produce an economic surplus. 
Once this process had commenced, the acquisitive side of 
human nature would be fuelled, and the desire for 
increased production would become insatiable. Initially, 
the availability of cheap labour would enable a rapid 
increase in exports, ensuring a steady rate of economic 
growth. But in the long run economic development would 
lead to rising wages, while the inflows of bullion 
arising from regular trade surpluses would generate 
inflation. British exports would become uncompetitive in 
relation to the products of newly industrializing 
nations, and de-industrialization, unemployment, and 
renewed poverty would follow.(8)
The Jacobite economist, Sir James Steuart, made the 
relationship between trade and development into one of 
the central themes of his major work, An Inquiry into 
the Principles of Political Economy (1767). Steuart 
outlined a stages theory of development.(9) In the first 
stage of 'infant trade' the British manufacturing sector 
would be able to grow by drawing upon a reservoir of 
underemployed agricultural labour. Once industry was 
firmly established in the domestic market; it would be 
possible to enter the stage of 'foreign trade', in which 
the economy would experience export-led growth. Low 
labour costs would result in a rapid increase in
7exports, thereby facilitating a further extension in 
manufacturing production. However, during this stage, 
the preconditions would be laid for
de-industrialization. Despite a rising population, the 
labour supply would soon become fully absorbed in 
industry and agriculture. Increasing population would 
necessitate the cultivation of waste land, resulting in 
a rise in the price of bread. Wages would have to be 
increased to compensate for the higher cost of living, 
pushing up the price of manufactured goods for export.
Meanwhile other countries, which had formerly
i
exported only primary products, would be starting to 
industrialize. Foreign governments would soon realise 
that their long-term interests were not served by 
specializing in primary products. As the quantity and 
price of imported manufactures increased, it would 
become steadily more difficult for them to obtain a 
balance of trade by exporting food and raw materials 
alone. Moreover, under conditions of diminishing 
returns, a concentration on agricultural exports would 
bring about an increase in the domestic price level, 
harming both the poor and those in receipt of fixed 
incomes, and resulting in widespread social conflict. 
The foreign statesmen, Steuart argued, would attempt to 
avoid these dii?e consequences by stimulating 
manufacturing industry and placing restrictions on 
imported manufactures.
British producers would find it difficult to 
contend with such competition. High labour costs due to
8rising food pices would hamper British exporters. In 
addition, employers would be reluctant to reduce the 
large profit mark-ups to which they had grown accustomed 
during the period of expansion. As the British balance 
of trade degenerated into secular deficit, bullion would 
continually drain abroad, the money supply would 
progressively diminish, and the nation would be reduced 
to penury. "We perceive in history", Steuart asserted, 
"the rise, progress, grandeur, and decline of Sydon, 
Tyre, Carthage, Alexandria, and Venice, not to come near
home [sic]".(10) He argued that only a policy of state
assisted re-equipment behind a rigid protective wall, 
similar to that advocated in the 1970s and 1980s by the 
Cambridge Economic Policy Group, could prevent 
de-industrialization and restore prosperity. This
regeneration of British industry would take place 
against a background of severe austerity, of which even 
Sir Stafford Cripps, the Labour Chancellor during the 
1940s, would have been proud. If the state grasped this 
initiative, a new stage of domestically generated
growth, or 'inland trade', would be ushered in. At a 
later date the reopening of the domestic market to
foreign goods might be possible; indeed Steuart
envisaged a situation in which the economically advanced 
nations oscillated between the stages of 'foreign trade' 
and 'inland trade'.
Steuart's contribution to the theory of
de-industrialization is of great relevance for
understanding the predicament of Britain in the 1980s,
9not least because his recommendations for government 
policy are so clear. Perhaps the most important aspect 
of Steuart's analysis is the contention that 
international trade can, at different stages in an 
economy's development, be both the engine of growth and 
a harbinger of de-industrialization. These themes have 
been taken up again in recent years, notably by Nicholas 
Kaldor and the Cambridge Economic Policy Group.(11)
In his inaugural lecture at the University of 
Cambridge in 1966, Professor Kaldor advanced the 
hypothesis that the rate of economic growth is a 
function of the growth rate of manufacturing 
production.(12) This was a restatement of Verdoorn's 
'Law', i.e. that the rate of growth of productivity in 
an economy is a function of the rate of growth of 
output. Kaldor suggested that the growth rate of 
manufacturing output influenced the rate of change in 
output per capita in the following ways:
(i) A faster increase in the rate of growth of 
manufacturing output encourages greater
specialization and the extension of the division 
of labour, resulting in reductions in unit costs.
It would be possible further to subdivide 
operations within an individual factory, and for 
firms increasingly to specialize in a small range 
of products or processes. This follows from Adam 
Smith's fundamental postulate that the division of 
labour is determined by the extent of the 
market.(13)
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(ii) A greater division of labour would foster 
specialist skills and learning-by-doing, which 
would lead to a faster rate of innovation and
productivity growth.(14)
(iii) A higher growth rate of manufacturing output 
would induce increases in productivity in
agriculture and the service trades, sectors 
usually characterised by surplus labour and low 
levels of per capita ouput. As more labour was 
drawn into manufacturing industry, underemployment 
in agriculture and the service sector would be
reduced and output per worker would be increased.
Having established these principles, Kaldor 
attempted to explain the factors determining the rate of 
increase in manufacturing output. Changes in consumption 
and investment were obviously of great importance, but 
Kaldor emphasised the role of exports. Unconsciously 
following in the footsteps of Sir James Steuart, he 
outlined a stages theory of development. In the first 
stage, the growth of the manufacturing sector would be 
based upon import substitution in light industries such 
as textiles. Export-led growth, also concentrating on 
the products of light industry, would be the primary 
dynamic factor in the second stage. The third stage 
would be marked by import substitution in the capital 
goods industries, and the fourth by exports of capital
goods. The fifth stage would be characterised by a 
reduction in the rate of economic growth. Deceleration 
would arise from the absorption of the reservoir of
11
surplus agricultural labour, and would b© accompanied by 
rising labour costs. Kaldor described the fifth stage as 
one of "maturity" and suggested that it accorded with 
the position of the British economy in the second half 
of the twentieth century.(15)
In 1971 Kaldor expanded upon the crucial role of 
exports in the process of economic growth. (16) He ^irgued 
that since 1950 the policy of the U.K. government had 
been to stimulate the growth rate by increasing the 
level of domestic demand. But this was essentially a 
"second best" strategy, as a high proportion of domestic 
expenditure leaked abroad as a result of the high 
marginal propensity to import. Moreover, personal 
consumption expenditure was being increasingly 
channelled towards the service industries, which offered 
little scope for economies of scale. Export-led growth 
would have been preferable, because of its concentration 
on the manufacturing sector and its encouragement of a 
high rate of investment. Manufacturing industry, Kaldor 
claimed, experienced increasing returns and had the 
potential for unlimited technological progress.(17)
In a further major article in 1972 Kaldor paid 
tribute to the work of Allyn Young on increasing returns 
in the- manufacturing sector.(18) Increasing returns 
predominated in manufacturing as a result of:
(i) The three-dimensional nature of space, which 
ensured that productive capacity always increased 
faster than construction costs.
(ii) The unlimited opportunities for the division
12
of labour. Young used the example of the mass production 
of cars by Ford to illustrate the principle that the 
division of labour was a function of the size of the 
market.
(iii) Learning-by-doing: Young stressed the stimulus to
innovation following from an expansion in production.
*
(iv) Young postulated that an increase in the output of
one manufactured good constituted an increase in demand
for other manufactures. Consequently increasing returns
in different industries were mutually reinforcing. When
commodities:
"[A]re produced competitively under conditions 
of increasing returns and when the demand for 
each commodity is elastic, in the special 
sense that a small increase in its supply will 
be attended by an increase in the amounts of 
other commodities which can be had in exchange 
for it...an increase in the supply of one 
commodity is an increase in the demand for 
other commodities, and it must be supposed 
that every increase in demand will evoke an 
increase in supply".(19)
A number of attempts have been made to provide 
statistical support for Kaldor's theories. Cripps and 
Tarling attempted to substantiate the hypothesis that 
labour shortages were the major constraint on economic 
growth and productivity in industrialized countries, but 
their method has been criticized by Rowthorn.(20) Kaldor 
accepted Rowthorn's dismissal of the labour supply 
thesis, but reiterated his belief that the growth rate 
of productivity is a function of the growth rate of 
manufacturing output, and that the latter is a function 
of the rate of increase of exports.(21) Cornwall
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provides a useful summary of the results of several 
studies suggesting a strong statistical relationship 
between the growth rate of manufacturing output and the 
growth rate of productivity.(22) However, regression 
exercises, although useful for indicating the probable 
existence of a functional relationship, are incapable of 
providing an explanation of it.
Mowery and Rosenberg show that there is no reliable 
empirical evidence to indicate that innovation is a 
function of the level of demand for manufactured 
products.(23) Therefore the Kaldor-Verdoorn thesis 
appears to be thrown back upon increasing returns, the
division of labour, and reciprocal demand, at least 
until better evidence is available on rates of
innovation.
As regards the effect of export demand on the 
growth of the manufacturing sector, the results of an 
investigation by Cornwall offer substantial support for 
Kaldor's position. Cornwall found that the success of 
the export sector, the propensity of manufacturers to 
invest, and the extent of the technological gap between 
the country in question and the most highly developed 
country, jointly governed the rate of growth of
manufacturing output in advanced industrial nations 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Further empirical support 
has been forthcoming from research by Parikh.(24)
The dispute over Kaldor's Laws continues 
unabated.(25) But several points seem to have been 
established. Firstly, exports are a major determinant of
14
the rate of growth of manufacturing production. 
Secondly, the faster the growth of the manufacturing 
sector, the faster the increase in productivity in the 
economy as a whole. The implications of this argument 
are quite obvious: much of the deceleration of the
British economy in the twentieth century can be 
attributed to a poor export performance.(26)
It remains to explain Britain's failure to increase 
exports at a sufficient rate, either to support an 
expanding manufacturing sector, or to stimulate rapid 
improvements in productivity. But at the outset it is 
worthwhile disposing of the objection that Kaldor has
merely put forward a circular argument. Kaldor explains 
that exports determine the rate of expansion of 
manufacturing output, which in turn determines the rate 
of advance in productivity. However, it should be 
obvious that the rate of growth in productivity is 
crucial to the competitiveness of exports. A degree of 
circularity is perhaps unavoidable in economics, or 
indeed in any discipline which considers the interaction 
of factors. The economy is a system, within which each
element reacts upon all other elements. While these
interactions can usually be ignored at the level of the 
individual firm or consumer, at the level of the economy 
as a whole they are of enormous importance. Perhaps it 
would be helpful to look at matters in the following 
way: the rates of growth of productivity, exports, and
output form an inter-related system, on the same lines
as the circular flow of income of elementary macro-
15
-economics. The mutually re-inforcing tendencies of this 
system can be interrupted by forces which intrude from 
outside. For instance, the rate of growth of 
productivity is not exclusively a function of the rate 
of growth of output; it could also be affected by such 
factors as the willingness of trade unions to accept new 
technology, the ability of entrepreneurs to select the 
most efficient technique, and so on. In the present 
context overseas development is the crucial exogenous 
factor creating an undesirable imbalance in the system.
During the late nineteenth century the 
industrialization of Europe and the United States led to 
increasing competition in many important markets for 
British exports, attesting to the remarkable accuracy of 
Sir James Steuart's predictions. In Germany and Russia, 
industrialization was carried out at a forced pace, as 
the result of government intervention. Steuart's 
contention that other countries would not be satisfied 
to remain suppliers of primary products to Britain was 
echoed in the 1860s by Georg von Siemens, a future 
director of the German Bank:
""We want to preserve our position vis-a-vis 
[Britain and France]... who are ahead of us in 
capital and power, and not let ourselves be 
relegated to the status of a colony, such as 
Portugal, Turkey and Jamaica...we don't want 
to become a purely agricultural nation, with 
our products replaced by English goods, and we 
ourselves subject to direct plunder.'"(27)
Bismarck's policy of encouraging industrial development
was emulated by the government of Russia. During the
1890s the Witte ministry embarked upon an ambitious
programme of state investment in industry, particularly
16
in infrastructure projects such as railway 
construction.(28) European and North American 
industrialization was accompanied by a gradual increase 
in import controls, which further restricted the market 
for British exports. Stringent tariff barriers were 
imposed in Germany in 1879-80 and 1902, France in 1892 
and 1910, the United States in 1890 and 1897, It^ly in 
1878-9 and 1887, and Switzerland in 1891 and 1906.(29)
Exporters responded to these developments by 
concentrating on more easily accessible markets in the 
colonies and other less developed regions, but this 
redirection of effort did not prevent a decline in the 
overall dynamism of the British economy. The rate of 
growth of U.K. exports fell from 3.8 per cent per annum 
between 1851 and 1880 to 2.7 per cent per annum between 
1881 and 1911; and the rate of increase in industrial 
production per decade declined from 33.2 per cent 
between 1860-9 and 1870-9 to 12.2 per cent between 
1900-9 and 1910-9.(30) These trends are consistent with 
Kaldor's thesis concerning the connection between the 
performance of the export sector and the rate of growth 
of manufacturing production.
Indeed, once overseas industrialization was 
underway, it was inevitable that the rate of growth of 
British exports should have declined. It was equally 
inevitable that this should have had a deleterious 
effect on the rate of growth of manufacturing output. 
Although there was some improvement in the growth rate 
of industrial production during the interwar period, in
17
recent years the failure of the British manufacturing 
sector has again become the subject of deep concern. 
According to Thirlwall, a fall in employment in the 
manufacturing sector is probably the least ambiguous 
definition of de-industrialization. Official figures 
show that this has been happening in the U.K. since the 
mid 1960s.(31) Writers of the New Cambridge school have 
identified the failure of the British export sector as 
the immediate cause of this state of affairs. Singh 
stressed that manufactured exports have become 
insufficient to pay for the full employment level of 
imports.(32) He followed the approach of R.S. Sayers in 
discriminating between 'complementary" and "competitive" 
phases in world development.(33) The period from 1945 to 
1960 was dominated by postwar reconstruction in the 
industrialized world, and consequently a large demand 
was generated for the products of British industry. But 
since 1960 the further development of the European, 
Japanese, and North American economies, not to mention 
those of the newly industrializing third world 
countries, has resulted in direct competition with 
British manufacturers. In this increasingly harsh 
international climate, the poor design and quality of 
British products have been exposed.(34)
A number of explanations have been advanced for 
Britain's inability to supply the products which are in 
high demand abroad. Most can be classified as forms of 
institutional rigidity. These rigidities have distorted 
the structure of the British economy and have weakened
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the connection between the growth of manufacturing 
output and industrial productivity.
Veblen was the first to argue that Britain's 'early 
start' hampered the assimilation of new technology later 
on. This problem arose from the inter-relatedness of 
technology. Let us assume an industry in which there are 
two successive processes, A and B, which are carried out 
by different firms. Let us also assume that for each 
process, entrepreneurs have a choice between two types 
of machine: Al, A2, Bl, B2. Initially the techniques A1 
and Bl are employed. Technical change leads to the 
development of techniques A2 and B2. The cost of the 
final product would fall, and the profits of both the A 
firms and the B firms increase, if Al and Bl were 
simultaneously replaced by A2 and B2. But if the A firms 
installed the new technique, while the B firms continued 
to use the original technique, the A firms would be 
worse off, and vice-versa, due to the problems 
associated with combining new and old techniques. An 
identical argument could be applied to technical change 
in the economy as a whole; the implication is that 
piece-meal change is very difficult. On the other hand, 
in a free market economy, it is impossible to 
co-ordinate the re-equipment of firms in different 
industries or those in different sections of the same 
industry.(35)
Technical inter-relatedness and the early start 
retarded the adaptation of established industries to the 
challenge of new technology. However, it is essential
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that an expanding economy should continually diversify
into new industries. Vernon's product cycle thesis
contends that comparative advantage is always
changing.(36) New products are usually developed in the
most advanced countries, because in their early stages
they are highly knowledge-intensive. As techniques for
producing the commodity become more commonplace, the
cost of labour becomes the predominant factor in
determining the industry's location. Production
gradually shifts to countries possessing ample supplies
of cheap labour. The moral is that it is foolish for the
advanced countries to resist this process. Everything
possible should be done to secure a speedy and smooth
transfer of resources to new knowledge-intensive
industries, thus maintaining the momentum of growth.(36)
The current income-inelasticity of demand for
British exports suggests that the United Kingdom has
signally failed to diversify. Svennilson recognised this
problem of structural rigidity in his masterly survey,
Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy:
"In an economy with a slow long-term growth, 
there is a comparatively large number of 
stagnating industries which lag behind in 
modernization and efficiency. They tend to 
store up labour, which could otherwise have 
been transferred to other growing industries.
In this way the transformation of an economy 
as a whole is held back and the general 
economic growth slowed down".(37)
Svennilson accused entrepreneurs of taking up entrenched
positions and of refusing to diversify, but this is a
rather simplistic approach. Entrepreneurs and managers
do not have perfect knowledge and may be unaware of the
2 0
opportunities open to them; it is not easy for a
businessman to predict changes in comparative advantage. 
If adequate profits can still be accumulated in an ’old 
staple’ industry, the average entrepreneur will see 
little advantage in experimenting in a new, and 
seemingly more risky, venture. Moreover the skills
needed by a manufacturer in one industry, say ^cotton
spinning, may not be of much use in another industry, 
such as the production of electrical goods.
Mancur Olson maintains that structural rigidity 
will be intensified by the development of collusive 
groups in society. The objective of these combinations 
of employers, workers, consumers, and state officials is 
to protect the interests of their own members, 
irrespective of the consequences for the overall health 
of the economy. For instance, trade unions will resist 
new technology which threatens unemployment in the 
short-term, while producers in a declining industry will 
combine to preserve their power by lobbying for import
controls and state assistance, or by entering into
restrictive agreements. Collusive groups of this nature 
create distortions in the market and preserve industries 
and technologies which would not otherwise be viable. In 
countries which have undergone violent political 
upheavals, such as Germany and Japan, the influence of 
special interest groups has been reduced. But Britain
has experienced centuries of relative tranquility,
during which time collusive groupings have been allowed 
to develop unchallenged.(38) Olson’s basic argument
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is highly persuasive and is consistent with the general 
structural rigidity thesis. Instead of merely
criticizing entrepreneurs and trade unions, he attempts 
to provide a rational explanation for their behaviour.
In conclusion, the relative decline of the British 
economy can be accounted for by two sets of
inter-related factors:
(i) A loss of overseas markets, which reduced the 
rate of growth of manufacturing output, and 
consequently restricted opportunities for further 
specialization, mass production, innovation, and 
productivity growth. The loss of markets was 
partly the result of foreign industrialization, 
and partly the result of weaknesses within the 
British economy itself.
(ii) Structural rigidities, arising from Britain's 
early start and its plethora of collusive 
organizations. These rigidities served to 
intensify the reduction in the rate of growth of 
exports, by encouraging inefficiency in the 
manufacturing sector.
Ill
The cotton industry has been suffering from 
declining export markets, stagnating production, and 
slow productivity growth, since the late nineteenth 
century. These problems are identical to those
confronting the bulk of the British manufacturing 
sector; consequently cotton can be regarded as a 
microcosm of the wider economy.
2 2
The plight of the cotton industry has attracted the 
interest of a number of leading economists, but until 
quite recently few have recognized the similarities 
between cotton's decline and the overall demise of the 
British economy. G.T. Jones was the first authority to 
provide detailed estimates of the course of productivity 
change in the cotton industries of Lancashire and New 
England. He concluded that between 1885 and 1913 there 
was little improvement in productivity in Lancashire, in 
sharp contrast with the large advances made in the U.S. 
cotton industry.(39) In 1927 G.W. Daniels and John 
Jewkes identified increasing competition from Japan and 
Italy, together with import substitution in India, as 
the prime causes of the rapidly deepening crisis in the 
industry's affairs, but offered little in the way of 
analysis to explain these trends.(40)
J.M. Keynes took an active interest in cotton, and 
vigorously campaigned for the rationalization of the 
industry.(41) Keynes thought that Lancashire's problems 
were confined to the coarse spinning section, where low 
wages in Japan more than negated the superior skill of 
British workers. The spinning employers' response to the 
crisis had revealed their inability to understand the 
gravity of the problems facing the industry. Believing 
that the fall in demand was only temporary, the British 
spinners had instituted a regime of short time working: 
“The less Lancashire sells, the shorter the time she 
works, the higher therefore her [unit fixed] costs - a 
cumulative progress towards perdition only limited by
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the rate at which other countries can erect new
spindles”.(42) The real problem, Keynes argued, was
surplus capacity. Mills which were not viable in the
long run were driving down prices and reducing the
profits made by efficient factories. The solution was
equally simple: cotton firms should abandon their
traditional mistrust of one another and amalgamate into
«»
large groups, which would then scrap the inefficient
units and return stability to the market. Once sound 
finance had been restored to the industry, the banks 
would be prepared to recommence their lending to 
Lancashire for re-equipment. Keynes was correct to 
emphasize the need for contraction, but failed to
discern that even this would constitute no more than a 
holding operation.
The industrial economist, Henry Clay, produced a 
secret report on Lancashire for the Securities
Management Trust Ltd. in 1931. Clay criticized high 
hourly wages, and inflexible labour practices for
contributing to the industry's problems, and concluded 
that the industry's survival depended upon a shift 
towards higher quality skill-intensive products. He 
suggested that, in the short-term, pressures on the more 
efficient firms could be relieved by instituting a 
scheme for scrapping surplus capacity, and by 
establishing a large merchanting and marketing combine 
which would guarantee them large orders.(43) G.C. Allen 
entered the debate on the cotton industry in 1933. He 
thought that falling prices of primary products relative
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to manufactures had encouraged less developed countries 
to diversify into cotton textiles. Moreover it was 
unfair to place all the blame on cheap foreign labour: 
"it is likely that recent improvements in machinery have 
lessened the advantages of highly-skilled labour and 
have made it more difficult for labour of this type to 
maintain its accustomed superiority in wage rates over 
the less skilled workers in competitive industries".(44) 
The increasing availability of automatic looms and ring 
frames enabled foreign producers to substitute 
semi-skilled for skilled labour. Lancashire was now 
beginning to lose trade in the high quality segment of 
the market. Although improvements in marketing 
arrangements to secure longer production runs could have 
assisted Lancashire, "no reorganisation of the cotton 
industry could have prevented the post-war decline, for 
this has been brought about mainly by a complex of 
external factors".(45) Allen's comparatively fatalistic 
analysis provided the most accurate prewar estimation of 
Lancashire's prospects.
In view of the continuing difficulties of the 
cotton industry after World War Two, it is surprising 
that relatively little serious consideration has been 
given to the causes of the industry's decline. In the 
mid 1940s Rostas contributed another comparison of 
trends in labour productivity in U.K. and U.S cotton 
textiles during the 1930s (46), while Gibson produced a 
further condemnation of the supposedly restrictive 
labour practices and lavish wage payments prevailing in
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Lancashire.(47) Vitkovitch attributed the continuing 
failure of British cotton textile exports during the 
early 1950s to a combination of high prices, poor 
delivery dates, and the manufacturers' preference for 
home orders.(48) In the late fifties and early sixties 
S.R. Dennison and G.C. Allen expressed their lack of
confidence in the industry's ability to combat the
to
growing menace of foreign competition.(49) But no
comprehensive analysis was offered of the demise of the
industry. Indeed some quite peculiar statements were,
from time to time, made about the industry. For instance 
in 1946 Professor Jewkes made the somewhat eccentric 
assertion that labour productivity in the U.K. cotton
industry was fully comparable with that in most U.S.
mills, and that in consequence Lancashire had very 
little to worry about.(50)
Several postwar contributions to the study of the 
cotton industry analyze Lancashire's difficulties within 
the context of the decline of the British economy as a 
whole. The debate about the inter-relatedness of 
technology and Britain's early start employed examples
from the cotton industry. Frankel postulated that the
slow rate of adoption of automatic looms in Lancashire 
was the result of the problems associated with 
technological inter-relatedness. The successful 
operation of automatic looms required the simultaneous 
installation of advanced spinning and preparatory 
machinery. Unfortunately weaving firms were unable to 
influence the re-equipment programmes of firms in the
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spinning section.(51) What is more, the slow growth in 
demand for British cotton textiles, must in itself have 
reduced the speed of re-equipment. As Svennilson 
observed: "The proportion of modern equipment in an 
industry will... increase in proportion to the rapidity 
of the industry's growth. This leads to the conclusion 
that, ceteris paribus, the efficiency of an industry 
increases according to the rapidity of its 
expansion".(52)
William Lazonick amplified upon Frankel's analysis, 
arguing that, although British cotton textile producers 
behaved rationally within the constraints set by the 
market and the structure of the industry, these 
constraints were so severe that they prevented any 
significant improvements in technique or
organization.(53) The atomistic and horizontal structure 
of the industry resulted in each firm being a 
price-taker. Under these circumstances, a concerted 
response by the industry to secular changes in demand or 
in the structure of the market would be impossible. For 
instance, let us consider the example of the emergence 
of a major foreign competitor, whose exports depress the 
world price for yarn and cloth. It is unlikely that each 
individual firm will have sufficient information to form 
a correct analysis of the situation. Some firms, 
observing a fall in their profit margins, may increase 
their output in the belief that they can still reach 
their target profits. This response would intensify the 
downward pressure on prices. Other firms, forced into a
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loss-making position by the original fall in prices, may
decide to continue in business in the false expectation
that demand will recover. Others may follow a policy of
competitive price cutting or 'weak selling' in the hope
that they will be able to secure a share of the trade
that remains. Small firms may find it more convenient to
reduce costs by cutting wages and offering less
acceptable conditions of employment, than to do so by
installing new machinery and modernizing their
management procedures. Contrast this situation with one
in which the industry is subject to a considerable
degree of central direction. The industry's response to
the emergence of the competitor could be planned in
detail. Inefficient units would be closed to relieve
pressure on the rest of the industry. A disciplined
pricing policy could be instituted to prevent the
emergence of 'weak selling'; while a carefully planned
programme of re-equipment would sidestep the problems
associated with technical inter-relatedness.
Lazonick's analysis is not only relevant to cotton;
it could be applied to the examination of many other
major British industries. He is commendably vigorous in
his condemnation of neoclassical economics and its
contribution to the debate about Britain's decline:
"In dealing with the real world, neoclassical 
economists remain every bit as trapped by 
their theoretical vision of economic activity 
in which firms are subordinate to markets as 
were the British cotton capitalists for whom 
such subordination was a reality. The era of 
competitive capitalism has long since past. It 
is time that orthodox economists began to 
learn some lessons from history. Perhaps then
they could begin to illuminate rather than
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obscure our understanding of the dynamics of 
the corporate capitalist economy that exists 
today”.(54)
While it is clear that a more centralized structure 
of. control would have moderated the rate of contraction 
of the cotton industry, it would by no means have 
arrested Lancashire's decline altogether. Indeed, from 
the wider national perspective, the preservation of the 
cotton industry for a further twenty of thirty years 
would have been positively undesirable. By the early 
1950s it should have been apparent that Britain no 
longer had a comparative advantage in cotton textiles. 
The ideal solution would have been a speedy run down of 
the cotton industry and a rapid transfer of labour to 
expanding industries, of which there were many in the 
North West, notably engineering. During the 1950s the 
Lancashire cotton industry hoarded 200,000 workers who 
ought to have been employed elsewhere. In view of the 
labour shortage in the British economy at this time, 
there can be little justification for such a 
misallocation of resources. Cotton's survival during the 
1950s and early 1960s is the supreme example of the 
structural rigidity of the U.K. economy - of the failure 
to secure an efficient transfer of factors of production 
from a doomed industry to expanding sectors.
IV.
This chapter has attempted to incorporate the 
analysis of the decline of the cotton industry into a 
more general model of the failure of the British 
economy. The rapid growth of demand for cotton textiles
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during the early nineteenth century encouraged a high 
degree of specialization by process in Lancashire. 
Although specialization enabled the industry to reap the 
benefits of the division of labour, it also had 
drawbacks, notably the enhancement of the difficulties 
caused by the inter-relatedness of technology. But these 
problems were not important as long as the market 
continued to expand. However when overseas producers 
entered the industry in the late nineteenth century, the 
rate of growth of demand for Lancashire textiles 
declined, and consequently the rate of growth of 
productivity in the industry was reduced. The 
disadvantages of specialization came increasingly to the 
forefront and Lancashire found itself ill-equipped for 
survival.
Supporters of the product cycle thesis would be 
unimpressed by cotton's demise. They would claim that 
the rise and decline of industries is to be expected. 
'Old' industries are relocated in low wage countries, 
while 'new' industries are established in the 
technologically advanced countries. Consequently, after 
1950 resources should have been transferred out of 
cotton textiles as quickly as possible. Sadly for 
Britain, this did not happen. In fact the absence of a 
speedy reduction and reallocation of the cotton 
industry's labour force was typical of the general 
structural rigidity of the British economy.
Cotton exemplified the British economy in decline. 
It exhibited all the symptoms of the 'hardening of the
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arteries' which has afflicted Britain so severely in 
recent years. The obvious conclusion is that markets do 
not work very well, at least in Britain. This would 
appear to leave Britain with no option but to implement 
the policies of Sir James Steuart and enter, at least 
for the time being, the regime of 'inland trade'.
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Chapter 2.
PLANNING FOR COTTON, 1945-1951.(1)
In consequence of chronic shortages of raw cotton 
and labour, over one-third of the capacity of the 
British cotton industry was closed by government order 
during World War Two. As the war progressed attention 
turned to postwar reconstruction and the avoidance of 
the problems of high unemployment, low productivity, and 
instability which had bedeviled the Lancashire in the 
1920s and 1930s. But when peace returned it became clear 
that there was an even more urgent consideration. 
Britain was unable to pay for essential imports, and 
cotton, traditionally a major export earner, was thrown 
into the breach.
In the late 1940s government propaganda stressed 
that 'Britain's bread hangs by Lancashire's thread'. The 
immediate priority was to increase production as quickly 
as possible. Although it proved impossible to attract 
sufficient labour into the industry to attain the level 
of output achieved before the war, cotton was still able 
to make a significant contribution to the easing of 
Britain's balance of payments difficulties.
Unfortunately, less progress was made towards the long 
term revitalization of the industry, and at the close of 
the 1940s doubts were emerging as to the viability of a 
major cotton industry in Lancashire.
This chapter provides . an overview of the cotton 
industry during the 1940s, with particular emphasis on 
government policy and on planning at the industry level.
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Section I examines the position of the industry during 
World War Two and considers the various plans for the 
revitalization of Lancashire textiles which were put 
forward in 1943 and 1944. Section II deals with the
policies of the Labour government for the long term 
development of cotton textile production. Section III is 
concerned with the problems peculiar to the latter, half 
of the 1940s, when the short term need to mobilize the
industry to meet the requirements of the balance of
payments crisis overrode the issue of long-term
development.
I
The 1920s and 1930s had been decades of almost
unmitigated disaster for Lancashire. Employment in 
cotton fell from 786,000 in 1912 to 485,000 in 1937, 
while exports of cotton cloth declined from 7075 million 
linear yards in 1913 to 1448 million in 1938.(2)
World War One hastened the transfer of the centre 
of the world's cotton textile industry from Britain to 
Asia. Shipping shortages led to the isolation of 
Lancashire from its main markets in India and China, 
giving encouragement to Japanese textile manufacturers 
and to the indigenous cotton industries of these
regions. After the armistice Lancashire experienced a 
brief boom, as consumers at home and abroad compensated 
for the austerity they had suffered during the war. In
the false expectation that the prevailing prosperity
would usher in a return to normality, Lancashire 
experienced an unprecedented degree of speculation and
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firms vied with one another to obtain large bank loans 
with which to launch take-over bids. Sadly the bubble 
burst in 1920 and firms were left with a crippling debt 
problem for the succeeding twenty years. In a period of 
general world recession and falling incomes for primary 
producing nations the demand for British cotton textiles 
declined. This problem was aggravated by^ the 
protectionist policies of India, Egypt, and China, all 
of which were anxious to aid the development of their
own cotton industries. Moreover the Japanese textile 
industry continued to forge ahead, undercutting 
Lancashire in all markets, even those where Imperial 
Preference was in force.
Lancashire appeared to have no answer. Prices of 
yarn and cloth fell, profits were eliminated, excess 
capacity was rife, and operatives were made redundant or 
put on short-time. Attempts were made to institute
minimum-price schemes, but these soon collapsed. The 
Bank of England assisted in the formation of large
combines such as the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, but 
they did not succeed in rationalizing the industry or in 
re-equipping. A Spindles Board was established in 1936 
to purchase and scrap redundant machinery, but its 
achievements did not live up to expectations. The only 
piece of good fortune experienced by the industry during 
the interwar year was the emergence of rayon. Cotton 
firms which were able to spin or weave some rayon 
managed to offset a portion of the losses incurred from 
us ing cotton.
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Lancashire placed great hopes in the 1939 Cotton 
Industry (Reorganisation) Act to rid it of its 
difficulties. This legislation made provision for the 
establishment of a Cotton Industry Board. Plans for 
price control, quota agreements, and schemes for 
disposing of redundant plant would be put to the Board 
by each section of the industry. Representatives of the 
employers and the unions would have seats on the Board, 
and if they and the Board of Trade approved of a scheme, 
it would be accorded statutory force.(3) War intervened 
to prevent the implementation of the 1939 Act, and in 
the event provided a more effective guarantor of stable 
prices and profits than any statutory peacetime scheme. 
A Cotton Control was established in November 1939 to 
regulate the industry’s war effort. Over the following 
three years the Cotton Controller Frank Platt, formerly 
chairman of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, gradually 
extended official jurisdiction over the industry.(4) 
Many mills were not working to full capacity during the 
early phases of the war, due to shortages of raw cotton 
and shipping and the drift of labour into armaments 
factories. In 1941 production was concentrated in a 
smaller number of fully employed mills, resulting in a 
reduction in overheads and the temporary closure of 38 
per cent of spinning mills and an equivalent proportion 
of weaving sheds. Operatives would be subject to the 
Essential Work Order, which prevented them from leaving 
their jobs without permission. By 1942 the Cotton 
Control fixed raw cotton prices, and spinning, weaving,
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and finishing margins, It also practised detailed 
production planning: every order for raw cotton, yarn, 
or cloth came before the Control for approval. Naturally 
priority was granted to military requirements. One firm 
at Bury began to produce specially prepared felts to 
cover aircraft fuel tanks and seal them when pierced by 
a bullet. The Fine Spinners and Doublers combing made 
inflatable decoy tanks and 20 million yards of floating 
rope for use by the navy and the R.A.F.(5)
A major problem confronting Lancashire during the 
early 1940s was that of preparing the cotton industry 
for a return to peacetime conditions. In July 1942 Hugh 
Dalton, the President of the Board of Trade, having 
secured the transfer of responsibility for the coal 
industry to the new Ministry of Fuel and Power, began to 
concentrate his thoughts on the future of the cotton 
industry.(6) Dalton worked very closely with Frank 
Platt, who was a staunch advocate of rationalization. 
Platt's views were outlined in a confidential paper:
'Whither the Cotton Industry'. According to Platt, 
spinning was the key to the industry's future and ought 
to be the first section to be reorganized. A central 
agency would be established by legislation. This
authority would attempt to reorganize the section by 
persuasion, but would have powers of compulsion in 
reserve. All firms involved in cotton spinning
(including vertically integrated concerns) would be 
grouped into units of at least two million spindles.
Each combine would close one third of its mills to
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assist in the elimination of excess capacity. The 
central agency would have powers to raise a levy on the 
industry to finance the scrapping of redundant machinery 
and the operation of a price maintenance scheme. Funds 
would also be made available to subsidize re-equipment. 
The new spinning combines would exert an informal 
control over the more atomistic weaving section.. Long 
runs of production would be encouraged, enabling lower
prices to be quoted for export. Platt's objective was 
the creation of a highly concentrated industry 
controlled by a handful of managing directors.(7)
Dalton was very impressed by Platt's approach to 
Lancashire's problems, and in September 1943 advocated
the establishment of a powerful Spinning Board in a 
paper for his ministerial colleagues. Dalton hoped that 
this authority, which would consist of representatives 
of the unions and the employers, would be chaired by
Platt. The Board would be the sole purchaser of raw
cotton from the Cotton Control and the sole supplier of 
yarn to the weaving section. Consequently it would 
possess de facto control over the spinning industry. The 
Spinning Board would administer a fund to assist 
re-equipment and have the power to force amalgamations. 
Although Dalton was supported by Ernest Bevin, the 
Minister of Labour, he could not persuade the government 
to adopt his plan.(8)
While Dalton and Platt were drawing up their own 
personal schemes for the industry, discussion was 
progressing on a wider front. In 1943 the United Textile
Factory Workers Association (U.T.F.W.A.), a body 
representing all the cotton unions, produced a 
comprehensive programme for the reorganization and 
modernization of the industry.(9) Mr. A.C.C. Robertson 
of the Oldham Cardroom Workers, who later became 
notorious as one of the most obstructive union officials 
in the industry, chaired the committee which produced 
the report. The trade unions maintained "that the way to 
meet foreign competition, satisfy the aspirations of the 
workers to a better life, and make the industry a
national asset, is by the Socialisation of the
Industry”.(10) A General Board would be appointed by the 
President of the Board of Trade, in consultation with 
the unions and the administrative staff, to exercise 
overall control of the industry. Cotton would continue 
to be run on sectional lines, with "Sub Controls' for 
the spinning, weaving, finishing, marketing, and raw 
cotton sections. The General Board would close 
inefficient mills, re-equip the industry, provide 
security of employment, and institute efficient 
marketing procedures. But little urgency was attached to 
socialisation, and the U.T.F.W.A. was content to 
advocate the continuation of wartime controls for a
substantial period after the end of the war. The cotton
unions' commitment to public control of the industry had 
never been particularly strong even during the 1920s and 
1930s.(11) The most novel aspect of the U.T.F.W.A.'s 
programme was its advocacy of an International Board of 
Control for Textiles. This organization would share out
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the world market between the various cotton textile 
producing nations, preventing the re-emergence of the 
cut-throat competition of the prewar decades. Prices 
would also be controlled by the International Board. As 
the Allies were in command of the major cotton growing 
regions of the world, the Japanese could be denied raw 
material supplies if they refused to conduct^their 
trading along fair lines.(12) This was certainly an 
imaginative, if not a particularly practicable, 
proposal.
Greater significance should be attached to the 
findings of the 1943 Cotton Board Committee to Enquire 
into Post-war Problems.(13) The Cotton Board, which 
comprised employers and operatives, had been established 
in 1940 to co-ordinate the export drive and engage in 
discussion and research which would assist the long term 
development of the industry. Dalton asked the Cotton 
Board to produce a report dealing with investment 
requirements, the introduction of new products, and the 
attainment of full employment. Sir Raymond Streat, 
chairman of the Cotton Board, worked tirelessly to 
secure a unanimous report. It was agreed that cotton 
would remain a vital sector of the British economy in 
the immediate postwar period. The nation would be too 
poor "to accept any avoidable contraction of an industry 
capable of sustaining many hundreds of thousands of 
workers and contributing most substantially to the 
export trade".(14) Lancashire's long-term prospects were 
less certain. The Committee believed that excess
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capacity would reappear if countries with low labour 
costs were allowed a free rein in the industry's major 
export markets. British cotton textile producers did not 
seek special investment subsidies from the state and had 
plans to re-equip their mills to the value of £43 
million (at 1939 prices), but they would not implement 
their modernization schemes without assurances from the 
government that prewar conditions would not be allowed 
to return. In short, the Committee called upon the 
government to restore confidence in the cotton industry 
by safeguarding Lancashire's remaining export markets in 
Africa and Australasia from Japanese competition. This 
would have involved further manipulation of the Imperial 
Preference system to Lancashire's advantage, and action 
by the Allies to restrict the postwar development of the 
Japanese cotton industry. As will be seen, the British 
government was reluctant to take action on either front. 
The Committee also recommended an international 
agreement to stabilize raw cotton prices; a tripartite 
arrangement between the cotton industry, the government, 
and the textile machinery industry to secure adequate 
supplies of new looms and ring frames; and the 
continuation of price management in the cotton and rayon 
industries, under the auspices of a strengthened Cotton 
Board, to prevent a return to weak selling. The report 
was quite comprehensive and clear in its emphasis on the 
need for speedy government action to guarantee the 
industry's future.
The Cotton Board report drew a very cautious
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response from the Board of Trade. In February 1944 
Streat met Dalton for an unofficial discussion of the 
document, which the latter claimed to have read seven 
times. Dalton and his officials, including Sir Arnold 
Overton, were unsympathetic towards any form of postwar 
price maintenance, which they claimed would be difficult 
to supervise, a disincentive to efficiency, apd an 
encouragement to other industries to seek similar
provisions. The Board of Trade was strongly in favour of 
amalgamations as an alternative method of ensuring 
stability in the industry, but would not say whether 
these were to be compulsory. Mention of amalgamations
was omitted from the Cotton Board report in deference to 
the employers, who regarded amalgamation drives, whether 
voluntary or compulsory, as a prelude to 
nationalization.(15) Dalton was also unwilling to commit 
the government to trade negotiations to regulate the
future world market for textiles.(16) A few days later 
Streat saw Keynes who, although more sympathetic to the 
idea of price maintenance than Dalton, regarded 
amalgamations as essential to "'push the bone-heads 
out'".(17) Bevin had little respect for Lancashire's 
capitalists and strongly urged Dalton to adopt a policy 
of compulsory amalgamations.(18) In view of the
government's hostile response, Streat advised the Cotton 
Board to drop the issue of price maintenance.(19)
Cotton's future did not evoke universal interest 
among the government, and in July 1944 Dalton informed 
Streat that several ministers thought that "'the best
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thing would be to let Lancashire stew in her own
juice'".(20) Throughout the summer of 1944 conflict
raged between Dalton, Bevin, and Platt on the one hand,
and Streat and the employers on the other hand. Talks
between the cotton industry and the textile machinery
manufacturers were one of the few positive moves taken
towards the implementation of the Cotton Board's
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recommendations. Dalton's main concession was a promise 
to weaving manufacturers that the government would 
attempt to secure the reduction of foreign import 
restrictions against British cloth.(21) Although Cabinet 
rejected a proposal from the Dalton camp to institute a 
scheme for compulsory spinning amalgamations in 
September 1944, this issue reappeared under the 
following Labour administration.(22) Dalton's anger with 
Lancashire's opposition to his amalgamation schemes 
steadily increased, and in May 1945 he taunted Streat 
with the following gibe: “'There, at the bottom of the 
class sit those two loutish dunces, Cotton and 
Coal'".(23)
A Labour government was returned at the general 
election in July 1945, but the cotton industry was no 
closer to having a clear strategy for the future than it 
had been in 1943. Virtually no progress had been made 
towards the articulation of workable policies to deal 
with re-equipment, the recruitment of an adequate supply 
of labour, the adjustment of the industry's structure, 
or the stabilization of markets at home and abroad. 
Eighteen months had been wasted in arguments about
50
whether the government should force the industry, 
against its will, to amalgamate into larger units. This 
was clearly a significant issue, but not one which 
justified the neglect of other important considerations.
II
Sir Stafford Cripps replaced Oliver Lyttleton (the 
caretaker President of the Board of Tradej and 
immediately set to work on a strategy for the cotton 
industry. Cripps, unlike Dalton, was eager to reassure 
the employers that he had no intention of nationalizing 
the cotton industry during Labour's first term of 
office. He believed that without such an assurance the 
employers would be reluctant to invest or to reform 
their labour policies. However, his Cabinet colleagues 
disagreed with this conciliatory approach. They 
concluded that the government should reserve the right 
to nationalize the spinning section if the employers 
proved unwilling to co-operate with the Board of Trade's 
plans. In essence, the difference between Cripps and 
other Cabinet members was largely over the best tactics 
to employ to reap the maximum return from the 
employers.(24)
Without further delay Cripps travelled to 
Manchester to meet representatives of the unions, the 
employers, and the Cotton Board. It was stressed that: 
"The Government are prepared to assist the industry to 
the best of their ability, provided that it is clear 
that the national interest of producing as great a 
volume of goods as possible at a reasonable price, and
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with good working conditions for the operatives, takes 
precedence over all other considerations."(25) Radical 
reforms would be necessary, including re-equipment, 
amalgamation, shift-working, and the extension of 
procedures for joint consultation. Government help for 
the industry depended on both sides accepting the need 
for changes and their participation in a commission (the 
Evershed Commission) to modernize the spinning section's 
archaic staffing arrangements and wage structure. The 
wages commission was readily agreed to and its 
recommendations, which involved a general increase in 
earnings and workloads, were implemented in the late 
1940s.(26)
During 1945 and 1946 Cripps commissioned Tripartite 
Working Parties to make recommendations for the 
development of seventeen industries including cotton. 
These Working Parties were appointed by the President of 
the Board of Trade and consisted of independent members 
plus representatives of the employers and the 
operatives. Cripps envisaged that a tripartite 
Development Council would be created in each industry to 
oversee the implementation of the relevant Working 
Party's recommendations, and to conduct joint 
consultations at a national level. In the case of cotton 
this would involve expanding the role and authority of 
the wartime Cotton Board. (27) Cripps put his proposals 
for a Cotton Working Party to the various sections of 
the industry in September 1945. The response, at least 
from the employers, was decidedly frosty. Sir John Grey
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leader of the Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' 
Association (C.S.M.A. ), the major weaving employers' 
federation, thought that a Cotton Working Party was
unnecessary. Cotton had done more than any other 
industry to institute procedures for involving the
unions in joint decision making, through the Joint 
Committee of Cotton Trade Organizations and the existing 
Cotton Board. A Working Party would be positively 
damaging to the industry's morale, as its creation would 
imply a lack of confidence in Lancashire by the
Government.(28) The spinning employers were even more 
reluctant to co-operate with the Working Party.(29) 
There was a widespread fear in employers' circles that 
the Working Party would be the first step in a gradual 
tightening of government powers over the industry, 
possibly as a prelude to nationalization. Sir Raymond 
Streat summed up many peoples' thoughts when he remarked 
that: "As to Cotton, I said we had had committees ad
nauseam, and all that could be said had been said. . .a 
new 'Commission' would appal the Cotton folk. They
wanted decisions, not new machinery for reaching 
decisions".(30) Such criticisms were probably justified. 
No formal reply had been received from the government to 
the report of the Cotton Board Committee to Enquire into 
Post-War Problems. It must have appeared to Streat as 
though the government was merely toying with the 
industry. He must have wondered whether the government 
was genuinely concerned about Lancashire, or whether it 
merely wanted to use the Working Party as a delaying
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tactic to mask its indifference.
Eventually the employers gave their reluctant
assent to the establishment of a Working Party. Cripps
wished to appoint a trade unionist to the chair of the
Working Party, but he conceded ground to the employers
by appointing Sir George Schuster, an independent with
no financial interest in cotton. The Working „ Party
reported in May 1946 and, hardly surprisingly, concluded
that cotton still had a major role to play in the
economy. Private enterprise would continue to run the
industry, but:
"There must be a concerted programme [for 
reviving the industry] and a recognition that 
the national interest is involved in a manner 
which, while it may justify a claim for 
special action by the Government, also puts 
upon all individual interests in the industry 
an obligation to collaborate in a joint effort 
to secure the maximum benefit for the industry 
as a whole".(31)
Unanimous agreement was reached on a number of 
points: a survey of existing plant to estimate the 
industry’s requirements for new machinery, an orderly 
programme for the supply of textile machinery, 
experimentation with new methods of labour utilization, 
the introduction of uniform costing procedures, the 
establishment of a co-operative marketing enterprize, 
the extension of technical research, the improvement of 
managerial quality, and the institution of a ’Cotton 
Council’ (i.e. an enlarged Cotton Board) to co-ordinate 
these policies. The government was pleased to learn that 
there was little support in the Working Party for price 
maintenance.
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However, the Working Party was split on several 
important issues, including amalgamations, the scrapping 
of redundant machinery, and the provision of 
re-equipment subsidies. Schuster, the trade unionists, 
and a lone employer were in favour of a substantial 
degree of centralization. They agreed with Frank Platt's 
recommendations of 1943-4, namely that mills should 
combine into larger groupings, putting control of the 
industry into fewer hands, and facilitating the 
pursuance of concerted policies. Larger combines, unlike 
small family firms, would have no incentive to preserve 
marginal units in production. To assist the spinning 
section to replace its mules with ring frames, a 
re-equipment subsidy would be offered, financed by a 
levy on all spinning mills. New investment would raise 
the possibility of the re-emergence of excess capacity. 
Consequently a scheme, partly financed by the exchequer, 
would be devised for the purchase and scrapping of old 
mills and spindles.(32)
John Jewkes of Manchester University, two other 
independents, and three employers appended a 'Dissenting 
Memorandum' to the report. Jewkes was a firm believer in 
the efficacy of the market and saw no need for 
redundancy schemes or re-equipment subsidies. The market 
would ensure that the industry remained at the optimum 
size and that an optimum level of investment would be 
generated. Unwanted combinations of mills would only 
encourage the abuses attendant upon an oligopolistic 
market structure. "In a socialised industry there is one
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form of incentive; under free enterprise there is 
another. But there is little incentive to be found 
either in monopolistic capitalism or in free enterprise 
fussily fettered by the state".(33)
While the Cotton Working Party was squabbling over 
these issues, Sir Stafford Cripps was in India taking 
part in the negotiations leading up to independence. 
Cripps received a series of frantic telegrams from the 
Board of Trade: "Dissension on the Schuster Working
Party has created an exceedingly awkward situation in 
Lancashire and unless matters are carefully handled 
suspicion and mistrust between the employers and 
operatives will spread over all sections of the industry 
to hamper progress in the next two or three years".(34). 
The affair was complicated by Schuster’s lack of clarity 
over amalgamation. Compulsion was implied rather than 
explicitly recommended. In view of Streat’s hostility to 
the principle of compulsory amalgamation, the Board of 
Trade was uncertain whether it would be wise to proceed 
along compulsory lines.(35)
G.C. Allen provided the most favourable assessment 
of the Working Party’s achievements. He stressed the 
Working Party’s successes, and was not too dismayed at 
its failure to agree in the impossible task of 
identifying the most beneficial division of functions 
between private and collective action.(36) A more 
jaundiced analysis might conclude that the Labour Party 
had wasted a further year in idle debate. No radically 
new ideas had emerged from the Working Party, indeed
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none had been expected. The main accomplishment of the 
Working Party had been to reopen old divisions between 
the employers and the operatives.
Cripps left it to Streat to secure the industry's 
assent to the broad principles of the Working Party 
Report. A restless meeting of the industry's leaders at 
Manchester on 5 June agreed that the Working Party 
Report should be the basis of future negotiations with 
the government; that the Cotton Board should begin to 
frame detailed proposals for the implementation of the 
non-controversial aspects of the report; that surveys of 
existing plant and the state of the textile machinery 
industry should immediately commence; and that all trade 
organizations should begin talks on the more contentious 
parts of the report.(37) Work soon began on the surveys 
of existing machinery and the investigation into the 
condition of the textile engineering industry.(38) In 
November 1946 George Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, 
persuaded the employers and operatives in the weaving 
section to co-operate in a commission to devise a new 
wage structure, based on work study techniques, which 
eventually led to increased earnings and larger loom 
complements.(39) Steps were taken to implement the 
Working Party's recommendation that a central factory 
should be chosen to conduct experiments into new methods 
of labour utilization, and between January and July 1947 
extensive tests were carried out at a spinning mill in 
Bolton.(40)
However, the government was more concerned about
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the wider issues of reorganization and re-equipment. In
September 1946 Cripps told Streat that he intended to
introduce legislation directly to subsidize investment
in the spinning section. He hoped that this would arouse
less controversy among the spinning employers than a
scheme financed by a levy on the industry. Firms
requiring a re-equipment subsidy would make their
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application through the Cotton Board, which would advise 
the Board of Trade on the distribution of the grants. 
Streat feared that Cripps intended to place the Cotton 
Board in a position where it, rather than the 
Government, would receive all the blame if the scheme 
was unsuccessful.(41) Details of the scheme leaked out 
over the following couple of months. Firms wishing to 
take advantage of the 25 per cent re-equipment subsidy 
would have to combine into groups of 500,000 spindles 
(this was later reduced to 250,000, although even this 
was not a rigid figure); the unions would have to agree 
to the principle of shift working in re-equipped mills; 
and the employers would have to show that they were 
willing to scrap some of their older mills. There was a 
considerable degree of suspicion towards the proposed 
subsidy among the employers, who vehemently opposed the 
clause forcing firms to amalgamate or form close 
groupings before they could qualify for assistance, and 
from certain sections of the unions (especially the 
Cardroom Workers) who were reluctant to agree to 
shift-working.(42) Cripps was dismayed by the industry's 
initial response to his plans. Having resolved not to
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impose compulsory amalgamations upon the spinning 
industry, and not to force firms to pay a re-equipment 
levy, he believed that the government had produced an 
attractive scheme. He blamed the conservatism of many 
employers' leaders and the difficulty of obtaining 
agreement among the multitude of small unions for the 
industry's failure to to respond more positively to the 
government's offer.(43) Eventually Cripps's proposals 
were reluctantly accepted and came into operation under 
the 1948 Cotton Industry (Re-equipment Subsidy) Act. But 
due to a combination of factors, including continuing 
hostility to the grouping regulations, and the 
complacency accompanying a period of high world demand 
for cotton textiles, only eight new groupings were 
formed and only £2.6 million of the total of £12 million 
available in subsidies was claimed.(44)
The abject failure of the Labour's plans for the 
re-organization and revitalization of the cotton 
industry during the mid 1940s can hardly be denied. 
Cripps was unable to construct a generally acceptable 
policy for reforming the industry. Platt's ambitious 
plans for the concentration of power into the hands of a 
dozen or so public-spirited directors, and the Board of 
Trade Working Party's proposals for a large-scale 
modernization programme, had been reduced to the rather 
modest proportions of the 1948 re-equipment subsidy. In 
a moment of despondency Cripps mused that 
nationalization might have been a better solution to the 
industry's problems after all, but that it was too late
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(March 1947) to change course. He could not hide his 
contempt for "ridiculous fools" like A.C.C. Robertson of 
the Cardroom Workers and H.S. Butterworth of the 
Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Associations 
(F.M.C.S.A.), who jointly and religiously opposed any 
attempt to bring the industry up to date. He concluded 
that: "Lancashire must take the consequences of putting 
such men in office".(45)
III
The question of the long term regeneration and 
development of the cotton industry was not the only 
pressing problem facing the cotton industry in 1945. 
Lancashire"s short-term contribution to national 
recovery, and in particular the balance of payments, was 
possibly of even greater immmediate significance.
World War Two had left Britain heavily indebted. 
The termination of the Lend-Lease scheme in August 1945 
further increased the pressure on sterling. A rapid 
recovery in exports of manufactured goods was essential 
to permit Britain to pay for vital imports of food and 
raw materials, meet overseas military obligations, and 
service its mountainous debts. Cotton's potential role 
in this struggle had long been recognised, both in the 
report of the Cotton Board Committee to Enquire into 
Post-War Problems and also in government circles. In 
February 1944 Keynes was beginning to regard cotton as 
the spearhead of postwar export drive. Wartime losses 
had crippled Lancashire's overseas competitors: "'Who
will export cotton goods if Britain does not?'", Keynes
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told Streat, "'Who [sic] are you supposing will do the 
export trade - Japan, America, who?'".(46) The supply of 
labour was expected to be the main constraint on the 
expansion of British cotton textile production. Speaking 
at an exhibition of textiles in Manchester in January 
1944 Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, confronted the 
industry's leaders with this crucial problem:
"'I realise that you have lost from the 
cotton industry during the war 175,000 
operatives, and the more I think of it the 
more it gives me a headache as to how I am 
going to get them back. Well, it is quite 
clear that the younger generation and the 
people coming back from the modern [munitions] 
factory won't be content with the cotton mill 
they left'".(47)
Table 2.1 illustrates Lancashire's position at the 
end of World War Two. Between 1937 and 1945 the 
production of yarn and cloth in the cotton and allied 
textiles industry had halved. Exports had collapsed to 
an even greater extent. Employment was significantly 
reduced and the proportion of the industry's productive 
capacity that was active fallen from 89 per cent in 1937 
to 44 per cent in 1945 (in the case of spinning). If the 
problem of attracting labour back into cotton could be 
overcome, there was great scope for a rapid increase in 
production and in exports from Lancashire, and for 
cotton to play a crucial role in the government's plans 
for recovery.
Deconcentration, i.e. the reopening of mills closed 
under wartime regulations, commenced in March 1945. By 
the end of October 1946 the Cotton Control had given 
permission for the reopening of 129 of the 189 closed
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Table 2.1.
The British cotton and allied textiles industry,
1937-50.
(1) Spinning section (excluding waste spinning
doubling)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
SPINDLES
YARN EMPLOY­ IN PLACE RUNNING
OUTPUT MENT (ALL MILLS) SPINDLES
(M lbs) (M mule equivalent sp
1937 1253 176,000 44. 1 39.3
1945 625 71,700 39.0 17. 0
1946 697 82,610 38. 2 20. 4
1947 704 87,380 37. 3 21.8
1948 863 99,110 36. 1 25. 1
1949 887 103,420 35. 0 26.8
1950 944 106,990 34. 5 27. 5
(e)











CLOTH CLOTH EMPLO- 
OUTPUT EXPORTS -YMENT 















1937 4124 1429* 187,000 . , , . , .
1945 1847 517 96,020 300. 0 215. 9 72
1946 1974 626 101,000 324. 6 208. 4 64
1947 2012 643 108,600 363. 6 224. 0 62
1948 2440 916 121,270 363. 5 252. 4 69
1949 2592 1084 129,800 356. 9 268. 3 75
1950 2971 1020 137,080 357. 7 281. 4 79
*1938.
N.B. Yarn production and exports include spun rayon and 
mixtures yarn; cloth production and exports include 
mixtures and man-made fibres cloth. One ring spindle is 
equivalent to approximately 1.5 mule spindles.
Sources: Annual Abstract of Statistics: Board of Trade 
Journal. 152 (1946), p. 28; E. Hopwood, A History of the 
Lancashire Cotton Industry and the Amalgamated Weavers * 
Association (Manchester: A.W.A., 1969), pp. 191, 6; R.W. 
Lacey, "Cotton's War Effort", Manchester School, XV 
(1947), pp. 56-7; C.B.Q.S.R^.
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spinning mills.(48) However the process of 
deconcentration was not accomplished as smoothly as the 
government had hoped. In January 1946 the. management of 
Asia Mill complained that they were only producing at 68 
per cent of capacity because their operatives were 
leaving to enter mills reopening under the 
deconcentration scheme.(49) The case of Asia Mill was 
not untypical: in practice deconcentration meant little 
more than reshuffling the existing labour force, as it 
was proving extremely difficult to persuade youngsters 
and munitions workers to enter the mills. A shortage of 
labour persisted throughout the 1940s, despite attempts 
by the government to initiate reforms of the cotton 
industry's wage structure, through the Evershed and 
Cotton Manufacturing Commissions, and to shame firms 
into improving working conditions in their mills. The 
industry's particular concern was the shortage of women 
operatives. This was not surprising in view of the fact 
that the wages of female textile workers had fallen from 
96 per cent of average female industrial earnings in 
1938 to 79 per cent in 1944.(50) Although women textile 
workers improved their relative position in the later 
1940s, surpassing the average for female industrial 
workers in 1948, many women munitions workers had been 
permanently dissuaded from returning to their old jobs.
The state retained a fairly tight control over the 
activities of cotton textile producers during the latter 
half of the 1940s. Although detailed production planning 
was abolished in December 1945, most of the other
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controls continued in force. The allocation of raw 
cotton to firms remained in the hands of the Cotton 
Control and its successor the Raw Cotton Commission. 
Export licensing persisted, enabling the government to 
control the destination of cloth and yarn produced for 
export. The regulation of prices and margins at each 
stage of production continued for some considerable
to
time. Clothes rationing remained in force and the 
Utility Clothing scheme attempted to ensure that 
sufficient quantities of standard cloths for home 
consumption were supplied.(51) These controls were 
defended by the government on several grounds. Prices 
were regulated to limit increases in the cost of living. 
Export licensing and the maintenance of controls over 
raw cotton allocations enabled the government to 
determine the proportion of the industry's output 
destined for overseas markets. A delicate balance had to 
be struck between the exigencies of the dollar crisis 
and the government's need to preserve its domestic 
popularity by maintaining the clothing ration. A final 
objective of policy was "salvage work abroad - to supply 
cotton goods to the colonial territories where they were 
desperately needed to give people something to work for, 
to check inflation and to hold the social system
together."(52)
Regulation of the supply of raw cotton was central 
to the government's short-term strategy. Each quarter 
the government Raw Materials Committee decided how the 
output of yarn should be shared between cloth for home
use, cloth for export, and supplies for the hosiery
trade. Firms would tell the government what orders they
hoped to produce, then apply to the Cotton Control for
an allocation of raw cotton. A supply of raw cotton
would be forthcoming if the firm's plans accorded with
the state's overall priorities for the quarter. Raw
cotton prices were fixed by the Cotton Control to
*
provide spinning and weaving firms with a certain amount 
of stability in their costs.(53) During the war there 
was little opposition to this system, but once peace 
returned the question of the propriety of reopening the 
Liverpool raw cotton market emerged. The trade unions 
and the Labour Party were adamant that there must be no 
return to the unregulated speculation of the Liverpool 
Exchange. Cripps added that the balance of payments 
situation necessitated the rationing of dollars and made 
it impracticable to have a free market in raw cotton. He 
moved a bill for the establishment of a Raw Cotton 
Commission (R.C.C.) to take over the monopoly powers of 
the Cotton Control in relation to the supply of raw 
cotton.(54) Despite the vigorous opposition of the 
Liverpool interest and its allies among the spinning 
employers (55), the R.C.C. came into being on 1 Jan. 
1948. It attempted, with varying degrees of success, to 
conclude long-term agreements for the supply of raw 
cotton with colonial governments in Nigeria, Uganda, the 
Sudan, and the West Indies, with the ultimate objective 
of reducing Lancashire's reliance on the United 
States.(56) But the R.C.C. was judged by its ability to
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supply the spinning mills of south Lancashire with good 
quality cotton at a reasonable price. Accusations of 
incompetence on the part of the Commission's officials 
filled the press. The Manchester Guardian reported that 
although the R.C.C. insulated Lancashire from short-term 
fluctuations in raw cotton prices, its policies led to 
disconcertingly large jumps in prices from time to 
time.(57) Mr. R.H. Smith of Manchester Mill, Preston 
complained that it was impossible to obtain yarn of a 
consistent quality under the new regime and that: "the 
present system of bulk cotton buying imposes on 
Lancashire a handicap which, onerous now, may become 
fatal to its competitive position as soon as the 
sellers' market has entirely passed away".(58) Even Hugh 
Dalton questioned, in retrospect, the decision to 
establish a Raw Cotton Commission: "It lost money and 
failed to bring the steady prices we had promised. If 
Platt had still been in charge, and in his prime, it 
would, I am sure, have been a very different story. But 
as things were, the Tories scrapped it later and I could 
hardly blame them".(59) Most of these criticisms were 
unfair. The difficulties of the R.C.C. primarily stemmed 
from the shortage of dollars, which prevented it from 
obtaining the quality and quantity of cotton demanded in 
Lancashire. It is doubtful whether any method of raw 
cotton dealing, whether private or public, could have 
been a success under such a constraint.
Export licensing formed the second strand of the 
government's policy. Markets were divided into three
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categories. Group ’ A’ consisted of hard currency areas, 
notably the United States, Canada, Argentina, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Iran, and Portugal. Canada was in 
the unique position of being the only major country for 
which an actual export target was specified. This 
reflected Canada’s importance as a supplier of dollars 
and the significance that the government attached to 
regaining the Canadian market from U.S. competition. 
Priority, in raw cotton and yarn supplies, would be 
given to firms wanting to export to these markets. Group 
’B J consisted of the Commonwealth (excluding Canada). 
Group ’C’ comprised the rest of the world.(60) The small 
colonies, including East Africa, Malta, Cyprus, etc. 
received specially guaranteed allocations of cloth to 
fulfil the government’s objective of maintaining 
stability in those regions.(61)
In 1949 three quarters of cotton and rayon cloth 
woven in British mills for domestic consumption was 
produced under the Utility clothing scheme.(62) This 
scheme had been introduced in September 1941 to ensure 
adequate supplies of cheap standard textiles for 
domestic consumption during the war. As a weapon in the 
campaign to keep down the cost of living, the prices of 
Utility cloths were strictly controlled. Moreover 
Utility fabrics had to be woven to precise 
specifications to guarantee the maintenance of a product 
of reliable quality. Production of Utility cloth was 
encouraged by its exemption from Purchase Tax. When the 
war ended it was deemed beneficial to continue the
Utility scheme, as the public had welcomed its guarantee
of quality, and the manufacture of standard Utility
cloths had enabled textile firms to reap the economies
of long runs of production. However it did not prove
possible to preserve all the advantages of the scheme.
Originally there had been only 40 official Utility
cloths, including Utility woollen cloths, but firms soon
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petitioned for the number of designated cloths to be 
increased, so that they could exploit the exemption of 
Utility products from Purchase Tax. By 1951 there were 
over 1000 non-woollen cloths included in the Utility 
scheme. With so many different varieties of fabric it 
became impossible to police the Utility scheme. Firms 
were able to debase the quality of their cloth without 
detection, while charging the price for a higher quality 
product. Consequently the Utility scheme lost a good 
deal of public credibility. In 1952 the Conservative 
government decided that it would be scrapped, having 
come to regard Utility specifications as little more 
than a license to avoid Purchase Tax.(63)
Price controls on cotton textiles were only 
gradually relaxed after the end of World War Two. In a 
situation of excess demand in the British economy it was 
considered wise to use any expedient to prevent prices 
rising. It was the constant complaint of the employers 
that the government allowed prices to lag behind 
increases in production costs. For instance during 1947, 
in an attempt to strengthen the employers' resolve 
against wage claims, the government permitted prices to
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rise by only 80 per cent of any increase in costs.(64) 
There were widespread claims that the government's 
pricing regime distorted production plans. Initially, a 
situation prevailed in which strict control was 
exercised over the prices of non-Utility cloth for home 
consumption and of cloth for export, while the 
production of Utility cloth was made attractive by its 
exemption from Purchase Tax. This encouraged firms to 
concentrate on Utility production, to the detriment of 
the weaving of export cloths and of experimentation with 
new types of product in the home market. Price controls 
and the Utility scheme worked to thwart the government's 
measures designed to increase the quantity of exports. 
Fortunately the folly of this position was eventually 
realised, and in June 1948 the price of grey cloth for 
export was freed from control, ensuring a rise in export 
prices relative to Utility prices.(65) In February 1949 
the price of cloth destined for industrial and 
governmental use was released from control, and in April 
1949 the Board of Trade announced the abolition of all 
controls over spinning, weaving, and finishing prices in 
the non-Utility section of the cotton industry.(66)
Controls over the cotton industry were very much of 
a mixed blessing during the latter half of the 1940s. 
The bulk buying of raw cotton was not as successful as 
its proponents had anticipated, while the government's 
Utility and export programmes were plainly 
contradictory. It is against this background that the 
export drive of 1947-9 will be considered.
Throughout 1945, 1946, and 1947 the balance of
payments crisis deepened. Between 30 June 1946 and 30 
June 1947 the total amount of credit available to 
Britain in the U.S. and Canada, together with the gold 
and dollar reserves, declined from $7080 million to
$4660 million.(67) During 1946 the coal industry had 
borne the main burden of the nation's export drive, but 
in 1947 and 1948 the government turned to cotton for 
even greater exertions. In Sep. 1947 Cripps outlined 
cotton's role in the: "front line of a battle for the 
balance of payments" to a special meeting of textile
representatives in Manchester.(68) It was essential, 
Cripps thought, that cotton textile production should 
immediately increase by ten per cent, and by a further 
ten per cent by Easter 1948. These targets would require 
a speedy improvement in the utilization of the labour
force, overtime working, and an increase in the 
workforce. The first target of a ten per cent increase 
in production was achieved in November 1947, largely as 
a result of an improvement in recruitment and the influx 
of a small group of European Volunteer Workers.(69) It 
proved far more difficult to meet the second target, 
although this was eventually achieved. Operatives in 
both spinning and weaving were highly reluctant to work 
overtime and consequently disrupted the government's 
plans. Cripps blamed Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, for 
this problem. Isaacs had not given serious attention to 
the overtime question, and left negotiations with the 
operatives to junior and regional officials, instead of
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using his personal influence over old friends in the 
cotton trade unions.(70)
The new year brought a fresh crisis. Shortages of 
steel and overseas import controls were threatening to 
prevent the attainment of the government's export 
targets for engineering and related products. A Cabinet 
Production Committee Working Party on Textile Exports 
suggested that increased targets for exports of cotton 
textiles would enable the government to achieve its 
overall target for 1948. The Working Party maintained 
that the present world demand for cotton textiles was 
insatiable. Moreover Canada had decided to help
Lancashire by restricting its imports of U.S. textiles. 
Cotton textile exports could be increased by reducing 
the domestic clothing ration (from four coupons to
three, which would free 22,000 tons of cloth for 
export), by further overtime, and by measures to
restrict employment in industries, such as local 
government, chemicals and clothing, which competed with 
cotton for labour.(71) Cripps successfully advocated an 
increase in cotton textile export targets in Cabinet. 
The monthly target for piece goods exports, to be
achieved by December 1948, was increased from 69 per 
cent of the 1938 level to 79 per cent. It was resolved 
to step up the production campaign, and a committee of 
junior ministers was established to consider means of 
overcoming the labour shortage. However the more 
extravagant proposals of the Working Party were not
implemented: there was no attempt to restrict
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alternative employment in Lancashire and the clothing 
ration remained at four coupons. In 1947 the ration had 
been cut from four and a half coupons to three and it 
was deemed undesirable to recreate the ensuing 
ill-feeling.(72)
At a press conference in March 1948 Harold Wilson, 
the new President of the Board of Trade, said that 35 
per cent of cloth production would be exported. Firms 
applying for export licenses were being told to 
concentrate on hard currency areas, particularly Canada. 
Wilson stressed that two thirds of the bread ration, 
over half of the bacon ration, and one quarter of the 
cheese ration was Canadian produce. These purchases 
could not be maintained unless exports to Canada 
increased.(73) Much progress was made towards fulfilling 
these targets. Cloth exports to Canada increased 
sevenfold between 1947 and mid 1948, and the spinning 
section fell short of its 1948 production target of 900 
million pounds of yarn by a mere half a week’s 
output.(74) But despite these achievements 30 per cent 
of the industry’s spindleage remained idle and output of 
both yarn and cloth was far below the prewar level. 
Targets for exports and production may well have been 
met but, as it was proving impossible to attract labour 
into the industry, the government could set only fairly 
modest targets.(75)
Once a target had been established the government 
proceeded to make the necessary raw cotton available, 
assisted the industry to recruit more labour, and
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attempted to secure agreement between the operatives and 
employers on overtime and evening-shift working. The 
government was not in a position to force its targets 
upon the employers, but this made no difference. In an 
industry with plenty of idle capacity it was in firms’ 
interests to increase their production and thereby reap 
higher profits. Some critics said that people were being 
expected to do too much. Sir Raymond Streat complained 
about the diversion of textiles from the home market, 
while Andrew Naesmith, general secretary of the 
Amalgamated Weavers, thought that cotton workers should 
receive increased clothing rations if they were to be 
expected to lead the export drive.(76) Undaunted, the 
government persisted through 1948 and 1949 with its 
production and austerity campaign. Cinema programmes in 
Lancashire were interrupted by films exhorting the
operatives to greater efforts. Workers were lectured 
during their mealbreaks on the need for increased
exports. In Darwen, Nelson, Heywood, and Eccles the 
operatives were specially privileged, being chosen to 
participate in local production drives. Slogans were 
plastered on factory walls. Each mill had its own
production target and at Nelson a ’Nelson’s Column’ was 
erected in the town centre. This edifice was floodlit at 
night and indicated the progress made towards reaching 
the town’s target.(77) People soon tired of these 
techniques and they only succeeded in securing temporary 
increases in production.
Table 2.1 shows that the production and export of
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cotton textiles increased substantially between 1945 and 
1950, although the prewar levels of output and exports 
were not regained. Modest targets were set and attained. 
Home consumption of cotton textiles was restricted to 
make more available for export. Raw cotton allocations 
and export licensing ensured that exporters concentrated 
on hard currency markets. Cotton made a significant 
contribution to the export drive in the 1940s, and could 
have done more, had enough people been willing to work 
in the mills.
IV
Lancashire's cotton industry, having negotiated the 
1940s, approached the 1950s with trepidation. Little 
progress had been made during the late 1940s towards 
equipping the industry to meet the renewed rigours of 
overseas competition; indeed the cotton industry's 
capital stock in 1950 was much the same as it had been 
in 1939. In 1949 the mule spinners' union warned that 
although a return to the pre-1939 state of affairs in 
the industry would be "intolerable...the signs and 
portents at present indicate that such a situation is
not impossible".(78)
The revival of Japanese competition in particular, 
had long been feared. After the war the Japanese textile 
industry was controlled by the Allied administration in 
Tokyo, which was led by General MacArthur. The policy of 
the Allies was to restrict the development of Japan's 
heavy industries. Consequently, if Japan was to cease 
being gLO ©conomic burden on the Allies, it would be
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necessary to revitalize its light industries, the most
important of which was cotton textiles. The British
government was reluctant to pressurise the Americans to
restrain the growth of Japanese cotton textile
production. In July 1948 Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin
refused to receive a Cotton Board deputation, which was
to ask him to approach the U.S. State Department along
*
these lines.(79) Bevin and the Foreign Office were far 
more concerned about relations with the United States 
than they were with the future of the British textile 
industry. In 1949 the Cotton Board complained that the 
sterling area was scheduled to receive a 
disproportionate share of Japanese cotton textile 
exports.(80) Once more this warning was unheeded by the 
British government. The following year Streat visited 
Japan, with an Anglo-American textile delegation, to see 
MacArthur for himself. Although he found the General 
conciliatory, Streat did not believe his assurances that 
the Allies had increased wages in Japan to a level which 
would preclude low-wage competition. He told MacArthur 
that strong pressures were building up for action 
against Japanese cotton textile exports.(81) The 
Lancashire lobby also requested that Japanese exports to 
the African colonies should be restricted, to give 
British mills a safe export trade. Although these moves 
had the support of the Board of Trade, they were 
resoundingly defeated in Cabinet by the Colonial Office 
and Ernie Bevin, who thought it would be "wise to let 
Lancashire become gradually acclimatised to such
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competition”.(82)
In July 1950 the Cotton Board reported that the 
Allied administration in Tokyo had removed the final 
post-war restrictions on the spindleage of the Japanese 
cotton industry.(83) The cut-throat competition in 
export markets which had been the norm before 1939 was 
about to return. Lancashire had few friends left in the 
government. In the light of the industry’s failure to 
respond to the government’s initiatives on re-equipment 
and amalgamations during the mid 1940s, it was unlikely 
that cotton would be considered worthy of protection. A 
memorandum written in 1948 by Sir Henry Tizard, chairman 
of the Cabinet Committee on Industrial Productivity, 
sums up the changing official attitude towards the 
cotton textile industry:
"Clearly we cannot re-equip all the older
industries of this country within a period of 
five years. Hence, it appears to me that we 
should strive to form a clear judgement about 
those industries that are most likely to hold 
their place or increase their importance in 
the export trade...In my view the Cotton 
textile Industry will not".(84)
Tizard argued that the industry’s dependence on
U.S. raw cotton imposed a permanent drain on the
nation’s dollar reserves, while Japan would probably 
still be able to undercut the prices of even the most 
modern British mills. Only mills using man-made fibres, 
which were based on raw materials produced in the 
sterling bloc, had a future. The tide had turned once 
more and Lancashire was destined to experience a further 
- and this time final - period of decline.
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Chapter 3.
LABOUR SUPPLY IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1945-51.
At the end of World War Two the British cotton 
industry was confronted by a major labour shortage. In 
January 1946 the Board of Trade Working Party on the 
cotton industry estimated that employment in spinning, 
doubling, and weaving was 42 per cent below the number 
required for Lancashire to restore prewar levels of 
production. It would therefore be necessary to recruit a 
further 72,750 spinning and doubling operatives, and a 
further 91,250 weaving operatives to achieve this 
target.(1) Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give additional 
information regarding the extent of the labour shortage 
at the end of the war: in 1945 61 per cent of the mule 
spindles and 50 per cent of the ring spindles in place 
in all mills were idle, primarily due to the shortage of 
operatives. Almost 30 per cent of looms in place in 
running weaving mills were also idle as a result of the 
absence of an adequate supply of labour.(2) The purpose 
of this chapter is to analyze the ways in which the 
industry and the government attempted to overcome the 
shortage of operatives, while the following chapter 
concentrates on the closely related problem of 
inefficiency in the utilization of the labour force.
Section I traces the development of industrial 
relations and labour issues in the cotton industry up to 
World War Two. Many of the difficulties facing the 
industry, as it vainly attemted to step up recruitment, 
were rooted in long-standing problems and uncertainties.
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T ab 1 © 3.1.
Employment and machine activity in cotton spinning,
1945-51.
(i) Employment, recruitment, and quits.
EMPLOYMENT RECRUITMENT QUITS
(thousands) (weekly averages)
TOTAL MALE FEMALE MALE FEM. MALE FEM
1945 71. 70 25. 95 45. 75
1946 82.61 33. 77 48. 84 450 608 284 547
1947 87. 38 36. 57 50. 81 347 665 321 59*&
1948 99. 11 39. 99 59. 12 344 701 289 601
1949 103.42 41.69 61. 73 326 656 294 619
1950 106.99 42. 79 64. 20 347 691 336 645
1951 109.66 43.00 66. 66 331 662 320 596















1937 (44. 10)** (39.,30)** (89)
1945 23. 41 10. 36 9. 19 5. 20 39 50
1946 22. 60 10. 41 11. 91 5. 64 53 54
1947 21. 93 10. 26 12.93 5.88 59 57
1948 21. 00 10.09 14. 56 7. 04 69 70
1949 19. 71 10. 19 15. 23 7. 70 77 76
1950 18. 98 10. 33 15. 22 8. 16 80 79
1951 18. 24 10. 57 15. 01 8. 55 82 81
N.B. All figures exclude doubling and waste spinning. 
* Including both closed and running mills.
** Mule-equivalent spindles.
Sources: Board of Trade Journal. 152 (1946), p. 28; R.W. 
Lacey, 'Cotton's War Effort', Manchester School. XV 
(1947), pp. 56-7; C. B. Q.. S. R. .
8 6
Table 3.2.







EMPLOYMENT IN RUNNING TN
TOTAL MALE FEMALE PLACE* LOOMS PLACE
(thousands) (thousands)
1945 96.02 29.25 66.77 300 216 72
1946 101.00 34.20 66. 80 325 208 64
1947 108.60 38. 40 70. 20 364 224 62
1948 121.27 43.32 77. 95 364 252 69
1949 129.80 47. 11 82. 68 357 268 75
1950 137.08 50. 34 86. 74 358 281 79
1951 140.32 51. 54 88. 78 358 287 80
N.B. Loomage figures apply to North West England only.
* Looms in running mills only.
Sources: R.W. Lacey, 'Cotton's War Effort', Manchester
School. XV (1947), p. 57; C.B.Q.S.R. .
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Section II attends to the ways in which the government
and industry tried to coax more labour into the mills:
improvements in working conditions, better training
programmes, the introduction of part-time and
evening-shifts, and improvements in the pay and
promotion prospects of the lower grades of worker.
«»
Consideration is also given to less popular measures for 
increasing the amount of work done in the industry, such 
as bouts of compulsory overtime working, and production 
drives. Finally abortive plans are revealed for the 
virtual direction of labour into the mills. Section III 
looks in some detail at the most imaginative scheme for 
increasing the labour supply to Lancashire's mills: the 
employment of European Volunteer Workers and other 
immigrants from the continent. Section IV summarises the 
reasons for the failure of the recruitment drive to 
restore output to prewar levels.
I
Cotton spinning was the first industry to adopt the 
factory system. The pioneering mills depended on water 
power and were situated in the foothills of the 
Pennines, but by the early nineteenth century the 
application of steam power to textile machinery had 
brought about a concentration of the industry within 
close proximity to the Lancashire coalfield.(3)
Before the introduction of the self-acting mule in 
the 1830s, spinning was an occupation requiring brute 
force as well as dexterity. Labour was in short supply 
in the Pennine valleys and each spinner was expected to
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bring up to five piecers with him, to assist in the 
tying together of broken threads, the removal of the 
finished cops of yarn, and the sweeping and cleaning of 
the mules. Initially it was the custom for the spinner 
to employ members of his own family as piecers. The 
spinner received a piece-rate and paid his assistants a 
fixed wage out of this sum. This system of 
subcontracting was to remain in force until the 
implementation of the Evershed proposals in the late 
1940s. Even though labour was more readily available 
when the industry became concentrated in the towns, it 
benefitted the employers to retain the subcontracting 
system. Responsibility for disciplining junior workers 
was given to the skilled spinner. This was an ingenious 
means of dividing the workforce, for discontented 
piecers would vent their anger against their immediate 
employers, the spinners, rather than against the company 
itself. The spinner-piecer system also constituted a 
cheap method of on-the-job training for future spinners 
and a means for governing promotion in the mill.(4)
Trade union organization was particularly strong 
among the skilled mule spinners. The earliest record of 
union activity is in the 1790s. From that time the 
spinners" unions went from stength to strength, 
regularly defying the Combination Laws to strike for 
higher wages. In 1830 the mule spinners" militancy led 
to their involvement in John Doherty's ill-fated scheme 
of general unionism, the National Association for the 
Protection of Labour (5), while John Foster has
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suggested that during the 1820s and 1830s spinning 
operatives in Oldham played an important role in the 
furtherance of a revolutionary class consciousness.(6)
However such radicalism did not persist. Less skill 
was required to operate the automatic or 'self-acting' 
mules, introduced in the 1830s and 1840s, than to work 
the earlier machines. This was an excellent opportunity 
for the employers to humiliate the spinners, but in the 
event they adopted a far more devious policy. Through 
the maintenance of the subcontracting system they gave 
the spinners privileges and authority which their 
bargaining power no longer justified. The spinners could 
not afford to be militant for fear of losing these 
privileges, and as time went on they became incorporated 
into the managerial hierarchy of the mill. Moderation 
became a by-word of mule spinning trade unionism, and 
major disputes such as the Preston strike of 1853-4 were 
conducted in an orderly fashion, while the Cotton Famine 
of the 1860s failed to lead to a revival in radical 
agitation.(7)
In weaving the factory system was comparatively 
underdeveloped, and handloom-weaving predominated, until 
well after the Napoleonic Wars. The power-loom spread 
slowly, due to technical difficulties and the low wages 
of handloom-weavers, but by 1850 it had gained the upper 
hand. Power-loom factories tended to concentrate in the 
north east of the county. Weavers did not achieve the 
high status of the mule spinners for several reasons. 
Firstly, power-loom weaving had never been a highly
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skilled occupation. Secondly, the infant power—loom 
weaving section did not experience a shortage of labour, 
since population was rapidly growing and there was a 
large reserve army of unemployed or underemployed 
handloom weavers to draw upon. Indeed unions of 
power-loom weavers did not come to the fore until the 
1850s.(8) Although subcontracting did not prevail in 
weaving, there was still a rigid hierarchy of control, 
with overlookers (i.e. foremen) performing many of the 
disciplinary functions of the mule spinners. The 
overlookers were invariably male, and in sheds with a 
high proportion of female weavers this could lead to an 
extremely oppressive and intimidatory regime.
After 1850 industrial relations in the cotton 
industry began to settle into a fairly stable routine. 
Permanent federations of trade unions in spinning and 
weaving were formed in the 1850s and 1880s respectively 
(9), and employers became increasingly prepared to 
conform to common lists of piece rates. These wage lists 
played a crucial role in the controversies of the 1930s 
and 1940s. Patrick Joyce portrays the period from the 
1850s to the 1880s as one of growing paternalism on the 
part of the masters and deference on the part of the 
operatives. Joyce's examination of the polling records 
suggests that, even after the introduction of the secret 
ballot in 1872, cotton workers still tended to vote for 
the party supported by their employer.(10) Dutton and 
King question whether the examples selected by Joyce are 
representative, and contend that conflict remained the
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basic feature of industrial relations in the mill.(11) 
But the fact remains that in later years the cotton 
operatives' amalgamations became stalwarts of the 
right-wing in the T.U.C.. In 1899 James Mawdesley, the 
leader of the mule spinners, stood as a Conservative 
parliamentary candidate for Oldham.(12)
During the late nineteenth century conflict, began 
to emerge within the cotton labour force. As competition 
increased from foreign firms and from mills equipped 
with the more efficient ring-spinning system, the 
employers and the mule spinners co-operated to speed up 
production by increasing the workloads of the piecers. 
The latter group were paid a time rate, and consequently 
gained no financial compensation for their extra 
effort.(13) This was the beginning of a deep-rooted 
conflict within the spinning unions. Piecers were paid 
appalling wages, denied full membership of the unions, 
and, since there were two or three piecers to each 
spinner, had little chance of promotion once the rapid 
growth of the industry had come to an end. Meanwhile in 
the weaving industry conflict between weavers and 
overlookers was never far from the surface.(14)
Rising prices and falling real wages, together with 
the re-emergence of socialist and radical ideas within 
the textile unions, contributed to the unrest between 
1905 and 1914. The famous Brooklands Agreement of 1893, 
which instituted a formal system of collective 
bargaining in the spinning section, limited the amount 
by which wages could vary in any one year to five per
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cent. In the inflationary Edwardian era such a 
restriction was unacceptable to the operatives. The 
number of serious disputes rose and in 1913 the unions 
withdrew from the agreement. Dissatisfaction spread to 
the weaving section, where attempts to eliminate 
non-union labour, in order to strengthen the unions in 
preparation for a major assault on the wages issue,
Ok
resulted in a bitter series of strikes and 
lock-outs.(15)
After the collapse of the brief postwar boom in 
1920 the position of the cotton operatives became 
increasingly desperate. It was during these years that 
the seeds were sown for the later reluctance of 
Lancastrians to enter the mill. Between 1926 and 1939 
the rate of unemployment of cotton operatives never fell 
below 10 per cent, and reached a maximum of 43.2 per 
cent in 1931, a figure of the same order as unemployment 
levels in coal, steel, and shipbuilding.(16)
The initial response of the industry to the fall in 
demand in 1920 was to introduce short-time working. But 
in 1921-2 it became apparent that trade was not 
recovering, and the employers were able to enforce large 
reductions in the wages of spinning and weaving 
operatives following a three week strike of 375,000 
workers. Mule spinners were able partially to insulate 
themselves from this cut in wages by reducing the pay of 
the piecers: Roger Penn has shown that the differential 
between the earnings of mule spinners and piecers 
increased by five per cent between 1920 and 1932. The
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Communist Party took advantage of the unskilled 
operatives ' grievances and attempted to form a breakaway 
piecers' union in 1932, although this soon 
collapsed.(17) Recession resulted in recurrent breaches 
of wages agreements by firms, while the fining of 
operatives for poor work and insubordination was 
re-introduced on a large scale. The number of dismissals 
increased, with the Blackburn Masters claiming "the 
right as employers to employ whom we think fit, and also 
the right to make a change without being compelled to 
give a reason"(18).
Between 1928 and 1933 the major bone of contention 
in the weaving section was the 'More Looms System', 
which involved increasing the looms per operative from 
four to six or eight and reducing earnings per loom. 
This obviously threatened a large number of weavers with 
unemployment and speed-up, and was vigorously opposed by 
most of the operatives.(19) In 1932 the employers 
attempted to force the issue by demanding a general 
reduction in weavers' wages. The weavers were beaten 
into submission after a disastrous strike, and were 
compelled to sign the Midland Agreement, which involved 
a reduction in wages and acceptance of the 'More Looms 
System'. Industrial relations in the weaving industry 
continued to drift towards complete chaos, and in 1935 
the government stepped in to stabilize matters by giving 
statutory backing to the wage lists. Events in spinning 
followed a similar pattern of confrontation and 
ultimately defeat for the operatives during the early
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1930s. If these problems were not enough, the unions 
also had to contend with underemployment. In the mid 
thirties 20 per cent of weavers were operating less than 
their full complement of looms. As they were paid by the 
piece, this resulted in significantly reduced levels of 
earnings.(20)
Taking the cotton industry as a whole, male workers 
in 1931 had average weekly earnings of 45/3d. This put 
male cotton operatives in 39th place in the Ministry of 
Labour’s earnings league table covering 40 manufacturing 
groups. Female operatives earned an average of 27/3d,
putting them 12th out of 28 industries in the women’s
league table for 1931.(21) Thus cotton was an extremely
unattractive occupation for men, but a quite well-paid
one for women. Men were concentrated in the 
mule-spinning section (from which the unions completely 
excluded women), weaving, and highly-skilled preparatory 
work. Women predominated in ring-spinning, which was 
relatively unskilled, and also constituted a large part 
of the weaving workforce.
During the 1930s serious fears were being expressed 
about the long term consequences for recruitment of low 
wages, poor and authoritarian working conditions, high 
unemployment and underemployment. Jewkes and Gray 
highlighted the problems of the piecers in mule-spinning 
mills. Senior piecers had little prospect of promotion 
and had to leave the industry when they married because 
their wages were so low. Junior piecers, entering the 
mill straight from school, had less than a one in five
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chance of a permanent job in the industry. The ensuing 
despair resulted in a 75 per cent fall in the number of 
piecers taking evening courses in spinning at their 
local colleges between 1926 and 1934. In Oldham the 
proportion of male school-leavers opting for a job in 
cotton fell from 58.2 per cent in 1920-1 to 14.7 per 
cent in 1932-3, while the proportion of girls entering 
the industry fell from 80.8 per cent to 38.4 per cent 
over the same period.(22) Parents were clearly becoming 
increasingly reluctant to send their children to the 
mill. Although this did not matter when labour was in 
excess supply, prejudice against working in cotton would 
become extremely damaging to the industry when full 
employment returned. Jewkes and Gray recognized this 
possibility and advocated the reorganization of the mule 
room to replace the spinner and senior piecer by two 
joiner-minders. This system was already in operation in 
a few mills and improved promotion prospects for junior 
piecers. There were also calls for the introduction of 
formal apprenticeship systems in both spinning and 
weaving, but neither operatives nor employers appeared 
interested in such a departure from traditional 
practice.(23)
When war broke out in 1939 cotton was in large 
measure held in contempt by workers and potential 
workers. Many operatives were eager to join the armed 
forces or to enter the new munitions factories, while in 
1941 the government took steps to concentrate essential 
cotton textile production into a core of mills. In
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consequence of these trends the industry's labour-force 
was drastically curtailed. Employment in spinning and 
doubling fell from 68,000 men and 108,000 women in 1937 
to 36,000 men and 72,000 women in the first quarter of 
1942, while employment in weaving was reduced from
62.000 men and 125,000 women in 1937 to 31,000 men and
72.000 women in early 1942. Major spinning centre^ such 
as Preston, Chorley, Leigh, and Warrington suffered 
particularly badly from concentration, due to the 
transfer of labour to the large shell-filling factories 
at Euxton and Risley.(24) By early 1943 acute shortages 
of spinning labour, especially among cardroom [i.e. 
preparatory] workers, were causing serious problems in 
Oldham. Bolton employers thought that their operatives 
were being stretched to the limit; absenteeism was 
rising, and strikes were only avoided by a reduction in 
machine speeds,(25) The Ministry of Labour tried to 
encourage some workers to return to the mills but their 
efforts met with little success, and employment in 
spinning and doubling fell a further 6,000 between the 
first quarters of 1942 and 1945. Henceforward enticing 
workers back into the textile factories would be a prime 
objective of the industry.
II
As the end of the war approached, Lancashire was 
united in the clear recognition that an enormous effort 
would be needed to regain the industry's 175,000 lost 
workers. The shortage of labour was expected to be 
particularly acute in spinning. This section will
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recount the steps taken to increase the supply of labour 
in cotton textiles between 1945 and 1951: overtime 
working, improvements in working conditions, the 
adoption of more effective training procedures, advances 
in the status and prospects of the lower grades of 
operative, the introduction of part-time and 
evening-shift working, and the consideration of plansto
for the direction of labour into the mills.
Both the (J.T.F.W.A. and the Cotton Board, in their 
respective reports on the postwar prospects for the 
industry, feared that it would be extremely difficult to 
attract labour into cotton textiles unless major changes 
were made in working conditions. Many mills had 
disgraceful toilets, inadequate first-aid facilities, 
and nowhere suitable for operatives to eat their meals. 
But the crucial determinant of the supply of labour to 
the cotton industry would be potential workers' 
expectations of the long-term state of demand for 
British textiles. The government would have to convince 
the public that there would be no recurrence of the 
prewar scourges of unemployment, underemployment, and 
short-time working.(26) This was a very tall order. In 
the light of Lancashire's inability to regain its prewar 
labour force between 1945 and 1951, it must be concluded 
that the government failed to persuade people that 
cotton offered them a secure and prosperous future.
During the final phases of the war in Europe, the 
Churchill government began to draw up plans for the 
demobilization of textile workers and the transfer of
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operatives from the munitions factories to the mills.
The Ministry of Supply created alarm by calculating that
the cotton industry faced a shortfall of 47,000
’key-men': loom overlookers, maintenance men, strippers
and grinders, and other skilled preparatory workers,
etc. However only 4000 of these 'key-men' were in the
armed forces, and nobody knew where to find the
*
remaining 43,000.(27) In February 1945 a working party 
of civil servants was established in Manchester to 
supervise the transfer of operatives from the munitions 
works to the mills. Four mills were reopened to 
accomodate the expected rush of volunteers, but it 
proved difficult to fill these vacancies, as pay was 
considerably higher in munitions than in cotton
textiles. The government responded by authorising the 
compulsory direction of labour into the mills, but, as 
on subsequent occasions, they thought better of 
implementing such extreme measures.(28)
If the majority of mills closed under the
concentration scheme were to be reopened, the industry 
would have to attract and retain operatives who had
never worked in cotton before. It was generally agreed 
that this would necessitate the introduction of new
training programmes. Prior to World War Two there had 
been little systematic training of cotton operatives.
New entrants were assigned to an older operative who 
trained them on the job. A good example of this approach 
was the gradual progression of a young recruit, from 
little piecer, to big piecer, and ultimately (if he was
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lucky) full spinner. This method of training was thought 
to be excessively lengthy and unreliable, as it depended 
upon the competence and goodwill of the senior 
operatives. In 1945 the Cotton Board initiated a series 
of courses in training techniques for managers and 
foremen. The method taught was the American 'Training 
Within Industry' programme. New entrants would be „ given 
full-time supervision in a special section of the mill. 
Jobs would be split into a number of simple tasks which 
could easily be mastered and remembered. For example, 
under the new system, weavers could be trained to a 
reasonable degree of efficiency in three months instead 
of eighteen months.(29) A Ministry of Labour Training 
Centre was established in the summer of 1945 at the 
disused Belgrave Mill, Oldham, where new entrants were 
trained according to the latest principles. When fully 
operational this centre was able to train 500 workers 
per year.(30) However neither of the schemes had much 
impact in relieving the short-term labour shortage. The 
spinning employers remarked that much of the recruitment 
that took place in the second half of 1945 was offset by 
the withdrawal from the labour market of married women 
and old age pensioners, groups which had formed the 
backbone of the wartime workforce.(31)
The new Labour government in 1945 continued to 
attach a very high priority to the resolution of the 
labour shortage in cotton textiles. Exports of cotton 
textiles were crucial to the defence of Britain’s 
balance of payments. Between 1945 and 1948 the
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government supplemented its financial budget with a 
manpower budget. This assisted ministers to identify 
mining, agriculture, and textiles as the industries 
encountering the most serious shortages of labour. 
Government policy was directed towards closing the gap 
between labour supply and labour requirements in these 
industries.(32)
Sir Stafford Cripps, the incoming President of the 
Board of Trade, rapidly set to work to solve the labour 
impasse. His plan was to institute a commission to 
reform the wage structure and organization of work in 
the spinning section, and to persuade the industry to 
proceed with implementation of the Chief Inspector of 
Factories' recommendations on the improvement of working 
conditions in cotton textiles.(33) Ministers regarded 
the supply of labour to the spinning section as the 
crucial issue, for the output of yarn determined the 
amount of work at later stages in the production 
process. After consultation with both sides of the 
industry, Cripps appointed Mr. Justice Evershed to chair 
the investigation into labour problems in the spinning 
section. He was assisted by four representatives of the 
F.M.C.S.A., and two each from the Operative Spinners and 
the Cardroom Workers.
In October 1945, the Evershed Commission produced a 
wide ranging report calling for a number of measures to 
increase the attractiveness of work in the industry. 
Section I described the historical development of labour 
practices in mule-spinning. Mule spinners were in
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receipt of a piece-rate, while piecers were paid a 
time-rate. A subcontracting system was in use, whereby 
the piecer was employed by the mule spinner. The 
Evershed Commission advocated abolition of the 
pernicious subcontracting system, so that all grades 
would be paid directly by the company. Moreover the 
report recommended changes in the staffing of mules. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, each pair of mules had 
enjoyed a complement of three workers: a spinner, a big 
piecer, and a little piecer. The Evershed Commission 
suggested that each pair of mules should be operated by 
a spinner, and, depending on the length of mule, one or 
more assistant spinners (equivalent to a big piecer). 
Alternatively the spinner and big piecer would be 
replaced by two joiner-minders. A new grade of ancillary 
worker would be employed to do menial tasks such as 
sweeping and cleaning. Thus the post of little piecer 
would disappear. The existing Bolton and Oldham 
piece-rate lists for mule spinners would be replaced by 
a new universal list for mule-spinning, taking the form 
of a piece-rate with a fall-back minimum wage, while the 
assistant spinners and ancillary workers would receive a 
time-rate. (34)
Evershed also considered arrangements in the 
ring-spinning and preparatory sections. Ring-spinning 
had always been thought of as 'women's work'. The ring 
spinner receved a time-rate which fluctuated according 
to the number of spindles tended. Their assistants, the 
doffers, were poorly treated and did not have even the
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protection of a wage list; they depended on a time-rate
negotiated at mill level. Although Evershed suggested
little change in the wage system for ring spinners, he
aimed to revolutionize the position of the doffer. In
future, doffers would be paid according to a list of
piece prices, so that their earnings would become a
function of the number of bobbins changed; they would
*
also have the benefit of a minimum fall-back wage.
Moreover differentials between the wages of ring 
spinners and doffers would be reduced. This would 
represent a major improvement in the status of the 
doffer, encouraging higher levels of recruitment in the 
ring-spinning section.(35) In the long-term the Evershed 
Commission wanted to attract more men into 
ring-spinning. Indeed the Commission advocated a gradual 
increase in the ratio of men to women in the industry as 
a whole, arguing that: "Generally speaking male
operatives are likely to remain more permanently in 
industry than women".(36) There were numerous grades of 
preparatory worker, including gassers, slubbers, 
jack-frame tenters, crossbailers, and strippers and 
grinders. Evershed proposed the rationalization of wage 
lists in this section, the introduction of minimum
fall-back wages, and the revision of staffing 
arrangements.(37)
The Evershed Commission hoped that its 
recommendations would lead to improvements in the 
relative status, earnings, and promotion prospects of 
the lower grades of operative, thereby facilitating
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increased recruitment. But their wishes were only 
partially fulfilled. Negotiations between the employers 
and the unions on the detailed implementation of the 
report were conducted at a leisurely pace. This 
infuriated and dismayed the government. In September 
1946, eleven months after the report's completion, the 
F.M.C.S.A. and the Operative Spinners agreed to 
implement the Commission's recommendations on the 
staffing of mule rooms and the abolition of 
sub-contracting.(38) However it took them a further two 
years to complete the revision of the wage list for mule
spinners.(39) In the ring-spinning and preparatory 
sections, negotiations between the Cardroom Workers and 
the F.M.C.S.A. were conducted with a similar lack of 
haste. The Aronson Agreement, which applied the Evershed 
proposals to these sections, finally came into force in 
January 1948.(40) Even so, it had not been possible to 
satisfy everyone. Female jack-frame tenters in Bolton 
and the surrounding district went on strike against the 
new agreement, claiming it had resulted in them being 
paid less than the slubbers, a less skilled grade.(41)
It can hardly be denied that the Evershed proposals 
contributed to the narrowing of differentials between 
the wages of skilled and unskilled operatives in 
mule-spinning. Between 1946 and 1951, the weekly wages 
of mule spinners increased by 29 per cent, while those 
of assistant spinners increased by 46 per cent. But in 
the ring room there was little change: between 1946 and 
1951 ring spinners' wages rose by 36 per cent, only
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slightly less than the 38 per cent gain for doffers.(42)
The Evershed Commission cannot even claim sole
responsibility for the narrowing of differentials in
mule-spinning, for during the 1940s there was a movement
in favour of flat-rate rather than percentage wage
demands. One must conclude that the dilatory attitude of
the employers and the unions towards implementation of
the Evershed Report both delayed and substantially
reduced its impact upon the labour shortage.
Between 1945 and 1946 capacity utilization in the
spinning industry increased from 44 per cent to 53 per
cent. Nearly half of the industry's spindleage remained
idle, largely in consequence of the scarcity of labour.
By October 1946 the Cotton Board had given permission
for two-thirds of the spinning mills closed under the
concentration scheme to reopen, but few of these
factories were able to attract a full complement of
labour.(43) In December 1946 the Government's Economic
Survey Working Party reported that:
"The problem of manning the textile 
industries, where the ruling bottleneck is in 
the spinning sections... makes increase in the 
clothing ration difficult...Moreover, the
resulting shortage of textile supplies for 
export is holding back the production of 
needed food-stuffs and raw materials in those 
countries (especially in Africa and the Far 
East) where an adequate supply of imported 
textiles is the only effective incentive to 
output."(44)
The Steering Committee on Economic Development, 
chaired by the head of the Treasury Sir Edward Bridges,
responded to this report by recommending a drastic
solution to the cotton industry's labour problem:
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Lancashire women aged 20 would be called up for two 
years national service in the Womens Auxiliary Forces, 
the Womens Land Army, or the hospitals, unless they 
volunteered for work in the mills.(45) This was but a 
short step from industrial conscription and was quietly 
disregarded by the Cabinet. However as the balance of 
payments situation continued to deteriorate during. 1947, 
the pressure to find an answer to the labour shortage in 
cotton textiles was intensified. Cairncross attributes 
nearly three-quarters of the reduction in gold and 
dollar reserves during 1947 to the Sterling Area's 
current account deficit with the dollar area.(46) 
Increased cotton textile exports were a crucially 
important source of foreign exchange, without which 
draconian cuts in imports would have been necessary.
One of the government's first expedients was the 
reintroduction of overtime working. The supply of labour 
could be increased by two methods: firstly by recruiting 
more operatives, and secondly by making existing 
employees do more work. As recruitment was not 
proceeding as quickly as the government would have 
liked, it decided to try the second of these approaches. 
During the war there had been several rounds of 
compulsory overtime working in cotton. On each occasion 
output rose for a short period, but soon fell again, as 
increasing fatigue led to a reduction in effort.(47) 
When the Cotton Controller suggested a further dose of 
overtime during the summer of 1945, the spinning 
Amalgamations balloted their members, who decisively
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rejected the proposal.(48) In 1946 the U.T.F.W.A. 
negotiated a reduction in the normal working week from 
48 hours to 45 hours.(49) When, in August 1947, the 
Prime Minister pleaded for an emergency increase in 
working time by half an hour per day, his exhortations 
fell on deaf ears. Although the spinning and weaving 
unions advised their members to comply with Mr. Attlee's 
request, two-thirds of the operatives simply refused to 
work the extra time.(50) Cripps, who had recently been 
promoted to the post of Minister of Economic Affairs, 
was particularly worried by the situation in Oldham, 
where the operatives had decisively balloted against 
overtime. He wrote frantic letters to Isaacs, the
Minister of Labour, urging him to intervene personally 
to win over the workers, but Isaacs appeared to lack the 
will to act.(51) Barbara Castle, the left-wing M.P. for 
Blackburn, wrote to Cripps setting out the feelings of 
the weaving operatives in North East Lancashire: "The 
call for overtime reduces the workers' confidence in the 
Government's handling of the cotton industry. So far 
they see no evidence of any basic reorganisation or
re-equipping of the industry and the call for overtime 
to get us out of a mess seems to them to be am old Tory 
expedient."(52) Overtime was clearly no solution to the
shortage of labour and only served to poison
relationships between the government and the operatives. 
In fact it was positively counter-productive. Overtime 
bred resentment and resulted in absenteeism and fatigue. 
The reduction in the working week during 1946 had made
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cotton a slightly more attractive industry to work in.
but the overtime crisis of the winter of 1947-S
cancelled out this effect. In short, the Stakhanovite
spirit was never very strong in Lancashire and the
government's overtime policy limped along from disaster
to disaster. Most operatives felt that they were already
doing their share and in 1948 the overtime scheme was
*
dropped.
After the war a large number of married women had 
quit the industry to return to their homes. Ministers 
were particularly anxious to find a way of enticing this 
type of labour back into the mills. During 1947 Cripps 
and Isaacs canvassed for the introduction of part-time 
evening-shifts in cotton mills, for the benefit of
married women whose family responsibilities prevented 
them from working full-time. The co-operation of the
trade unions was grudgingly given and by April 1948 
civil servants could report that there were 4335 
part-time and evening-shift workers in weaving and 4476 
in spinning.(53)
In Lancashire it was widely believed that mothers 
would not return to full-time work unless there was
someone to look after their children. Consequently there 
was a movement among the local authorities for the
provision of nurseries for the children of mi 11-workers. 
Unfortunately this affair was completely mismanaged by 
central government. In March 1946, as part of a drive to 
restrict public expenditure, the government reduced 
grant support to local authority nurseries from 100 per
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cent to 50 per cent. By the end of the year the number 
of council nurseries in the cotton districts had fallen 
from 174 to 155. This forced the Cotton Board to rely on 
the goodwill of private enterprise for the development 
of the nursery system. At the time only 73 spinning or 
weaving mills provided creches, and many firms were
prevented from building their own nurseries by an
inability to obtain certificates to acquire the 
necessary building materials and labour. More resources 
were made available during 1947 and 1948, but this 
recognition of the serious nature of the problem did 
little to dispel the bad impression which had already 
been created.(54) Fortunately some firms succeeding in 
providing a high standard of nursery facilities. By 1950 
the Lancashire Cotton Corporation had nurseries at most 
of its 50 mills: for instance it opened a huge nursery 
at Shaw, run by two matrons and 15 other staff, to serve 
five mills in the area.(55) But this whole episode 
revealed a lack of co-ordination between different 
government policies. With a little more effort and
foresight a great deal could have been done to make
married women more welcome in the cotton industry.
In January 1948 the government realised that, after 
two and a half years in office, it was still nowhere 
near solving the labour shortage in cotton textiles. 
Between 1945 and 1947 employment in spinning had risen 
by a mere 15,680, while the number of operatives in 
weaving had increased by 29,510. The combined increase 
of 45,190 operatives was far short of the target of
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175.000 set by the Board of Trade Working Party in 1946. 
As can be discerned from Table 3.1, one of the major 
reasons for this failure was the high rate of turnover 
of operatives.
The government's Economic Planning Board met on 22 
Jan. 1948 to review the situation and consider the 
report of the Working Party on the Increase of Textile 
Exports;. This report painted a desperate picture. Vital 
exports were being held back by a persistent shortage of 
operatives. Expedients such as overtime and part-time 
working were inadequate. Measures were needed to 
restrict employment in occupations which competed with 
cotton for female labour. In the cotton towns 3000 women 
were employed by the local authorities or in government 
industrial establishments. A further 20,000 were 
employed in the transport and service industries, while 
the number of women in other manufacturing industries 
such as engineering, chemicals and clothing had risen by
32.000 since 1939. Several possible solutions were 
floated by the Working Party. Firstly, when women left 
their existing employment they could be compulsorily 
directed into the mills. Secondly, non-cotton firms 
could be persuaded, or if necessary forced, to reduce 
their workforce in Lancashire. The Working Party pointed 
to the example of the clothing firm, Montague Burton, 
which had three factories in the Bolton district, 
drawing women away from work in the mills. Recalcitrant 
firms would be threatened with a withdrawal of their 
production licenses or a reduction in their raw material
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allocations.(56) Finally the Working Party concluded 
that:
"If the political difficulties are accepted 
and the difficulties of administration can be 
overcome, there seems little doubt, however 
that the methods outlined...offer firmer hope 
of achieving quick resilts for cotton than any 
other method. It is a question, as during the 
war, whether the end justifies the means, and 
the end in this case is achieving nearly £1 
million extra exports per annum, mainly 
dollar-earning or dollar-saving, from each 
extra thousand workers."(57)
Once again the government instinctively recoiled 
from the idea of industrial conscription, and resolved 
instead to appoint a committee of junior ministers under 
the chairmanship of Ness Edwards, the Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Board of Trade, to examine and 
implement a number of more modest schemes for dealing 
with the labour shortage. This committee was known as
the Labour (Textile Industries) Committee, and it 
established an office in Manchester under a Regional 
Controller to maintain contact with the . unions and 
employers.(58)
In April 1948 Edwards was able to report on the 
committee's activities. The Ministry of Labour had been 
persuaded to suspend the call-up of skilled men to the 
armed forces for a period of six months on application
from the employer. All advertising for the Womens
Auxiliary Forces in Lancashire had been suppressed and 
was being replaced by a publicity campaign for work in 
cotton textiles. Non-cotton firms had been asked to 
release volunteers for work in the mills. No attempt was 
made to issue threats of sanctions to these firms.
Ill
Unfortunately this plea to the employers' goodwill was 
counteracted by the use of the Control of Engagement 
Order to prevent such firms from replacing released 
operatives. A survey had been conducted of improvements 
to working conditions in spinning and doubling mills. In 
March 1948 465 mills were equipped with canteens or 
messrooms, at 13 work was in progress, three were 
awaiting materials, four were applying for a building 
license, and 83 had taken no action at all. It was clear 
that significant improvements were made to conditions in 
the mills during and after World War Two, to make them 
more attractive to the operatives.(59)
In retrospect it would appear that the government 
was now only interested in palliatives. It had 
effectively ignored the proposals of the Working Party 
on the Increase of Textile Exports, and was content to 
tinker with the problem of labour shortage. Calls for 
volunteers to work in the mills met with little 
response. In June 1948 representatives of the Ministry 
of Labour visited 958 non-cotton firms in Lancashire and 
wrote to 2943 others. As a result of these gargantuan 
efforts a grand total of 21 workers were placed in the 
cotton industry!(60) In 1948 and 1949 the government 
resorted to production drives in individual towns, as a 
means of attracting new labour and of encouraging 
greater enthusiasm for hard work amongst existing 
operatives , but these campaigns had little success.(61) 
By 1950 employment in spinning was still 75,000 
short of the 1937 level, while that in weaving was
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50,000 below prewar levels. Approximately 80 per cent of 
looms and spindles were running, but in spinning this 
high rate of capacity utilization was partly a result of 
a reduction in spindieage since 1945. Government and 
industry had failed in their quest for a return to 
prewar levels of employment and output in the industry. 
Improvements in working conditions; the introduction of 
better training facilities, promotion prospects, and 
scales of remuneration for the lower grades of 
operative; and calls to patriotism, all proved 
inadequate to achieve the desired end. Even an increase 
in the average earnings of textile operatives compared 
with workers in other industries was not able to 
eliminate the shortage. Between 1945 and 1950 average 
earnings in textiles (including wool, etc.) rose by 52 
per cent compared with 33 per cent in British industry 
as a whole.(62)
The direction of labour would have secured adequate 
employment in cotton textiles, but this would have been 
politically unpopular. One factor stands out in the 
explanation of the labour shortage in cotton textiles 
during the second half of the 1940s: a continuing, and 
fully justified, lack of confidence in the industry's 
long-term future among the industrial working class of 
Lancashire. Since alternative employment in thriving new 
electrical and service industries was easily obtained 
during the 1940s, few were prepared to risk a lengthy 
association with an industry such as cotton, in which 
the threat of a revival of foreign competition and
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widespread unemployment was always present.
Ill
By far the most novel aspect of the industry's
recruitment drive during the 1940s was the increasing
use of European Volunteer Workers (E.V.W.s) and other
immigrant and migrant labour. These workers were largely
recruited from the millions of people, primarily from
central and eastern Europe, who were made homeless at
the end of World War Two.(63) In many respects these
European workers were the precursors of the Asian
immigrants who arrived in Lancashire in the 1960s. As
such their case is worthy of separate consideration.
During 1945 and 1946 the Ministry of Labour failed
in its attempt to recruit labour for the mills from the
North East and the Republic of Ireland.(64) Consequently
the Cotton Board and the government began to consider
the use of foreign labour in the industry. On 10 Dec.
1946 the Cabinet Foreign Labour Committee resolved to
proceed with the recruitment of displaced persons for
employment in the cotton spinning industry.(65) European
labour would also be recruited for other industries
experiencing labour scarcity, notably the coal mines and
agriculture. The government's Economic Survey Working
Party concluded that:
"The advantage of these classes of workers is 
greater than the numerical addition which they 
provide to the working population, because, 
within the limits of housing them, they can 
more readily be directed or steered to 
particular jobs to help in overcoming 
industrial 'bottlenecks. ' "(66)
This initiative was enthusiastically welcomed by
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the F.M.C.S.A.: "In view of the prospective long-term 
shortage of labour...early and energetic action along 
these lines would be in the interest of our own industry 
and of the country as a whole"(67).
The first batch of 20 Polish women and 'girls' 
arrived in January 1947 for duty at spinning mills in 
Bolton, Rochdale, and Ashton.(68) Then, during February, 
a Cotton Board mission visited camps in Austria and 
Italy to see whether suitable displaced persons were 
available for work in the mills. It was planned to
commence recruitment in May 1947, primarily of single 
women, for work in coarse spinning, preparatory work, 
and doubling. By the end of November 1947 2530 female
E.V.W.s were at work in the spinning industry. As some 
of the women were married, 274 men were also
employed.(69) Many E.V.W.s went to the Inskip holding 
camp near Preston on their arrival, where they were
provided with an interpreter, who informed them of their 
,duties and responsibilities' as workers. Spinning mills 
in Oldham took 800 E.V.W.s, 550 went to Bolton, and 400
to Rochdale; the remainder were spread among the smaller 
centres. Recruitment of foreign workers for the weaving 
section, where the shortage of labour was less severe,
did not commence until May 1948. Since less than five
per cent of the newcomers had experience of the cotton 
industry when they arrived in Britain, they required 
several months of training before they were of much use. 
By 1949 there were over 100 hostels for European workers 
in Lancashire. Most of these were provided by the
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employers and were often situated in sections of disused 
mills. There were three larger hosteis run by the 
Ministry of Labour: Glen Mill (Oldham), Chadwick House 
(Bolton), and Woodlands House (Chorley). Probably just 
over half of the European workers lived in these 
establishments; the rest were found private billets. 
Most E.V.W.s were employed on fixed-term contracts of up 
to five years, and they could not leave the mill to 
which they had been assigned without permission from 
their employer and the Ministry of Labour.(70)
In 1948 the Ministry of Labour decided that it was 
necessary for the industry to look further afield. A 
second mission, representing the employers and the 
unions, left for Germany and Austria in March 1948. They 
were interested in recruiting members of the 
'Volksdeutsche' community. These people were of German 
descent, formerly living in areas such as the 
Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. In 1945 they were no 
longer welcome in their homelands and had become 
refugees. Initially there was some resistance among the 
operatives and employers to the idea of employing 
Germans, but once they had been screened by the security 
services, 'Volksdeutsche' workers began to swell the 
ranks of the E.V.W.'s. They began arriving in Lancashire 
in 1949, although the Ministry of Labour's target of
10,000 Sudeten-Germans proved wildly optimistic.(71)
Several other schemes operated to the benefit of 
the cotton industry. At the end of the war 91,400 
members of the Polish armed forces (the Polish
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Resettlement Corps) were allowed to reside in Britain; 
2150 of these found employment in cotton textiles.(72) 
More Poles, together with Latvians, Lithuanians, 
Ukrainians, Yugoslavs, and Czechs came to Lancashire 
under the 'Westward Ho' scheme. 770 Austrian women were 
given two year contracts to work in the mills under the 
'Blue Danube' programme. In May 1950 there were 3981 
male and 7982 female Europeans working in the spinning 
section, while 850 male and 1268 female Europeans were 
employed in the weaving section of the cotton industry. 
Many of these workers became British citizens during the 
1950s.(73)
Lancashire's cotton unions had an ambivalent 
attitude towards the engagement of foreign workers. 
Their official policy was to co-operate with the 
Government in securing an increase in the supply of 
labour. But both the spinning and weaving operatives' 
Amalgamations negotiated agreements with the employers 
which restricted the proportion of immigrant workers in 
any mill (or sometimes in any section of a mill) to ten 
per cent. Under these agreements European workers would 
only be recruited if indigenous workers were 
unavailable, and they would be the first to become 
redundant in a recession.(74)
Sometimes there was conflict between the rank and 
file of the unions and the newcomers. In 1949 the 
Ministry of Labour wanted to introduce some unemployed 
Italian cotton workers into the mule-spinning section. 
The Executive Council of the Operative Spinners agreed
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to this proposal, but opposition from the districts led 
to the Italians' exclusion. Further pressure from the 
rank and file forced the Operative Spinners to declare 
its implacable opposition to the promotion to full 
spinner of any foreign worker, except in the unlikely 
circumstance of no British operative being 
available.(75) The strike of jack-frame tenters against 
the Aronson List around Bolton in 1948 was aggravated by 
the fact that semi-skilled foreign slubbers were earning 
more than skilled British jack-tenters.(76)
Although the agreements between the unions and the 
employers on the engagement of E.V.W.s specified that 
they should always receive the full rate for the job, 
and that they should join the appropriate union as 
quickly as possible, the other clauses of the agreements 
restricted their employment and promotion prospects, and 
made it clear that they would be first to be released if 
the state of trade deteriorated. In other words the 
E.V.W.s, despite their formal membership of the trade 
unions, were treated as second-class citizens. The 
Poles, in particular, complained of segregation at work, 
and in hostels, and claimed to be the victims of 
Communist Party propaganda which portrayed them as 
fascists.(77) The hostels for European workers did not 
necessarily provide a healthy environment. Many of them 
were filled with young women with a limited knowledge of 
English, who had recently been plucked from an 
agricultural society and transported to a strange land. 
They had no freedom to find alternative employment, and
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their lives revolved around "the mill and the hostel. (78) 
When recession returned to Lancashire in 1952-3 
many of those E.V.W.s who had not yet obtained British 
citizenship were made redundant. They were often unable 
to obtain permission to look for work in other 
industries, and, like 26 Maltese girls who lost their 
jobs at a Royton mill, had to leave the country.^ Many 
Poles went to the United States and Canada. Those who 
were lucky enough to remain in work found themselves on 
short-time, sometimes facing the hostility of their 
fellow operatives. One young Austrian woman had only 3/- 
per week left after she had paid her bus fares and her 
board at the hostel.(79)
In 1950, foreign workers comprised between 10 and 
12 per cent of the workforce in the spinning section of 
the cotton industry. Thus they made a significant 
contribution to the containment of the industry's labour 
shortage. Indeed this contribution might have been even 
greater haul they arrived in 1946 instead of 1948 and 
1949.
IV
To assist the national export drive and protect the 
balance of payments, it was necessary for the cotton 
industry to maximize production during the period 
1945-51. The supply of labour was seen as the crucial 
determinant of output. Between 1945 and 1950 wages in 
the cotton industry increased relative to those in 
British industry as a whole; the status and prospects of 
the lower grades of operative were significantly
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improved; better training facilities were created;
working conditions were brought up to a more acceptable
standard; evening-shifts were introduced for the benefit
of part-time operatives; workers were encouraged to
increase their efforts; and displaced persons were
brought from Europe to swell the ranks of the
labour-force. Yet none of these measures was sufficient
*
to overcome the shortage of labour.
Only one explanation of the labour scarcity would 
appear to fit the facts, although it is one for which 
little direct evidence can be produced. People in 
Lancashire simply had no confidence that their jobs 
would be secure if they went into the mill. Memories of 
the twenties and thirties, and the poverty and despair 
to which cotton operatives had been reduced, militated 
against the decision to accept work in the mills.
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Chapter 4.
TIME AND MOTION: WORKLOADS AND WAGE LISTS IN THE
COTTON INDUSTRY, 1945-50.
"The prosperity of Lancashire is in itself a 
vital part of the well-being of our whole 
country...both sides of industry...must put 
aside selfish interests and come together with 
a determination to make use of all the 
available knowledge to get the very most out 
of all their resources, whether it be 
manpower, scarce materials, fuel or whatevef 
it is...the needs of production efficiency 
demand the introduction of new methods and the 
abandonment of old customs and habits."(1)
Sir Stafford Cripps, Oct. 1947.
The shortage of labour in the cotton industry
during the 1940s stimulated increasing interest in
techniques for improving the efficiency of utilization
of the workforce. Ministers, employers, and even many
trade union leaders argued that it should be possible to
increase the machine complements of operatives without
causing them to be overworked. In Lancashire this issue
was known as 'redeployment'.
This chapter considers the movement for the
intensification of work in Lancashire during the 1940s.
Section I outlines the background to redeployment and
traces its development within the cotton industry before
1945. Section II examines the redeployment movement in
the spinning section, while section III concentrates on
the weaving section.
I
In Capital Marx postulated that competition between 
firms would produce the intensification of labour, as 
each firm struggled to reduce its costs to a minimum. 
Within the constraints of a fixed working day, employers
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would be forced to increase the speed of machinery and 
the number of machines per operative. Moreover this 
process would be accompanied by a reduction in 
piece-rates, so that although operatives' earnings might 
rise, there would be a cut in labour costs per unit of 
output.(2)
Harry Braverman took up Marx's theme and traced the 
history of the intensification of work from the 
nineteenth century to the 1970s in Labor and Monopoly 
Capital. The introduction of Taylorism or 'scientific 
management' towards the end of the nineteenth century 
was the most significant development during this period. 
Taylorism was the precursor of modern methods of 
scientific workload assessment.(3)
The principles of workload assessment are quite 
straightforward. Tests, known as work studies, are 
carried out in factories to determine the 'full' 
workload for an average operative. Each task (e.g. tying 
together a broken thread) is timed. The frequency with 
which an average worker, given a suitable allowance for 
rest, can perform this task in a given period is 
calculated. This constitutes the 'full' workload for the 
job. If workers in the factory consistently fail to meet 
this target, it is usually because they have too few 
machines to tend, and therefore do not have the 
opportunity to perform the requisite number of actions 
per hour. Such workers are 'underloaded'; their 
machinery should be speeded up, or else they should be 
assigned more machines, bringing them up to a full
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workload. Managers, possibly in consultation with the 
unions, specify a 'target wage'. Piece-rates are set at 
a level enabling the average operative with a full 
workload to achieve the target wage.
Braverman also discussed Marx's thesis that the 
intensification of work would be accompanied by the 
substitution of unskilled for skilled workers. Complex
to
operations would be split into simple tasks to eliminate 
the bargaining power of the skilled worker. Lazonick and 
Penn have shown that 'deskilling' was of little 
consequence in the cotton industry, where job 
descriptions remained virtually unchanged between 1840 
and 1940. Skilled workers were useful allies of the 
employers because they could be given responsibility for 
discipline in the mills.(4)
In Lancashire the intensification of work proceeded 
by ad hoc methods before World War One. Taylorism was 
virtually unknown in Lancashire at that time. In Oldham 
between 1896-7 and 1906-7 the average number of spindles 
per mule increased by 12.1 per cent, while the speed of 
mules rose by 4.7 per cent.(5) Agreements between the 
A.W.A. and C.S.M.A. restricted the number of Lancashire 
looms per weaver to four. But automatic loom complements 
were not subject to central regulation, and depended on 
negotiations at mill level. For instance, between 1902 
and 1908 operatives at Ashton Bros., Hyde, accepted a 
system of 20 automatic looms per weaver, although they 
struck when the company proposed to increase this to 24 
per weaver.(6)
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In the late 1920s employers in North East
Lancashire attempted to undermine the four-loom weaving 
system by forcing operatives to accept complements of up 
to eight Lancashire looms. After several years of bitter 
conflict the A.W.A. signed the Midland Agreement in
1933, recognising the right of employers to introduce a 
'More Looms System' in Lancashire loom sheds. To the
intense chagrin of the unions the Midland Agreement also
specified that more-looms weavers were to be paid a 
lower piece-rate than four-loom weavers. However, less 
than one-fifth of firms took advantage of the
opportunity to introduce more-looms working, as it was
unsuited to certain types of weaving. But in the mid 
1930s the A.W.A. complained that in practice six-loom 
weavers often earned a mere shilling a week more than 
four-loom weavers.(7)
Between the wars both the government and the 
employers complained about what they regarded as 
restrictive labour practices. The report of the 
government's Cotton Industry Committee in 1930 welcomed 
the 'More Looms' experiment, expressing the hope that it 
would help safeguard the long-term future of jobs, 
although it might lead to higher unemployment in the 
short run.(8) Spinning employers declared that
production in their section could be speeded up if the 
unions would allow the oiling of machines outside normal 
working hours. They were also angered by the refusal of 
strippers and grinders (preparatory workers) to accept 
higher workloads despite technical improvements which
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had made their jobs easier. But it was hardly surprising 
that operatives should try to protect their jobs at a 
time of severe unemployment.(9)
Formal work study techniques were first introduced 
into the cotton industry in the 1920s. In the 1930s 21 
per cent of all British firms using the Bedaux system, 
which was the most popular form of redeployment based on 
work measurement, were in the textile industry.(10) Mike 
Savage has shown that the workloads of overlookers at 
Horrockses in Preston were set according to work study 
principles in 1929-30.(11) But the cotton textile unions 
were generally united in their opposition to all such 
practices. Mr L.H.C. Tippett of the Shirley Institute 
vividly recalled the reaction of cotton operatives to 
the application of work study during the thirties: "In
the early days we used the stop-watch to obtain much of 
the data...[but] for many workers and their leaders the 
stop-watch has become the symbol of exploitation and 
driving, and of an attitude that regards operatives as 
machines".(12)
The question of the application of work study 
techniques to the cotton industry acquired greater 
urgency between 1943 and 1945, as Lancashire prepared 
for the end of World War Two. A severe labour shortage 
was expected and a considerable degree of thought was 
given to the solution of this problem. During 1943 a 
team of cotton industry representatives, including 
Andrew Naesmith the general secretary of the A.W.A., 
went to the United States to observe labour practices in
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American mills. The Platt Report, published in 1944,
raised the alarm by revealing that British spinning
operatives produced between 18 and 49 per cent less yarn
per hour than U.S. workers, while weavers in Lancashire
produced between 56 and 67 per cent less cloth per hour
than their American counterparts. Although this
disparity was partly due to the use of obsolete
*
equipment in Lancashire, the Platt Report attached
considerable importance to the flexible attitude of the 
U.S. trade unions towards new forms of labour
utilization, and the almost universal employment of
"scientific" methods of work assignment. It was
concluded that Britain should follow suit, thereby 
relieving the labour shortage, and tackling the 
long-term problem of declining competitiveness.(13)
Curiously, despite these warnings, the official 
U.T.F.W.A. plan for the postwar development of the
industry did not discuss redeployment, concentrating 
instead on the need to improve working conditions and
prospects for promotion in the mills.(14) Even the 
Cotton Board Committee to Enquire into Post-War Problems 
was reluctant to take the hint and merely suggested that 
action should be taken to ensure that "too much 
rigidity" in the function of operatives was avoided. (15) 
However the extreme caution of trade union leaders in 
public was not always mirrored in private. By 1943-4
Andrew Naesmith and the A.W.A. were beginning to
consider the feasibility of introducing a wage system in 
weaving that would be grounded in work measurement
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principles.
Ernest Bevin, the wartime Minister of Labour, was 
one of the most enthusiastic exponents of moves to 
increase the efficiency of labour utilization in 
Lancashire.(16) Bevin thought that the Cotton Board 
should set aside a mill for the pursuance of work study 
experiments and the investigation of new systems of 
labour utilization, and called on the operatives and 
employers to be realistic, "like Marshall Stalin".(17) A 
Cotton Board Committee to deal with 'mill investigations 
and experiments' was duly formed, and during the mid 
1940s this body conducted a number of important trials 
at the Wye Mill in Shaw and the Musgrave Mills (Nos. 7 
and 8) at Bolton, into new methods of labour deployment 
for the spinning section.(18)
Soon after the election of the Labour government in 
1945, Stafford Cripps called for a review of wage 
systems and staffing procedures in cotton spinning. The 
following train of events led to the establishment of 
the Evershed Commission in spinning, and the Cotton 
Manufacturing Commission in weaving. Between 1945 and 
1950 the government was the most enthusiastic advocate 
of redeployment in the cotton industry. Britain faced a 
major balance of payments crisis which threatened the 
maintenance of reasonable living standards. Redeployment 
in cotton would assist Lancashire to increase its output 
and exports, and play an important role in the struggle 
for economic survival.
Employers were keen to see improvements in the
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efficiency of labour utilization, as this would enable
productivity to be increased, and idle looms and
spindles to be brought back into production. But the
masters were not prepared to force the issue to the
point of confrontation with the unions. Competitive
pressures were weak during the 1940s. Large profits
could be obtained for little effort in the conditions of
•»
high demand which prevailed under the Attlee government. 
It was not worth putting these profits in jeopardy by 
risking a major conflict over redeployment.(19)
Redeployment aroused considerable controversy 
within the trade union movement. Some prominent figures 
in the unions, such as Andrew Naesmith of the A.W.A. and 
Alfred Roberts of the Cardroom Workers, were 
enthusiastically supporters of redeployment. During the 
1940s union leaders were increasingly drawn into the 
fringes of government and industrial planning through 
their membership of the Cotton Board, their close 
relationship with the Labour government, and their 
involvement in official investigations such as the Platt 
Mission and the Board of Trade Working Party. They no 
longer saw matters in purely trade union terms, and were 
prepared to work for what they, rightly or wrongly, 
regarded as the wider 'national interest'.(20) But most 
of their members retained an implacable fear of driving 
and the Bedaux system from the dark years of the 1930s. 
Consequently the trade unions found it difficult to 
formulate a consistent policy on redeployment.
The cautious and ambivalent policies of the unions
and employers over redeployment created uncertainty and 
inertia. Neither side wanted to antagonise the other. 
Neither side wanted to make concessions which their own 
supporters would repudiate. In consequence, discussions 
over changes in staffing, the reform of wage systems, 
and the introduction of work study techniques took years 
rather than months. As we shall see, the government took 
a very dim view of the industry's response to 
redep1oyment.
II
Progress towards redeployment in spinning is 
considered in this section. A cursory study of the 
subject might create the impression that the 
implementation of the Evershed Commission's proposals 
constituted the most radical departure in methods of 
labour utilization in the cotton spinning industry 
between 1945 and 1950. But this was far from the case, 
and the movement for the introduction of forms of labour 
utilization based on work measurement techniques takes 
on equal significance when viewed from a longer 
perspective.
In the previous chapter the report of the Evershed 
Commission was discussed in some detail.(21) Evershed 
advocated the introduction of new methods of staffing 
and new wage lists for many operatives in the cotton 
spinning industry. In the interests of reaching a speedy 
and generally acceptable report, the Commission did not 
attempt to employ work measurement principles to set 
workloads. The staffing arrangements advocated in the
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report were based on rule-of-thumb estimates. In the 
mule-spinning section the Evershed Commission was 
primarily concerned with improving the status of 
semi-skilled workers. It recommended the replacement of 
the traditional staffing arrangement for a pair of 
mules, i.e. spinner, big piecer, and little piecer, by a 
system of staffing comprising a spinner and one or more
to
assistant spinners. Teams of ancillary workers and mule 
assistants would perform menial tasks such as sweeping, 
cleaning, and carrying bobbins. The change was minimal, 
although to be fair the mule room offered little scope 
for improvements in labour utilization. In the
ring-spinning section there were no major departures in 
job specifications or workloads in the Evershed 
proposals. Workloads would be increased in the 
preparatory section, but the new machine complements 
were not related to the findings of work studies.(22)
Existing forms of staffing in mule-spinning were 
abolished in late 1946 and replaced by the Evershed 
system, but the revision of labour practices in the
ring-spinning and preparatory sections was delayed until 
January 1948. The reform of staffing levels brought 
about by the Evershed Commission was more apparent than 
real. The best that can be said for the Evershed 
proposals is that "they gave rough justice between
operatives".(23) In some respects it might have been 
better had the Evershed Report been shelved, for it
installed a rigid new orthodoxy in labour utilization 
which was difficult for innovating firms to overcome.
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A modest degree of progress was made in the 
application of work measurement techniques to cotton 
spinning during the 1940s, although the movement 
suffered several important reverses. In 1945 work study 
tests commenced at the Cotton Board's experimental 
station at Wye No. 2 ring-spinning mill in Shaw, with 
the formal support of the executive committees of the
to
Operative Spinners and the Cardroom Workers. The work 
study team discovered a substantial amount of 
underloading and was able to secure a 45 per cent 
increase in output per operative hour by introducing new 
forms of labour utilization. Following this success it 
was decided to hold further tests at Wye Mill in January
1946. Unfortunately this decision was taken in the
absence of Mr. A.C.C. Robertson of the Oldham Cardroom 
Workers, who had been looking for a good excuse to 
disrupt proceedings. Robertson and the local Oldham
Cardroom Workers had been opposed to the experiments 
from the start, as they believed that the employers 
intended to use the intensification of work as a 
substitute for investment in new machinery. George
Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, was called in to settle 
the dispute, but Robertson was immovable and the Wye 
Mill experiments had to be abandoned.(24)
A second series of Cotton Board work study trials 
was carried out between January and July 1947 in the 
card room of the Fine Spinners and Doublers 
Association's Musgrave No. 7 Mill at Bolton. On this 
occasion the full co-operation of the local trade union
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was obtained. Changes were made to the layout of the 
machinery and each worker received a larger complement 
of machinery. During the experiment output in the 
cardroom increased by 15 per cent notwithstanding a 21 
per cent reduction in the number of operatives. Earnings 
per operative rose by 30 per cent, and at the* end of the 
trial the workers and their union representatives
to
resolved to retain the new system at the mill.(25)
Concurrently with these trials, the Shirley
Institute was conducting a series of "Abbreviated 
Surveys", or mini-work studies, at 100 spinning mills. 
These surveys, which became available in 1947, revealed 
very wide variations in labour productivity between 
mills spinning comparable yarns, suggesting the 
existence of a substantial measure of underloading at 
many mills. No actual experiments were made with new
methods of labour utilization, but it was estimated 
that, if the average output per operative hour in the 
coarse-medium spinning section could be increased to the 
level of the most efficient 25 per cent of mills, output 
per worker in the card and ring rooms would increase by 
30 per cent. These results could be achieved by partial 
redeployment, and full redeployment would enable even 
greater improvements in labour productivity to be
made.(26)
The Shirley Institute"s findings stimulated
considerable interest in government circles. Attempts to 
attract labour into the cotton spinning industry were 
having little success, while re-equipment was proceeding
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at an extremely slow pace.(27) During 1947 the
Technology and Operational Research Panel of the
Committee on Industrial Productivity turned its
attention to the question of labour utilization in the
spinning section. A Study Group on Cotton Productivity 
was established, and in early 1948 it reported that with 
the better utilization of labour in the spinning
section:
"The output of the industry can be 
increased...more rapidly than by large-scale 
re-equipment...and more permanently than by 
the working of longer hours...So far as the 
total labour force of the industry is 
concerned, increased numbers can only come
from imported labour or as a result of drastic 
restrictions on alternative employment in the 
cotton areas".(28)
Two complementary policies were recommended. 
Firstly, the government should encourage the employers 
and the trade unions to press ahead with the full
redeployment of mills according to the principles of 
work measurement. A Cotton Board publicity campaign 
should be run to disseminate information on the 
advantages of work study. Firms of industrial 
consultants should be encouraged to make cotton their 
priority in cases where there were conflicting demands 
for their services; futhermore they should be asked to 
train selected cotton managers in the use of work study 
techniques. Secondly, the industry should also be 
encouraged to institute a programme of 'Spring 
Cleaning': the results of the 'Abbreviated Surveys' had
encouraged the belief that substantial improvements 
could be made in labour utilization without the full
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implementation of work measurement techniques. The 
Shirley Institute should provide firms with technical 
advice on procedures for "Spring Cleaning", while the 
Ministry of Labour should establish a special 
conciliation service to deal with any disputes which 
arose. A Human Factors Panel, staffed by economic 
historians (I), would be set up to help with the "social 
and psychological" aspects of redeployment.(29) The 
success of full redeployment and "Spring Cleaning" would 
depend on the willingness of the unions to permit 
exceptions to the principles of labour utilization 
enshrined in the Evershed Report.
In considering this report, the Committee on 
Industrial Productivity despondently noted that the 
industry had so far shown virtually no interest in the 
idea of "Spring Cleaning".(30) This was unfortunate, as 
the prospects for successful "Spring Cleaning" were 
considerably better than those for full redeployment, in 
view of the chronic shortage of work study consultants. 
The Technology and Operational Research Panel calculated 
that, by March 1948, only five per cent of spinning 
mills had been fully redeployed. Associated Industrial 
Consultants Ltd. (A.I.C.), one of the main companies in 
the work study field, claimed to have improved output 
per operative hour by an average of 50 per cent in fully 
redeployed ring rooms, and 40 per cent in fully 
redeployed card rooms. Average earnings in these mills 
had risen by 25 per cent, so that average labour costs 
had fallen by about 20 per cent. But although these
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savings were substantial, it was feared that the
shortage of industrial consultants would make it
impossible for more than one per cent of spinning mills 
to be fully redeployed each year.(31) This problem was
treated very seriously. After pressure from the
government the Cotton Board opened a work study school 
at Manchester in October 1949 to teach the principles of
to
work measurement techniques to managers and trade union 
officials in the spinning section.(32)
Most of the leading members of the F.M.C.S.A. were 
anxious to see a more widespread adoption of work
measurement principles. Employers found that the 
attitude of the trade unions to work study varied widely 
between districts. Local unions were most co-operative 
in the fine spinning areas such as Bolton, but could be 
extremely obstructive in Oldham and other coarse 
spinning towns. A Redeployment Sub-committee was 
established by the F.M.C.S.A. in 1948, to collect 
information from redeployed mills and advise firms which 
were considering introducing modern methods of work 
organization. Firms were also provided with a list of 
reputable industrial consultants and warned to beware of 
"others [who] possess little more than great 
self-confidence, a good line in sales talk, a smattering 
of knowledge and the firm intention to cash in on what 
they take to be a rising market."(33) Uniformity of wage 
rates was one of the main advantages of the Evershed and 
Aronson Lists and their predecessors. But in the absence 
of a central agreement to regulate target wages and
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piece-rates in reorganized mills, there was a danger of 
earnings varying widely between reorganized mills. Each 
redeployed mill set its own target wage and instituted 
its own wage list, in line with the findings of its work 
study consultants. This situation threatened to lead to 
jealousy between operatives and possibly industrial 
unrest. One of the major functions of the Redeployment 
Sub-committee was to encourage the introduction of 
similar rates of pay at each redeployed mill.(34)
The F.M.C.S.A. was eager to negotiate with the 
Operative Spinners and the Cardroom Workers about the 
procedures that should be followed in the application of 
work measurement techniques to the industry. Mr Alfred 
Roberts, the secretary of the Cardroom Workers, found 
himself in an exceptionally difficult situation. He had 
toured the United States, where he had been convinced of 
the desirability of introducing modern methods of labour 
utilization in Lancashire mills. But he recognised that 
most operatives were still highly suspicious of 
stop-watch techniques. Roberts explained that he would 
have to "oppose any attempt to impose [work measurement] 
upon any group of operatives...It should continue or end 
by their free vote."(35) Mr A.C.C. Robertson and the 
Oldham and Rochdale Cardroom Workers continued their 
campaign of opposition to any deviation from established 
practices. This caused the government some concern and 
Harold Wilson, the President of the Board of Trade, 
secretly met with Roberts and other Cardroom Workers 
leaders to plot against the powerful delegation from
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Oldham.(36) In the event the Cardroom Workers could 
offer little more than a promise -to treat each 
individual work study application on its own merits.
Discussions about the application of work study
methods to mule-spinning were opened with the Operative
Spinners in July 1949. In September a General
Representative Meeting voted in favour of preliminary
*
trials by 48 to 26. At a time of national crisis the 
Operative Spinners Amalgamation was concerned not to be 
seen as a defender of restrictive labour practices, but 
it expected little would be gained from the application 
of work study techniques to mule-spinning: "Having
regard to the changes of deployment already provided for 
in the recent Evershed List, the workload is now at a 
maximum."(37) The trials were not a great success. At 
Britannia Mill, Bury, the spinners were asked to take a 
reduction in piece-rates after their workloads had been 
calculated. Quite naturally they refused, and the trial 
was cancelled.(38) However the Operative Spinners 
decided that their Executive Council would consider 
applications for permission to introduce new methods of 
labour utilization from individual firms. (39) Thus the
F.M.C.S.A. failed to achieve a general agreement on
internal redeployment with either of the main unions.
Work study applications proceeded by means of
negotiations at each individual mill. By 1950 21 per
cent of mills (i.e. 104) affiliated to the F.M.C.S.A. 
were using forms of labour utilization derived from work 
measurement techniques in one or more departments, while
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another 15 mills were just about to commence work
studies.(40) Successful applications of work study
techniques were always accompanied by full consultations
with the unions and the operatives. In this respect
Greenhalgh and Shaw and English Sewing Cotton were model
employers. At the end of the War Greenhalgh and Shaw
Ltd. embarked upon a substantial programme of
*
reorganization in their preparatory, ring-spinning, and 
doubling departments. Their objective was to overcome a 
chronic shortage of female labour, which prevented the 
firm from working at more than 61 per cent of productive 
capacity during 1945. Before any action was taken the 
district secretaries of the relevant unions were invited 
to discuss procedures with the firm. Works Councils were 
established and their co-operation was sought and 
obtained at each stage of the reorganization of the work 
process. By 1948 Greenhalgh and Shaw had secured a 21 
per cent increase in output per operative-hour and 
production had returned to full capacity, achievements 
which the management attributed directly to changes in 
methods of labour utilization.(41) English Sewing Cotton 
used similar methods to achieve the successful 
introduction of a wage system based on work measurement 
and the reallocation of duties at its spinning mills. As 
a result, between 1949 and 1954 the production of yarn 
at English Sewing Cotton's Stanhill ring-spinning mill 
increased by 50 per cent, despite a 15 per cent 
reduction in the workforce.(42)
Nevertheless employers continued to suffer setbacks
147
in their plans for the extension of work measurement 
techniques. For instance, in 1950 can-tenters (a grade 
of preparatory worker) at the Werneth Spinning Company 
in Oldham, went on strike to demand a 30 per cent 
increase in their rates of pay. At that time the 
can-tenters were paid according to the Aronson List, 
which had been established under the recommendations of
to
the Evershed Report. Employers were horrified by this
wage claim, for they believed that the can-tenters were
already grossly underloaded. The F.M.C.S.A. pressed for
work studies to determine a proper workload for
can-tenters, which they hoped would form the basis for
negotiations on a new wage list. Indeed Werneth was
regarded as a major test case by the employers: "In the
country's interests, as well as in the interests of the
industry, we are not justified in accepting this and
adopting a passive attitude."(43) But this time the
employers had to capitulate. A.C.C. Robertson and the
Oldham Cardroom Workers staunchly refused to agree to
the employers' proposals, and were able to enforce the
continuation of the staffing arrangements specified in
the Aronson Agreement. Werneth was by no means an
isolated episode and similar cases caused intense
frustration among the ranks of the F.M.C.S.A. One local
spinning masters' secretary complained that:
"There is nothing so discouraging as the 
'horse-trading' method especially in regard to 
new machines, or new arrangements. What we 
object to most is that the Unions are opposed 
to bargaining on a scientific, objective and 
impartial basis, insisting on trials of 
strength. And this produces the unevenness of 
the workload, so that some operatives are
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considerably underloaded compared with
others."(44)
Pruthi's hypothesis that the introduction of the 
Evershed and Aronson Lists was detrimental to the 
development of wage systems based on work measurement 
was certainly borne out in the Werneth case.(45) The 
unions were very reluctant to stray from these lists, 
which had only been secured after difficult and 
protracted negotiations. Had the Bolton and Oldham 
mule-spinning lists, and the old ring-spinning and 
cardroom lists managed to survive the Evershed 
investigation, it is likely that the operatives would 
have been more amenable to new developments in labour 
utilization.
Changes in methods of labour utilization had a 
negligible effect on productivity in the spinning 
section between 1945 and 1950, although some quite 
spectacular results could be obtained at the level of 
the individual firm. Consequently these innovations made 
little contribution to the resolution of the industry's 
labour shortage. In 1948 a Cotton Board survey showed 
that output per operative-hour in the spinning section 
fell by five per cent between May 1939 and November 
1947.(46) Later research suggested that there was no 
appreciable change in productivity in cotton spinning 
between 1948 and 1952.(47) During the 1940s it would 
appear that labour productivity was held back by poor 
standards of machine maintenance, the dubious quality of 
raw cotton supplies, high absenteeism, and the shortage 
of experienced operatives. These difficulties were
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largely a product of the war.
Few significant improvements in the efficiency of 
labour utilization in cotton spinning followed from the 
recommendations of the Evershed Report, which largely
reproduced the status quo. Most of Lancashire ignored 
the call for 'Spring Cleaning', i.e. partial 
redeployment, while the application of full work 
measurement studies proceeded at far too slow a pace to 
have had a major impact on productivity in the industry 
at large: indeed in 1950 redeployment was proceeding at 
the unsatisfactory rate of two mills per month.
Substantial increases in the efficiency of labour
utilization in the cotton spinning industry were held 
back by the shortage of work study consultants, the
ambivalent attitude of the trade unions, and the 
complacency of many employers.
Ill
In the weaving section the struggle for
redeployment revolved around the twin issues of the wage 
lists and the number of looms to be assigned to each 
weaver. Between 1940 and 1950 steps were taken to
develop greater flexibility in labour utilization in 
Lancashire loom weaving. These moves culminated in the 
introduction of the Cotton Manufacturing Commission 
(C.M.C.) system in 1949, which incorporated many of the 
principles of work measurement. Although the consent of 
the workforce was required before the C.M.C. system 
could be applied at a particular mill, it enabled
employers to to tailor loom complements to the
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particular circumstances of the shed.
At the outbreak of World War Two there were several
alternative systems of labour utilization in operation
in the weaving section. Approximately 80 per cent of
operatives were employed under the terms of the Uniform
Lists for Lancashire loom weaving. The Uniform Lists had
been introduced between 1890 and 1914 and specified
•»
piece-rates for weavers operating six, four, or fewer 
looms.(48) Since the mid 1930s about 15 per cent of 
weaving operatives had been paid according to the 'More 
Looms' lists, which set piece-rates for Lancashire loom 
weavers working with complements of eight looms. The 
remaining weavers (under five per cent) operated 
automatic looms. As there was no central agreement on 
piece-rates or machine complements in the automatic loom 
section, many firms were able to reorganize their sheds 
in accordance with the findings of work study 
investigations.(49)
The Lancashire loom lists were extremely 
unsatisfactory. They had evolved in an unplanned 
fashion, and the loom complements which they specified 
bore little relation to those which would have prevailed 
had workloads been established by work measurement 
techniques. Over the years the introduction of new and 
unusual varieties of cloth, yarn, and equipment had led 
to a number of special clauses being added to the 
original Uniform Lists. For instance, between 1900 and 
1914 rayon cloth began to be woven in the cotton 
industry. Initially it was more difficult to weave rayon
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than cotton cloth; consequently a series of ’Rayon 
Differentials’ were incorporated into the Uniform List 
to give rayon weavers up to 15/- more in their weekly 
wage packets than ordinary weavers.
Before long the Uniform List contained 43 separate 
clauses, mainly dealing with additions to the basic 
piece-rates. These additions were made on a percentage 
basis and were calculated cumulatively; moreover their 
amount was determined primarily by the relative strength 
of the unions and the employers at the time of their 
negotiation.(50) Consequently there was often only a 
tenuous relationship between weavers' workloads and 
earnings under the Lancashire loom lists. Operatives 
weaving 'good sorts’ obtained high wages for relatively 
little effort, while operatives weaving ’bad sorts’ were 
inadequately compensated for difficult or arduous work. 
Once a new clause had been added to the Uniform Lists it 
achieved the status of holy writ, and was rarely amended 
despite changing circumstances. For example, by the 
1930s and 1940s the quality of rayon yarn had improved 
to such an extent that man-made fibre cloth could be 
woven just as easily as cotton, but no attempt was made 
to eliminate the rayon differentials, and as a result 
rayon weaving became a privileged occupation.
Thus the Lancashire loom lists imposed penalties on 
firms weaving certain types of cloth, including rayon, 
while they artificially reduced the wage costs of firms 
producing simpler cloths. In times of labour shortage it 
was difficult to find any weavers who were prepared to
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put up with working on the bad sorts. Archaic wage lists
and forms of work organization were distorting the
industry's product range, and it would be fair to say
that neither the employers nor the trade unions were
particularly happy with the status quo.
“If the proper aim of a wages system for 
cotton weaving is to relate reward to effort, 
then the Uniform List is fundamentally 
unsound, because it largely ignores the two 
factors [i.e. the length of time needed to 
change shuttles containing the weft and to 
repair breakages in the warp] which chiefly 
determine the amount of effort required from 
the weaver."(51)
During World War Two careful consideration was 
given to the question of reforming the Lancashire loom 
lists. Mr Andrew Naesmith and the A.W.A. were gravely 
concerned about the low wages of weavers on bad sorts. 
In 1935 a minimum wage had been introduced for 'More 
Looms' weavers.(52) A lengthy campaign was mounted for 
the extension of the guaranteed minimum wage to 
four-loom weavers who were paid under the Uniform Lists, 
and this point was finally conceded by the C.S.M.A. in 
December 1942 after the issue had been brought before 
the industry's Conciliation Committee.(53)
However, the introduction of a minimum wage was 
merely a palliative, designed to deal with the symptoms 
rather than the causes of bad sorts. A complete overhaul 
of the Lancashire loom lists would be required to enable 
the industry to combat the inevitable postwar labour 
shortage and to make weaving a more attractive 
occupation to new entrants in the long run. In 1943 the 
C.S.M.A. set up a 'Special Wages Sub-Committee' to look
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at the possibilities for reform. At the suggestion of Mr 
Yerkess, an outspoken employer from Nelson, the Special 
Wages Sub-Committee decided to commission a report from 
the Shirley Institute on the advantages of 
systematically applying time study techniques to 
Lancashire loom weaving.(54)
Work , study experts from the Shirley Institute 
measured the time needed for an average weaver to change 
a shuttle and to repair a broken warp (warp and weft 
work) in an average mill producing several kinds of 
cloth. Obviously timings varied according to the type of 
cloth to be woven. This information facilitated the 
calculation of the number of operations that an average 
weaver of each grade of cloth could perform in a given 
period. Under such a system, a weaver would be assigned 
a sufficient number of looms to enable the performance 
of a full load of warp and weft work in the given 
period. Piece-rates would be manipulated to ensure that 
ail fully loaded weavers attained the same target wage, 
irrespective of the type of cloth they were producing. 
Hence, weavers would be paid according to the work which 
they did and not on the basis of the arbitrary clauses 
of the old lists. Consequently all operatives of equal 
skill and diligence should receive the same wage 
regardless of the sort which they were weaving.(55)
Shirley Institute investigators visited a selection 
of mills and found that many four-loom weavers were 
grossly underloaded.(56) A number of employers 
volunteered to take part in trials using the Shirley
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Institute scheme. Unfortunately the Shirley Institute 
system was not free of anomalies, and weavers of
different cloths continued to earn different wages. Warp 
and weft work timings based on industry-wide averages 
failed to take into account the special circumstances at 
each mill and could not provide for the infinite
variation in cloth construction. Therefore the Shirley
Institute's scheme was unable to equalise workloads in 
mills across the county.(57)
Only a system of labour utilization depending on 
comprehensive work studies at each individual mill could 
ensure the equalization of workloads and earnings. The
R.W.A. had produced plans for such a scheme, but the
C.S.M.A. believed that it would be impractical. Firstly, 
the performance of full work studies at every mill in 
the county would have been extremely expensive.
Secondly, there was a serious shortage of industrial
consultants. Thirdly, both the C.S.M.A. and A.W.A.
wanted a wage system which would be suitable for 
'legalisation' in case depression returned to the 
industry. In 1935 the government had made the Uniform 
Lists legally enforcable to prevent wages being reduced 
by maverick employers. But it would be almost impossible 
to legalise the R.W.A.'s scheme, as different
piece-rates would be required at each mill to enable
all weavers to earn the centrally determined target 
wage.(58)
The report of the C.S.M.A.'s Special Wages
Sub-Committee (October 1944) unreservedly called for the
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abolition of the Uniform Lists. But serious doubts were
expressed about the Shirley Institute and R.W.A.
schemes, neither of which made special provision for
additional payments to such groups as rayon weavers. 
Although the C.S.M.A. accepted that rayon differentials 
etc. were unjustified, they feared that the A.W.A. would 
not accept any scheme which would deprive some of their 
members of a long established privilege. The report
concluded that an amended version of the Shirley
Institute's scheme, which took into account the need to
retain the guaranteed minimum wage and certain special 
payments might be acceptable.(59)
Union members were taken aback by this report. They 
had vigorously opposed redeployment and work measurement 
during the interwar period, and were now being asked to 
abandon the legalised Uniform Lists in favour of a
system which left indeterminate machine complements for
Lancashire loom weavers. Nevertheless, in April 1945 two 
members of the Shirley Institute staff were invited to 
explain their plans to the A.W.A. Central Committee. It 
was reported that an "interesting discussion" took 
place. (60) Several years later one A.W.A. official
eloquently explained the rationale for the union's
cautious attitude towards changes in labour utilization:
"The protective walls of Unionism against 
unemployment, which we have erected during the 
last hundred years in the protracted struggle 
against capitalist exploitation, cannot 
crumble in one or two years... People are 
afraid that if they give up their small 
protective defences, they will stand unarmed 
if the trial of strength comes once more and
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full employment comes to an end."(61)
In late 1945 the deliberations of the Evershed 
Commission led the weaving industry to anticipate that a 
similar commission was in the offing for their own 
section. In principle the C.S.M.A. was in favour of such 
an initiative, but lived in mortal fear that it would 
result in a general levelling up of wages, possibly to 
the rates earned by rayon weavers.(62) This expectation 
was fuelled by the recommendation of the Board of Trade 
Working Party Report in early 1946 that: "A review of 
wages arrangements and methods of organization of work 
should be made in all sections."(63) As spinning had 
already been the subject of a detailed investigation, 
the clear implication was that weaving should be next. 
In July 1946 Sir Raymond Streat reported to the C.S.M.A. 
that since "London is honestly fumbling with the Report 
with no fixed ideas or policy", it was up to the 
industry itself to take the initiative if it wanted a 
fair deal.(64) The government was bound to ask for a 
wages commission and the C.S.M.A. must show eagerness to 
co-operate. Employers * leaders resolved to follow 
Streat's advice and adopt a positive attitude to any 
calls for an enquiry. The following week Streat was able 
to elicit a similar promise from the A.W.A.’s Central 
Committee.(65)
George Isaacs, the Minister of Labour, announced in 
November 1946 that he would be setting up a commission 
to devise a new method of labour utilization for the 
Lancashire loom weaving section. Mr R. Moelwyn Hughes
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K.C. chaired the Cotton Manufacturing Commission, which 
consisted of three independent members plus five each 
from the C.S.M.A. and A.W.A.. External events gave the 
deliberations greater urgency. During 1947 the 
government was forging ahead with its plans for a 
re-equipment subsidy for the spinning section. One of 
the conditions for the receipt of a re-equipment grant 
would be the willingness of the firm and its operatives 
to introduce modern methods of labour utilization. 
Weaving employers hoped that a similar investment 
subsidy would be made available for the purchase of new 
looms and were anxious to proceed with the establishment 
of a new wage list.(66)
The Cotton Manufacturing Commission produced an 
interim report in early 1948. Two crucial assumptions 
underlay the Commission's recommendations. Firstly, that 
trade would be sufficiently buoyant to prevent 
redeployment leading to a net loss of jobs in the 
industry. Secondly, that automatic looms could not be 
produced in sufficient numbers to re-equip the industry 
in the near future.
Some rayon weaving sheds outside the North West 
area (and therefore not subject to the Uniform Lists) 
were able to run their Lancashire looms in complements 
of up to 48 per operative, but the restrictive clauses 
of the Uniform Lists were holding back all progress in 
Lancashire: "We have been told that the craft of weaving
in Lancashire is still the same in all important 
respects as it was half a century ago. It is hardly too
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much to say that the Uniform List has seen to that.. . the 
Uniform Lists must go."(67)
Setting out the principles which must govern the 
new list, the Commission stressed that it must enable 
the great majority of operatives to increase their 
earnings, otherwise it would be unacceptable to the 
unions; however those currently weaving particularly 
well paid sorts might have to accept a reduction in 
wages.(68) The Commission decided to recommend a wage 
list based on the Shirley Institute scheme, as it was 
thought that the R.W.A.'s plan for a full work 
measurement study at each mill would have been 
unworkable. Several amendments to the scheme as it stood 
would be necessary: for instance, the guaranteed minimum 
wage would be retained. In a concession to expediency 
the rayon differentials would also continue, although at 
a considerably reduced level. The interim report 
concluded that the new C.M.C. List should be optional, 
with firms free to use the old lists if they or their 
operatives so desired. This was in sharp contrast to the 
Evershed proposals which involved the abolition of the 
prevailing lists. However, it was imperative that the 
C.M.C. List be speedily introduced: "We cannot wait
years before the cotton manufacturing industry has its 
proper chance to contribute more fully to the vital 
needs of our export trade and of our own homes."(69)
Reaction to the Commission's report was mixed. 
Herbert Morrison, the Lord President of the Council, 
told a rally at Belle Vue, Manchester, that redeployment
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would form an essential part of the industry’s
production drive, while most employers Were generally
favourable to its recommendations.(70) The trade union
response was less fulsome. Andrew Naesmith, still
general secretary of the A.W.A., welcomed the report as
"revolutionary" and predicted that the C.M.C. List would
soon entirely supplant the Uniform Lists.(71) Not all of
*
Mr Naesmith’s members, particularly in rayon weaving and 
high wage centres such as Nelson, Colne, and Padiham, 
shared his enthusiasm.(72) Nevertheless the industry 
resolved to proceed with a number of ’notional’ 
experiments to find out what effect the C.M.C. List 
would have on wages. These experiments took several 
months and by January 1949 the government was growing 
increasingly impatient with the weaving section’s
dilatory progress, threatening to set up a Wages Council 
to implement the C.M.C. List regardless of the
industry’s attitude.(73)
The results of the ’notional’ experiments showed 
that (without redeployment) the C.M.C. List would reduce 
the earnings of rayon weavers and operatives producing 
mixtures and some coloured cloths by up to 25 per cent. 
But it was expected that these losses would be more than 
offset after redeployment. Underloading, especially in 
rayon weaving sheds, was descibed as "ludicrous". Most 
cotton weavers could easily take on several more looms, 
while rayon weavers could tend up to eight more looms 
without being overworked. To support their case, the 
Commission referred to data from ten mills which had
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tried out the C.M.C. List in conjunction with a major 
reorganization of the work process. Output per operative 
hour increased by an average of 89.4 per cent, while 
average earnings rose by an average of 43.2 per cent. It 
was pointed out that these were model sheds and that 
such spectacular results could not always be 
expected.(74)
*
Dissension in the Nelson area was not quelled by
these results. Nelson's employers continued to complain
that they would be left "high and dry" by the C.M.C.
Lists, as their weavers would not accept the
introduction of the system. They proposed the addition
of a quality bonus for weavers in areas producing fine
cloths and were the only group within the C.S.M.A. to
vote against endorsement of the C.M.C. Lists.(75) The
Nelson Weavers Association stridently opposed the C.M.C.
List and warned that:
"The drive for redeployment is taking place on 
the old machinery. It is in many cases 
becoming a cover for the old pre-war 
rationalisation with a drive for speed-up and 
exploitation. It is true that in some cases 
the bait offered to the worker is increased 
earnings, but the amount of increase is not 
commensurate with the speed up in the 
work."(76)
In November 1949 agreement was finally reached 
between the A.W.A. and C.S.M.A. on implementation of the 
C.M.C. List. The A.W.A. insisted that the new list could 
only be introduced after a ballot of the operatives at 
the mill concerned, although this was not always 
followed in practice. It was resolved that a special 
enquiry should look into the question of the rayon
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differentials in an attempt to placate the Nelson 
interest, but little came of this proposal.(77) Three 
years had elapsed since the establishment of the Cotton 
Manufacturing Commission in 1946. Negotiations had been 
painfully slow as a result of suspicions on both sides, 
and this was undoubtedly detrimental to the redeployment 
movement in the weaving section as a whole.
The C.M.C. system was not based on the application 
of work measurement techniques at mill level; therefore 
it could not guarantee that workers at different firms 
were assigned exactly the same workload. Nevertheless 
the C.M.C. List constituted the best approximation under 
the circumstances.(78) Operatives in redeployed mills 
using the C.M.C. system enjoyed an increase in earnings 
of about 32 per cent. (79) Unfortunately the new list was 
introduced too late for it to have had a major impact on 
productivity or the postwar labour shortage. Only four 
per cent of mills had introduced the C.M.C. List by the 
end of 1950.(80) Lomax estimated that between 1948 and 
1952 productivity in weaving rose by a mere 1.8 per cent 
per annum.(81) The Cotton Manufacturing Commission's 
recommmendations had been far more ambitious than those 
of the Evershed Commission, but they had been stifled by 
the same environment of inertia and suspicion.
IV
"A great wealth lies dormant in the mills and 
sheds of Lancashire which can, by 
redeployment, be used for the benefit of all 
concerned...[but the wage lists] had
conceived, brought forth and nurtured, a 
Frankenstein monster which, by its cloying 
grasp, envelops the trade, barring the way to 
progress".(82)
R.J. Gigli, A.I.C. Ltd, 1947.
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Ministers had hoped that the cotton industry could 
be induced to reform its methods of labour utilization, 
thereby assisting Lancashire to contribute to the export 
drive between 1945 and 1950. The results were 
disappointing. Discussions on schemes involving the 
reform of labour practices took longer than could 
reasonably have been expected. Employers were reluctant 
to force the pace and risk strikes at a time when they 
were already making substantial profits. The unions 
themselves were unsure how to proceed. In the twenties 
and thirties they had fought the intensification of work 
on the grounds that it increased the exploitation of 
their members and threatened them with unemployment. 
Although in 1945 it seemed unlikely, to men such as 
Naesmith, that unemployment would return in the 
short-term, it was not easy to convince the 
rank-and-file that things had changed.
In these circumstances it was perhaps inevitable 
that negotiations should be convoluted and almost 
interminable. Slow progress in redeployment put 
additional constraints on Lancashire's contribution to 
the production and export drives of the 1940s, and 
reduced the industry's ability to stand up to renewed 
overseas competition in the 1950s.
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INVESTMENT IN THE LANCASHIRE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1945-51.
The re-equipment of Lancashire's elderly fixed
capital stock was commonly regarded as one of the prime
tasks facing the cotton industry at the end of World War
Two. A substantial investment programme was considered
important on two counts: to assist the industry to save
*
scarce labour and increase its output, thereby raising 
cotton's contribution to the nation's postwar export 
drive; and in the longer term to enable British mills to 
regain their international competitiveness.
Little had been done to re-equip the industry 
during the interwar years, when low profits, failing 
confidence, and the depressed state of demand had made 
investment a particularly unattractive proposition. In 
1945 mule spindles still made up the lion's share of 
British cotton spinning capacity, while in most other 
countries the mule was virtually extinct. The vast 
majority of mule spindles had been installed before 
World War One, with few, if any, new mules constructed 
after the mid 1920s.(1) In weaving Britain was unique 
among major cotton textile producing regions in 
persisting with the Victorian technology of the 
Lancashire loom. Over 90 per cent of looms in place in 
British mills in 1945 were aging Lancashire looms, the 
automatic loom having gained only a small foothold in 
the weaving sheds. It was clear to everyone, the 
government, the unions, and the employers' federations, 
that this state of affairs could not be allowed to
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continue, that Lancashire would have to re-equip if the 
future was to be met with confidence.
This chapter discusses the progress made towards 
re-equipment between 1945 and 1951.(2) In the event 
Lancashire's achievement was minimal. Section I 
considers the re-equipment plans devised by the 
government and the industry at the end of the war, and 
contrasts these ambitious programmes with the low level 
of investment in cotton during the late 1940s. Section 
II provides a theoretical background for the following 
analysis of the reasons for Lancashire's failure to 
invest. In Section III factors influencing the demand 
for textile machinery are considered, while Section IV 
looks at the supply of textile machinery. The general 
conclusion is that a combination of low levels of 
capacity utilization, uncertainty about the long run 
demand for British cotton textiles, the low fixed costs 
of continuing to operate with old machinery, technical 
inter-relatedness, and the inadequacy of supplies of 
certain crucial items of equipment, were the main 
constraints on investment in Lancashire between 1945 and 
1951.
I
After the debacle of the 1920s and 1930s few people 
involved with the cotton industry questioned the need 
for some measure of modernization, although doubts 
remained over the appropriate nature and extent of 
re-equipment. There was no shortage of grandiloquent 
schemes for re-equipping Lancashire's spinning mills and
weaving sheds. The most authoritative of these 
programmes will receive consideration in the first part 
of this section; in the second part the evidence, such 
as it is, on the level of investment in the cotton 
industry during the late 1940s will be examined.
In 1944 the Cotton Board Committee to Enquire into 
Post-War Problems reported that many firms were eager to 
re-equip, provided the government could assure them of 
the maintenance of stability in the markets for raw 
cotton, cotton textiles, and textile machinery. A survey 
conducted for the Cotton Board estimated that the 
industry had firm plans to place orders for plant and 
machinery worth £43M at prewar prices.(3) But several 
preconditions would have to be met before firms would 
have the confidence to implement their re-equipment 
plans. Firstly, the government would have to promise to 
follow a 'sound policy' towards the industry, 
guaranteeing a regime of minimum prices to prevent the 
re-emergence of weak selling (the sale of output below 
cost-price), establishing a redundancy scheme to 
eliminate excess capacity, and taking political action 
to ensure that cheap foreign cloth would not be allowed 
to overrun Lancashire's export markets. Secondly, there 
would have to be an agreement between the government, 
the cotton industry, and the textile machinery industry 
to facilitate an adequate supply of new equipment. This 
agreement would include plans for the early release of 
textile machinery works from munitions production, and 
the assignment to textile machinery makers of priority
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access to supplies of skilled labour and raw materials. 
There would also be understandings on the proportion of 
textile machinery to be exported and on the pursuance of 
a responsible pricing policy for new looms and spinning 
equipment. Given these measures the Cotton Board was 
confident that re-equipment could proceed without an 
investment subsidy. But this belief in the industry's 
ability to raise the finance for re-equipment without 
government assistance was not universally shared. The
United Textile Factory Workers' Association, the 
political arm of the cotton unions, warned that "the 
public...have already lost large sums" lending to
Lancashire and may not want to risk more, in which case
the state should provide the cash for re-equipment.(4)
In broad terms the significance of the 1944 Cotton 
Board report did not lie in the spuriously exact figure 
specified for firms' investment plans, but in the
assertion that expectations were crucial to the decision 
to re-equip. Nevertheless the government chose largely 
to ignore the 1944 report and appeared unsympathetic 
towards proposals for price maintenance and redundancy 
schemes, and action to curb the resurgence of Japanese 
competition.(5) Talks were initiated between the cotton 
and textile machinery industries but these proved of 
dubious value, as will be seen in section IV. By casting 
aside the Cotton Board's recommendations for measures to 
restore confidence to Lancashire, the government created 
a serious rift between itself and the cotton industry.
Further prominence was given to the re-equipment
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issue by the publication, also in 1944, of the report of 
the Ministry of Production's Textile Mission to the 
U.S.A.. The Platt Report, named after its chairman Frank 
Platt, stressed that labour productivity in British 
mills was far below that in U.S. mills.(6) Platt claimed 
that the use of archaic machinery contributed to 
Britain's low level of productivity. He recommended that 
Lancashire should increasingly concentrate on modern 
ring spinning systems (i.e high-drafting) and automatic 
looms. One manufacturer described the Platt Report as 
"terrifying", but it probably did more to raise 
employers' hackles than to spur them on to more rapid 
modernization.(7) A leading spinning employer, J.A. 
Barber-Lomax, complained that Lancashire was already 
doing its best to re-equip and that the installation of 
the latest spinning technology often led to a reduction 
in yarn quality.(8) In the weaving section the C.S.M.A. 
considered the Platt Report, but came to the lame 
conclusion that substantial progress could be made 
through the reconditioning of existing machinery, 
without resorting to extensive re-equipment.(9)
Trade unionists were generally more effusive in 
their advocacy of large-scale re-equipment, possibly 
because they would not have to foot the bill. Leaders of 
the ring spinners' and weavers' unions were particularly 
enthusiastic about new techniques. Andrew Naesmith, 
general secretary of the A.W.A., "wanted to see a wide 
expansion in the use of automatic looms, something like
250,000 operating alongside 150,000 Lancashire
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looms. (10) Hardly surprisingly the mule spinners were
the least amenable to re-equipment, as this would have
involved the gradual disappearance of their section of
the industry. In 1948 they told the President of the
Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, that the government was
being hasty in its dismissal of the mule-spinning
section, and argued that mules could produce yarn of a
*
higher quality than ring frames.(11)
By far the most detailed examination of the 
re-equipment question was carried out by the 1946 Board 
of Trade Working Party on the cotton industry, which was 
chaired by Sir George Schuster. The Working Party could 
not agree on the amount of investment that was
desirable. One group, consisting of Schuster and the
trade union members, had no qualms about putting forward 
an ambitious scheme under the motto: "Fewer and better 
mills. " They advocated a five-year plan to install
120,000 automatic looms.(12) As regards spinning, they 
Were less precise, but indicated that there must be an 
"eventual transformation into an industry equipped with 
a greatly reduced number of modern spindles... worked 
double shifts." They recommended an immediate survey of 
equipment in the spinning section to assess needs. 
Although much could be achieved by reconditioning 
existing capacity, it was emphasised that unless this 
was accompanied by extensive re-equipment, cotton would 
"drift into a period of prolonged trouble and eventually 
shrink down to the size of a minor British 
industry. ”(13) There was a danger that high textile
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machinery prices would render re-equipment unprofitable; 
but as it was in the national interest to maximize 
production and guarantee the future of a major industry, 
the Schuster group recommended the institution of 
schemes for purchasing and scrapping redundant spinning 
machinery, and for the provision of a spinning
investment subsidy, to be financed by a compulsory levy
to
on firms in the industry.(14)
These proposals were vigorously resisted by the 
other members of the Working Party, mainly comprising 
representatives of the employers, whose spokesman was 
John Jewkes of Manchester University. Jewkes believed 
that market forces would ensure that the appropriate
amount of re-equipment would take place. A redundancy
scheme would be foolhardy in the absence of any firm 
idea of the future level of demand in the industry: "To
carry out a ’surgical operation’ before it is known what 
part, if any, of the patient should be amputated, seems 
to us a highly precipitate move."(15) Schuster’s 
investment programme was based, in part, on the need to 
introduce labour-saving machinery to increase production 
at a time of labour shortage, but the extent of the 
permanent shortfall of operatives would not be known 
until demobilization had been completed. Jewkes 
maintained that a re-equipment subsidy would probably do 
no more than redistribute a fixed amount of investment 
expenditure among firms in the industry. Even assuming 
that the subsidy succeeded in increasing the overall 
level of investment in cotton, it would be at the
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Table 5.1.
U.K. output, exports, and imports of ring spindles,
1937-51.
RINGS PRODUCTION OF EXPORTS OF IMPOR'
IN PLACE RING SPINDLES RING SPINDLES OF RI1
’ 000s '000s tons ' 000s tons tons
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
%
1937 10,700 44,773
1945 10,360 • • 9,059 12
1946 10,410 ■ • • • 30,292 131
1947 10,260 • * * • 41,298 302
1948 10,090 1284 24,298 1085 19,492 297
1949 10,190 ■ • • • 879 15,341 215
1950 10,330 • • « • 799 14,434 189
1951 10,570 1264 787 15,243 302
N.B. (i) This column refers to rings in the cotton
industry and includes rings in closed mills. Source:
C.B.Q. S.R. .
(ii), (iii) Production figures refer to sales of 
rings for spinning all fibres except wool. Source:
Board of Trade, Census of Production. 1948. 1951.
(iv), (v) Exports comprise rings for spinning
cotton and rayon staple fibres. Source: Annual Statement 
of the Trade of the United Kingdom.
(vi) Figures for 1945-7 include machinery for
preparatory processes. Imports exclude imports for 
re-export, but include rings for the spinning of all 
fibres. Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the 
United Kingdom.
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expense of a misallocation of resources. It was 
pointless bribing spinning companies to install 
equipment which they did not really want, for this would 
not help the industry to reduce its costs in the 
long-term.(16) Moreover there were other sectors of the 
economy more deserving of subsidy, such as the housing 
programme. Jewkes’s only positive suggestion wafe that 
textile firms should have access to subsidised loans for 
a limited period, if this was considered necessary to 
break through a psychological barrier to
re-equipment.(17) With hindsight Jewkes’s policy of 
non-intervention would have been at least as rational as 
the confused and half-hearted meddling of successive 
governments in the affairs of the Lancashire cotton 
industry.
In the remainder of this section the industry’s 
success, or rather lack of success, in fulfilling the 
government’s plans for large-scale re-equipment will be 
examined. Unfortunately this task is hampered by the 
relative paucity of useful data. Nevertheless a clear 
picture emerges.
Table 5.1 shows that the number of ring spindles in 
place in British cotton mills hardly changed between 
1937 and 1951. Re-equipment in spinning was particularly 
sluggish. British textile machinery manufacturers 
produced a mere 24,298 tons of ring spindles in 1948, 
compared with 44,773 tons in 1937. What is more, 80 per 
cent of the U.K. output of ring spindles was exported. 
Since imports were negligible, this left approximately
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Table 5.2.
World cotton spinning capacity, 1939-50.
(Figures in thousand spindles)
(1939) (1950)to
Mule Ring Mule Ring
U.K. 25,847 10,475 19,270 10,310
Germany 3,287 8,938 446 5,339
France 2, 303 7,491 1, 388 6, 760
Italy 550 4,774 91 5,475
U.S. 213 25,698 0 23,286
India 494 9,560 314 10,220
Japan 6 11,496 0 3,739
WORLD 36,996 110,652 24,450 98,876
N.B. In the 1950 data the Russian Zone is excluded from 
Germany, and Ceylon and Pakistan are excluded from 
India.
Source: International Federation of Master Cotton
Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations, International 
Cotton Statistics (Manchester: I.F.M.C.S.A., 1950).
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200,000 ring spindles per annum for the British market.
At this rate of re-equipment it would have taken fifty
years to replace Britain's mule spindles with ring
spindles, and a further fifty years to renew the stock
of prewar ring spindles in place in 1948. The figures
for 1951 suggest that the quantity of ring spindles
*
available for the home market had risen to about 500,000 
per annum, primarily as a result of falling exports, but 
it would still have taken several decades to replace the
capacity installed prior to 1939. Between 1939 and 1950
Britain's share of world mule-spinning capacity rose 
from 69 per cent to 79 per cent, while its share of
ring-spinning capacity was roughly constant at 10 per 
cent (see Table 5.2). There can be no clearer evidence 
that Britain was failing to keep pace with its
competitors in the scrapping of old mule spindles and 
the installation of modern ring frames. In the light of 
the high expectations of the 1946 Board of Trade Working 
Party this performance appears particularly damning.
The data on automatic looms are depicted in Tables 
5.3 and 5.4. As in the case of ring spindles, little 
progress was made during the postwar era. Although the 
Ministry of Supply's Committee of Investigation into the 
textile engineering industry had looked forward to the 
installation of 20,000 automatic looms per annum, and 
Andrew Naesmith wanted this doubled to 40,000, there was 
no prospect of these targets coming to fruition. Indeed 
the number of automatic looms in British mills rose by
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Table 5.3
U.K. output, exports, and imports of automatic looms,
1936-52.
LOOMS IN PLACE PRODUCTION EXPORTS IMPORTS
Total Autos OF AUTOS OF AUTOS OF AUTOS
(’000s) Looms Total Cotton Total Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1936 505 15,224 -
1937 471 3,062
1945 300 158 40
1946 325 % m 6053 72
1947 364 * . m n 7732 650
1948 364 25,719 7,032 6055 2495 398
1949 357 , t t t 2687 1087
1950 358 . p 6,259 2931 628
1951 358 t . 10,021 8051 4045 213
1952 354 34,282 9,042 . , 4171 101
N.B. (i) Automatic and non-automatic looms in running 
mills in the cotton and rayon industry of N.W. England. 
Source: C. B. Q.. S. R .
(ii) 1936 figure is for the cotton and rayon 
industry of Great Britain; 1948 and 1952 figures are for 
the cotton and rayon industry of the United Kingdom. 
Source: Cotton Board, Survey of the Machinery in the
Weaving Section of the Cotton Industry (Manchester:
Cotton Board, 1949), p. 10; International Federation of 
Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers’ Associations, 
International Cotton Loom Statistics: Census of the
World’s Cotton Power Looms (Manchester: I.F.M.C.S.M.A. ,
1937-53).
(iii) This series refers to the production of 
automatic looms for all sections including the wool
industry. Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics: Board
of Trade, Census of Production, 1948, 1951.
(iv) Automatic looms for weaving cotton, rayon, and 
silk only. Source, Board of Trade, Census of Production. 
1948. 1951.
(v), (vi) Figures for 1945-7 do not distinguish 
between automatic and other looms. Figures deal with 
automatic looms for use in all branches of textile




World cotton and rayon weaving capacity, 1936-52. 







U.K. 484 15 6 309 34 6
Germany 170 18 13 141
France 153 38 3 92 64
Italy 92 34 22 51 50 37
U. S. 181 392 m ( t t 399
India 197 4 m t 189 9 0
Japan 293 40 238 52 m B
WORLD 2344 662 64 830 834 65
N.B. In the data for 1952 the Russian Zone is excluded 
from Germany and Ceylon and Pakistan are excluded from 
India.
Source: International Federation of Master Cotton
Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations, International 
Cotton Loom Statistics: Census of the World's Cotton
Power Looms (Manchester: I.F.M.C.S.M.A., 1937-53).
slightly less than 20,000 in the 18 years between 1936 
and 1952. Exports accounted for between one third and 
one half of British automatic loom production. Had 
exports been eliminated, production would still have
been insufficient to fulfil the Board of Trade Working 
Party's objective of 120,000 new automatics looms for 
Lancashire. In 1936 Britain possessed two per cent of
to
automatic looms in the world cotton textile industry. By 
1952 this proportion had risen to four per cent, a 
paltry figure for a cotton industry second only to that 
of the United States. Lancashire's weaving mills had no 
more success than its spinning section in re-equipping 
between 1945 and 1951.
This section has described the plans for
re-equipment which were formulated in the mid 1940s. An 
account has been given of the course of investment in
Lancashire between 1945 and 1951. No attempt has been
made to explain the cotton industry's failure to renew 
its fixed capital stock during this period. Such an 
exercise must await the introduction of a theoretical 
framework in the next section.
II
The present section outlines the theoretical 
framework within which the analysis of fixed capital
formation in the British cotton industry between 1945 
and 1951 will be conducted. A neo-classical approach to 
investment will be eschewed in favour of one which 
builds on the work of Michal Kalecki. Recourse will also 
be made to the theory of the inter-relatedness of
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"technology, which suggests that investment may be 
inadequate in industries lacking a strong element of 
vertical integration. As Britain in the 1940s exhibited 
some of the traits of an East European socialist 
economy, Janos Kornai's examination of
resource-constrained economic systems will be of
assistance in discussing bottlenecks in the investment 
process.
Irving Fisher provided one of the baldest
statements of the neo-classical theory of investment in
his The Theory of Interest: "The rate of return over
cost [of a project] is that rate which, employed in 
computing the present worth of all the costs and the
present worth of all the returns, will make these two
equal."(18) If the rate of return exceeds the rate of
interest, the firm will proceed with the project. It was
argued, other things being equal, that the rate of
interest was the prime influence on the decision to
invest. In the late 1930s the Oxford Economics Research
Group was able to refute this hypothesis with empirical
data. Firms in a variety of industries were asked to
fill in a detailed questionnaire about interest rates.
80 per cent said that the rate of interest had no affect
whatsoever on investment. Crucially, from the point of
view of the present work, 23 of the 29 textile firms in
the survey came to this conclusion.(19) Many firms
considered expectations of changes in the price and
availability of raw materials to be of far greater
importance than interest rates in determining whether or
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not to invest.
More recent neo-classical investment theories have 
played down the role of interest rates. For instance, 
Jorgenson's postulates that changes in tax rates, the 
output of final goods, and the ratio of the price of 
final goods to the price of capital goods, are crucial 
factors in determining the profitability of an 
investment project.(20) This cautious retreat from 
emphasis on the interest rate does not resolve the other 
major problem with the neo-classical argument, namely 
the assumption that firms can accurately predict both 
the lifespan of the project and the running costs and 
revenues that will prevail in each year. It is plainly 
impossible for the firm to know how its costs and the 
price of its final product will change in the future. 
Such uncertainty will be increased by firms' ignorance 
of their competitors' intentions. G.B. Richardson has 
demonstrated that firms may be reluctant to proceed with 
otherwise attractive items of investment, if they 
suspect that other companies are planning similar 
projects. They will fear the emergence of surplus 
capacity and the consequent redundancy of their newly 
installed equipment. If all firms shared the same 
concern no investment would take place and the 
industry's capital stock would become increasingly 
obsolete.(21) By assuming that firms have perfect 
foresight, neo-classical theories are able to ignore 
such difficulties. Herein lies the poverty of the 
neo-classical approach and the need to devise a more
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fruitful theory of investment.
In their analysis of the United Steel Company's
performance, Andrews and Brunner concluded that the
level of demand for the final product was the foremost
influence on the decision to invest in fixed
capital.(22) This view is echoed by economists working
in the Kaleckian tradition. The accelerator theory
*
predicts that a firm's investment intentions are a 
function of changes in its planned level of final 
output. Thus it is possible to identify the first set of 
factors influencing the decision to invest: the current 
state of demand for the final product, expectations of 
changes in the demand for the final product, and the 
level of capacity utilization. A further important 
influence would be the ratio of the price of capital 
goods to the price of the final product.(23)
In Kaleckian investment theory financial factors 
are of great significance. Undistributed profits are the 
most accessible source of finance for the firm, and 
consequently their level and rate of growth will be 
important factors for a company to bear in mind when it 
is considering its plans for investment. The rate of 
change of profits relative to the rate of change of 
capital goods prices should also be taken into account. 
Moreover if firms cannot pay for their investment 
programmes out of profits alone they will turn to the 
banks and the stock exchange. The ease with which loans 
and overdrafts can be obtained and new stocks and shares 
issued will influence the level of investment. Kalecki
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argued that capital markets were highly imperfect, so 
that small firms would find it disproportionately 
difficult to raise finance.(24)
Two further factors could affect the level of 
investment. Firms may be induced to install new 
machinery if they perceive that it embodies technical 
improvements. Finally the Kaleckian approach to
to
investment puts great emphasis on the state of business 
confidence, i.e. on Keynes's 'animal spirits'. In
essence Kaleckian investment theory can be reduced to 
four basic influences: demand, capacity, profits, and
expectations. Empirical support for this approach has
been forthcoming in recent years. In a study of seven
major U.K. manufacturing sectors, Panic and Vernon 
concluded that demand, profitability, and confidence 
were the main determinants of gross investment between 
1960 and 1972. Nobay has produced similar results for 
the U.K. between 1959 and 1966, while Savage has found 
that fixed investment in the U.K. is insensitive to 
changes in the interest rate.(25)
Lancashire's cotton textile industry was organized 
on a horizontal basis, the successive processes of 
spinning, weaving, finishing, and converting, being 
carried out by separate firms. Marvin Frankel argued 
that the form of industrial structure in the Lancashire 
cotton industry had important consequences for 
investment behaviour.(26) Technology was inter-related: 
to obtain the maximum return from the introdution of 
automatic looms, it was necessary to operate them in
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conjunction with ring frames, which produced a stronger
and more uniform yarn than the mule. Unfortunately
weaving concerns had no control over the investment
programmes of spinning firms, so there was no guarantee
that a weaver re-equipping with automatic looms would be
able to obtain a suitable supply of ring-spun yarn. The
lack of co-ordination between the investment decisions
*
of firms at different stages of the production process 
could well have been a factor retarding fixed capital 
formation in the cotton industry. William Lazonick has 
pointed out a related problem, resulting from the 
infrequency with which spinning and weaving capacity was 
located on the same or adjoining sites. Mule yarn could 
be transported on cheap and lightweight paper tubes, 
while ring yarn had to be wound onto large, heavy wooden 
bobbins. Consequently transport costs were higher for 
ring spinners, reducing the incentive for firms to 
substitute ring frames for mules.(27) It is impossible 
to say just how important these factors were in the 
1940s, but they will certainly have to be borne in mind 
in the following discussion.
W.E.G. Salter clarified a crucial aspect of the 
decision to invest. Old fully written down machinery 
would be worth keeping in production for as long as it 
covered its average variable costs. But new machinery 
would be required to meet both average variable and 
average fixed costs. Therefore firms would only adopt a 
policy of scrapping and re-equipping if the total costs 
of operating the new machinery were less than the
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variable costs of maintaining the existing 
equipment.(28) In an industry such as cotton, which was 
replete with elderly equipment, this factor should have 
been of considerable importance.
The work of Janos Kornai has been directed towards 
an analysis of economic transactions in economic systems 
where the problem of shortage predominates.(29) To a 
significant degree this was the situation in Britain 
during the 1940s: there was a general shortage of
inputs, and, to varying degrees, the government 
instituted schemes for the rationing of coal, steel, and 
skilled labour. Prices of important commodities were 
controlled by formal and informal methods; consequently 
long waiting lists were the norm in situations of excess 
demand. The building of new factories was strictly 
regulated, as was the issuing of new stocks and 
shares.(30) Britain exhibited many of the features of an 
East European economy.
Kornai argued that markets experiencing chronic 
excess demand would exhibit 'suction'. This concept will 
be employed in the succeeding analysis of relations 
between cotton textile producers and textile machinery 
manufacturers during the 1940s. In a regime marked by 
suction there is constant pressure on suppliers to 
increase production as quickly as possible. Unable to 
raise prices at will or to obtain a greater allocation 
of inputs, suppliers will institute 'shock-work', 
working on Sundays and through holidays. Their 
investment plans will be directed towards obtaining a
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rapid increase in output using established methods, and 
few resources will be channelled into projects with a 
long gestation period or into research and development. 
The short supply of some materials results in the 
'forced substitution' of others and a reduction in 
efficiency. Suppliers need not provide work of a high 
quality, or adjust their product to meet the 
requirements of the customer. The customer's desperation 
is a function of the length of the waiting list, 
expectations of changes in the degree of shortage and 
the price level, and the urgency with which supplies are 
needed. Crucially, the vendor is in a position to choose 
the buyer. Output could be allocated among customers in 
various ways: the supplier may select purchasers at
random; a higher authority may distribute output 
according to a plan; supplies may be made available to 
those prepared to pay the largest bribes; or suppliers 
may express a preference for buyers who are willing to 
accept shoddy work without complaint.(31)
The process of investment in cotton textiles during 
the second half of the 1940s will be examined within the 
context of the theories described in this section. 
Kaleckian investment theory, the economics of 
inter-relatedness, Salter's exposition of the choice 
between old and new machinery, and Kornai's analysis of 
markets in excess demand, will be of considerable use in 
the analysis of investment in the cotton industry.
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III
This section analyzes the factors affecting the 
demand for capital goods in the Lancashire cotton 
industry between 1945 and 1951; namely the strength of 
demand for cotton textiles; the industry's level of 
capacity utilization; the prevailing state of 
confidence; profitability; the industry's access to 
external sources of finance; the effect of re-equipment 
on production costs; the inter-relatedness of 
technology; and the 1948 spinning re-equipment subsidy.
In the aftermath of World War Two there was no 
question of investment in cotton being constrained
through a lack of demand. Table 5.5 shows that the 
production of yarn and cloth rose by over 50 per cent 
between 1945 and 1950. Both domestic and export markets 
were buoyant. Although clothing was strictly rationed 
during the postwar era, the supply of cotton and allied 
textiles to industrial and public sector consumers 
increased by 28 per cent between 1935-7 and 1949.(32) 
Cotton was also selected by the Labour government to 
play a major part in the nation's export drive during 
successive balance of payments crises in the second half 
of the 1940s. Textile production in Japan and Germany 
had been severely curtailed as a result of the war, and 
Lancashire had a free run of world markets. In January 
1948 the Working Party on the Increase of Textile 
Exports reported to the Cabinet Production Committee 
that: "The present demand is almost insatiable, and in
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Table 5.5.
Demand and capacity utilization in the British cotton 
and allied textiles industry, 1937-50.
(1) Spinning section (excluding waste spinning and 
doubling)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
SPINDLES
YARN EMPLOY­ IN PLACE RUNNING
OUTPUT MENT (ALL MILLS) SPINDLES
(M lbs) (M mule equivalent sp
1937 1253 176,000 44. 1 39.3
1945 625 71,700 39.0 17. 0
1946 697 82,610 38. 2 20. 4
1947 704 87,380 37. 3 21.8
1948 863 99,110 36. 1 25. 1
1949 887 103,420 35. 0 26.8
1950 944 106,990 34. 5 27. 5
(e)
























1937 4124 1429* 187,000
1945 1847 517 96,020 300. 0 215. 9 72
1946 1974 626 101,000 324.6 208. 4 64
1947 2012 643 108,600 363.6 224. 0 62
1948 2440 916 121,270 363. 5 252. 4 69
1949 2592 1084 129,800 356. 9 268. 3 75
1950
*1938.
2971 1020 137,080 357. 7 281. 4 79
N.B. Yarn production and exports include spun rayon and 
mixtures yarn; cloth production and exports include 
mixtures and man-made fibres cloth. One ring spindle is 
equivalent to approximately 1.5 mule spindles.
Sources: Annual Abstract of Statistics; Board of Trade 
Journal. 152 (1946), p. 28; E. Hopwood, A History of the 
Lancashire Cotton Industry and the Amalgamated Weavers' 
Association (Manchester: A.W.A., 1969), pp. 191, 6; R.W. 
Lacey, ’Cotton's War Effort’, Manchester School, XV 
(1947), pp. 56-7; C.B.Q.S.R^.
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so f&r as other countries are unable to find dollars to 
import from the U.S.A., is likely to be 
intensified."(33) Investment in new equipment, argued 
the Textile Exports Working Party, would facilitate an 
increase in production and exports to meet the demands
of overseas customers. In the prevailing labour
shortage, the installation of automatic looms and large 
modern ring-spinning equipment would be particularly 
desirable, as these would enable output per operative to 
be increased.
Other things being equal, the intense pressure of 
demand experienced by the cotton industry between 1945 
and 1951 would have been a powerful incentive to the 
industry to re-equip. However, in the peculiar
conditions of the late 1940s, a high level of demand was
accompanied by a low level of capacity utilization. 
During the war 40 per cent of the cotton industry's 
capacity had been closed under the 'concentration
scheme', which aimed to free workers for munitions
production.(34) After the war the industry and the 
government had great difficulty, both in attracting
operatives back into cotton, and in recruiting new 
labour. Conditions in the mills were unattractive and 
other industries, such as engineering, chemicals, 
clothing, and the public sector, were increasing their 
employment at cotton's expense.(35) Consequently the 
utilization of capacity in spinning and weaving remained 
at a comparatively low level. It could be argued that 
the condition of the labour market should have impelled
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Table 5.6.
Index of cotton textile shares, 1938-51.
(100=Par)
June 30 1938 54
Dec. 31 1938 50
June 30 1939 55
Dec. 31 1939 84
June 30 1946 204
Dec. 31 1946 227
June 30 1947 220
Dec. 31 1947 232
June 30 1948 190
Dec. 31 1948 214
June 30 1949 149
Dec. 31 1949 164
June 30 1950 173
Dec. 31 1950 199
June 30 1951 258
Dec. 31 1951 195
N.B. The shares are those of 12 leading combines
involved in the spinning, doubling, weaving, and 
finishing sections of the cotton industry, viz:
Amalgamated Cotton Mills Trust; Bleachers Association; 
Bradford Dyers association; British Cotton and Wool
Dyers Association; Calico Printers Association; Crosses 
and Heatons; English Sewing Cotton; English Velvets;
Fine Spinners and Doublers; Joshua Hoyle and Sons; 
Lancashire Cotton Corporation; and Rylands and Sons.
Source: F.W. Tattersall's Annual Cotton Trade Review.
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firms to install labour saving equipment such as 
automatic looms, modern ring frames, and high drafting 
preparatory equipment.(36) But since this clearly did 
not happen, an alternative line of reasoning must be 
sought. The most logical explanation would be that firms 
did not expect the shortage of labour to last. Once 
operatives were available in sufficient numbers it would 
be possible to increase output and exports without first 
re-equipping. Firms would have reached this conclusion 
on the evidence of Lancashire's experience in 1918, when 
labour was in short supply, but only for a relatively 
brief period.
Expectations are naturally quite difficult to 
quantify, especially as there are no C.B.I. surveys of 
industrial trends for the 1940s; but data is available 
on the prices of the leading cotton textile shares. 
Table 6.6 depicts this information, which must be 
treated with particular caution, because share prices 
are a measure of the Stock Exchange's short-term 
confidence in the cotton industry, and do not
necessarily reflect long-term expectations within 
textile firms themselves. It is apparent that the
market's confidence in the Lancashire was considerably 
greater than it had been before the war, although it 
began to flag a little between 1948 and 1950. However, 
the share index for January 1951 marked a peak which was
not to be exceeded, even during the merger drive of
1963-4. Unfortunately the City's relative optimism about 
cotton was not echoed in the board-rooms of Lancashire.
Most of the literary sources suggest that the latter
half of the 1940s was dominated by apprehension and
uncertainty. As Mr. G.A. Barnes, president of the
F.M.C.S.A., told the Federation's A.G.M. in March 1946:
"No firm will renew its machinery merely to have
1946...on it."(37) The industry feared a return to the
disastrous conditions of the 1920s and 1930s, when firms
•»
were forced into liquidation by the loss of export 
markets and the recession in domestic demand. If demand 
collapsed again in the 1940s, after firms had installed 
new equipment, they would be faced with large 
depreciation charges, and possibly interest payments, 
which they could ill afford in the changed market 
conditions. This possibility was a powerful deterrent to 
investment and was stressed by many firms during the 
discussions on the Platt Report. In this connection 
great concern was expressed about the revival of 
overseas competition. One weaving employer voiced the 
fear that if the Indian cotton industry invested its 
wartime profits in automatic looms, "we should be in a 
hopeless position."(38) During the period after 1945 the 
Cotton Board regularly petitioned the British 
government, without success, to limit the future 
development of the Japanese cotton industry. In 1950 the 
chairman of the Cotton Board went so far as to visit 
Japan to acquaint the Allied authorities with the depth 
of Lancashire's fears.(39) Firms were well aware that 
competition would eventually return to world textile 
markets. Instead of spurring them on to even greater
Table 5.7.
Net profits and textile machinery prices in the 
Lancashire cotton industry, 1930-1951.
(i) Independent Spinning Companies: profits, dividends, 
and textile machinery prices.
Total Average Average Machinery
Firms Profits Prof it Dividend Prices
No. <£) (£) (% p. a. ) (£/ton)*
1930 -6,548 1.91 95
1931 -7,727 1.46 05
1932 -3,550 1. 55 87
1933 -3,273 1.50 92
1934 , , -356 1.57 85
1935 , „ 196 1.75 103
1936 95 157,511 1,658 1.91 112
1937 90 797,108 8,857 4.28 112
1938 85 913, 119 10,742 5. 53 119
1939 86 481,292 5,596 5.39 131
1940 74 1,072,085 14,488 8. 80 162
1941 71 792,482 11,162 9.84 200
1942 65 525,071 8,078 9.59 262
1943 62 493,476 7,959 10.68 360
1944 63 534,856 8,490 11.00 357
1945 65 535,801 8,243 11. 13 339
1946 68 667,174 9,812 12. 21 278
1947 73 1,026,267 14,058 14.52 303
1948 81 1,626,762 20,083 15. 25 330
1949 73 1,920,863 26,313 16.83 367
1950 73 2,602,252 35,166 18. 21 386
1951 80 4,443,309 55,154 21.26 416
* This series is derived from figures showing the weight
and value of textile machinery (for all fibres) exported 
from Britain.
(ii) Leading Spinning and Weaving Combines: profits and 
dividends.
Firms Average Profit Average Dividend
No. (£> (% P. a. )
1948 9 306,684 15.00
1949 9 426,850 15. 22
1950 10 484,371 16.96
1951 11 761,526 19. 00
N.rB. The combines controlled over 200 mills. Figures 
include profits of subsidiaries.
Source: F.W. Tattersall's Annual Cotton Trade Review.
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efforts to re-equip, this knowledge merely served to 
deepen the industry's gloom. Lancashire's confidence had 
been shattered after 1920 and the industry had no faith 
in its ability to compete, except in a heavily protected 
imperial market.
Uncertainty was increased by concern about the 
government's intentions towards the industry. Although 
nationalization of cotton was not mentioned in Labour's 
election manifesto, Sir Stafford Cripps warned the 
Cabinet in August 1945 that many employers were still 
profoundly suspicious of the government's involvement in 
the industry's affairs, and that this was threatening to 
undermine his plans for Lancashire's postwar 
reconstruction.(40) Even the establishment of the Board 
of Trade Working Party was regarded in some quarters as 
a prelude to nationalization. Confidence, as both Keynes 
and Kalecki emphasised, is a crucial factor in the 
decision to investment. The climate of pessimism in 
Lancashire after 1945 was a major cause of the 
industry's failure to re-equip.
Kalecki stressed that profits were the main source 
of finance for industrial investment. Table 5.7 shows 
levels of net profits (i.e. after depreciation) for 
independent spinning companies and large combines in 
1930-51 and 1948-51 respectively. Due to the inadequacy 
of the data, movements in the proftability of the 
independent spinners will have to be taken as a proxy 
for changes in the profitability of the industry as a 
whole. It is evident that there was a substantial
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improvement in profits between the mid 1930s and mid
1940s, particularly when it is recalled that the
apparently high profits of the late 1930s are the result
of the exclusion from the statistics of bankrupted
firms, and do not reflect a dramatic improvement in
market conditions.(41) Firms constantly complained that
their profits were being eroded by punitive levels of
*
taxation. P.W.S. Andrews, the economist, also believed 
that high taxation had contributed to Lancashire's 
failure to invest after 1945. But there seems little 
justification for such an argument. The burden of 
taxation on companies was reduced during the period of 
the Attlee government, while steps were taken in 1945 to 
introduce a 20 per cent investment allowance.(42) 
Lancashire had no call to decry the tax laws when a 
substantial proportion of the industry's increased 
profits during the late 1940s was dissipated in 
increased dividend payments. Tattersall's figures do not 
take account of inflation during the war; consequently 
it is useful to be able to compare profits with 
machinery prices. Kalecki postulated that changes in the 
ratio of profits to machinery prices were important 
influences on investment. The Board of Trade Cotton 
Working Party estimated that automatic loom prices rose 
by 50 per cent during World War Two, while the price of 
high-draft ring spindles increased by an average of 65 
per cent. The machinery prices in Table 5.7 indicate 
that the Board of Trade's figures may have been 
underestimates. Nevertheless it still seems that
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profits increased faster than capital goods prices 
between the mid 1930s and the mid 1940s.(43) It must be 
concluded that profits were not the obstacle to 
re-equipment after 1945 that they had been before World 
War Two.
Useful evidence on borrowing by the cotton textile 
industry is not easily available. Bank advances to the 
cotton industry were stable at between 2.6 and 2.8 per 
cent of total advances to manufacturing between 1947 and 
1951, while over the same period advances to the smaller 
wool industry rose from 4.4 to 8.8 per cent of advances 
to manufacturing.(44) Improvements in short term 
liquidity would have freed other financial resources for 
investment, but it is impossible to say from the data 
whether Lancashire's low share of manufacturing advances 
was due to prejudice against cotton on the banks' part, 
or whether it was simply due to a lack of demand. J.A. 
Barber-Lomax, a Bolton spinning employer, thought the 
latter was probably the case, and remarked upon: "[T]he
inherent distaste of companies to place themselves in 
creditors' hands again, now that they are financially 
sound after the experiences of the past twenty 
years."(45) Investment theory would suggest that, if 
firms were not inclined to invest out of their profits, 
they would hardly seek outside sources of finance.
The question of the savings in costs of production 
that could be made from installing the latest machinery 
was examined by the Costs Sub Committee of the Board of 
Trade Working Party. A comparison was made of the costs
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Table 5.8.
Cost savings from re-equipment, 1946.
(Costs are expressed as a percentage of costs using new 
low-drafting rings and new Lancashire looms run on the 
four-looms system)
High Dft High Dft High Dft High Dft 
8 Lancs 8 Lancs Autos* Autos*
1 Shift 2 Shifts 1 Shift 2 Shifts
DRILL
Raw cotton 98.4 98.4 99.1 99.1
Spinning 95.1 93.5 96.3 94.3
Weaving 107.4 112.0 96.7 93.8
* 20 autos per weaver.
TOTAL COST 99.7 100.4 97.9 96.7
LINING
Raw Cotton 100.0 100.0 97.8 97.8
Spinning 97.8 89.4 96.7 88.2
Weaving 92.3 90.9 102.2 92.4
* 16 autos per weaver.
TOTAL COST 96.4 93.6 99.3 93.2
CAMBRIC
Raw cotton 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2
Spinning 96.0 90.1 96.9 90.6
Weaving 94.8 98.0 97.2 91.6
* 20 autos per weaver.
TOTAL COST 97.1 96.5 98.0 94.8
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High Dft High Dft High Dft High Dft 
8 Lancs 8 Lancs Autos* Autos*
1 Shift 2 Shifts 1 Shift 2 Shifts
HAIR CORD
Raw Cotton 100.0 100.0 97.8 97.8
Spinning 97.5 89.5 96.8 88.8
Weaving 98.5 99.4 119.0 109.5
* 20 autos per weaver.
TOTAL COST 98.8 96.9 104.3 99.0
SHEETING
Raw Cotton 100.7 100.7 98.0 98.0
Spinning 93.5 91.0 92.0 89.3
Weaving 100.0(a) 100.5(a) 100.9 92.7
* 12 autos per weaver.
TOTAL COST 99.0 98.7 97.9 94.4
POPLIN SHIRTING
Raw cotton 99.5 99.5 99.5 99.5
Spinning 99.8(b) 97.7(b) 99.8(b) 97.8(b)
Weaving 96.5 102.4 92.0 92.2
* 16 autos per weaver.
TOTAL COST 98.1 99.6 97.3 96.3
(a) 4 Lancs looms, (b) Low draft spinning throughout.
Source: Board of Trade, Working Party Reports, Cotton 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1946), pp. 264-5.
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of producing six classes of cloth, using various types 
of newly installed machinery and shift—work regimes. For 
example, the cost of producing a particular cloth on a 
combination of new low-draft mules and Lancashire looms, 
was compared with the cost of producing the same cloth 
on new high-draft ring-spinning equipment and automatic 
looms.(46)
The Costs Sub Committee's conclusions, which are 
summarised in Table 5.8, were not encouraging to firms 
contemplating investment. Although it was nearly always 
worthwhile installing new high-drafting rather than new 
low-drafting spinning equipment, new automatic looms 
were not always preferable to new Lancashire looms. On 
some of the more complex weaves the Lancashire loom was 
still competitive when employed on the 'More Looms' 
system. However the high piece prices specified for 
certain cloths under the Uniform List for Lancashire 
loom weaving favoured the use of automatic looms in 
other cases. Unfortunately on even the most beneficial 
assumptions, including the employment of a double-shift 
system, the automatic loom's cost advantage over the 
Lancashire loom was rarely greater than five per cent of 
the total cost of the cloth.(47) In one important 
respect the Costs Sub Committee's report did not give a 
true picture of the choice open to firms. For most firms 
the crucial decision was not whether to invest in new 
Lancashire looms or new automatic looms, but whether to 
re-equip at all. As Jewkes pointed out in the 
'Dissenting Memorandum' to the Working Party Report, if
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capital costs were removed from the data for Lancashire 
looms, to represent the cost of producing cloth with old 
prewar equipment, it would be pure folly for firms to 
re-equip at all.(48) According to Salter's criterion the 
existence of an aging capital stock was a severe 
deterrent to re-equipment. Indeed the Cotton Board was 
able to show that 91.8 per cent of ring frames in 
Britain in 1946 had been installed before 1935, and 73 
per cent of all looms in place in 1948 were of pre 1920 
origin.(49)
Another detailed series of costings was conducted 
for the Cotton Board in 1947. (50) This investigation 
placed greater emphasis on the problems of 
inter-relatedness. Firms re-equipping with new automatic 
looms were generally at a disadvantage over firms 
re-equipping with new Lancashire looms, unless they 
could secure a supply of 'direct spun' yarn. But the 
availability of direct spun yarn depended on the 
modernization of spinning capacity to enable the 
production of larger yarn packages, something over which 
weaving firms had little control. The problem of 
inter-relatedness of technology recurred within the 
mill, with the installation of heavy modern machinery 
requiring the strengthening of floors in old weaving 
sheds, which could often be at a probitive cost.(51)
The general conclusion of these surveys was that 
re-equipment would not be forthcoming unless something 
could be done to reduce the price of textile machinery, 
and to persuade the unions to adopt a more
forward-looking attitude on the question of 
shift-work.(52) These difficulties were confronted by 
the 1948 Cotton Spinning (Re-equipment) Subsidy Act, 
which was the government's response to the Board of 
Trade Working Party's recommendation for an investment 
subsidy scheme. Sir Stafford Cripps announced the scheme 
in the autumn of 1946. Spinning firms would be entitled 
to a 25 per cent grant on the cost of new machinery on 
condition that certain criteria were met. Mills would 
have to combine into groups of approximately 500,000 
spindles to be eligible for assistance, while the unions 
would have to agree to double day-shift working in 
re-equipped mills and to co-operate in schemes to 
improve the efficiency of labour utilization.(53) 
Applications would be sifted by the Cotton Board, which 
would recommend suitable groupings and proposals to the 
Board of Trade. The cost of the subsidy would wholly be 
met by the Exchequer and firms in receipt of a subsidy 
would receive priority in the allocation of textile 
machinery supplies.
Cripps's terms were accepted by the operatives, but 
the unions described the attitude of the employers as 
"obscure."(54) Amalgamations were generally regarded 
with antipathy, especially among smaller firms which 
stood to lose their independence. The F.M.C.S.A. 
complained that a 25 per cent subsidy would be 
inadequate to stimulate a substantial increase in 
investment.(55) Unfortunately the scheme did not get off 
to a good start. Mr. Belcher, Parliamentary Secretary to
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the Board of Trade, told the Commons in March 1948 that 
the intransigence of shareholders was preventing 
appropriate groupings being formed in many cases.(56) 
Several weeks later the minimum size of groupings was 
reduced to 400,000 spindles and it was established that 
vertically integrated groups with only 250,000 spindles 
would be eligible. Robson, the Cotton Board's director 
of statistics estimated that only eight new groupings 
were formed to take advantage of the subsidy, and most 
of these were based on prior directorial linkages.(57) 
The Cotton Board had hoped that Cripps's scheme would 
lead to the installation or modernization of six million 
spindles, plus the acquisition of a substantial amount 
of preparatory equipment, but the spinning subsidy 
proved a singular failure.(58) Although the government 
had planned to spend £12M on the scheme, implying an 
overall investment of £48M, only £2.6M was actually 
claimed by the spinning industry.
Clearly the F.M.C.S.A. was correct in its assertion 
that a 25 per cent subsidy would be inadequate to 
overcome prevailing disincentives to re—equip. In 
conclusion the cotton industry's demand for capital 
goods between 1945 and 1951 was constrained by a high 
level of spare capacity, flagging confidence, the low 
fixed costs associated with the use of aging capital 
stock, and the problems of technical inter-relatedness 
in a vertically disintegrated industry.
IV
In a resource-constrained economy, such as Britain
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in the 1940s, the supply of a commodity may be very slow
to adjust to changes in the level of demand.
Consequently the possibility that re-equipment in
Lancashire was severely hampered by restrictions on the
output of the textile machinery industry, and on the
levels of machinery imports and exports, is at least
deserving of serious consideration. As there was a wide
*
divergence of conditions within the textile machinery 
industry, it will be convenient to begin with the 
section producing equipment for the weaving industry, 
and then to look at the factors affecting the supply of 
spinning machinery.
During World War Two the textile machinery industry 
had been diverted to munitions production. As in the 
cotton industry itself, the immediate postwar problem 
was one of attracting labour back into the factories and 
resuming normal levels of production. But in the case of 
automatic loom production the Board of Trade Working 
Party identified a more fundamental problem: the
complete inadequacy of existing capacity to meet the 
requiments of the re-equipment drive.(59) Over 90 per 
cent of automatic loom production was in the hands of 
the British Northrop Loom Company of Blackburn. Although 
this company was well on the way to increasing its 
capacity from 3000 automatic looms per annum in 1939 to 
6000 in 1948-9, this level of production would not be 
sufficient to fulfill the Board of Trade Working Party's 
objective of 120,000 new automatic looms in five years. 
What is more, the government regarded exports of
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machinery as a vital source of foreign exchange. High 
export targets were established and enforced by the 
government's control over steel allocations.(60) In 1948 
35 per cent of British automatic loom production was 
exported and in 1949 Harold Wilson, President of the 
Board of Trade, set an export target of 60 per cent for 
textile machinery as a whole.(61) Imports of automatic 
looms were restricted for similar reasons, although the 
government's rigid controls were occasionally relaxed, 
as when arrangements were made in 1947 to acquire 192 
Japanese Toyoda automatic looms.(62)
In these desperate circumstances the Ministry of 
Supply was empowered to make a full inquiry into the 
industry's affairs. Several options for increasing 
output were considered and rejected. Plant and labour 
currently engaged in the manufacture of Lancashire looms 
would not be suitable for the production of automatic 
looms. Former Royal Ordnance Factories lacked the 
necessary foundries to facilitate their conversion to 
loom production. Eventually the Committee of 
Investigation declared that the only solution was for 
automatic looms to be mass-produced "by application of 
some similar scheme of manufacture as was applied in the 
war to the production of... Lancaster bombers".(63) This 
would have involved opening factories in areas where 
there was a more plentiful supply of engineering labour. 
But such a scheme would have entailed a considerable 
commitment of the nation's resources; moreover the 
government judged that there were more pressing needs.
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Mr. G.R. Strauss, Minister of Supply, told the Commons 
that existing capacity absorbed all the materials and 
components that were available.(64) An Official Working 
Party on Textile Machinery Supplies was established by 
the Cabinet to consider a more modest programme of 
expansion. Reporting in February 1948, this body 
suggested that production could be increased to about 11 
000 automatic looms per annum by 1949. This would
involve easing bottlenecks in timber and steel supplies 
to assist the further expansion of British Northrop's 
capacity. The Working Party felt that it would not be 
worthwhile embarking on a more extensive scheme for 
growth until there was a major improvement in the supply 
of ancillary equipment, such as automatic winding
machines, for the preparatory stages to weaving.(65)
Despite the government's efforts, Table 5.3 shows 
that the production of automatic looms for use in the 
cotton and rayon sections had only risen to 8000 per 
annum by 1951. There were shortages of labour, delays in 
the delivery of materials, and in the completion of 
extensions to the Northrop works. The government's 
schemes to attract other firms into automatic loom 
production had come to nothing. In 1948 Courtaulds had 
shown an interest in producing American Crompton and 
Knowles automatic looms on license in Britain. Although 
the government agreed to Courtaulds demand that they be
given special guarantees of steel supplies, the man-made
fibre producers pulled out of the arrangement.(66)
During the 1940s British Northrop's order books
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exceeded six years work; using Kornai's phraseology, a
high level of 'tension' existed in the market for
automatic looms.(67) To a large extent production was
allocated by government fiat through the system of
export targets. Unfortunately it is impossible to say
whether weaving firms had to offer Northrop officials
bribes to obtain looms. Kornai suggested that the
*
existence of chronic excess demand in a market would 
reduce the supplier's incentive to produce high quality 
products of the latest design. In 1950 a government 
report into research and development in the textile 
machinery industry concluded that the position in the 
loom making section was highly unsatisfactory. There 
were no "facilities for fundamental research of any kind 
and indeed the quality of their staff is...not such as 
would enable them to grasp the significance of the 
results of research being done elsewhere."(68) The 
Minister of Supply had been unable to persuade British 
Northrop to improve its range of products, and weaving 
companies were beginning to claim that British automatic 
looms were no longer of a comparable technical standard 
to foreign products, especially at the fine end of the 
trade. The market for automatic looms in Britain closely 
resembled the type of market described by Kornai, and 
the conditions which prevailed were obviously an 
important constraint on re-equipment in the weaving 
section.
By sharp contrast with the loom making section, the 
section producing spinning equipment was marked by a
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substantial degree of slack. The Textile Machinery 
Makers (T.M.M.) group controlled 80 per cent of British 
capacity and had an appalling reputation in the spinning 
industry for abusing its monopoly position by 
overcharging, making outdated products, treating its 
customers with contempt, and neglecting research and 
development. Although T.M.M. attempted to assure the 
Cotton Board in 1944 that it would pursue a responsible 
pricing policy, some spinning employers doubted their 
sincerity and advocated government control of machinery 
prices.(69) Suspicion of T.M.M. was not unjustified, in 
view of the Board of Trade Working Party's conclusion 
that high-draft spinning prices had risen by 65 per cent 
between the mid 1930s said 1945, compared with a price 
rise of 50 per cent for automatic looms. The Ministry of 
Supply's Committee of Investigation into the Textile 
Machinery Industry tried to allay these fears by 
pointing to improvements in the quality of T.M.M.'s 
management and to extensions to its capacity, notably 
the new Barton works at Eccles which had formerly been 
an aero-engine factory. (70) But it was not possible to 
restore the industry's faith in T.M.M.. Although it 
would be facile to claim that distrust of T.M.M. was in 
itself a major factor in restricting the demand for new 
spinning machinery, it could well have been a 
contributory factor to the general feeling of malaise in
the spinning section.
As domestic demand for machinery was inadequate, 
T.M.M. increasingly concentrated on the export market.
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Table 5.1 shows that 85 per cent of U.K. production of 
spindles was exported in 1948, a much higher percentage 
than in the case of automatic looms. Nevertheless T.M.M. 
was forced to operate with spare capacity. The Barton 
works had been leased from the government in 
anticipation of a large postwar demand for ring spindles 
and preparatory machinery, but despite the efforts of 
the Government to encourage re-equipment, this demand 
did not materialise. In April 1948 the M.P. for 
Stretford reported that 112 workers had been dismissed 
from the Barton works due to a lack of work, and the 
following year he was able to show that the Barton works 
was operating at no more than half its full 
capacity.(71)
Lack of capacity in the spinning machinery industry 
was by no stretch of the imagination a constraint on 
re-equipment. The 1948 Re-equipment Subsidy Act was, in 
part, an attempt to secure the greater utilization of 
T.M.M.’s new capacity. Investment grants were not 
offered to weaving firms because they would have merely 
served to increase the pressure of demand for automatic 
looms.
V
No monocausal explanation can be offered for the 
failure of the Lancashire cotton industry to meet the 
investment targets set for it at the end of World War 
Two. Several factors contributed to a climate which 
constrained the rate of re-equipment. A shortage of 
labour, particularly in the spinning section, led the
industry to operate well below capacity. But few expeced 
labour scarcity to be a permanent characteristic of the 
postwar economy. It was less risky for firms to increase 
their output by gradually attracting more labour, than 
step up production by the installation of expensive 
labour-saving machinery. Confidence was brittle after 
the industry's traumatic experiences in the twenties and 
thirties. Fears of the return of Japanese competition 
and of the emergence of Indian competition held the 
industry in thrall. It would be difficult to 
overemphasise the importance of confidence. Lancashire's 
large complement of old looms and spindles was an 
additional deterrent to investment for many firms. The 
low fixed costs associated with the operation of prewar 
equipment, made it difficult for many firms to justify 
re-equipment. The absence of co-ordination between 
re-equipment decisions in different sections was a 
significant handicap. Finally, the inadequate capacity 
of automatic loom producers, coupled with the 
government's policy of encouraging textile machinery 
exports, reduced the quantity of machinery available to 
the weaving section.
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Chapter 6.
DECLINE AND FALL: THE LANCASHIRE COTTON INDUSTRY,
1950-70.
The prosperity of the 1940s and the heady days of 
1950-1 were followed by two decades of painful and 
irreversible decline for the Lancashire cotton industry. 
Cotton ceased to be a major industry during the fifties 
and sixties and it is the purpose of this chapter to 
describe and account for this decline.
The present chapter is divided into four sections. 
Section I is primarily descriptive and illustrates the 
industry’s demise with the assistance of tables 
outlining trends in employment, output, trade, and 
labour productivity between 1950 and 1970. Section II 
provides a brief narrative of the industry’s fortunes 
during the fifties and sixties, concentrating on 
fluctuations in the state of trade, government policy 
towards Lancashire, and the industry’s perceptions of 
its future. Section III employs an ’accounting 
procedure’, drawn from the theory of trade and 
development, to estimate the relative contributions of 
changes in the levels of exports, imports, domestic 
demand, and average labour productivity, to the decline 
in employment in spinning and weaving between 1950 and 
1970. The results suggest that the impact of these 
factors varied significantly over the period in 
question. Between 1950 and 1955 falling exports were the 
primary cause of the decline in employment of cotton 
operatives. Rising imports were the dominant factor 
between 1955 and 1960, while falling domestic demand for
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yarn and cloth was the major cause of declining 
employment during the 1960s. Section IV attempts to go 
behind these results by comparing costs of production in 
British and overseas mills.
I
Lancashire, temporarily shielded from foreign
competition during the forties, approached the new
decade with apprehension. In July 1950 Sir Cuthbert
Clegg, leader of the spinning employers, warned his 
colleagues in spinning and weaving that the days of easy 
markets would shortly be over and that they had better
prepare for hard times: "’The position was bound to
become more acute since Japan could not be held down 
indefinitely...intense competition amongst Tokyo 
merchants was to be feared’".(1) Clegg’s worries were 
well-founded, for after 1951 the long decline of the 
British cotton industry resumed its course. Tables 6.1, 
6.2, and 6.3 reveal the extent of the industry’s trials 
over the following twenty years. British yarn production 
(inclusive of staple man-made fibre yarn) fell from 944 
million lbs. in 1950 to 439 million lbs. in 1970, while
the output of cotton and man-made fibre cloth declined
from 2971 million square yards to 1276 million square 
yards over the same period. Employment fell apace, from
244.000 operatives (excluding doubling) in 1950 to
76.000 in 1970.(2)
It goes without saying that declining output and 
employment were accompanied by a further reduction in 
the U.K.’s share of world cotton textile exports and a
Table 6.1.








exports share exports share
(M yds) <%> (M yds) (%)
1937 6500 29.6 800 10.0
1950 5500 15.0 900 21.9
1955 4700 11.8 1700 7.9
1960 6030 5.3 2234 2.4
1965 5588 3.7 2893 3.3
1968 5559 2.8 3555 2.2
Sources: C.B.Q.S.R.. R. Robson, The Cotton Industry in 
Britain (London: Macmillan, 1957), p. 359.
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Table 6.2.
The U.K. cotton and allied textiles spinning industry,
1950-70.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
total (spun total (spun total Spg.
yarn m-m-f yarn m-m-f yarn Spg. Py.
output & mix. exports & mix imports Erapt. lbs/
M lbs. M lbs) M lbs M lbs) M lbs 000’s worker
1950 944 (91) 87 (3) 14 107 • 8820
1951 968 (103) 85 (5) 32 110 8820
1952 682 (91) 48 (3) 7 87 7850
1953 844 (151) 57 (5) 3 97 8750
1954 887 (147) 56 (4) 11 100 8840
1955 771 (125) 51 (4) 14 91 8450
1956 737 (139) 52 (5) 17 86 8550
1957 763 (141) 53 (5) 15 86 8840
1958 671 (144) 40 (6) 15 78 8660
1959 652 (145) 34 (3) 21 71 9190
1960 640 (145) 34 (4) 39 64 10060
1961 591 (126) 26 (3) 44 62 9340
1962 505 (113) 27 (5) 33 54 9390
1963 516 (121) 26 (5) 37 49 10440
1964 552 (139) 27 (6) 43 48 11510
1965 528 (135) 21 (6) 32 45 11780
1966 495 (127) 24 (7) 36 41 12010
1967 425 (117) 23 (6) 46 36 11930
1968 445 (141) 28 (10) 47 34 13130
1969 446 (154) 34 (15) 48 33 13460
1970 439 (162) 36 (18) 49 33 13470
N.B. All figures exclude doubling and continuous filament 
man-made fibre yarn.
(A) Total output of cotton, spun rayon and mixtures yarn. 
(Million lbs.)
(B) Output of spun rayon and mixtures yarn. (Million lbs. )
(C) Total exports of cotton, spun rayon, and mixtures yarn
and thread. (M lbs.)
(D) Exports of spun rayon and mixtures yarn and thread. (M
lbs. )
(E) Total imports of cotton, rayon, and mixtures yarn. (M
lbs. )
(F) Employment in spinning. (Thousands)
(G) Average labour productivity (lbs. spun per worker per
annum)
Sources: C. B . Q.. S. R. : Annual Abstract of Statistics.
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Table 6.3.
The U.K. cotton and allied textiles weaving industry, 1950-70.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Total (M-m-f Total (M-m-f Total Wvg.
Cloth & mix Cloth & mix Cloth Wvg. Py. Yarn
Output cloth) Exports cloth) Imports Empt. sq yd/ Used
( Mill ion square yards ) 000’ s worker M lb
1950 2971 (742) 1020 (197) 342 137 21670 714
1951 3109 (797) 1082 (218) 475 140 22150 742
1952 2406 (631) 863 (152) 209 118 20330 551
1953 2764 (807) 887 (177) 143 124 22260 631
1954 2914 (820) 812 (175) 335 127 22930 666
1955 2603 (733) 689 (134) 365 118 22070 578
1956 2430 (737) 595 (121) 380 108 22430 535
1957 2402 (692) 570 (112) 490 104 23210 550
1958 2131 (631) 468 (84) 434 93 22990 479
1959 2024 (620) 407 (64) 575 85 23850 445
1960 2007 (648) 375 (54) 786 81 24700 450
1961 1934 (638) 331 (49) 801 80 24250 411
1962 1693 (594) 287 (55) 642 75 22610 352
1963 1653 (588) 303 (80) 700 68 24300 350
1964 1727 (641) 301 (91) 859 67 25930 356
1965 1722 (656) 300 (95) 676 65 26590 336
1966 1608 (647) 236 (65) 680 61 26500 294
1967 1338 (556) 215 (71) 784 51 26230 297
1968 1350 (583) 234 (78) 854 47 28450 303
1969 1377 (618) 243 (101) 700 46 29780 293
1970 1276 (556) 255 (117) 631 43 29670 264
(A) Total output of cotton, man-made fibre, and mixtures cloth. 
(Million sq. yds.)
(B) Output of man-made fibre and mixtures cloth. (M sq. yds.)
(C) Total exports of cotton, man-made fibre, and mixtures cloth. 
(M sq. yds.)
(D) Exports of man-made fibre and mixtures cloth. (M sq. yds. )
(E) Total imports of cotton, man-made fibre, and mixtures cloth. 
(M sq. yds.)
(F) Employment in weaving. (Thousands)
(G) Average labour productivity. (Sq. yds. woven per worker per 
annum)
(H) Cotton, spun rayon, and mixtures yarn used by the weaving 
section. (M lbs.)
Sources: C.B.Q.S.R.: Annual Abstract of Statistics.
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Table 6.4.
U.K. exports of cotton cloth to selected markets,
1938-69.
(all figures in million square yards)
1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1969
Argentina* 95 6 +
Australia 138 105 100 36 13 10++
Br. E. Africa 6 ’ 12 13 6 4 1
Br. W. Africa 66 121 89 61 17 2
Canada* 41 16 8 7 5 2
Ceylon 19 11 10 5 3 . ,
Egypt 42 4 i . . * . • . .
India 216 5 5 . . . . . .
Indonesia 36 9 7 , , * » , .
Ireland 29 25 12 11 10 13++
Jamaica 13 6 3 2 1 1
New Zealand 18 43 35 25 13 7++
Pakistan , . 70 5 . • . . . .
Rhodesia(a) 26 38 23 20 . . . .
Malaya(b) 49 36 9 4 2 1
S. Africa 152 117 75 57 27 11++
* thousand quintals. The Cotton Board took 1000 quintals
to be approximately one million sq. yds. 
(a) Inc. Nyasaland; (b) Inc. Singapore.
+ 1948.
++ 1970.
Source: C. B. Q.. S. R. .
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Table 6.5.
British cloth imports from selected countries, 1938-69.
(i) Cotton cloth (million square yards).
Origin 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1969
Belgium 12 10 14 27 19 4
Canada . . B t 10 22 26
China t t • « 5 25 35 48
France 1 10 10 18 19 7
Hong Kong , , 5 51 123 123 97
India 1 76 137 231 157 . 119
Ireland 2 5 4 12 30 22
Japan 19 91 64 52 28 10
Holland 6 7 3 13 19 4
Pakistan % , • • g g 40 43 76
Portugal . . , , , . 18 14 30
Spain . t 21 64 6 6
U. S. A. 1 2 • • 17 3 4
W. Germany 2 8 4 18 7 5
Others 8 52 8 60 64 87
TOTAL 52 287 300 728 589 545
(i i) Man-made f ibre and 
yards).
mixture cloth (million square
Origin 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1969
Austria 5 13 1 3 22
Belgium 1 1 2 2 10 11
France 6 8 11 3 4 4
Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . 13
Italy 3 22 15 11 16 15
Japan 3 3 9 4 4 5
Portugal 2 . . . . • • 3 14
Switzerland 2 4 . . . . 2 14
U.S.A. . , 1 . . 15 14 13
W. Germany 6 4 6 10 11 10
Others 1 7 9 12 21 34
TOTAL 24 55 65 58 69 155
Figures include imports for re-exports after finishing.
Source: C. B. Q., S. R.
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deteriorating balance of trade in yarn and cloth. During 
1959 British cotton and rayon cloth imports exceeded 
cotton and rayon cloth exports for the first time since 
the dawn of industrialization. The deficit inexorably 
widened in the following years. In fact between 1950 and 
1970 British cotton and man-made fibre cloth exports 
declined from 1020 million sq. yds. to 255 million sq. 
yds. While exports of rayon, nylon, and mixtures cloth 
fell by 80 million sq. yds. during this period, cotton 
cloth exports declined by a massive 685 million sq. yds.
Although some of the inter-war reduction in British 
cotton textile exports could be attributed to the
general recession in world textile exports, this was no 
longer the case after 1950. Table 6.1 shows that world 
trade in cotton textiles was rapidly expanding during 
, the fifties and sixties. As in the thirties, the only
encouraging trend was in the man-made fibre section. 
After a period of decline, during the 1950s and early 
1960s, exports of man-made fibre cloth began to regain 
some ground.
Imports were another major problem for the
industry. Between 1950 and 1960 cotton cloth imports
rose from 287 million sq. yds. to 728 million sq. yds., 
although there was little increase in imports of
man-made fibre and mixtures cloth. This trend was
fgyersed in the sixties. Between 1960 and 1970 imports 
of man-made fibre cloth rose from 58 million sq. yds. to 
164 million sq. yds., while cotton cloth imports
declined, from a peak of 731 million sq. yds. in 1961,
to 467 million sq. yds. in 1970. However, Britain was
still holding its own in the man-made fibre section:
between 1960 and 1970 the deficit in Britain's trade in
man-made fibre and mixtures cloth increased by a
comparatively small amount, from 4 million sq. yds. to
47 million sq. yds. Exports of yarn spun from staple
man-made fibre rose from 3 million lbs. in 1950 to 18
«»
million lbs. in 1970. Moreover, despite the rapid 
increase in world output of man-made staple and
continuous filament fibre during these years, Britain's 
share of this total only fell from 10.3 per cent in 1950 
to 8.1 per cent in 1960 and 7.2 per cent in 1970.(3) 
British involvement in the initial establishment of 
man-made fibre producing and processing capacity had 
been substantial. Until the 1930s Courtaulds had
dominated the world rayon scene and had large 
subsidiaries in Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland, and 
the U.S.A.(4) It also had strong links with firms in 
India, Japan, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Poland, the 
U.S.S.R., and Holland. But the pre-eminence of British 
capital was no longer in evidence after 1945, with the 
American firm Du Pont leading the way in the development 
of the nylon section.(5)
Additional light can be thrown upon Lancashire's 
trading difficulties by examining the position in 
individual export markets. Table 6.4 shows that
Lancashire lost substantial export markets in Argentina, 
Canada, Egypt, India, and Indonesia between 1938 and 
1950, when supplies of British cloth were severed by the
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war. In 1950 only three major overseas customers 
remained: the West African colonies of Nigeria and the 
Gold Coast (Ghana), South Africa, and Australia. Tables
6.11, 6.12, and 6.13 (see Appendix I to this chapter)
illustrate the course of exports to these three areas,
which accounted for 63 per cent of the total reduction
in British cotton cloth exports between 1950 and 1970. 
Ultimately Lancashire lost these vital customers because 
it was unable to produce cloth cheaply enough. To take 
one example, in January 1962 in the home market, where 
transport costs for British cloth were at a minimum, 
Lancashire drill 3110 cloth could be purchased for 23d 
per yard, while identical pieces of cloth woven in Hong 
Kong, India, and China, could be obtained for 18.75d, 
18.25d, and 16.75d per yard respectively.(6)
This weakness was exposed by the erosion of the 
Imperial Preference system during the 1950s. After the 
early fifties the West African governments became 
increasingly hostile to the principle of Imperial 
Preference and gradually reduced their tariff and quota 
restrictions against European and Japanese cloth. (7) 
Imperial Preference did little to protect Lancashire's 
trade with Australasia, as textiles from India and Hong 
Kong were permitted to enter these markets at the same 
preferential duties as British cloth. In addition 
G.A.T.T. and other trading agreements served to reduce 
the margin between full and preferential tariffs. 
Moreover adjustments to preferential margins usually 
failed to keep pace with inflation, resulting in a
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further decline in their effectiveness.(8) The net 
result was that British cotton cloth exports to 
Australia fell from 105 million sq. yds. in 1950 to 10 
million sq. yds. in 1970, while over the same period 
Australian imports of Japanese cloth increased from 8 
million sq. yds. to 102 million sq. yds. British exports 
to South Africa were increasingly hampered by 
protectionism and the subsidisation of local firms. In 
the early 1960s Cyril Lord responded to this challenge 
by closing two of his British mills and establishing 
production facilities in the Cape, but Lord's solution 
was the exception rather than the rule.(9) By the mid 
1960s Lancashire had been forced into the role of a 
second or even third-rate power in the international 
cotton textile trade.
According to Table 6.5 India, Hong Kong, and 
Pakistan were the main suppliers of cotton cloth to 
Britain between 1950 and 1970.(10) India already had a 
large cotton industry in 1945, and this continued to 
grow despite periodical attempts by the government to 
protect handloom weavers by restricting the installation 
of modern automatic looms, and to encourage production 
for the domestic market by imposing export duties and 
controls.(11) The development of cotton textile 
production occured at a far more dramatic pace in Hong 
Kong and Pakistan. The flight of Shanghai industrialists 
to Hong Kong during the revolutionary period provided 
the initial impetus for the development of a cotton 
industry. Productive capacity increased from 8000
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spindles and a negligible quantity of looms in 1948 to
210,000 spindles and 4500 looms in 1951 ‘ and continued
rapidly to expand. When exports to Britain were
restrained by quotas in the 1960s, Hong Kong firms
responded by diversifying into clothing and man-made
fibre products and establishing production facilities in
other Asian countries.(12) Pakistan's cotton industry
*
was established in 1947. Its development was assisted by 
public investment, the provision of subsidised credit, 
tax concessions for foreign investors, and 
state-financed export bonus schemes.(13) But it should 
not be imagined that these special circumstances were 
the primary reasons for the devastating impact of Asian 
cotton textiles on the Lancashire industry. As will be 
seen in Section IV the Asians countries' success was 
largely due to their low labour costs.
The statistics displayed in this section reveal the 
fundamental failure of the Lancashire cotton industry to 
attain viability in the increasingly competitive world 
environment of the 1950s and 1960s. In the following 
section the sequence of events between 1950 and 1970 
will be examined in greater detail and the succeeding 
sections will attempt to analyze the reasons for 
decline.
II
In retrospect 1950 and 1951 were years of 
remarkable prosperity for the cotton textile industry. 
Output and exports of cloth reached their maximum 
postwar levels of 3109 and 1082 million square yards
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respectively in 1951. Profits rose to heights unheard of 
since 1918-20.(14) This prosperity was short lived, and 
the period fom spring 1952 to spring 1953 saw a major 
slump in the fortunes of the industry. Although the
causes of this particular recession were largely 
unrelated to the factors responsible for the continuing 
decline of the cotton industry over the following 
fifteen years, the events of 1952-3 had an immense 
symbolic value, representing the end of the postwar era 
of high demand and easy markets.
Between their peak levels in 1951 and the low spot 
of May 1952 hours worked in cotton weaving declined by 
26.4 per cent, while those worked in cotton spinning
fell by 48.5 per cent, as a result of increasing
unemployment and short-time working.(15) Table 6.6 shows 
that between May 1951 and May 1952 unemployment in
cotton spinning increased from 0.4 per cent to 32.9 per 
cent, while unemployment in weaving rose from 0.3 per 
cent to 22.3 per cent. Meanwhile short-time working 
returned to many Lancashire towns: for instance in
Royton during the first week of May 1952 10 out of a
total of 21 mills were running a three-day week, while 
seven more were closed all week. Unemployment increased 
by more in spinning than in weaving because weavers ran 
down their stocks of yarn during the recession. 
Consequently, orders for yarn declined by a greater 
proportion than the fall in orders for cloth.(16) In 
addition to unemployment and short-time working many 
firms enforced reductions in machine complements. H.A.
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Table 6.6.
Percentages unemployed and on short-time in the cotton
industry, 1950-70.
spinning weaving
unemployed short-time unemployed short-time
1950 0.6 0.4
1951 0. 4 0.3
1952 32.9 29.5 22.3 16.5
1953 1.5 1.4+ 1. 1 0.5+
1954 0. 7 0. 1 + 0.5 0.4+
1955 5.8 10. 5 3.4 7.9
1956 1.9 6.6 2.3 4.2
1957 0.8 0.4 1. 1 0.6
1958 9.3 15. 6 6.2 6.5
1959 4. 7 1.7 3.0 0.3
1960 3.4 0.2 2.8 0. 1
1961 2. 3 1.2* 1.3 —
1962 5.2 6. 1* 4.7 —
1963 3.8 1.9* 3.4 —
1964 2.0 0. 1* 1.4 -
1965 1.6 0. 3* 1. 1 -
1966 1.3 0. 1* 1.0 -
1967 4. 8 5.2* 4. 9 -
1968 2.7 0. 1* 2. 1 -
1969 2.0 , , 1.8 -
1970 2.2 , . 2.7 -
Unemployment figures apply to May/June each year; 
short-time figures to August.
Figures for 1959-70 include the spinning and weaving of 
flax and man-made fibre.
* spinning and weaving combined.
+ August.
Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette: Annual Abstract of 
Statistics.
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Turner estimated that 12.3 per cent of spinning and 5.2 
per cent of weaving operatives were 'underemployed' in 
the depths of the recession.(17) In May 1952 Andrew 
Naesmith criticized employers for cutting the number of 
looms assigned to each operative instead of introducing 
short-time working, and thought the recession was "as 
bad as at any time he could recall, even in 
1925-31".(18) Rates of unemployment, except for very 
brief periods in particular towns, never again 
approached the levels of 1952, and during the remainder 
of the fifties and sixties the decline in employment was 
effected by retirements and the smooth transfer of 
operatives to other industries.
The slump of 1952 was part of a general world-wide 
recession, yet the Lancashire cotton industry suffered 
to a greater degree than the rest of the British 
economy. A number of explanations were offered for this 
state of affairs. The most curious of these was the 
allegation that in September 1951 Hugh Dalton, the 
Minister of Local Government, encouraged a 'buyers' 
strike' by telling a meeting of housewives in Swansea 
that they should refuse to buy clothing and textiles 
until the prevailing exorbitant price levels had been 
reduced.(19)
Turner and Smith provided a more reasonable account 
of the factors responsible for the crisis. Firstly, 
excessive stock-piling by traders during the early 
stages of the Korean War had produced a reaction in 
which new orders collapsed. Secondly, the wider national
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recession reduced the earnings of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers, the class with the highest average 
propensity to consume textiles. Recession abroad, 
accompanied by increasing Japanese competition, and the 
imposition of import controls in Australia, resulted in 
a fall in cotton textile exports. These misfortunes were 
aggravated by uncompetitive prices, which were partly 
the consequence of higher costs and partly the effect of 
the price-fixing arrangements of the Yarn Spinners' 
Association.(20)
During 1953 demand improved. Yarn output recovered 
to 87 per cent of the 1951 level and cloth output to 89
per cent of the 1951 level. Short-time working virtually
disappeared and unemployment in spinning and weaving 
declined to 1.5 per cent and 1.1 per cent of their 
respective labour forces. But all was not well. The 
slump had resulted in the loss of 16,000 spinning 
operatives to other industries or through retirement. 
Firms argued that they were unable to restore 1951 
levels of production because of a shortage of labour, a 
complaint which was to recur time and time again over 
the following years.(21) This contention was not
strictly true, for other things being equal the supply 
of labour is a function of the wage offered. It is 
hardly surprising that cotton firms were unable to 
attract more labour, given that between 1952 and 1955 
average wages in cotton increased 12 per cent compared 
with 16 per cent in U.K. industry as a whole.(22) But, 
on the other hand, in the increasingly difficult
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competitive climate of the 1950s, a faster increase in 
wage costs would have brought about an even more rapid 
decline in demand. In retrospect it seems obvious that 
1952 was the beginning of the end for Lancashire.
Lancashire's cotton industry experienced a high
rate of attrition during the mid-1950s. A total of 20
mills were permanently closed in 1952, 17 were abandoned
*
in 1953, 14 were closed in 1954, while in 1955 and 1956 
the rate of closure accelerated to 59 and 55 mills 
respectively.(23) In 1955 unemployment in spinning rose 
to 5.3 per cent and in weaving to 3.4 per cent. This 
recession was relatively mild compared with that of 
1952, but it created widespread concern among the 
employers for the industry's future. In their annual 
report the spinning employers remarked that: "In 1955
the position was caused by more permanent factors which 
will continue to affect the industry adversely over a 
far longer period if no action is taken by the 
Government".(24) Rapidly expanding competition from 
Asian producers and uncertainty about raw cotton prices 
in the United States constituted the 'permanent factors' 
feared by the spinning masters. Cotton textiles from 
India, Hong Kong, and Pakistan were able to enter the 
British market free of duty under the provisions of the 
Imperial Preference system. Employers and trade 
unionists in Lancashire mounted a vigorous campaign to 
secure the industry a measure of protection from 
Commonwealth imports, but met with no success.(25)
The governments of Churchill and Anthony Eden
showed little sympathy for the fate of the cotton
industry. Peter Thorneycroft, the President of the Board 
of Trade, confirmed the government's policy of 
non-intervention in the industry's affairs during a 
visit to Lancashire in 1954. While Thorneycroft 
maintained that the Cabinet was genuinely concerned for 
Lancashire's future, he stressed that there would be no 
special legislative measures along the lines of the 1948 
re-equipment subsidy to help the industry. Neither would 
there be any restriction of Commonwealth exports to
Britain, as this would lead to retaliation and a loss of 
goodwill. Moreover Britain would not oppose Japanese 
entry to G.A.T.T.. Thorneycroft argued that the 
government had already done a great deal for Lancashire 
by creating a healthy and buoyant domestic economy. 
There would be minor reductions in purchase tax on 
cotton textiles, but he implied that the industry's 
constant self-pity was counter-productive and only 
served to weaken confidence in Lancashire.(26)
Non-interventionism was not popular in all 
quarters. It was attacked by protagonists of both the 
left and the right. The Tory imperialist L.S. Amery
argued for a far more active policy, contending that 
stringent restrictions should be placed on foreign 
exports to Commonwealth and colonial markets. He 
believed that further protection for the U.K. market 
might also be required, but did not specify whether this 
wbuld include the control of imports from the Asian 
Commonwealth. The government should assist Lancashire to
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specialize in the spinning and weaving of man-made 
fibres: The State might advance money on specially
favourable terms to cover the cost of converting or 
adapting cotton factories to the new fabrics, as well as 
of erecting new factories for their production".(27) 
Amery went on to say that serious consideration should 
be given to subsidising exports of the 'new fabrics'. It 
is ironical that a politician who was outraged at goods 
being 'dumped' in the U.K. should have advocated a 
policy of 'dumping' by Lancashire. But Amery's advocacy 
of subsidised re-equipment anticipated the provisions of 
the 1959 Cotton Industry Act.
In 1953 the U.T.F.W.A. invited Harold Wilson to 
prepare an analysis of the prospects for the cotton 
industry and to set out a programme for its revival. 
Wilson made a number of urgent recommendations.
Firstly, an international raw cotton agreement 
should be negotiated. This would create an agency with 
powers to stabilise raw cotton prices through a 
buffer-stock system. Encouragement should be given to 
raw cotton growing in the colonies, and the Raw Cotton 
Commission should be reconstituted to regulate prices 
and supplies in the home market.(28) Secondly, the 
price—maintenance functions of the Yarn Spinners 
Association should be subject to regulation by the Board 
of Trade. An investigation should take place into 
allegations of excessive margins in the merchanting 
section. It might be necessary to license merchants to 
rid the industry of 'spivs'.(29) Thirdly, British
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Overseas Cottons Ltd. should be resurrected to negotiate
long-term export orders for standard lines. In the home
market the Utility scheme should be revived, while the
public sector should bring forward purchases of cotton
textiles during periods of poor trade.(30) Fourthly,
there should be a state buying agency with exclusive
powers to import yarn and cloth. The mere threat of a
*
state import monopoly would encourage the Asian 
producers to accept voluntary quota agreements. Action 
should be taken to raise wages in Hong Kong.(31)
Fifthly, investment allowances should be increased 
and a tripartite Cotton Industry Re-organization 
Commission (C.I.R.C.) established to assist firms to 
invest. This body would have the authority to build, 
equip, and lease new mills to 'efficient firms', to 
lease machinery, and provide 'easy finance' for firms 
wishing to re-equip. The C.I.R.C. would have first claim 
on the output of the textile machinery industry. But if 
firms were reluctant to co-operate, as they had been at 
the time of the Cripps subsidy in 1948, the C.I.R.C. 
would have powers to force them to amalgamate into 
larger groups, to control the appointment of the new 
boards, and to compel the new groups to re-equip. The 
C.I.R.C. would be financed either by a levy on the 
industry or directly by the state.(32) Finally, although 
outright nationalization would not take place, the state 
should purchase a controlling interest in the major
combines.(33)
The Wilson plan was readily endorsed by the cotton
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unions, the Labour Party, and the T.U.C., and became the 
basis of Labour's policy for cotton at the 1959 General 
Election.(34) The Cotton Board itself, having to 
accomodate the interests of conservative employers as 
well as 'socialist' trade unionists, refused to be drawn 
into a discussion of long-term planning for the 
industry. Instead it rather shamefacedly concentrated on 
the single issue of restricting cheap Commonwealth 
imports.(35)
In 1958 a further recession. interrupted the 
otherwise sedate decline of the Lancashire cotton 
industry, and unemployment increased to 9.3 per cent in 
spinning and 6.2 per cent in weaving. Short-time working 
affected thousands more operatives. In August, according 
to the local employers' secretary, at least 4000 
operatives in Rochdale alone were on short-time.(36) A 
major debate in the Commons during July saw Harold 
Wilson launch a blistering attack on the President of 
the Board of Trade: "For four years the industry ha[s] 
been slowly bleeding to death and the Government ha[s] 
rejected or ignored all appeals for help".(37) The 
employers' associations in spinning and weaving were 
busy devising schemes for the organized scrapping of
excess capacity.(38)
Tories in Lancashire were in revolt and the 
government feared the consequences in the approach to 
the coming election. At the 1958 Cotton Board Conference 
in Harrogate, Harold Macmillan asked the industry to 
prepare schemes for re-organization. The government
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would sympathetically consider such schemes with a 
regard to the provision of financial assistance. 
Macmillan's initiative came to fruition in the 1959 
Cotton Industry Act.(39) Firms would be offered grants 
to scrap redundant machinery. It was hoped that 
productive capacity in the spinning section would be cut 
by at least 50 per cent, and in the weaving section byto
at least 40 per cent, eliminating surplus capacity and 
removing a major disincentive to re-equipment. A levy on 
firms remaining in the industry, supplemented by a 
contribution from the taxpayer, would pay for the 
scheme. After pressure from the employers, the 
government agreed to offer a 25 per cent subsidy on the 
purchase of modern looms and spinning machinery. The 
re-equipment grants would be financed by the state. 
Machinery to be scrapped under the provisions of the 
1959 Act was taken out of commission in 1959-60 and 
broken up in 1961. A total of 48 per cent of the 
spindles, and 38 per cent of the looms in place in April 
1959 were eliminated under the scheme, proportions only 
marginally below the targets set by the government.(40) 
While the 1959 Cotton Industry Bill was still under 
consideration, the government was involved in a further 
initiative, this time in the field of import regulation. 
For several years the Cotton Board had been trying to 
secure voluntary quota arrangements with Hong Kong, 
India, and Pakistan. Eventually the British government 
intervened to give added weight to the Cotton Board's 
proposals, and voluntary trading agreements between the
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U.K. and the Asian textile producers were concluded in 
early 1959. Unfortunately the ceilings were exceedingly 
liberal, and gave plenty of scope for Hong Kong, India, 
and Pakistan to expand their cotton cloth exports to 
Britain. Moreover, as the arrangements were confined to 
cotton cloth imports, Commonwealth producers were 
encouraged to increase their exports of clothing and 
man-made fibre products. These industry-level agreements 
were soon followed by equally permissive bilateral quota 
agreements with other low-cost producers in the Far 
East, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean.(41)
Despite the government's attempts to liquidate 
surplus capacity, subsidise re-equipment, and institute 
voluntary quota agreements, Lancashire's cotton textile 
industry entered the 1960s in complete disarray. 
Confidence remained at an extremely low ebb and trading 
conditions continued to deteriorate. In 1961 an A.W.A. 
survey discovered that the lack of orders was forcing 
Some firms to abandon shift-working. The secretary of 
the Blackburn Weavers' Association added that: "this is
a sorry state of affairs so soon after the Government 
scheme."(42)
The decline in output and employment continued 
unabated during the 1960s. Conditions were so bad that 
firms were reluctant to take advantage of the 
re-equipment subsidy provided under the 1959 Act. Only
678,000 new spinning spindles and 11,000 new looms were 
installed as a result of the subsidy, representing 12.8 
per cent and 8.8 per cent respectively of 1965 spinning
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and weaving capacity. (43) In retrospect it is hardly 
surprising that the re-equipment scheme failed. Caroline 
Miles calculates that the subsidy offered was actually 
quite trivial: the equivalent of an effective rate of 
protection of a mere five per cent over two years.(44)
Contraction did not ease cotton's labour shortage. 
As native Lancastrians became increasingly reluctant to
to
enter the mills, the number of Asian workers grew. Net 
immigration to the U.K. from India and Pakistan rose 
from 8350 persons per annum between 1955 and 1960 to 
34,812 per annum between 1961 and 1966.(45) In 1965 
As isms comprised seven per cent of the labour force in 
the cotton industry, and by 1968 59 per cent of
operatives on night-shifts in spinning and 36 per cent 
of those on night-shifts in weaving were Asians.(46) As 
late as 1975 47 per cent of all Gujaratis of working age 
in certain wards of Bolton were employed in the textile 
and clothing industries, mainly as spinners, weavers, 
and doffers.(47)
By the late 1960s the Lancashire cotton industry 
had become an ancillary industry serving the needs of 
the major man-made fibre producers. One of the first 
victims of the man-made fibre firms was the rayon 
weaving concern, James Nelson Ltd., which had risen to 
prominence earlier in the century under the benevolent 
guidance of Sir Amos Nelson. After taking over Nelsons 
in 1963, Courtaulds acquired a number of major spinning 
combines in 1964, including the Lancashire Cotton 
Corporation, Fine Spinners and Doublers, and Hayeshaw.
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This policy was designed to secure a stable market for 
Courtaulds man-made fibre products and was accompanied 
by a large investment programme. Indeed between 1962 and 
1969 Courtaulds spent £57 million re-equipping its 
fibre-using operations in Lancashire and built a large 
new weaving mill at Skelmersdale.(48) At the same time 
I.C.I. lent money to Viyella International and
to
Carrington and Dewhurst to establish a cotton textile 
empire of its own. Naturally the remaining small firms 
were heavily dependent upon the the goodwill of
Courtaulds and I.C.I. for work and for survival. The 
merger movement was accompanied by the growing use of 
computers in the industry. A survey conducted by the 
National Computing Centre in 1968 estimated that 12 per 
cent of textile and clothing firms either owned or had 
access to a computer, primarily for stock control and 
general management purposes. About 90 per cent of these 
firms had started using computers within the previous
five years, although there is little evidence that they
were applied to the control of the production
process.(49)
None of these developments halted the secular 
decline of cotton textile production in the U.K. Towards
the close of the 1960s the last of the great cotton
industry reports was issued by the Textile Council, 
successor to the Cotton Board. The report recommended 
the replacement of the fairly ineffective import quota 
schemes developed during the 1960s by a system of
tariffs. It predicted that a further round of
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contraction would be necessary, but did not want another 
state scrapping scheme:
"There is no evidence that the industry itself 
would welcome such a scheme. If, as in 1959, 
it were to involve a levy on firms staying in 
the industry, we consider that the objection 
then advanced to this system of financing - 
namely, that it penalised the efficient firms 
- would still hold good. If, on the other 
hand, it were to be entirely Government 
financed, we would regard the expenditure of 
public funds as unjustified."(50)
The Textile Council requested temporary investment 
grants for firms outside Development Areas, and an 
increase in depreciation allowances for firms operating 
three or four-shift systems. In 1970 the government 
raised depreciation allowances and established a special 
£10 million loan fund for investment by small and medium 
sized textile firms under the auspices of the Industrial 
Reorganization Commission. But after much vacillation 
the Conservative government decided not to replace 
quotas by tariffs.(51)
This section has surveyed the virtually unbroken 
course of decline for the cotton industry between the 
peak year of 1951 and the appearance of the Textile 
Council's rather forlorn report in 1969. The remainder 
of the chapter analyzes the factors contributing to the 
process of contraction.
Ill
It has been seen that the period from 1950 to 1970 
saw a rapid decline in employment in the Lancashire 
cotton industry. What were the immediate causes of this 
process? It would be very useful to to have some means
of estimating the relative contributions to the
250
reduction in employment, of such factors as the increase
in imports, the decline in exports and in home demand,
and the course of average labour productivity. This is
the function of the 'accounting procedure', a technique
which is applicable to the analysis of reductions in
employment in either a single industry or a group of
industries. The variant of the procedure that is used in
*
this chapter is similar to the one employed by Cable in 
his examination of the causes of declining employment in 
the U.K. textile and clothing industries over the 
1970s.(52)
The procedure is based on the following identities:
[1] D = Q - X + M
[2] P = Q / E
[3] therefore E = (1 / P)(D + X - M)
[4] dE = f(dP, dD, dX, dM)
[5] dE = (1 / P0 ) (dD + dX - dM - E^.dP )
D is domestic demand, E is employment, M is 
imports, P is average labour productivity, Q is 
output, X is exports, 0 and t are the beginning 
and end years of the exercise.
The first identity defines domestic demand (D) as
output (Q) minus exports (X) plus imports (M). Identity
[2] defines average labour productivity (P) as output 
divided by employment (E). Combining [1] and [2] we 
arrive at identity [3], which defines employment in 
terms of domestic demand, exports, imports, and average 
labour productivity. Identity [4] shows that changes in 
employment depend upon changes in exports, imports, 
productivity, and domestic demand. Identity [5] gives 
the final form of the procedure.(53)
251
Data collected by the Cotton Board enable the 
changes in E, X, M, and P to be calculated, which leaves 
D as a residual. The next step is to hold M, P, and D 
constant, and calculate the number of jobs lost over the 
period in question as a result of variations in X. The 
same procedure is applied to the analysis of changes in 
M, P, and D. In the case of employment in the weaving
to
section this is relatively straightforward. But in the 
application of the technique to spinning, it is 
necessary to take into account the effects of changes in 
the exports, imports, and domestic demand for cloth, on 
the consumption of yarn and hence on the employment of 
spinning operatives. The weight of yarn consumed each 
year in the weaving section can be obtained from Cotton 
Board statistics. Since the output of cloth is already 
known, the amount of yarn required to produce one square 
yard of cloth in a given year is easily calculated. 
Holding yarn consumption per square yard constant over 
the period to be examined, it becomes possible to 
measure the effects of changes in exports, imports, and 
domestic demand for cloth on the demand for yarn and 
consequently on employment in the spinning section. This 
completes the procedure.(54)
At this point it is worth mentioning some of the 
defects of this technique. Martin and Evans have 
criticized the 'accounting procedure' on several 
grounds.(55) Firstly, they suggest that the choice of D 
(or indeed of X, M, or P) as the residual term is in 
essence arbitrary. This is not wholly accurate. In the
present case the choice of residual factor was 
determined by the availabilty of data. Secondly, they 
assert that the technique is unable to measure the 
proportion of any reduction in employment which is due 
to the interaction between X, M, P, and D. This is a 
more telling criticism, as the procedure assumes that 
these factors are strictly independent. In the real
to
world this would almost certainly not be the case. 
Moreover the 'accounting procedure' does not allow for 
feedback between factors. For instance, although in the 
first period employment in cotton would be reduced by an 
increase in imports, there would also be ramifications 
for employment in later periods. Increased competition 
from imports may induce surviving firms to reduce their 
costs through re-equipment. As this would increase 
average labour productivity, it would lead to a further 
crop of redundancies. With a static model this problem 
is insoluble. One answer would be to develop a dynamic 
model capable of incorporating these effects. But this 
may lead to further problems in estimating the most 
appropriate time lag. In practice, the shorter the 
period of the exercise, the less important will be these 
inter-relationships. This will be particularly the case 
in an industry such as cotton, which was not renowned 
for its speed of adaptation.
The results displayed in Table 6.7 suggest that the 
fifties and sixties can be divided into three distinct 
periods." 1950 to 1955, 1955 to 1960, and 1960 to
1970.(56) From 1950 to 1955 employment in spinning and
Table 6.7
Factors accounting for the decline in employment in the 
U.K. cotton industry, 1950-70.
(i) Spinning section.
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weaving fell by 34,820. Given the assumptions of the
'accounting procedure' as specified above, the main 
factor accounting for decline during this period was the 
reduction in exports of yarn and cloth. If exports had 
remained at their 1950 level, there would have been 
28,430 more jobs in the British cotton industry in 1955 
than was actually the case. Changes in employment due to 
imports and domestic demand were relatively slight, 
while average labour productivity in spinning actually 
declined in the early fifties.
The second period, from 1955 to 1960, saw rising 
imports become the major element in employment decline,
although by a less decisive margin. Employment fell by
64,350 between 1955 and 1960. The level of employment in 
1960 would have been 33,067 higher if imports had not 
risen over the previous five years, 24,487 higher if 
exports had not fallen, and 21,785 higher if average
labour productivity had not increased.
During the 1960s declining domestic demand for 
cloth and yarn took over as the primary contributory 
factor to the reduction in employment. Between 1960 and 
1965 employment in spinning and weaving fell by 35,370. 
Employment in 1965 would have been 19,240 higher in the 
absence of falling domestic demand, 12,657 higher if 
average labour productivity had not risen, and 6025 
higher if exports had not decreased. Declining domestic 
demand was by far the largest single factor in the 
continuing reduction in employment during the late
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1960s. The net decline in spinning and weaving 
employment was 33,870 between 1965 and 1970, with 
falling domestic demand for yarn and cloth accounting 
for 25,361 job losses during this period.
Under the restrictive assumption that X, M, P, and 
D are entirely independent, it appears that the loss of 
Lancashire's export markets was the primary factor 
accounting for the decline in employment in British 
cotton and allied textiles between 1950 and 1955; the 
rising tide of imports was the major element between 
1955 and 1960; while falling domestic demand 
predominated during the sixties.
Competition from the rapidly expanding
warp-knitting industry was a major cause of declining 
domestic demand for woven cloth. U.K. production of 
warp-knitted fabric increased from eight million kg. in 
1961 to 35 million kg. in 1970. This impressive rate of 
growth was mainly at the expense of woven cloth, and was 
primarily the result of the technical superiority of 
warp-knitting over weaving, especially after the 
introduction of double-jersey knitting in 1954. 
Continuous filament fibre yarn did not weave 
particularly well, but it knitted excellently, so that 
warp-knitting firms were at an advantage in the 
production of man-made fabric for use in the clothing 
industry.(57) Warp-knitting also produced fabric at a 
higher speed than the weaving process. In 1970 
warp-knitted shirtings could be made 25 per cent more 
cheaply than woven shirtings of the same quality. As a
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result by 1969 50 per cent of men's shirts and 80 per
cent of women's lingerie and nightwear were made using
fabric produced by the warp-knitting industry.(58)
There is little evidence to support the view that a
decline in the British clothing industry reduced
domestic demand for woven cloth. Despite rising imports
the clothing industry continued to prosper. Between 1958
*
and 1963 British imports of cotton dresses rose from
727.000 per annum to 2,768,000 per annum, while imports 
of cotton shirts rose from 529,000 per annum to
1.264.000 per annum over the same period.(59) 
Nevertheless U.K. production of stockings and socks 
(from all types of fabric) increased from 33.5 to 50.5 
thousand dozen pairs between 1958 and 1969. During the 
same interval the output of underwear and shirts rose 
from 14.6 to 17.3 thousand dozen items, and outerwear 
production increased from 7.7 to 9. 1 thousand dozen 
items.(60) Thus the decline in domestic demand for cloth 
during the 1960s cannot be attributed to the problems of 
the clothing industry, and must be put down to clothing 
manufacturers substituting warp-knitted fabrics for
woven fabrics.
To conclude this section, it might be worthwhile 
comparing the results derived from the current 
application of the 'accounting procedure' with those 
obtained in similar studies. Frobel et al have estimated 
that increasing labour productivity was the main factor 
accounting for the decline in employment in the West 
German textile industry between 1960 and 1975. Krueger's
study of the U.S. between 1970 and 1976 concluded that 
the net effect of foreign trade in textiles was to 
improve the prospects for employment in the textile 
industry. Cable has shown that, in the British case, an 
increase in imports was the primary cause of declining 
employment in cotton cloth production between 1970 and 
1976.(61) Cable's results are interesting in the present 
context, for they raise the possibility that the 
dominance of domestic demand as an explanation of 
falling employment in cotton textiles during the 1960s 
may only have been a temporary phenomenon; and that the 
deteriorating trade balance was the primary factor in 
the long run.
IV
The accounting exercise in the previous section 
identified rising imports, declining exports, and 
stagnant and declining domestic demand as the prime 
causes of contraction in the British cotton industry 
between 1950 and 1970. But it would be facile to regard 
the results of this procedure as constituting an 
adequate explanation of the underlying causes of 
decline. The 'accounting procedure' merely provides a 
first approximation. The purpose of this section is to 
delve deeper and uncover the basic forces responsible 
for the industry's demise.
Chapter 1 outlined a theory of industrial 
contraction. To recapitulate, the rate of growth of 
demand, and in particular of exports, was proferred as 
the main determinant of the growth rate of manufacturing
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output. The faster the growth of output, the greater 
would be the opportunity for exploiting increasing 
returns, and hence the more rapid would be the increase 
in manufacturing productivity. But it was also 
recognised that causation was unlikely to be 
uni-directional. An initial loss of markets would lead 
to a slow rate of growth of industrial productivity.
to
Slow productivity growth would inevitably result in 
declining competitiveness in domestic and overseas
markets and a further reduction in sales. In cotton's
case the initial loss of markets occured in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as a result of 
industrialization in North America, Europe, and Asia. 
The product cycle theory suggests that less developed 
nations industrialize by imitating the products and 
practices of the technological leader. Consequently the 
establishment of a mechanized cotton textile industry
was one of the first manifestations of overseas
industrialization. As the rate of growth of demand for 
Lancashire's output declined the industry became 
increasingly depressed and inefficient, and this 
resulted in further losses of markets during the mid 
twentieth century.(62)
Lancashire's inability to compete with imported
piece goods in the home market is illustrated in Table 
6.8, which refers to the market prices of a typical 
selection of cloths during January and February 1962. 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 are still more instructive; they 
outline average production costs of cotton textile
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Table 6.8.
Prices of British and overseas cloth in the U.K. market,
Jan.-Feb. 1962.
(Old pence per yard)
UK HK INDIA CHINA*
Drill 3110 23.00 18. 75 18. 25 16. 75
Poplinette 27.50 23.00
Satin Drill 23.00 20.00
4 Shaft Drill 21.50 19.00
Sheeting 48. 00 43. 00
* For re-export.
All U.K. prices are claimed to be severely cut.
Source: Cotton Board, The Implications for the U.K.
Cotton Industry of Britain's Entry into the E.E.C, 
(Manchester: Cotton Board, 1962), p. 30.
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Table 6.9.
Comparative production costs: 20s yarn, 1967.
(Old pence per lb.)
UK US FRA. WG POR. HK IND. PAK.
Raw cotton 31.7 33. 4 31.2 31.9 29. 1 30. 1 28*. 1 27.9
Labour 8.3 6. 1 4.7 5.7 4.0 3.2 4.2 2.6
Depreciation 2.4 1. 1 3.4 3.4 2.0 1.3 2.0 2.7
Other 4. 4 6.5 3.0 3.4 1.9 2. 1 2.3 3.3
TOTAL SPG COST 15. 1 13. 7 11.1 12.5 7.9 6.6 8.5 8.6
Selling cost 1.8 1.7 1.2 1. 1 3.0 2. 1 2.6 1.2
TOTAL YARN COST 48. 6 48.8 43. 5 45. 5 40.0 38.8 39. 2 37. 7
Other costs include supplies and maintenance, electricity, 
mill management, administration, etc.
Profits excluded.
Differences in depreciation charges depend on age of plant, 
write-off practices, hours worked, etc.
FRA. - France; WG - W. Germany; POR. - Portugal; HK - Hong 
Kong; IND. - India; PAK. - Pakistan.
Source: Textile Council, Cotton and Allied Textiles: A Report 
on Present Performance and Future Prospects (Manchester: 
Textile Council, 1969), p. 37, Table 5.
Table 6.10.
Comparative production costs: cotton/polyester shirting cloth,
1967
(Old pence per lb.)
UK US FRA. WG POR. HK IND. PAK.
Yarn cost 20.3 19.6 16.5 17. 4 15.9 17.7 16*. 4 16.2
Labour 4.4 4.7 5.3 5.9 2.9 2.7 2.8 1.8
Depreciation 1. 1 0.3 1. 1 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7
Other 4.4 4. 1 5.0 6.0 4.6 3.6 4.3 3.6
TOTAL WVG COST 9.6 9. 1 11.4 13. 1 8.2 6.8 7.7 6. 1
TOTAL G.C. COST 29. 9 28. 7 27. 9 30. 5 24. 1 24.5 24. 1 22. 3
G.C. - grey cloth.
Other costs include supplies and maintenance, electricity, 
mill management, administration, etc.
Profits excluded.
Differences in depreciation charges depend on age of plant, 
write-off practices, hours worked, etc.
FRA. - France; WG - W. Germany; POR. - Portugal; HK - Hong 
Kong; IND. - India; PAK. - Pakistan.
Source: Textile Council, Cotton and Allied Textiles: A Report 
on Present Performance and Future Prospects (Manchester: 
Textile Council, 1969), p. 40, Table 12.
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producers in a variety of leading nations. In Britain 
labour costs per lb. of 20s yarn were considerably above 
those incurred in any other of the countries shown; 
while fixed costs (excluding depreciation) in British 
spinning mills were also unusually high. In the 
production of cotton/polyester shirtings Britain was put 
at a distinct disadvantage by high yarn costs. Although 
labour costs per yard in weaving were somewhat below 
those in the United States, France, and West Germany, 
they were much higher than those in Portugal, Hong Kong, 
India, and Pakistan. High costs in Lancashire were both 
cause and effect of the loss of domestic and overseas 
markets. In the remainder of this section consideration 
will be given to the ways in which the loss of demand 
could have led to increasing relative inefficiency. This 
anticipates some of the conclusions of the following 
chapters.
Investment and technical progress are crucial to 
the survival and prosperity of all industries. The link 
between demand, confidence, and investment has already 
been established.(63) In view of this it is not 
surprising that investment per capita in the Lancashire 
cotton and allied textiles industry was below that in 
other developed nations during the 1950s and 1960s. For 
instance, in 1954 British cotton textile producers made 
new investments of $80 per worker, compared with $114 
per worker (excluding new buildings) in France and $191 
per worker in the Netherlands.(64) As late as 1964 only
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37 per cent of British cotton textile looms were 
automatic or semi-automatic, compared with 100 per cent 
in the United States, 74 per cent in the E.E.C., 86 per 
cent in Hong Kong, and 54 per cent in Taiwan. (65) 
Britain was no longer the technological leader, as had 
been the case in the mid nineteenth century, but was now 
a technological laggard installing equipment which was 
commonplace in many other countries.
British cotton textile firms were not in the 
forefront of research and development after World War 
Two. In 1950-1 the Federation of British Industries 
calculated that textile firms spent a mere 0.5 per cent 
of their turnover on research and development, compared 
with 2.4 per cent for chemical producers, 3.2 per cent 
for electrical engineering firms, and 5.1 per cent for 
scientific instrument producers.(66)
A high quality of managerial and technical staff is 
of great importance for industrial success. Carter and 
Williams found that declining industries such as cotton 
were unable to attract young managers of a high 
standard.(67) Moreover, in the mid-1960s cotton textile 
firms had a lower proportion of graduate scientists and 
engineers among their research and development staff 
than all but two (i.e wool and clothing) of a group of 
25 major British industries.(68)
Fewer textile operatives were employed on 
shift-work in Lancashire than in competing industries 
overseas. In 1959 British cotton spinning concerns were 
operating an average of only 1.1 shifts, while the
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Japanese were operating an average of 2.0, and the
Americans an average of 3.0 shifts.(69) Shift-working
was important because it enabled the high capital costs
associated with new machinery to be spread over a larger
annual output. During the 1950s the trade unions became
increasingly reconciled to shift-working. Consequently
it would be inaccurate to blame the obscurantism of
*
labour for Lancashire's backwardness in this area. It is 
more likely that the slow spread of shift-working was 
the result, rather than the cause, of the low rate of 
investment. Inadequate shift-working in Lancashire was 
merely another symptom of the weak state of demand.(70) 
Cotton textile producers in less developed 
countries enjoyed extremely low wage costs. The Textile 
Council estimated that average wages in Hong Kong, 
India, Pakistan, and Portugal were merely 25 per cent of 
those in the United Kingdom.(71) Cotton spinning and 
weaving are not particularly skill-intensive 
occupations; hence the higher quality of labour in 
advanced countries is unable to outweigh low wages in 
underdeveloped countries.(72)
Larger machine complements might have redressed the 
imbalance in labour costs between high-wage and low-wage 
economies. Chapter 4 described Britain's failure to 
increase output per worker during the 1940s.(73) In the 
1950s and 1960s Lancashire made better progress.In a 
sample of 23 representative British industries, cotton 
spinning experienced the seventh fastest rate of 
increase in the value of output per head between 1953
and 1964.(74) But the data in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 
suggest that it would have required an even faster rate 
of labour productivity growth for Lancashire to close 
the gap on its rivals. Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show that 
despite wages twice as high as those in Britain, the 
U.S. cotton industry could still produce yarn and cloth 
at roughly the same price as Lancashire.(75)
Rapid growth of demand for British cotton textiles 
during the mid nineteenth century led to an increasingly 
atomistic industrial structure, in which tiny firms 
specialized in a small range of products. When demand 
began to slacken specialist firms found themselves in 
difficulties. There was a need to combine to close down 
inefficient units, improve the financial stability of 
the industry, and permit modernization. But small family 
firms preferred to eke out a modest living than become 
insignificant parts of large combine. Consequently it 
proved difficult for the industry to adapt its structure 
to the changing conditions of demand.(76)
The debilitating effects of a fall in demand on 
productivity and on the suitability of the industry's 
structure have been considered. A further criticism made 
of Lancashire was that its marketing procedures were 
wholly inadequate. Hundreds of small merchants competed 
for orders, making it virtually impossible for spinners 
and weavers to gain a guaranteed outlet for their 
products. Moreover the financial resources of individual 
merchants were severely constrained, preventing them 
from financing large orders, and thereby limiting the
industry's ability to concentrate on longer and 
therefore more profitable production runs. The 
persistence of small merchanting firms can be explained 
by the factors which accounted for the survival of 
similar firms in spinning and manufacturing: the inertia 
of the industrial structure in the face of new market 
conditions. Merchanting arrangements were vigorously
to
attacked from all sides but the merchants 
themselves.^77) During the 1950s the industry 
increasingly discussed means of by-passing the 
merchanting system, either through vertical integration, 
or by spinners, weavers, converters, and clothing 
companies directly dealing with large retail chains such 
as Marks and Spencers.(78) This policy would have been 
more effective had it been implemented twenty years 
earlier.
Clearly, a number of factors contributed to the 
poor performance of Lancashire's textile industry during 
the 1950s and 1960s: low investment, low levels of
expenditure on research and development, second-rate 
management, comparatively inefficient labour
utilization, an atomistic industrial structure, and an 
outmoded marketing system. These problems were largely 
the result of declining markets, which sapped confidence 
in the industry and made it twice as difficult for it to 
modernize productive capacity, labour practices, and 
structure. The industry failed in this hopeless task.
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V
Between 1950 and 1970 the Lancashire cotton
industry underwent an increasingly damaging process of 
decline. The 'accounting procedure' employed in section 
III attempted to identify the relative contributions of 
exports, imports, domestic demand, and average labour 
productivity to the fall in employment in cotton.
to
Section IV supplemented this analysis by a look at
supply-side factors, such as high wage costs, and poor 
management, which contributed to Lancashire's relatively 
high costs of production. These supply-side factors were 
not exogenous forces, for they were partly the result of 
the loss of markets in earlier periods. In short, demand 
factors and supply factors interacted in a cumulative 
process of decline for Lancashire's cotton industry.
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APPENDIX I: British exports to W. Africa, South Africa, and
Australia.
Table 6.11
Cloth exports to British West Africa, 1937-69.
(i) Cotton cloth (million square yards).
Origin 1937 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 * 1969
U.K. 163 66 121 89 61 17 2
Bulgaria , , 8 1
China 27 53 75
Egypt . . * 19
Hong Kong . . 6 3
Hungary . . 18 1
India 15 13 27 75 21 9 1
Japan 5 4 50 94 124 117 6
Netherlands 16 4 17 32 52 21 5
Pakistan , . , , • , • 18
U.S.A. . t , , . , . . . . • 39
U.S.S.R. t . t , , . . ' . 12
Others 32 13 19 29 29 64 65
TOTAL 231 100 234 319 314 313 247
UK share (%) 71 66 52 28 19 5 1
(i i) Man-made 
yards).
fibre and mixture cloth (million square
Origin 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1969
U.K. 2 17 6 1 1 2
Japan 2 5 124 120 20 1
Others 5 8 22 19 17 4
TOTAL 9 30 152 140 38 7
U.K. share (%) 22 57 4 1 3 29
Source: C. B. Q.. S. R. .
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Table 6. 12.
Cloth exports to South Africa, 1938--70.
(i) Cotton cloth (million square yards).
Origin 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
U.K. 152 117 75 57 27 11
Belgium 3 2 14 8 2 1
Hong Kong • • . . 10 20 14 10
Japan 32 42 16 34 26 9
Netherlands , , 3 24 30 5 . 1
U.S.A. 2 13 34 32 16 5
West Germany . . 2 5 10 4 3
Others 2 16 19 43 19 12
TOTAL 191 195 197 234 113 52
U.K. share (%) 80 60 38 24 24 21
(ii) Man-made fibre and mixture cloth (million square 
yards).
Origin 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
U.K. 9 44 20 14 6 3
Italy 1 24 10 7 7 5
Japan 15 42 79 90 59 57
U.S.A. , , 12 39 20 20 15
West Germany 1 2 12 7 6 8
Others 1 12 12 15 13
TOTAL 27 136 172 138 113 101
U.K. share (%) 33 32 12 10 5 3
Source: C. B. Q.. S. R.
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Table 6. 13.
Cloth exports to Australia, 1938-70.
(i) Cotton cloth (million square yards).
Origin 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
U.K. 138 105 100 36 13 10
Belgium 2 2 12 16 1 1
China 14 52 69
Czechoslovakia 11 7 12 9 10
Hong Kong . , , . 5 17 52 . 73
India 1 54 44 63 17 15
Japan 61 8 71 140 120 102
Taiwan , , , » 11 39
Others 7 17 33 57 42 39
TOTAL 209 197 272 355 317 358
U.K. share •(%) 66 53 37 10 4 3
(ii) Man-made fibre 
yards).
and mixture cloth (million square
Origin 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
U.K. 20 51 20 5 1 1
Japan 50 2 4 10 25 50
U.S.A. 5 , , 6 5 5
West Germany 2 . . 5 3 1 2
Others 4 13 18 1 13 4
TOTAL 76 71 47 25 45 67
U.K. share (%) 26 72 43 20 2 1












.APPENDIX II: An accounting procedure.
(i) An analysis of declining employment in weaving.
Employment in weaving (EW) is defined as cloth 
output (QW) divided by average labour 
productivity in weaving (PW):
EW = QW = QW 
QW/EW PW
dEWT is the total change in employment between 
year 0 and year t:
EW(t) - EW(0) = dEWT
Therefore: dEWT = Q.W(t) - QW(0)
PW(t) PW(0)
Adding and subtracting QW(t)/PW(0) from (3) 
we obtain:
dEWT = QW(t ) - QW(t ) + QW(t) - QWCO)
PW(t) PW(0) PW(0) PW(0)
[QW(t)/PW(t)] - CQW(t)/PW(0)] is the change in 
employment due to changing productivity, which 
can be rewritten as dEWP:
Therefore: dEWT = dEWP + QW(t) - QW(0)
PW(0)
[1/PW(0)].[QW(t) - QW(0)] is the change in
employment due to changing output (dEWQ). This 
can be subdivided into the changes in 
employment due to domestic demand (dEWD),
exports (dEWX), and imports (dEWM):
dEWQ = dEWD + dEWX + dEWM;
Where:
dEWD = [l/PW(0)].j[QW(t) - QW(0) ] - [XW(t) - XW(0)] +
+ [MW(t) - MW(0) 51;
dEWX = [1/PW(0>].[XW(t> - XW(0)];
dEWM = [1/PW(0)].[MW(0) - MW(t)]
To summarise, the change in employment in 
weaving between years 0 and t is made up of 
the changes in employment due to alterations 
in the level of average labour productivity, 
domestic demand, exports, and imports:









(ii) An analysis of declining employment in 
spinning.
In analyzing the factors accounting for 
declining employment in spinning, it is 
necessary to consider an additional factor: 
the change in spinning employment due to 
declining cloth production (dESW).
dEST = dESP + dESD + dESX + dESM + dESW
The change in spinning employment due to the 
change in the weaving section's consumption of 
non-continuous filament fibre yarn, Y, is* 
shown in (12):
dESW = Y(t) - Y(0)
PS(O)
Non-continuous filament fibre yarn consumption 
in a given year can be rewritten as cloth 
output, QW, multiplied by the quantity of 
non-continuous filament yarn used to produce a 
unit of cloth, C.
dESW = [C(t).QW(t ) - C(0).QW(0)]
FSCO)---------
Adding and subtracting C(0).QW(t)/PS(0) from
(13) we obtain (14), where
[1/PS(0)].[C(t).QW(t) - C(0).QW(t)] is the
change in spinning employment due to the 
change in the amount of non-continuous 
filament fibre used to produce a unit of 
cloth:
dESW = C(0).[QW(t) - QW(0)] +
PS(0)
+ C(t).QW(t) - C(0).QW(t)
PS(0)
QW(t) - QW(0) can be subdivided into changes
in domestic demand, exports, and imports of 
cloth. Consequently, where dESW(D), dESW(X), 
dESW(M), dESW(C) are the respective changes in 
spinning employment due to domestic demand for 
cloth, cloth exports, cloth imports, and the 
amount of non-continuous filament fibre yarn 
used to produce a unit of cloth:
dESW = dESW(D) + dESW(X) + dESW(M) + dESW(C)
Therefore: dEST = dESP + dESD + dESX + dESM + dESW
Where: dESD = CQS(t) - QS(0)3 - [XS(t) - XS(0)] +
PS(0) PS(0)
+ [MS(t) - MS(0)] - [Y(t) - Y(0)] 
P'S CUT ‘ PS (O')
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INVESTMENT IN THE LANCASHIRE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1950-65.
Lancashire substantially failed to modernise its 
fixed capital stock between 1945 and 1950. Chapter 5 
suggested that uncertainty, excess capacity, technical 
inter-relatedness, the large stock of fully written down 
machinery, and the short supply of certain types of 
textile machinery, were responsible for the low rate of 
re-equipment during this period. Consequently in 1950 
the industry was largely equipped with a fixed capital 
stock of prewar vintage.
The present chapter extends the analysis of 
investment in the cotton industry into the 1950s and 
1960s and is divided into four sections. Section I 
examines trends in the cotton industry's capital stock 
during the 1950s and early 1960s and sets out the 
theoretical background for the succeeding sections. 
Section II will analyze the course of investment in the 
cotton industry during the 1950s. Section III looks at 
the extremely important issue of excess capacity and the 
schemes hatched within the industry for its elimination. 
Section IV considers investment during the early 1960s, 
emphasising the effects of the 1959 Cotton Industry Act 
and the adoption of new technology such as the 
shuttleless loom.
I
Between 1950 and 1965 the productive capacity of 
the cotton industry declined by more than half. Tables 
7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 reveal the details of this process of
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Table 7.1







1950 34,45 18.98 10. 33
1951 34. 10 18. 24 10.57
1952 33.42 17.24 10. 79
1953 32.99 16.60 10. 93
1954 32.00 15. 76 10.83
1955 30. 80 14.52 10.85
1956 29. 29 13. 33 10. 64
1957 27. 79 12. 28 10. 34
1958 26.24 10.89 10.23
1959 22.88 8.71 9. 45
1960 13. 79 3.33 6. 97
1961 13.05 2. 78 6.84
1962 11. 98 2. 36 6. 40
1963 10.02 1. 56 5.64
1964 8. 82 1.03 5. 19
1965 8.25 0. 90 4.90
N.B. Figures apply to U 
m.e. means mule equivalent.
One ring spindle is assumed to 
mule spindles.
Capacity utilization refers 
equivalent spindles operating
Spindles running capacity 
total mule ring utilizn. 
m.e. (%)
( mi 11ions )
27. 46 15. 22 8. 16 79., 7
27. 83 15.01 8. 55 81. 6
21. 10 10.33 7. 18 63. 1
23. 85 11. 25 8. 40 72. 3
24. 94 11 . 77 8. 78 77. 9
22. 18 9.68 8. 33 72. 0
20. 72 8. 52 8. 13 70. 7
20. 48 8. 12 8. 24 73. 7
17. 21 5.98 7. 49 65. 6
15. 46 4.90 7. 05 67. 6
12. 14 2.83 6. 22 88. 0
11. 90 2.56 6. 24 91. 2
10. 11 1.80 5. 54 84. 4
8. 72 1. 20 5.01 87. 0
8.,06 n. a. n. a. 91. 4
7. 32 n. a. n. a. 88. 7
. and to running mills only;
be the equivalent of 1.5





Productive capacity and excess capacity in the weaving
section, 1950-65.









1950 357. 7 n. a. 281.4 78. 7
1951 358.3 n. a. 287.2 80.2
1952 354.3 34. 3* 229.7 64.8
1953 345. 7 n. a. 250.8 72.5
1954 337.8 n. a. 260.0 77.0
1955 326.8 39. 2* 233.2 71.4
1956 259. 9 39. 6* 211.8 71.6
1957 276.0 39. 9* 207. 1 75.0
1958 255. 4 41.5 178.8 70.0
1959 222. 6 41. 3 160. 4 72. 1
1960 155.4 40. 6 135.8 87.4
1961 149.6 42.9 135.8 90.8
1962 140. 1 42.8 119.7 85.4
1963 125.9 42. 5 108. 3 86.0
1964 118. 5 42. 5 105.9 89.4
1965 114. 0 42. 5 102. 4 89.8
N.B. Figures apply to the Lancashire area and to
mills only.
* All U.K. mills.
Capacity utilization refers to the percentage of looms 
operating in running mills.
Sources: C.B.Q.S.R.: International Federation of Cotton
Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations, International 




Automatic and semi-automatic looms in place as a 
proportion of all looms in selected countries,
1939-64.
1939 1953 1960 1964
( percentages )
U.S.A. 88. 76 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00
France n. a. 42. 37 57. 02 68. 85
W. Germany n. a. n. a. 59. 55 76. 94
Italy n. a. 64. 06 78. 76 86. 48
Sweden n. a. 86. 79 95. 18 97. 78
U.K. 3. 17 11. 32 27. 54 36. 92
Hong Kong n. a. n. a. 70. 59 85. 51
India n. a. n. a. 8. 21 12. 17
Pakistan n. a. 60. 00 63. 58
U.S.S.R. n. a. 17. 78 50. 50 62.,21
Source: G.A.T.T., A Study on Cotton Textiles (Geneva: 
G.A.T.T., 1966), Table E, pp. 192-6.
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contraction. Ring spindles in place in running mills 
fell from 10.33 million to 4.90 million between 1950 and 
1965, while aggregate mule equivalent spindleage fell 
from 34.45 million to 8.25 million. Total loomage 
declined from 357,700 in 1950 to 114,000 in 1965. The 
number of automatic loom increased from 34,300 to 42,500 
between 1950 and 1965, but Britain continued to have a 
lower proportion of automatic looms than most of its 
major competitors.
In Chapter 5 a broad theoretical framework for the 
analysis of industrial investment was outlined.(1) 
Investment was seen to be a function of the following 
factors:
(i) Business confidence in relation to both the 
short-term and long-term prospects for the industry.
(ii) Demand and the rate of change of demand for 
the final product.
(iii) Capacity utilization levels.
(iv) The price, quality, and availability of 
capital goods.
(v) Costs of production using old equipment.
(vi) Profits and changes in profits relative to 
capital goods prices.
(vii) The cost and availability of outside finance.
(viii) Technical inter-relatedness in spinning, 
weaving, and finishing.
These factors are also relevant to the discussion 
of investment in Lancashire after 1950, and constitute
an essentially post-Keynesian framework for the
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succeeding analysis. Perhaps government policy should 
have been included in the above list. Governments could 
have a direct impact on the quantity of re-equipment 
through such measures as the 1948 Cripps re-equipment
subsidy and the 1959 Cotton Industry Act.
Nevertheless there is a significant difference 
between the approach of Chapter 5 and that o^ f the 
present chapter. In an analysis of the fifties and 
sixties there is little scope for the application of
Kornai’s theory of 'suction1 in a resource-constrained 
economy. By the early 1950s the dominance of the market 
system had been restored in Britain. Lamfalussy’s theory 
of defensive investment is a more appropriate tool. It 
explains why firms continue to invest in industries 
marked by weak demand and falling profits.
Lamfalussy considered investment decisions in a 
declining or stagnating market environment. Firms have 
three strategies to choose from. They could quit the 
industry immediately; they could install new equipment 
(defensive investment); or else they could persevere
with their old machinery in the short-term, while 
planning to withdraw from production in the long-term. 
Defensive investment would delay, but not prevent, the 
decline in profitability. (2)
How will firms choose between these strategies? A 
firm which decided not to re-equip need not make any 
allowance for depreciation in future years. Assuming 
perfect foresight, such a firm would calculate the 
present value of the gross profits (plus scrap value)
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that would accrue during the remainder of the working 
life of its existing equipment. It would plan to quit in 
the year in which the present value of cumulative gross 
profits (plus scrap value) reached a maximum. This can 
be clarified by the following numerical example. For the 
sake of simplicity it is assumed that the discount rate 
is zero.
EXAMPLE I: NO-REPLACEMENT OF FIXED CAPITAL.
1
Year
2 3 4 5 6
Gross profit 100 80 60 40 20 0
Scrap value 12 10 8 6 4 2
CUMULATIVE 
GROSS PROFIT 
PLUS SCRAP VALUE 112 190 248 286 304 302
It can be seen that the best time to quit would be 
year 5. But before the firm decided to adopt such a 
policy, it would compare the present value of cumulative 
gross profits (plus scrap value) in year 5, with the 
present value of the cumulative net profits that could 
be obtained as a result of re-equipment. I refer the 
reader to the second numerical example.
EXAMPLE II: DEFENSIVE INVESTMENT.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Gross profit* 120 120 60 50 40 30 20
Depreciation 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Net profit 100 100 40 30 20 10 0
CUMULATIVE 
NET PROFIT 100 200 240 270 290 300 300
* accruing to the new equipment.
In this isase the life--span of the new machinery is
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seven years, and during that time it earns cumulative 
net profits of 300. This is less than the present value 
of the gross profits (plus scrap value) that could be 
secured by eschewing investment and scrapping in year 5.
A rational firm would decide not to re-equip. The
relevant choice can also be expressed algebraically.
Firms will re-equip if:
[1] NP(1) + NP( 2) +...+ NP(n) > GP(1) + GP(2) +...+ GP(m).
(l+r) (l+r)1 (l+rf (1+r) (l+r)2- (l+r)m
Where: NP(1), NP(2 NP(n) are net profits 
in years 1,2,...,n, and n is the life-span of 
the new equipment; GP(1), GP(2),...,GP(m) are 
gross profits inclusive of scrap value in 
years 1,2,...,m, and m is the year in which 
the present value of cumulative gross profits 
plus scrap value using old machinery is 
maximized.
Firms would adopt the third policy, i.e scrapping
immediately, if the break-up value of the existing 
machinery exceeded both the present value of maximum 
cumulative gross profits (plus scrap value), and the 
present value of the cumulative net profits accruing 
from re-equipment.
Firms are likely to choose defensive investment if:
(i) The life-span of new equipment is high relative 
to its replacement cost. This would lead to low annual 
depreciation costs.
(ii) The new equipment embodies technical
improvements.
(iii) Scrap prices are low.
(iv) They have short planning horizons. Returning 
to our earlier numerical examples, firms which
2 9 0
re-equipped would enjoy large net profits in years 1 and
2. If firms did not possess detailed information about
years 3 to 7, they would be inclined to select a policy
of defensive investment, although this would make them
worse off after the first two years. Lamfalussy argued
that small firms tended to have short horisons. This
makes his analysis particularly relevant to the analysis
of the cotton industry in Lancashire.
Lamfalussy derived his theory of defensive
investment from an examination of the Belgian economy
during the 1950s:
“The moral...seems to be that...declining or 
stagnating markets may also induce capital 
outlay which will not be enough [or of the 
right kind] to save the firm for good, but 
will be enough to keep it alive for long 
years, after which it will nevertheless have 
to go out of business in the end. If defensive 
investment of this hopeless kind takes place, 
the transfer of capital and labour from 
declining to expanding industries will be 
greatly delayed."(3)
It would not be unrealistic to speculate that a 
great deal of the investment in Lancashire after 1950 
was of a defensive nature. Moreover it is quite possible 
that much of this investment would not have taken place 
had firms been able to take a longer view of demand and 
profitability in the industry. The theory of defensive 
investment may also help to explain the survival of a 
large number of marginal firms in cotton textile 
production.
II
The 1950s were years of regression for the 
Lancashire cotton industry. Investment was at a
Table 7.4
Comparative investment expenditure per operative in the 
cotton industries of selected countries, 1954-63.
France Holland Italy Japan U.K.
($u. S. ) *
1954 113.9 191.2 n. a. 44.2 80.0+
1955 129.8 190.0 n. a. 81.2 99.3 +
1959 179.0 231. 1 114. 5 73.2 148.8++
1960 176.5 284.0 151. 7 128.0 209.0++
1961 243.9 448.5* 144.3 119.0 331.5++
1962 292. 7 379.3* 159.5 105.4 342.4
1963 296.5 n. a. 178. 3 97.4 n. a.
* including rayon and linen.
+ including hosiery and knitwear.
++ including finishing.
N.B. The French data excludes investment in buildings; 
the Japanese data excludes investment in weaving.
Source: O.E.C.D., Modern Cotton Industry: A Capital




Ring spindles in the course of erection, 1951-7.
As replacement
of existing
spindles of As an increase
the same type in spindleage Total
( thousands )
Jan. 1951 n. a. n. a. 378
July 1951 n. a. n. a. 201
Jan. 1952 n. a. n. a. 271
July 1952 133 52 185
Jan. 1953 110 164 274
Jan. 1954 162 101 263
July 1954 241 64 305
July 1955 209 66 275
July 1956 265 49 314
July 1957 190 71 261
NB. Cotton and allied textiles only.
Source: International Federation of Master Cotton
Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations, International 
Cotton Statistics.(Manchester: I. F. M. C. S. M. A. , 1950-7).
2 9 3
Table 7.6
Looms in the course of erection, 1952-8.
As replacement for 
looms of same type
semi
Lancs auto auto
July 1952 536 1968 -
Jan. 1955 1158 1061 -
Jan. 1956 813 1126 82
Jan. 1957 428 1139 36






469 477 - 3450
1638 620 63 4540
462 246 54 2783
416 198 152 2369
277 245 11 1705
N.B. Data refers to looms in the course of erection and 
expected to run within twelve months. Cotton and allied 
textiles only.
Source: International Federation of Master Cotton
Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations, International 
Cotton Loom Statistics.(Manchester: I.F.M.C.S.M.A. ,
1952-8).
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relatively low ebb, as is revealed by the data collected 
in Tables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6. Although the information
displayed in Table 7.4 is of a tentative nature, it 
would appear that gross investment per operative in the 
British cotton textile industry during the 1950s 
compared unfavourably with levels of investment in 
competitor countries. At the rate of erection of new 
ring spindles in July 1954 (see Table 7.5) it would have 
taken 35 years fully to replace Britain's existing ring 
spinning capacity. Table 7.3 exhibited the extent of 
Britain's failure to convert its weaving capacity from 
Lancashire looms to automatic looms. Table 7.6 reveals 
that many firms were still installing new Lancashire 
looms during the 1950s. Taking both Lancashire and 
automatic looms into account, it would have about 50 
years to replace half of Lancashire's total weaving 
capacity at the rate of re-equipment prevailing in the 
mid 1950s. It is the purpose of the present section to 
explain the overall failure of Lancashire to re-equip 
during the 1950s, and this will involve examining the 
factors outlined in the previous section.
Re-equipment was seen as an important goal of the 
industry throughout the 1950s, by both the employers' 
organizations and the trade unions. During 1949 the 
employers and the operatives had co-operated in a series 
of missions to inspect mills in the United States. Their 
conclusions, published in 1950, led to widespread 
dismay, for they indicated that British mills had done 
little to catch up with best U.S. practice since the
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Platt Mission in 1943: "There is a great disparity
between the average productivity of American and British 
mills in favour of the U.S.A.. The high productivity in 
America is obtained without the sacrifice of yarn 
quality...and without diminution of machine 
efficiency".(4) It was therefore imperative that Britain 
should proceed towards the adoption of the latestto
technology. Two years later these conclusions were
echoed in the report of a delegation from the United
States, which had been shocked by the use of archaic
machinery in Lancashire spinning and weaving mills.(5)
Although the Americans' report was treated with thinly
disguised contempt by some employers, Mr George Hasty,
the president of the F.M.C.S.A., reiterated the need for
modernization in his annual statement in March 1953:
"We are now...approaching the top of a hill.
Our industry has two choices before it. It can 
gradually retreat down the hill and contract, 
relying almost entirely on the old methods.
Owing to the skill and reputation which it 
has, it would still continue to contribute for 
a long time towards our national economy, but 
it would not attract the rising generation of 
workers. As its equipment became old and the 
average age of its labour force increased, it 
would be less and less able to compete in a 
modern world. On the other hand, we can 
advance to the crest of the hill and go
forward with the aim of making our industry 
the most up to date and competitive in the 
world."(6)
In sharp contrast to the situation in the 1940s, Mr 
Hasty could expect little direct assistance for
modernization from the government. The Conservatives, 
elected in 1951, made it clear that the cotton industry 
would be left to its own devices. On 18 Aug. 1954 Mr 
Peter Thorneycroft, the President of the Board of Trade,
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warned a delegation of employers and trade unionists 
that there would be no question of special legislative 
measures, along the lines of the 1948 Cotton Spinning 
(Re-equipment Subsidy) Act, to assist the industry to 
replace its aging capital stock.(7) Only the U.T.F.W.A. 
and the Labour Party appeared to offer a coherent plan 
for modernizing the industry, in their Plan for Cotton. 
They argued that management was complacent and would not 
re-equip while profits could still be made with existing 
machinery.(8) This obstacle could be overcome by the 
creation of a Cotton Industry Re-organisation Commission 
with wide ranging powers. The C.I.R.C. would offer firms 
subsidised loans for approved re-equipment programmes. 
But the C.I.R.C. would have powers to compel firms to 
re-equip if they refused these inducements. Directors 
could be nominated by the C.I.R.C. and appointed to 
company boards to press for a policy of modernization. 
In extreme cases the government would be asked to take a 
controlling interest in recalcitrant firms to ensure 
that they implemented a suitable investment 
programme.(9) A levy on firms varying inversely with 
their investment expenditure would help to pay for the 
C.I.R.C. and act as an added inducement to re-equip. 
Labour's proposals went far beyond the rather weak 
provisions of the 1948 Cripps subsidy, but they were 
never implemented, the party remaining in opposition 
until 1964. As cotton was an industry with no long term 
future it is doubtful whether such policies would have 
been desirable from a national standpoint.(10)
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Lancashire faced the renewed difficulties of the 
1950s without any government aid for re-equipment. In a 
hostile climate marked by rapidly declining demand it is 
not surprising that many firms were reluctant to risk 
large capital expenditure. Output of yarn and cloth fell 
by one third between 1950 and 1960, exports collapsed, 
and cheap Asian imports flooded into Britain.(11) This 
decline was not uniform: there were particularly severe 
contractions of output in 1952, 1955-6, and 1958-9, with 
small recoveries in the intervening years, but this 
instability only added to firms’ uncertainty. Tables 7.1 
and 7.2 suggest that the industry was experiencing 
considerable excess capacity between 1950 and 1960. 
Panic calculated that between 1958 and 1975 capacity 
utilization in the British manufacturing sector averaged 
94.4 per cent at the peaks of the business cycle and 
82.9 per cent in the troughs.(12) In the most prosperous 
year (i.e. 1954) between 1952 and 1959, a mere 77.9 per 
cent of spindles and 77.0 per cent of looms in running 
mills were operating. The Lancashire cotton industry 
clearly exhibited an unusually high degree of redundant 
capacity. Declining demand and chronic surplus capacity 
were reflected in a growing loss of confidence in the 
industry. Tattersall’s index of cotton share prices and 
the Annual Abstract of Statistics’ index of industrial 
share prices are compared in Table 7.7. Lancashire share 
prices showed no improvement between 1950 and 1960, 
while those of British industry as a whole more than 
doubled in price. In these adverse circumstances
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Table 7.7




























* As calculated in the Annual Abstract of Statistics.
Sources: Annual Abstract of Statistics ;
F.W. Tattersall’s Annual Cotton Trade Review.
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investment in the industry was largely of a defensive 
nature.
Lamfalussy1s theory of defensive investment also 
predicts that firms, once they have decided to quit the 
industry, may delay closure for a number of years so 
that they might maximize the present value of future 
gross profits. The Labour Party's suggestion that a levy 
should be charged on firms unwilling to invest stemmed 
from the fear that this form of activity was rife. High 
short run profits could be made by firms choosing to 
hoard rather than to reinvest their depreciation funds, 
and then abandoning the industry. It is likely that this 
behaviour was partly responsible for excess capacity in 
the industry, thereby constituting a disincentive to 
investment by other companies.(13)
In examining an industry's record of investment, it 
is necessary to consider the availability of external 
and internal finance for re-equipment. Lancashire was 
not a major recipient of assistance from the agencies 
established during the 1940s to help small and medium 
firms to obtain finance. It is difficult to find 
detailed information on the activities of the Industrial 
and Commercial Finance Corporation and the Finance 
Corporation for Industry. But it appears that they 
concentrated on London, where 37 per cent of the 
I.C.F.C.'s portfolio was held in 1957. But this may have 
been because there was little demand for assistance in 
Lancashire. Lord Piercy, chairman of the I.C.F.C., told 
the Radcliffe Committee that: "We have become very well
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established in Birmingham where we seem to take people's 
fancy. We find it very difficult [to find clients] in 
Manchester".(14)
Lancashire was not particularly starved of advances
from the banks. Between 1950-2 and 1958-60 bank advances
to the cotton industry as a proportion of advances to 
all manufacturing industry increased from 3.0 per^ cent 
to 3.4 per cent.(15) The District Bank had very close 
links with Lancashire and was the main backer of Cyril 
Lord, in his attempt to expand his business interests in
spinning and weaving during the early 1950s. This was
greatly to the chagrin of Sir Raymond Streat, who 
described Lord as the "vulgarest of adventurers".(16)
In December 1957 the Association of British 
Chambers of Commerce submitted evidence to the Radcliffe 
Committee on monetary policy, dealing with the effects 
on investment of changes in interest rates and the
availability of credit. Out of 379 textile companies in 
the survey which had either experienced a contraction in 
turnover, or had decided to reduce or postpone their
investment programmes since September 1957, 48 per cent 
claimed that this was a result of slack business,
increased competition, or altered trading prospects. 
Only 13 per cent blamed the reductions in turnover and 
investment on tight money, while a mere three per cent 
stressed difficulties in obtaining finance, and a
further three per cent an increase in the cost of
borrowing to the punitive level of seven per cent.(17) 
Thus it would seem that even during the 1957 credit
3 0 1
squeeze textile producers were not seriously constrained 
from investing on account of changes in interest rates 
or the availability of outside finance.
Profits are the major source of finance for 
re-equipment in British industry. Tables 7.8 and 7.9 
show the broad trends in the profitability of firms in 
the cotton industry during the 1950s and early ^960s. 
Between 1951 and 1959 the average net profits of the 
leading combines declined from £694,823 to £81,528 at 
constant prices. The average dividend to shareholders 
fell from 19.00 per cent to 9.73 per cent over the same 
period, suggesting that firms were finding themselves 
under very great pressure. Such a disastrous loss of 
profitability must have had a very significant effect on 
investment decisions in the industry. At the same time 
there is some tentative evidence to suggest that firms 
were reluctant to invest those profits which remained. 
In 1956 the largest firm in the industry, the Lancashire 
Cotton Corporation, decided to increase dividends at the 
expense of further investment in fixed capital stock. 
Perhaps the L.C.C. was tending towards Lamfalussy's 
policy of delayed contraction.(18)
Further important determinants of the level of 
investment include the price, availability, and quality 
of textile machinery. During the late 1940s the supply 
of new textile machinery had been severely constrained 
by import restrictions and the government's attempts to 
channel a large proportion of British production of 
spindles and looms into export markets. After 1951 the
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Table 7.8
Net profits of the leading cotton industry combines,
1950-65.
Average Average




1950 484,371 484,371 16.96
1951 761,526 694,823 19.00
1952 534,004 447,614 17.42
1953 264,180 215,130 11.94
1954 431,928 344,440 13. 58
1955 333,213 254,945 14.99
1956 224,904 163,805 13. 23
1957 354,919 249,241 12.72
1958 235,716 160,679 10. 79
1959 120,254 81,528 9. 73
1960 375,425 251,963 12.48
1961 470,799 305,515 14.82
1962 250,317 155,864 12.83
1963 139,597 85,224 8.09
1964 147,669 81,365 12.68
1965 178,095 100,505 14.27
* i.e deflated by retail price index.
N.B. Figures are after deductions have been made for 
depreciation and include subsidiary firms. The firms 
within the leading group varied from year to year, 
consequently the results must be treated with care.
Source: F.W. Tattersall's Annual Cotton Trade Review.
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Table 7.9
Net profits of independent ootton textile companies,
1950-65.
Spinning firms Weaving firms
average average average average
net profits net profits net profits net profits
(current (1950 (current (1950
prices) prices)* prices) prices)*
(£) <£> (£) (£>
1950 35,166 35,166 n. a. n. a.
1951 55,541 50,676 n. a. n. a.
1952 55,154 46,231 87,323 73,196
1953 27,546 22,432 49,821 40,571
1954 31,226 24,901 40,920 32,632
1955 27,745 21,228 42,285 32,353
1956 21,077 15,351 28,090 20,459
1957 26,245 18,430 24,320 17,079
1958 25,099 17,109 25,015 17,052
1959 5,978 4,053 19,073 12,931
1960 31,146 20,903 47,492 31,874
1961 46,050 29,883 57,512 37,321
1962 26,587 16,555 76,073 47,368
1963 6,053 3,695 52,191 31,863
1964 10,752 6,355 46,382 27,413
1965 24,879 14,040 38,444 21,695
* i.e deflated by retail price index.
N.B. Figures are after deductions have been made for tax and 
depreciation and include subsidiary firms. The firms within 
these groups varied from year to year, consequently the 
results must be treated with care.
Source: F.W. Tattersall's Annual Cotton Trade Review.
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Conservative government ceased putting pressure on
textile machinery manufacturers to maximize exports;
nevertheless import controls remained for several years.
In 1954 the F.M.C.S.A. complained that imports of
machinery continued to be restricted where 'suitable'
British products were available, but these controls
gradually disappeared.(19) As British textile machinery
producers, particularly in the spinning section,
assiduously cultivated their reputation for poorly
designed and obsolete models, Lancashire increasingly
turned to foreign suppliers. Between 1950 and 1959 the
volume of imported spindles (for all fibres) increased
from 3783 cwt to 27,173 cwt, although there was no
significant increase in imports of automatic looms until
the 1960s.(20)
Despite the greater availability of textile
machinery in the 1950s firms still found plenty to
complain about. In 1955 Horrockses, a medium—sized
vertically integrated firm, maintained that:
"With the present-day prices for new automatic 
looms and other textile machinery, the Trade 
Union regulations forbidding the working of
double shifts in excess of 37 1/2 hours per
week...and the high wage costs operating not 
only in textiles, but in various 'supply' 
industries servicing Lancashire - e.g. 
nationalised coal, transport and local 
government etc., no matter how efficient a 
firm may be, it is just impossible to compete 
in terms of price with overseaes 
manufacturers".(21)
Table 7.10 reveals the justification for 
Horrockses' concern. Between 1950 and 1960 the prices of 
new automatic looms (at current prices) more than
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Table 7.10
Export prices of new ring spindles and automatic looms,
1950-60.













* Spindles for cotton and man-made fibres only.
+ Automatic looms for all fibres.
N.B. Trade in second-hand equipment is excluded. Data is 
at current prices.
Source:Annual Statement of the Trade of the United 
Kingdom.
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doubled, while ring spindle prices rose .by 60 per cent. 
It has already been established that the change in 
profits relative to the change in machinery prices is a 
crucial determinant of the incentive to invest.(22) By 
this criterion there was clearly little reason for firms 
in Lancashire to re-equip during the 1950s, as profits 
were collapsing against a background of rising machinery 
prices.
Horrockses mentioned difficulties relating to the 
introduction of shift systems as an important factor 
holding back investment expenditure. In an environment 
of rising textile machinery prices shift-working would 
enable high annual capital charges to be spread over a 
larger volume of output per spindle or per loom.(23) 
During the 1930s the trade unions had been hostile to 
shift-working, while in the 1940s the supply of labour 
was so severely curtailed that shift systems were 
impractical. But after 1950 the trade unions became 
increasingly willing to encourage shift-working, and 
between 1954 and 1964 the number of cotton operatives 
participating in shift systems increased from ten per 
cent to 32 per cent, although this proportion remained 
low by international standards.(24) In view of the 
general co-operativeness of the unions on this issue, it 
was perhaps a case of Britain's slow rate of 
modernization reducing the need for shift-working, 
rather than opposition to shift-working constraining 
re-equ ipment.
Technical inter-relatedness continued to retard
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re-equipment in the cotton industry. In 1958 the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
commissioned a study of innovation in cotton spinning, 
which concentrated on the rate of adoption of 
high—drafting equipment in the card—room. The survey 
discovered that modernization of the preparatory 
processes frequently led to a reduction in yarn quality 
unless ring frames were employed at the succeeding stage 
in the production process. Mule spinning was 
incompatible with high-drafting in the card-room. 
Consequently re-equipment had to be carried out 
simultaneously in the card-room and the spinning room, 
instead of piecemeal. This greatly increased the 
financial strain of modernization and dissuaded many 
smaller firms from attempting improvements.(25)
The survey also claimed that price maintenance 
agreements, particularly in the spinning section, were 
detrimental to the drive for modernization. Under the 
Yarn Spinners' Agreement minimum prices were established 
to prevent weak selling. It was argued that minimum 
prices added to the level of surplus capacity by 
protecting inefficient mills. Firms which had 
re-equipped were prevented from spreading fixed capital 
costs over a larger output through a reduction in 
price.(26)
Given the overall collapse in demand, confidence, 
and profits during the 1950s, and the existence of an 
overwhelming degree of excess capacity, it is tempting 
to depict all investment in the cotton industry as of a
308
fundamentally defensive nature.(27) Defensive investment 
can take place for one of two reasons. Firstly, its 
objective may be to reduce the rate of decline in 
profits. Even if this policy is successful it will only 
delay collapse for a few years. Secondly, defensive 
investment may be based on inadequate information about 
the future. Firms with a short planning horizon mgy not 
realise that a more rational strategy would be to eschew 
re-equipment and wait for the best moment to quit 
production. In neither case would re-equipment secure 
the permanent survival. By slowing the rate of decline 
of the industry defensive investment increases the 
misallocation of resources in the economy as a whole.
But perhaps it would be a little unfair to see all 
investment in Lancashire during this period in such 
terms. Not all sections of the industry were declining 
at the same rate. The demand for yarn and cloth for 
industrial uses, and for rayon and nylon in general, 
remained comparatively buoyant during the 1950s.(28) 
Cotton textile companies specializing in these products 
could still plan for the future with a degree of 
optimism. For instance, after World War Two James Kenyon 
and Son of Bury, a medium-sized concern, increasingly 
concentrated on the production of wet felts for 
industrial uses. Demand was high, and during the 1950s 
this firm had no difficulty in justifying the 
installation of new and larger looms and rebuilding its 
finishing works.(29) E & E Bottomley of Mossley were
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engaged in the lucrative trade of tyre fabric 
manufacturing and were able to expand into additional 
premises during the 1950s, while James Nelson continued 
to prosper on the basis of developing its rayon 
business.(30)
However, these qualifications aside, by 1958-9 the 
cotton industry had reached a point of utter 
demoralisation. It was generally accepted that only 
government intervention to stimulate investment and to 
limit foreign competition could enable the industry to 
continue for much longer. In the following section an 
account will be given of the industry's attempts to deal 
with one of the most pressing problems of the later 
1950s, that of redundant capacity.
Ill
Idle looms and spindles were a major deterrent to 
investment in the cotton industry during the 1950s. The 
existence of a large measure of spare capacity increased 
the mood of uncertainty in the industry. Moreover many 
firms feared that this machinery would be brought back 
into production, ushering in a period of intense 
competition or 'weak selling'.(31)
Excess capacity was by no means a new phenomemon in 
Lancashire in the 1950s. Between 1920 and 1939 this 
problem had generated great concern in British industry 
as a whole. One of the main objectives of the 
'rationalization movement' had been to eliminate 
redundant capacity. In the chemical industry Nobel 
Industries closed 55 per cent of its explosives capacity
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in the early 1920s in response to a reduction in demand.
After the formation of I.C.I. in 1926 alkali production
was concentrated in the most efficient plants and the
rest were closed. There were similar movements in the
metal and jute industries.(32) The Samuel Commission
advocated the closure of inefficient pits in its plan
for the regeneration of the coal industry in 1926, but
*
this recommendation was unacceptable to the colliery 
owners.(33) In the finishing section of the textile 
industry substantial progress was made towards the 
reduction of excess capacity. Between 1918 and 1939 the 
Calico Printers' Association permanently closed 11 of 
its 29 works. In 1931 the C.P.A., the Bradford Dyers' 
Association, and the Bleachers' association entered into 
an agreement which led to the elimination of a further 
section of the industry's capacity.(34)
The problem of excess capacity in spinning and 
weaving attracted the attention of Keynes during the 
late 1920s. In January 1927 he told a meeting of 
spinning employers in Manchester that "the real trouble 
and this is the beginning, the middle and the end of 
my argument — is surplus capacity — not necessarily 
permanent but at least prolonged and with no end in 
sight."(35) By 1930 42 per cent of the spinning
section's capacity was standing idle.(36) But between 
1930 and 1939 the industry's fixed capital stock was 
reduced from 63 million to 39 million spindles. Three 
factors contributed to this contraction. Firstly, a 
large number of firms left the industry. Secondly,
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around 5,000,000 spindles were scrapped by "the
Lancashire Cotton Corporation. This combine, with an
initial capacity of 10,000,000 spindles, had been formed
in 1929 at the behest of the Bank of England, with the
objective of improving the financial stability of the
coarse spinning section by means of rationalization.(37)
Thirdly, attempts were made to institute formal schemes
*
for the disposal of excess capacity. In 1934 the 
F.M.C.S.A. put forward a scheme for a Surplus Spindleage 
Board, which would purchase 10 million spindles, either 
for scrapping or to be held in reserve until demand
improved. A compulsory levy on firms would provide the
Board with the funds for this project. Three quarters of 
the firms in the industry supported the scheme, although 
some complained that the larger combines would be
guaranteed seats on the Board. In 1936 the government 
adopted this idea and created a Spindles Board with 
powers to impose a levy on the industry for the 
elimination of excess capacity. Its members were 
appointed by the government after consultation with the 
industry. By the outbreak of war the Spindles Board had, 
without compulsion, purchased and scrapped 6,000,000 
spindles.(38)
During the late 1930s the government and the
industry, through the medium of the Joint Committee of 
Cotton Trade Organizations, discussed proposals for the 
comprehensive regulation of cotton textile production. 
Statutory backing would be provided for redundancy and 
price maintenance schemes drawn up by each section of
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"the industry. The price maintenance schemes would be 
compulsory, but firms would not be fCreed to scrap 
equipment. A Cotton Industry Board would supervise and 
co-ordinate the implementation of these programmes.(39) 
A number of smaller firms vehemently opposed this 
initiative, claiming that redundancy levies would 
constitute an unfair tax on firms, that the combines 
would manipulate the Cotton Industry Board to increase 
their monopoly power by securing the closure of smaller 
competitors, and that redundancy grants paid to the 
combines would be used to build additional factories 
overseas.(40) However this opposition was overcome and a 
Cotton Industry Board was provided for under the 1939 
Cotton Industry [Re-organisation] Act. War prevented the 
Act being put into practice and the idea was quietly 
shelved.
Serious fears were expressed in the mid 1940s about 
the recurrence of excess capacity after the war. The 
Cotton Board Committee to Enquire into Post-War Problems 
was particularly worried about potential overcapacity in 
the weaving section, which had received little attention 
between the wars, and advocated the introduction of a 
loom scrapping scheme under the auspices of the Cotton 
Board.(41) The 1946 Board of Trade Cotton Working Party 
was unable to reach agreement on the need for the 
elimination of excess capacity. Although the majority 
recommended a scheme, financed jointly by the industry 
and the Treasury, for the purchase and non-compulsory 
scrapping of one eighth of British spindleage, it was
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ridiculed by Jewkes: "To carry out a 'surgical
operation' before it is known what part, if any, of the 
patient should be amputated, seems to us a highly 
precipitate move."(42) Nothing was done to implement any 
of these proposals, but by the early 1950s the cotton 
industry knew what to expect from excess capacity.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 above provide data on rates of
*
capacity utilization in the cotton industry between 1950 
and 1965. Between 1951 and 1955 the rate of capacity 
utilization of spinning capacity fell from 81.6 per cent 
to 72.0 per cent, while the rate of utilization of 
weaving capacity fell from 80.2 per cent to 71.4 per 
cent. This could hardly have gone unnoticed, and was 
perceived as a major constraint on firms' re-equipment 
decisions.
By the mid 1950s redundancy schemes were once more 
am important topic of conversation amd speculation in 
Lamcashire. At the 1955 Cotton Board Conference Mr C.E. 
Harrison of English Sewing Cotton posed the crucial 
question: "The industry must ask itself whether the 
problem is to be solved by another 'war of attrition' or 
whether a more orderly form of contraction is 
possible".(43) Arising out of a proposal made at this 
conference, discussions were held with the Bank of 
England concerning means of raising finance for the 
purchase and scrapping of surplus capacity. But this 
initiative came to nothing, as the spinning employers 
were reluctant to impose a further levy on the 
industry.(44)
Sir Raymond Streat, chairman of the Cotton Board, 
identified a number of obstacles to a successful 
rationalization scheme. No help could be expected from 
the government, nor would the different sections of the 
industry agree to subsidise one another's schemes. A 
levy would reduce the profit margins of firms remaining 
in the industry, although this could be offset by the
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likelihood of running to a higher capacity. Finally, tax 
would have to be paid on compensation received by firms 
scrapping machinery. But despite these difficulties, 
individual sections should press on with their own 
arrangements: "No more obvious moment them the present
is likely to arise and...whilst the precise degree of 
redundancy which may exist cannot be reasonably 
ascertained, policy may safely be based on the 
assumption that you cannot go too far".(45) Streat 
believed that the weaving section had most to gain from 
eliminating capacity but feared that "the large number 
of small family firms in the weaving section just won't 
go out of business with or without a scheme...They 
prefer to hae their managerial incomes, even if these 
are slightly reduced by bad trade."(46)
During 1956 a proposal was mooted in the press for 
a scheme covering both spinning and weaving which would 
avoid the necessity for a levy on firms. Groups of mills 
would voluntarily join together and submit plans to the 
Board of Trade for closing some of their factories and 
re-equipping the rest. They would receive special 
investment allowances and tax concessions to assist the
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installation of new machinery. This was an imaginative 
scheme, but evidently not one which appealed to the 
government.(47)
In some quarters the idea of a redundancy scheme 
aroused considerable suspicion. The chairman of Fine 
Spinners and Doublers accepted that spinning capacity 
should be reduced by over one half, but felt tt^ at "to 
achieve a compact and efficient industry of the right 
size I am convinced we must rely on natural [sic] 
forces. The alternative solution of an organised 
redundancy sceme would be in my opinion complicated, 
unworkable, inadequate and indefinable in its 
scope."(48) The trade unions were extremely wary about 
the scrapping proposals, accusing the employers of 
failing to consider the future of the workers who would 
lose their jobs and of neglecting the issue of workers' 
compensation.(49)
Streat was correct in his prediction that weaving 
would be the first section to draw up a formal scrapping 
scheme. This originated in the rayon weaving section. In 
1955 the R.W.A. concluded that it would be in the 
interests of the industry for concerted action to be 
taken to eliminate surplus capacity. Firms with outdated 
machinery but large reserves tended to delay withdrawal 
from the industry despite making significant losses: "It 
is much easier to put it off from month to month until 
events take the decision for you...in the Micawberish 
hope that something will turn up."(50) The C.S.M.A. was 
approached with the objective of establishing a joint
scheme for cotton and rayon weaving. It was argued that 
firms were being dissuaded from winding up their 
businesses because of the imposition of 30 per cent 
distributed profits tax on part of the proceeds of the 
disposal of the company's assets. This tax could be 
avoided if the firm was sold to a central agency, to be 
called Weaving Reorganisation Ltd., for scrapping.(51) 
This company would be controlled by the R.W.A. and 
C.S.M.A. and would attempt to raise money from finance 
corporations such as the I.C.F.C. and the F.C.I.. 
Weaving companies would be invited to subscribe loan 
capital, although this would be on a purely voluntary 
basis. There would be no question of a compulsory levy 
on firms to provide the company with funds.(52) A small 
amount of compensation would also be provided for 
redundant operatives.(53)
Although the weaving employers resolved to proceed 
with their scrapping scheme, they were overtaken by 
events. As support for the Conservative Party continued 
to decline in the wake of the Rochdale by-election in 
February 1958, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, 
announced a programme of government assistance for the 
elimination of surplus capacity. This amounted to a 
complete abrogation of the government's earlier policy 
of non-intervention in the industry's affairs, and 
marked the most significant initiative since the 1939 
Cotton Industry (Re-organisation) Act. The aim of the 
redundancy scheme was to scrap 50 per cent of spinning 
and 40 per cent of weaving capacity. Two-thirds of the
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cost of compensating firms for the elimination of 
capacity would be borne by the government, with a levy 
on the surviving firms providing the other third.(54) 
Employers associations co-operated with the Board of 
Trade in the construction of detailed plans for the 
implementation of these proposals. In the event 48 per 
cent of the spindles and 27 per cent of the looms into
place in April 1959 were scrapped by firms under the 
provisions of the 1959 Cotton Industry Act.(55)
The results of the scrapping phase were quite 
dramatic. Capacity utilization in the spinning section 
rose from an average of 69.9 per cent between 1955 and 
1959 to 88.4 per cent between 1960 and 1964. In weaving, 
capacity utilization rose from 72.0 per cent to 87.8 per 
cent over the same period. This moderated one of the 
most serious constraints on investment in the cotton 
industry, although other constraints remained, as will 
be seen in the next section.
IV
To a very limited extent, the 1959 Cotton Industry 
Act created new hope that the cotton and allied textiles 
industry could be restored to viability. But this was 
relatively short-lived, since although cotton textile 
shares rose substantially in 1959-60, they fell again in 
1961-2. Average net profits at constant 1950 prices of 
the leading cotton industry combines increased from 
£81,528 in 1959 to £305,515 in 1961, thereafter falling 
to £81,365 in 1964. Consequently, in the early sixties 
the overall level of investment increased: at current
318
prices fixed capital formation in the textile and 
clothing industry rose from £66.5 million in 1959 to 
£105.7 million in 1961, before falling back to £85.2 
million in 1962.(56) This section will examine the basis 
for the sudden rise and fall of investment in the early 
1960s, and consider the wider costs and benefits of 
modernization in the cotton industry during the 1960s.
When Mr Macmillan announced his plan for a 
subsidised scrapping scheme in 1958 he had no intention 
of supplementing this by a system of re-equipment 
grants. The underlying purpose was to help the industry 
to decline gracefully, while relieving the political 
pressure on the government. But Lancashire saw that this 
was an excellent opportunity to twist the government’s 
arm. During the winter of 1958-9 the employers and the 
Cotton Board demanded that assistance be given to firms 
to proceed with re-equipment. For instance, weaving 
employers asked the Board of Trade for a 50 per cent 
re-equipment subsidy, which would also be available 
retrospectively to firms which had already modernized. 
This caused some consternation in government circles. On 
5 Mar. 1959 the Permanent Secretary to the Board of 
Trade said that a re-equipment grant might be possible, 
although 50 per cent was out of the question. A week 
later the President of the Board of Trade, David Eccles, 
made it clear that there would be no retrospective 
grants, but reluctantly promised to give further thought 
to a re-equipment subsidy. Eventually the government 
agreed to offer a 25 per cent re-equipment subsidy to
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spinning and weaving firms, to be paid for by the 
taxpayer. (57)
Under the provisions of the re-equipment phase of 
the 1959 Act, 678,000 new ring spindles were installed, 
constituting 12.8 per cent of total spindleage in Oct. 
1965. In weaving 11,000 automatic looms were installed, 
representing 8.8 per cent of the industry's capacity in 
Oct. 1965.(58) Fine Spinners and Doublers alone scrapped 
1,500,000 spindles and over 1,000 looms under the Act 
and purchased 130,000 new ring spindles and 650 
automatic looms.(59) However, modernization did not go 
as far as had been hoped. The industry had expected that 
the Act would stimulate re-equipment costing £80 - £90
million, but in the event eligible re-equipment 
expenditure did not exceed £53.5 million.(60)
Mr A. Ormerod, managing director of Ashton
Brothers, a large weaving concern, viewed the whole 
affair with undisguised cynicism: "Under the [1948]
Cotton Re-organisation Subsidy Act, a re-equipment 
subsidy was paid to spinners...In 1959, the Cotton
Industry Act authorised payment to the proprietors of 
this equipment for breaking it up!"(61) Ormerod 
complained that high tariffs on imported textile 
machinery meant that the re-equipment grants only 
temporarily left the Treasury's coffers, and believed 
that the assistance offered was quite inadequate to make 
the industry competitive.(62) The failure of
modernization under the 1959 Act to meet the industry's 
expectations was primarily due to renewed uncertainty
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about imports. Voluntary quota agreements with the Asian
producers during the late 1950s had no more than a
transitory effect on the level of imports. Many firms
were afraid to invest in view of the continuing threat
to the industry of overseas competition. Caroline Miles
estimated that in total the Act cost the government
£24.7 million, equivalent to an effective rate of
protection of five per cent for a mere two years. In
1961 the Estimates Committee of the House of Commons
reviewed the 1959 Act and concluded that: "Failing a
speedy and satisfactory solution to the related problems
of imports, marketing, and the fuller use of plant and
machinery, much of the expenditure will have been to no
purpose".(63) Mr Philip Lees, president of the
F.M.C.S.A., argued that the industry would not have
required scrapping and re-equipment subsidies had it
been offered a fair measure of protection.(64)
Courtaulds' analysis of the situation was similarly
uncompromising:
"Because of the unsatisfactory position into 
which the industry has been brought by past 
policies, it would be necessary to accept that 
the well-established case for giving 
protection to 'infant industries' must be 
valid for the newly equipped, potentially 
viable plants, at least for a sufficient 
period to overcome teething troubles and 
initial losses."(65)
Between 1960 and 1965 total yarn output fell from 
640 million lbs. to 528 million lbs, while cloth 
production declined from 2007 million square yards to 
1722 million square yards.(66) The 1959 Act could do 
little to prevent the increase in foreign competition.
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In a market environment of this nature, the failure of
the 1959 measures was inevitable. To the extent that the
Act did stimulate investment for a brief period, it was
plainly pernicious, because it encouraged firms to
remain in the industry longer than they would otherwise
have done. Few employers or trade union officials could
regard the industry with the detachment of Caroline*
Miles, who thought that it was a "useful laboratory for 
economists" trying to explain why firms still invest 
despite adverse circumstances.(67)
The technology which has so far been considered was 
by no means new in the 1950s and 1960s. Both ring frames 
and automatic looms had been invented in the nineteenth 
century. Fortunately evidence also exists regarding 
Lancashire's rate of adoption of more recent techniques, 
notably ancillary equipment in the weaving industry and 
shuttleless looms.
Lancashire's foremost cotton industry research 
organization, the Shirley Institute devoted considerable 
energy to the development of new machinery. Evidence is 
available on the diffusion of three of the Shirley 
Institute's inventions: the electrical hygrometer, the
accelerated drying hood, and the automatic size box. 
These devices appeared between the mid 1930s and early 
1950s and aimed to improve the efficiency of warp 
preparation in the weaving section. All three 
attachments were used in conjunction with a machine 
called a tape frame. Of the firms in Lancashire 
employing tape frames and possessing at least 200 looms,
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Table 7. 11
Shuttleless looms as a percentage of all looms in
selected cotton industries, 1958-68.
France W. Germany Italy Sweden U.K
(percentages)
1958 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.9 cr. 1
1960 0.4 0.8 0.2 1.0 n. a
1962 0.8 1.3 0.6 1.0 n. a
1964 1. 1 1.9 0.7 0. 9 n. a
1966 1.4 2.4 0.5 1. 1 1.0
1968 n. a. 3.1 1.1 1.3 2.0
Source: G.F. Ray, "The Diffusion of New Technology: A
Study of Ten Processes in Nine Industries', N.I. E. R., 48
(1969), Table 27, p. 63.
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by 1966 35 per cent had introduced the electrical
hygrometer, 27 per cent the accelerated drying hood, and 
10 per cent the automatic size box. As might be 
expected, the size of firm influenced the rate of 
diffusion. Nineteen per cent of those firms with at
least 2,000 looms adopted the automatic size box,
compared with only six per cent of the firms? with
between 400 and 800 looms. Larger firms also proved to
be the first to install the new devices, while 
vertically integrated firms were more willing to 
innovate than single process firms.(68) This study lends 
support to the widely-held thesis that the cotton 
industry was hampered by an industrial structure 
composed of small, single-process firms.(69)
Shuttleless looms were potentially of far greater 
importance to the industry. Developed in Europe during 
the 1920s and 1930s, the shuttleless loom uses jets of 
water or air to pass the weft through the warp, 
resulting in a significant saving in time. Comparative 
rates of diffusion of shuttleless looms in Britain and 
other western nations have been calculated by the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research.(70) 
Table 7.11 shows that British firms were relatively slow 
to introduce the shuttleless loom until the latter half 
of the 1960s. A small sample of British firms was 
interviewed to discover their reasons for failing to 
install shuttleless looms. Twenty one firms considered 
that the shuttleless loom was unsuitable for the type of 
fabric which they were weaving. Twelve reported that
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they had been deterred from installation by the price of
the looms, and four claimed that they were unable to
raise sufficient funds for investment. A further four
firms blamed uncertainty and low profits for their
failure to adopt the new technology, while six remarked
that their existing machinery was adequate.(71) In
Britain, although the sample size was small, it appeared
«»
that vertically integrated firms were the most likely to 
invest in shuttleless looms. The survey suggests 
vertically integrated firms may have been able to ensure 
a more stable market for their cloth through the control 
of capacity in the converting and making-up sections. 
Vertically integrated companies also tended to be more 
flexible than single-process firms.(72) After 1966 the 
rate of diffusion of shuttleless looms in Britain 
improved. By 1980 22 per cent of British looms were
shuttleless, a proportion exceeded only by Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and the U.S.S.R.(73) The obvious conclusion 
is that this was a consequence of the rapid increase in 
concentration and vertical integration in the British 
textile industry after the early sixties.
During the 1960s cotton became an increasingly 
capital intensive industry. In 1957 Barna estimated that 
the replacement cost of a cotton or wool mill was £2710 
per operative (£1240 in buildings plus £1550 in 
machinery), compared with an average replacement cost of 
£1830 per operative in U.K. manufacturing as a 
whole.(74) As textile machinery became more 
sophisticated and innovations such as shuttleless looms
and break spinning (technically superior to ring
spinning) became available, the costs of re-equipment 
increased. The O.E.C.D. calculated that in 1965 it
required a capital investment of $15,000 - $25,000 per
work place to build and equip a modern vertically 
integrated cotton mill.(75) In the late 1960s Ormerod
estimated that a capital investment of £16,000 per
worker (at 1965 prices excluding building costs) was
needed to equip a new cotton mill with the latest ring 
spindles, shuttleless looms, automatic looms, and 
finishing machinery on a single shift basis, compared 
with £5000 per worker on a three-shift basis. The
installation of Sulzer shuttleless looms would entail 
investment per worker of £30,500 under a single-shift 
regime or £10,167 if three shifts were to be worked.(76) 
Ormerod ridiculed the methods of investment 
appraisal used by most firms in the industry. Many 
investment decisions were still made by rule-of-thumb, 
while firms which attempted to employ more precise
techniques were led astray by faulty data. A large
number of firms made the elementary error of not
contemplating re-equipment until their existing 
machinery was fully depreciated. Ormerod advocated 
closer collaboration between accountants and technical 
experts to overcome this problem.(77) It is difficult to 
find hard evidence on methods of investment appraisal in 
the cotton industry. But when it is observed that even 
Courtaulds did not begin to consider discounted cash 
flow (D.C.F.) techniques until 1961, the position in the
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Table 7.12
The case for re-equipment in spinning, 1968.
Conversion costs of 20s carded cotton, including winding 














Weekly hours 75 75 168 168 168
Spinning costs: Figures are in old pence per lb.
Opg. costs+ 11.66 8. 66 7.94 7.93 6. 60
Capital costs 0.00 0. 00 0. 29 1.96 3.58
TOTAL 11.66 8.76 8.23 9.89 10. 18
Cone winding++ 2. 36 2.36 2.54 2.54 0.00
GRAND TOTAL 14.02 11. 12 10. 77 12.43 10. 18
* As partially modernized; card and draw frames on 168 
hours, remaining machines on 75 hours.
+ Operating costs, primarily labour.
++ Winding charges are based on the following assumptions: 
1950 and 1960 mills - manual winding excluding capital
charges.
1960 modernized and 1968 ring mill - automatic winding
including capital charges.
N.B. Cost of raw cotton excluded. For new equipment, prices 
are those ruling in Jan. 1968 and allow for a D.C.F. rate of 
return of nine per cent over ten years.
Source: Textile Council, Cotton and Allied Textiles: A
Report on Present Performance and Future Prospects 
(Manchester: Textile Council, 1969), Table 3, p. 66.
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Table 7.13
The case for re-equipment in weaving, 1968.
Conversion costs of producing 42" polyester/cotton shirting 











Weekly hours 40 134.5 134.5 134.5 168
Figures in old pence per ;yard.
Opg. costs* 5. 80 3.89 3.82 3.26 2.28
Capital costs 0.00 1. 18 1.53 1. 32 1.98
TOTAL 5.80 5. 07 5.35 4.58 4. 26
N.B. Cost of yarn excluded. For new equipment, prices are 
those ruling in Jan. 1968 and allow for a nine per cent rate 
of return on capital on a D.C.F. basis over ten years.
* Operating costs, primarily labour.
Source: Textile Council, Cotton and Allied Textiles: A
Report on Present Performance and Future Prospects 
(Manchester: Textile Council, 1969), Table 5, p. 68.
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rest of the industry can all too easily be imagined.(78) 
Tables 7.12 and 7.13 show figures, collated by the 
Textile Council in 1967-8, suggesting that conversion 
costs in both spinning and weaving could be reduced by 
the installation of new machinery in existing buildings. 
According to the Textile Council's data, firms which 
re-equipped would also enjoy very high rates of iTeturn. 
For instance, firms replacing fully written down 
ring-spinning equipment of 1950 vintage with break 
spinning machinery, would achieve a D.C.F. rate of 
return of 23 per cent over ten years. A D.C.F. rate of 
return of 14 per cent over ten years would accrue to a 
company substituting break spinning equipment for 1960 
vintage ring spindles. In weaving, a shirting producer 
replacing old Lancashire looms with new Sulzer 
shuttleless looms could expect to earn a D.C.F. rate of 
return of 22 per cent over ten years.(79) These 
hypothetical rates of return were remarkable. 
Courtaulds' director of finance regarded a rate of 
return (on a D.C.F. basis) of 10 per cent over ten years 
as the minimum acceptable for a project.(80)
What prevented Lancashire from taking advantage of 
these opportunities? The Textile Council presented 
re-equipment in the most favourable light possible. It 
assumed that firms would have no difficulty finding 
workers to operate multi-shift systems, that firms could 
produce to a high level of capacity, and that there was 
no tendency for foreign competition to bring about 
further reductions in demand and price. When these
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factors are taken into account re-equipment appears a 
considerably more risky proposition.
Asian cotton textile producers had an overwhelming 
advantage over Lancashire firms in labour costs.(81) 
Cotton mills in Britain were forced into the adoption of 
increasingly capital intensive techniques in an attempt 
to remain competitive. But despite extremely high levels 
of fixed capital per worker they were unable decisively 
to overcome the cost advantage of their Asian 
competitors and the industry continued to contract.
V
Investment in the U.K. cotton industry remained at 
a relatively low level between 1950 and 1965, largely as 
a result of declining demand, falling profitability, a 
low rate of capacity utilization, and brittle 
confidence. During the 1950s investment was largely of a 
defensive nature. Its objective was to limit the decline 
of profits rather than to increase profits. In the early 
1960s there was a short revival in investment 
expenditure, as a result of the 1959 Cotton Industry Act 
which eliminated much surplus capacity and offered 
subsidies to firms intending to re-equip. The larger 
firms entertained the hope that they could restore 
competitiveness by introducing labour-saving machinery. 
But, in the absence of a protected home market, there 
was little prospect of this strategy succeeding. In 
retrospect it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
all investment in cotton after 1950 was misguided, for 
it tied up valuable resources in a doomed industry.
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Chapter 8.
LABOUR IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1950-65.
Employment in the cotton industry steadily
contracted after 1951. Between 1951 and 1965 employment
in spinning fell by 59 per cent and in weaving by 54 per
cent.(l) Fortunately the contraction of the industry was 
not marked by prolonged bouts of high unemployment or 
short-time working.(2) The demand for labour remained
high in Britain during the 1950s and 1960s and most 
(although not all) redundant cotton operatives had 
little difficulty finding alternative employment: indeed 
the employers frequently complained that too much labour 
was voluntarily leaving the industry. As Lancashire 
continued to decline the wages of cotton operatives fell 
relative to those of workers in other industries.(3)
The present chapter concentrates on three main 
developments: the growth of shift-working, the
continuing spread of work measurement, and the unions' 
attempts to improve redundancy terms for their members. 
Section I introduces the topic of shift-working in 
cotton textiles and outlines the benefits to be derived 
from its use. Section II examines the rate at which 
firms in spinning and weaving adopted shift systems in 
their mills, and considers the role of the trade unions 
in this process. Section III takes up the issues of 
workload reassessment and redeployment which were 
introduced in Chapter 4 and considers their advance 
during the 1950s and early 1960s. Section IV discusses 
the attempts of the trade unions to secure improved
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terms for redundant operatives.
I
"In many of [the mills]... work, like the 
stream, never stopped by day or night, and the 
children who had tended the machines by day 
crept into beds left vacant by the children 
who were to tend them through the night."(4)
Such is the Hammonds* portrayal of shift-working
among pauper apprentices in Lancashire during* the
industrial revolution. With the growth of trade unionism
and the emergence of factory legislation, which
restricted the hours of women and children and prevented
them from working at nights, it was possible to reduce
shift-working in cotton textiles to a minimum. During
the twentieth century a minority of employers started to
reintroduce shift-working on newly installed machinery.
In most cases the unions vigorously opposed this
development on a number of grounds. They believed that
shift-working would reduce the incentive for operatives
to take good care of their spindles and looms; that it
would lead to the concentration of production in the
most efficient mills, resulting in rising unemployment
in some localities; and that it would disrupt the
regular pattern of family life.(5) In August 1938 an
A.W.A. survey discovered that at least 26 weaving mills
were operating a shift system, and that at least 16 of
these mills had commenced shift-working since 1930. In
Chorley winders and warpers who were working a two-shift
system were expelled from the union, but in some other
areas including Hyde the union feared to act at a time
of high unemployment.(6)
The main advantage of shift working is that it 
enables re-equipped firms to reduce unit capital costs. 
Interest and depreciation charges are key elements of 
capital costs. Firms installing new machinery incur 
interest charges: if they use external finance they will 
have to pay interest to the bank, while if they employ 
internal finance they will forego the interest which 
would have accrued from putting their money in a deposit 
account. Clearly total interest costs will be 
independent of the number of hours per week that the new 
machinery is worked. A shift system which doubles the 
rate of utilization would halve interest charges per 
unit of output. Depreciation charges arise from the need 
to establish a fund to pay for the machine's replacement 
when it becomes either obsolescent or worn out. Once the 
expected life of the machine has been estimated, the 
firm calculates the sum which must be placed in the 
depreciation fund each year. The introduction of a shift 
system will reduce unit depreciation costs. Obsolescence 
is a function of the time it takes to design and develop 
a more efficient machine, and will be independent of the 
intensity of utilization of existing machinery. The 
annual cost of wear and tear remains roughly constant 
until a machine is fairly old, and therefore unit wear 
and tear costs fall as machine hours increase.(7) 
Consequently a firm installing new equipment can expect 
large savings in unit capital costs if it simultaneously 
introduces a shift system. But shift-working will not be 
attractive to firms intending to continue production
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with fully depreciated old machinery which can be run
without incurring any capital costs, except those
arising from wear and tear.
Firms considering the adoption of shift-working
must also examine the effects on other costs. There will
be an appreciable rise in unit labour costs, as workers
demand a combination of shorter hours and higher hourly*
wage rates in compensation for the inconvenience of 
working unsocial hours. In the case of night-work the 
shift premium is likely to be very large. Some of the 
increase in unit labour costs can be recouped if shorter 
hours spur workers on to higher productivity, but H.A. 
Clegg has shown that this did not take place in the 
cotton industry.(8) Other costs could also be affected 
by shift-working. Night or evening-shifts may increase 
the costs of lighting, although this might be offset by 
the use of off-peak electricity. There could also be 
savings in unit administrative and management costs. 
These factors were not of great importance in cotton and 
the following analysis will concentrate on capital and 
labour costs.
Shift-working involves a trade-off between lower 
unit capital costs and increased unit labour costs. 
Betancourt and Clague have formalised this relationship. 
Assume two shift systems, denoted by superscripts 1, 2. 
System 1 is a single-shift regime, while system 2 is a 
double-shift regime. Output is the same under both 
systems; therefore less capital is required under the 
double-shift system. The firm will reduce its overall
3 4 2
unit costs by adopting system 2 if:
r 4 -i r» I _ I r_2. 2. 2-
[1] r. K + w.. L > r. K + w.. L. + w. L,I I I 2 - 2 .
Let r denote the cost of owning capital stock for one 
day. K* and K^denote the stock of capital under each 
shift system. Operatives on the single-shift system and 
on the first shift of the double shift-system receive an 
hourly wage of w,, but those on the second shift of 
system 2 receive a premium hourly wage of w^. l' denotes 
operative hours worked under the single-shift regime, 
while and L^are the respective operative hours worked 
on the first and second shifts of the double-shift 
system. For convenience it is assumed that L^.The
shift differential C(w^/ w,) - 1] is signified by x. 
Dividing both sides of [1] by costs under system 1 we 
obtain:
[2] 1 > Li
L'
(r.K2-) + (2 + x ) 
(w,. Lj )
(r.K1 ) + 1 
<w,.L' )
where the R.H.S. is the ratio of costs under system 2 to 
those under system 1. If y is defined as the share of 
capital costs in total costs under system 1, [i.e. y =
r.Kl/(r-Kl+ w.L1 )], we obtain:
[3] 1 > L~V(r.K2-) + (2 + x) (1 - y)
- Li )
Shift-working will be profitable if the ratio in [3] 
falls below unity. This condition is more likely to be 
fulfilled in a situation where capital costs form a 
large proportion of total costs (i.e. y is large) and 
shift—work premia are low (i.e. x is small). It would be 
comparatively easy to derive rules which could be 
applied to the comparison of the relative
3 4 3
profitabilities of other shift systems.(9)
Only one economist, R.L. Marris, has attempted an 
analysis of shift—working in Lancashire. Marris 
suggested that during the 1950s the installation of new 
cotton textile machinery did not lead to very 
substantial improvements in productivity. Consequently 
re-equipment did not offer much opportunity for a 
significant reduction in costs even when shifts were 
introduced. Marris put forward this argument to refute 
the hypothesis that shift-working was being retarded by 
the high shift premia demanded by the operatives. In 
essence he claimed that shift premia in Lancashire were 
not excessive by British standards, and asserted that 
shift-working in cotton was held back because investment 
was simply unprofitable.(10) This interpretation will be 
kept in mind in the following section, which examines 
the development of shift-working in the Lancashire 
cotton industry after World War Two.
II
After World War Two re-equipment once more became a 
major issue in the cotton textile industry. Under these 
circumstances the shift-working question acquired a new 
and far greater significance. This section traces the 
development of shift-working in the cotton industry 
between 1945 and 1965, and highlights the changing 
attitude of the trade unions towards shift-working. This 
evidence will be put into a wider perspective by a 
comparison of the extent of shift-working in Lancashire, 
overseas cotton industries, and other British
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manufacturing industries. Lancashire's experience 
requires careful explanation. It will be suggested that 
shift—working was not a major constraint on investment, 
but that the low level of investment prevented the more 
rapid spread of shift-working in the industry. The 
unions are largely exonerated from the superficially 
plausible charge that their policies were responsible 
for the relatively slow spread of shift-working in 
Lancashire compared with cotton industries abroad.
Some confusion was exhibited by the Board of Trade 
Cotton Working Party over the issue of shift-working. 
Its recommendations conflicted with the empirical 
evidence which it presented. The Working Party 
confidently asserted that the introduction of double-day 
shifts would reduce the amount of machinery needed for 
re-equipment by 40 per cent, and went on to declare that 
"we cannot escape the conclusion that the Lancashire 
cotton industry will be unable to support the capital 
charges of re-equipment and remain competitive with 
other countries, without going over to a large measure 
of two-shift working."(11) But these conclusions were at 
odds with the data collected by the Working Party's 
Costs Sub-Committee, which had estimated the costs 
(including raw materials) of spinning and weaving six 
different sorts of cloth using newly installed 
ring-spinning equipment and automatic looms. An average 
saving of 3.2 per cent in total costs per yard of cloth 
could be made by working the new equipment on double-day 
shifts of 40 hours each, with a 20 per cent increase in
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hourly earnings, instead of on a single shift of 48 
hours.(12) However the majority report failed to point 
out that it would have been still cheaper to produce the 
cloths with fully depreciated prewar machinery on a 
single shift system.(13) Longer hours or a smaller shift 
premium for double-shift workers would have narrowed the 
gap, but it was patently clear that other factors, 
notably the existence of an enormous stock of elderly 
equipment, had a crucial bearing on the re-equipment 
decision. Thus the adoption of shift-working could help 
towards making re-equipment profitable, but it was by no 
means the only factor, or even the most important 
one.(14)
Sir Stafford Cripps took up these themes and 
stressed that double-shift working was an essential part 
of the government's plan to strengthen the industry and 
maximize production. Although the shortage of operatives 
would preclude the immediate large-scale adoption of 
shift-working, the government "attached importance to 
the formation of groups of mills so that where necessary 
workers might be transferred so as to concentrate their 
activities into fewer mills working two shifts".(15) The 
notion that production should be concentrated in the 
most efficient mills, which would be assisted to
re-equip on the basis of a double or triple-shift system
was not acted upon at the time, but it recurred during
the 1950s as excess capacity made its fatal
reappearance.(16)
Trade union leaders became increasingly aware that
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shift-working was not an unmitigated blight and that it
could make a significant contribution to the industry's
modernization programme. Militants in the Nelson Weavers
Association might exclaim that "workers in Lancashire
don't want the shift system"(17), but their single
mindedness was not shared by the A.W.A.'s general
secretary Mr Andrew Naesmith, who:
"[D]id not think night shift working in the 
weaving sheds was desirable but...did believe 
the double day shift was essential where 
employers installed high capital cost 
machinery. The trade unions were prepared to 
help and gain the will to co-operation...There 
was a far better atmosphere in our industry 
today than there had been for forty or fifty 
years"(18).
Steady progress was made towards a wider acceptance 
of the principle of shift-working after the end of the 
war. In August 1945 the Operative Spinners told the 
T.U.C. that thay were willing seriously to consider any 
approaches made by the F.M.C.S.A. concerning 
shift-working.(19) But the employers did not appear 
particular eager to act. An F.M.C.S.A. representative 
told Ernest Bevin's commission on double-day shift 
working in 1946 that new spinning machinery was cheaper 
than new weaving equipment; therefore the potential 
saving in unit capital costs from the introduction of 
shift-working in spinning mills was comparatively small. 
Moreover he explained that until sufficient labour could 
be found to run the industry to full capacity on a 
single-shift basis, there would be no point in trying to
adopt a double—day shift.(20)
Pressure to proceed with shift-working in spinning
primarily emanated from government rather than employer
circles. Sir Stafford Cripps demanded that the Operative
Spinners and Cardroom Workers should accept the
principle of shift-working in re-equipped mills, as a
precondition for implementation of his scheme for
granting an investment subsidy to the spinning section.
After a great deal of soul-searching, in March 1947 the*
U.T.F.W.A. finally resolved to comply with Cripps' 
request. In the event the 1948 spinning re-equipment 
subsidy may not have had much impact on the re-equipment 
drive, but it clarified the position of the spinning 
unions towards shift-working.(21) Thereafter the 
spinning amalgamations were prepared to consider 
applications for the introduction of double-day shifts 
from individual mills. During 1947, after a further 
government initiative, the unions agreed to permit 
evening-shift working at spinning and weaving mills in 
Lancashire, in an attempt to attract elderly and married 
workers into the industry on a part-time basis.(22)
Weaving employers were more anxious to secure an 
agreement on shift-working with the unions than were 
their counterparts in the spinning section. Although in 
1947 the A.W.A.'s general council had rejected a 
proposal that attempts should be made to conclude a 
formal shift-working agreement with the C.S.M.A. for 
automatic loom sheds, in practice the union's leaders 
encouraged firms installing automatic looms to introduce 
double-shift working.(23) Naesmith and his colleagues 
adopted this semi-clandestine strategy because they were
348
keen to see the rapid re-equipment of the weaving 
section; moreover they were acutely aware that many of 
their members would not take kindly to attempts to 
prevent them from working shorter hours for the same 
pay.(24)
Towards the end of the 1940s the C.S.M.A. increased 
the pressure for a formal agreement on shift-working in 
the automatic loom section. The employers proposed a 
double-day shift of 40 hours each, the A.W.A. one of 37 
1/2 hours each. After the case was considered by the 
weaving Conciliation Committee in 1950, a compromise of 
38 3/4 hours per shift was reached, with the adjustment 
of piece-rates to enable double-day shift workers to 
receive the same earnings as those on the single-shift 
of 45 hours per week.(25) This agreement undoubtedly 
made it easier for firms to introduce double-day shifts 
on automatic looms, but it should be borne in mind that 
by June 1950 (before the new agreement came into force) 
48 per cent of the firms with automatic looms were 
already operating a double-day shift system, largely as 
a result of the permissive attitude of the A.W.A
leadership.(26)
In theory the A.W.A. was less sympathetic towards 
double-day shifts on Lancashire looms, but in practice 
this policy was little more effective than the one on 
automatic looms. By August 1949 14 firms were running 
double-day shifts on Lancashire looms, in many cases, as 
in Preston, with the tacit consent of the local union. 
Firms producing specialist cloths argued that Lancashire
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looms were often more suitable for their purposes, and 
that they too should be able to introduce shift-working 
when they installed new machinery.(27)
Between 1946 and 1954 cotton spinning and weaving 
unions authorised permanent double-shift working at 190 
mills and temporary double-day shift working at 18 
mills. In August 1954 163 double-shifts were in receipt 
of formal union authorisation.(28) At Ferguson Brothers 
in Carlisle double-day shifts had been introduced in the 
weaving sheds in 1948 and by 1953 the operatives would 
not return to a single-shift system "for all the tea in 
China”.(29) Hayeshaws successfully introduced double-day 
shifts at two ring-spinning mills between 1951 and 1953 
and found that "many supposed objections of Lancashire 
cotton operatives to double shifts can be overcome 
if...a background of confidence has been developed 
between unions and management."(30)
Such evidence hardly suggests implacable union 
opposition to the principle of shift-working, but the 
employers maintained that more firms would have been 
induced to apply for authorisations had shift-premia 
been lower. In most cases the unions would only 
countenance double-shift working if hours were reduced 
from the usual 45 per week on single shifts to 37 1/2 or 
38 3/4 hours on a double-day shift. To maintain
earnings, the unions demanded shift-premia of 20 per 
cent and 16.1 per cent respectively. Ernest Hurst, 
president of the F.M.C.S.A., spoke for many employers in 
both spinning and weaving when he complained that even
with a premium of 16.1 per cent "shift working [is] a
knife-edge proposition".(31) H.A. Clegg suggested that
British premia were far in excess of those offered in
cotton textiles overseas: in Japan, for example, the
shift premium for double-shift workers was in the order
of three per cent.(32) Eels argued that double-day shift
premia in cotton were high even by British standards,
*
cement workers receiving less than 7 per cent and 
asbestos workers 5 per cent; but Marris countered this 
claim by the assertion that workers in other industries 
often enjoyed hidden bonuses which were unavailable in 
the mills.(33) Clearly it would have been unrealistic 
for textile employers to expect their operatives to 
accept shift premia which were, in real terms, lower 
them those in other industries. To do so would have been 
to drive labour out of the industry at an even faster 
rate them that at which it was already leaving. In the 
early 1950s cotton was not sufficiently
capital-intensive for large savings to be made from the 
introduction of double-day shifts; but as the industry 
became increasingly capital intensive towards the end of 
the decade, the potential savings in unit capital costs 
attendant upon shift-working increased to the point 
where shift-premia were of little consequence.(34)
Several significant developments in trade union 
recognition of shift-working occured during the mid 
1950s. In 1955 the A.W.A. and C.S.M.A. concluded an 
agreement setting out the terms on which double-day 
shifts could be operated on non-automatic looms.
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Double-day shifts of up to 40 hours each would be 
permitted, after a ballot of the operatives, at sheds 
which had recently installed new Lancashire looms. By 
December 1959 46 firms had taken advantage of this 
agreement to operate double-day shift regimes of 37 1/2 
or 38 3/4 hours each.(35)
Steps were also taken towards the negotiation of 
the first formal shift-working agreement in the spinning 
section. In 1955 the Cardroom Workers approached the
F.M.C.S.A. with proposals for an improvement in working 
conditions, but the employers insisted that the scope of 
these talks should be extended to cover shift-working. 
By December 1956 the Cardroom Workers and the F.M.C.S.A. 
had reached an agreement, which specified that 
double-day shifts of 38 3/4 hours each could be worked 
in card and ring rooms, after a favourable ballot of the 
operatives. A shift premium of 16.1 per cent would be 
enforced and the union would reserve the right to veto 
shift-working at mills where working conditions were 
inadequate. Although double-day shifts in the spinning 
section had been permitted on a mill by mill basis since 
1946, the employers welcomed the 1956 agreement on the 
grounds that it simplified the process of applying for a 
shift-work authorisation.(36) Formal agreements on 
double-day shift working were not extended to the 
mule-spinning section, where firms had no incentive to 
increase the intensity of capital utilization. No new 
mules had been installed since the 1920s; consequently 
nearly all mules were fully written down and unit
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capital costs were already at a minimum.(37)
The trade unions remained implacably opposed to 
night-working, long after they had accepted the
principle of double-day shift working. Moreover firms 
wishing to introduce night-shifts had to take into
account the prohibition of night-work for women workers 
under the Factory Acts. In 1955 64 per cent of the
spinning operatives and 62 per cent of the weaving
operatives in the Lancashire cotton industry were 
female.(38) Women were excluded from mule-spinning and 
therefore dominated the structure of employment in the 
ring-room.(39) This was undoubtedly an additional burden 
on the industry, but it was not insoluble, and during 
the early 1960s Lancashire increasingly turned to the 
immigrant community for additional male night-shift 
workers.(40)
In 1947 the trade unions had been horrified to 
learn that Stafford Cripps was seriously considering 
encouraging night-work in cotton, possibly to the extent 
of relaxing the Factory Acts to enable women to 
participate. Only nine weaving firms were operating a 
night-shift in 1949, and in 1950 the A.W.A. and 
Overlookers Amalgamation called a strike at Horwich 
which succeeded in forcing one firm to abandon 
night-work.(41) But, as the price of textile machinery 
continued to increase, the employers' federations began 
to argue that three-shift working was essential to 
secure a sufficient reduction in unit capital costs to 
justify installation of new equipment such as the
shuttleless loom. (42) In 1955 the C.S.M.A. put these 
points to the A.W.A. in support of fts demand for a 
formal agreement on night-shift working on automatic and 
non-automatic weaving machinery. The A.W.A. was prepared 
to accept that three-shift working was necessary, but 
negotiations broke down over the union's insistence on 
the closed shop for night workers. However the A.W.A. 
agreed to consider three-shift applications from 
individual mills, and by 1961 62 weaving mills were
operating a triple-shift system of 37 1/2 hours per 
shift.(43) Lewis Wright, Naesmith's successor as general 
secretary, succinctly expressed the A.W.A.'s new 
attitude to night-shift working at the Cotton Board 
Conference in 1958. He commended the situation at one 
firm which had completely re-equipped its plant at a 
cost of £800,000 and was running its new machinery on a 
three-shift system: "If we are to encourage capital
investment in new machinery shift working would seem to 
be a necessity"(44).
During 1958 the F.M.C.S.A. approached the Cardroom 
Workers concerning the night shift issue. The union 
replied that it would be prepared to consider individual 
applications on their own merits, taking into account 
the extent and cost of re-equipment, working conditions, 
the views of the operatives, and the firm's attitude 
towards the closed shop for night-workers.(45) After 
further discussions, in February 1960 the Cardroom 
Workers and the employers concluded a general agreement 
on night-working in the ring-room (but not the card
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room). Night-shift, workers would work up to 45 hours per 
week, but would receive overtime pay for work in excess 
of 40 hours.(46) Spinning employers were delighted with 
the pace of change in the late 1950s. In 1960 Mr H.C. 
Owtram of the Bolton Master Cotton Spinners Association 
paid:
M[T]ribute to the co-operation...received from 
all the Trade Union officials [in extending 
shift working in the town]. Chairmen of this 
Association have been stressing the need for 
flexibility for a considerable number of 
years, and it is very gratifying to be able to 
report that there is a more ready acceptance 
of this vital necessity".(47)
Cotton textiles became increasingly
capital-intensive during the sixties; Ormerod estimated 
that, at 1965 prices, it cost £16,000 per worker to 
equip a vertically integrated mill on a single shift 
system and £5,000 on a triple-shift system.(48) 
Multiple-shift working was essential in such an 
environment, and in 1968 a new shift-working agreement 
was signed covering all sections of cotton spinning and 
weaving. This agreement was designed to encourage mills 
to work around the clock for seven days a week and 
eschewed rigid formulae on shift-premia and hours, which 
would instead be negotiated at mill level. In return the 
unions obtained the closed shop for shift-workers.(49)
The pace of cotton's movement towards a wider 
utilization of shift systems was not unimpressive in 
comparison with the experience of other British 
industries. Between 1954 and 1964 the proportion of 
cotton spinning and doubling operatives participating in 
shift-working rose from 10 per cent to 31 per cent,
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Table 8.1
Shift systems in the British cotton industry, 1954-64.
(Percentages of all shift workers on various systems)
COTTON COTTON ALL U.K.
SPINNING WEAVING INDUSTRIES
1954 1964 1954 1964 1954 1964
Three-shift 2 12 3 26 46 41
Alternating
Day & night 3 4 3 3 24 23
Double-day 60 45 83 58 16 17
Part-time
Evening-shift 32 25 8 6 4 7
Other
Night-shift 3 14 3 7 10 12
ALL SYSTEMS 100 100 100 100 100 100
N.B. Three-shift systems includes continuous 24 hour a 
day working, which could involve a fourth shift.
Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette. LXII (1954), pp. 
337-42; LXXIII (1954), pp. 148-55.
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Table 8.2




1953 1960 1963 1953 1960 1963
France 2541 3665 4100 2139 3111 3367
W. Germany 3224 3807 3506 2492 3404 3339
Hong Kong n. a. 8400 8160 n. a. n. a. 7920
India 4563 5099 5412 4409 4794 4795
Italy 2829 3764 3713 2107 3061 3271
Japan 4084 4005 3338 3885 3895 4206
U.K. 1645 2478 2595 1817 2707 2585
U.S.A. 5513 6216 6091 5530 6153 6191
Source: G.A.T.T., A Study on Cotton Textiles (Geneva:
G.A.T.T., 1966), pp. 187-97.
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while the proportion of weaving operatives working shift 
systems increased from 10 per cent to 32 per cent. Over 
the same period the percentage of shift workers in 
British industry as a whole rose from 12 per cent to 18 
per cent.(50) But this picture needs qualifying by a 
consideration of different types of shift system. Table 
8.1 shows that the double-day shift was the norm in the 
cotton industry. In fact only the metal box industry had 
a higher proportion of its shift workers on the 
double-day shift than cotton. On the other hand the 
proportion of shift-workers in Lancashire operating a 
three-shift system was considerably below the average 
for other industries. This disparity was particularly 
marked in the spinning section. Table 8.2 provides an 
international perspective and shows that machine hours 
per annum in the British cotton textile industry were 
well below those prevailing in competitor nations.
These figures require careful interpretation. Is it 
true that outmoded attitudes in the cotton unions were 
responsible for the slow growth of shift-working in 
Lancashire? Probably not, for the spread of 
shift-working in the cotton textile industry proceeded 
at faster pace than in British industry as a whole. This 
would surely not have happened had shift premia in 
Lancashire been excessive by British standards. Was 
night-shift working seriously hampered by the high 
proportion of women employed in spinning and weaving? 
Undoubtedly this was a drawback, but firms found it 
possible to employ male workers, especially immigrant
358
workers, on night—shifts. In spinning, the proportion of 
shift-workers operating a three-shift 'system appears 
particularly low, but this was partly the result of the 
survival of mule-spinning.
Ultimately shift-working was less prevalent in 
Lancashire than in cotton industries abroad because 
there was relatively little demand for it in Britain. 
Lancashire's trade unions showed willingness to adapt 
their shift-working policies to the changing 
environment. Trading conditions, excess capacity, and 
the state of confidence are the primary determinants of 
investment in manufacturing industry.(51) These factors 
were responsible for the low rate of investment in 
Lancashire. There was nothing to be gained from 
introducing shift-working in mills which had not 
installed new machinery.
Ill
Several important reforms in wage systems and 
methods of labour utilization were made during the late 
1940s. Chapter 4 described how the Victorian wage lists 
in spinning were swept away by the new Ever shed and 
Aronson Lists. Although the Evershed Report did not lead 
to a radical revision of staffing arrangements, an 
increasing number of firms obtained permission from the 
trade unions to introduce alternative wage systems 
devised at mill level, and based on the results of work 
measurement studies. Progress towards redeployment in 
weaving centred around the C.M.C. system: a wage list 
introduced in 1949 as an alternative to the prevailing
3 5 9
Uniform and More Looms Lists for non-automatic loom 
weaving. The C.M.C. List established a direct link 
between workload and earnings and encouraged firms to 
reform their methods of labour utilization. Work 
measurement also proceeded in the automatic loom sheds, 
where wage systems had always been negotiated at mill 
level.(52) These innovations laid the foundations for
to
the developments discussed in the present section,
namely the increasingly widespread use of work
measurement techniques in spinning and weaving during
the 1950s and 1960s.
During the early fifties the Cotton Board continued
to run its successful series of work study courses for
managers and union officials. Progress was not dramatic,
but its cumulative effects were quite considerable.
Between 1949 and 1953 the number of spinning mills
employing a system of labour utilization and payment
based on work measurement in at least one department
increased from 90 to 184 (i.e. 38 per cent of the mills
affiliated to the F.M.C.S.A.).(53) Federation leaders
were increasingly eager to see the rapid advance of the
new systems of labour utilization, arguing that firms
would have no incentive to install new machinery unless
staffing levels could be altered:
"It is now more than ever necessary to achieve 
maximum efficiency in production methods, so 
as to reduce costs and at the same time 
maintain satisfactory earnings for
operatives... One can have a comparatively
large, low-paid labour force, or a well-paid 
labour force using to the best advantage the 
modern machinery and labour-saving devices put
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at its disposal".(54)
Redeployment was an essential part of many firms' 
modernization programmes. For instance, at Carlisle, 
Ferguson Brothers discovered that the reduction in 
average costs consequent upon the introduction of 
shift-working was in itself insufficient to justify the 
installation of new equipment. A judicious combination
a»
of shift-working (which reduced unit capital costs) and 
larger machine complements (which reduced unit labour 
costs) was often necessary to make modernization 
worthwhile. Although this particular example is taken 
from the weaving section, the same principle applied to 
spinning mills.(55)
In 1951 the F.M.C.S.A. succeeded in concluding two 
formal agreements with the unions on the introduction 
and recognition of wage systems based on work 
measurement; these were the first agreements of their 
kind in the spinning section. One applied to male 
doublers and gassers in the Stockport area, who were 
members of the General and Municipal Workers Union. In 
response to a claim for higher wages the F.M.C.S.A. had 
recommended the establishment of a wage system grounded 
in the accurate measurement of workloads. This was 
accepted by the union and the new wage system was 
introduced in the summer of 1951. In the other agreement 
the A.W.A. agreed to the use of work study principles to 
establish a new wage list for beamers and crossbailers 
in F.M.C.S.A. mills outside the Bolton area. Both 
agreements, like the C.M.C. system, were introduced on a
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permissive rather than compulsory basis.(56)
Neither of the 1951 work study agreements applied 
to the main groups of spinning operatives; and in 1953 
the F.M.C.S.A. concluded that “we are now in a position 
to negotiate central work study agreements with the 
operatives' Unions.“(57) Inflexible staffing levels had 
been established by the Evershed and Aronson agreements. 
The employers argued that spinners working under these 
agreements would become increasingly underloaded as a 
result of cumulative technical improvements which made 
their work easier. A wage system was needed which would 
allow workloads to be recalculated from time to time. 
Cardroom Workers leaders were extremely receptive to the 
employers' initiative. An agreement, dealing with card 
and ring-room operatives, was reached in December 1956. 
A ballot would be required at any mill at which it was 
proposed to introduce the new system. Full work studies 
would then be held at the mill to establish workloads 
and piece-rates. Target wages would be determined by 
collective bargaining at local level, to preserve a 
degree of similarity in earnings between mills. By 1962 
48 per cent of card and ring-rooms were using the new 
system, while 52 per cent persevered with the Aronson 
List.(58) Employers were pleased with the progress that 
was being made: in Bolton it was reported that "the 
Trade Union officials concerned, once convinced of the 
equity of the proposals, have done their utmost to 
secure the co-operation and support of their 
members".(59)
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In sharp contrast, relatively little effort was 
applied to the search for an equivalent agreement in 
mule-spinning. Following the minor changes in labour 
utilization introduced under the Evershed Agreement, the 
Operative Spinners declared that "the workload is now at 
a maximum".(60) The F.M.C.S.A. virtually ignored the 
question of redeployment in the mule-spinning department 
during the 1950s, a fact which suggests that they 
tacitly accepted the Operative Spinners' analysis.
Further developments ensued during the early 1960s. 
A Joint Technical Committee of spinning employers and 
representatives of the Cardroom Workers Amalgamation was 
created in 1963 to reinforce the principles of the 1956 
agreement.(61) The objective of the Manchester Card and 
Ring Room Agreement of 1964 was to extend the 
application of work measurement techniques to all 
modernized spinning mills. A system of job evaluation 
would be introduced at mills which chose to work under 
the new agreement: this would involve the replacement of 
a rigid target wage with a more flexible wage-band.(62) 
By 1968 15 per cent of spinners operated under the terms 
of the Manchester Agreement. Mr R.W. Greenhalgh, 
president of the British Spinners and Doublers 
Association (the successor to the F.M.C.S.A.) remarked 
that the Manchester Agreement "embodies the most 
up-to-date and rational wage structure in the 
country".(63) Between 1950 and 1965 the annual output of 
yarn per operative in the cotton spinning section 
increased by 25 per cent. Improvements in labour
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Table 8.3














1948 12.4 53.9 26. 1 7.6 33.7
1950 8.9 47. 2 31.9 8.0 4. 0 43.9
1951 7.5 43. 7 33. 8 8.2 6.8 48. 8
1952 8.3 46.6 31. 9 5.9 7.3 45. 1
1953 8.4 41. 7 34. 2 7.2 8.5 49.9
1954 7. 1 38. 7 35. 7 8.2 10.3 54. 2
1955 6.4 40. 9 34.7 8. 1 9.9 52. 7
Source: U.T.F.W.A., Plan for Cotton (Ashton under Lyne
U.T.F.W. A., 1957) , Table VIII, p. 44.
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utilization, which would not have been possible without 
the willingness of the trade unions to abandon a uniform 
wage system, had made a significant contribution to this 
advance.(64)
Table 8.3 illustrates the progress of the 
redeployment movement in Lancashire loom weaving between 
1948 and 1955. The total number of non-automatic* loom 
weavers operating complements of more than four looms 
increased from 33.7 per cent to 52.7 per cent over this 
period. Although this improvement was not insubstantial, 
the supporters of the C.M.C. List (1949) were deeply 
disappointed that their system, which encouraged the use 
of work study techniques, had not been more successful. 
By 1954 only 10.3 per cent of Lancashire loom weavers 
were on the C.M.C. List, and the following year this 
.proportion fell to 9.9 per cent.
Resistance to the C.M.C. List was intense in 
centres, such as Nelson, Colne, and Padiham, which 
concentrated on the production of fine cotton and rayon 
cloth. Weavers of these types of cloth were particularly 
well-paid under the Uniform Lists, and had little 
incentive to adopt the C.M.C. system. In other areas the 
Uniform List was less generous; consequently the C.M.C. 
system appeared more attractive.(65) For instance, in 
1950 at the Perseverance Mill Co. Padiham, operatives 
weaving high-quality cotton aero cloths voted against 
the introduction of the C.M.C. system, on the grounds 
that an expected 14 per cent rise in earnings would be 
inadequate compensation for an increase in loom
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complements from six to twelve per weaver. The leaders 
of the A.W.A. tried to persuade the weavers at Padiham 
to change their minds, fearing that an early setback for 
the C.M.C. List would be highly damaging to the further 
development of the system. When it became clear that the 
weavers at the Perseverance Mill Co. were not prepared 
to do his bidding, Andrew Naesmith angrily reacted that 
he "had never met such blind, biased and unreasonable 
prejudice".(66) By August 1950 only two mills in the 
Nelson district had passed the experimental stage of 
C.M.C. application, despite the A.W.A. 's attempts to put 
pressure on recalcitrant local officials to promote the 
new system.(67)
Rayon differentials under the C.M.C. List were less 
than those offered under the Uniform Lists, dissuading 
rayon weavers from participating in redeployment. Indeed 
in 1953 Mr Markwick, a leading representative of the 
employers in the rayon weaving section, explained that 
his members "considered the C.M.C. system to be at a 
dead end".(68) To overcome this obstacle several firms 
in the Nelson area proposed to amend the C.M.C. List to 
give extra payments to operatives producing rayon cloth. 
Other employers described this suggestion as an attempt 
to "sabotage" the C.M.C. List. The C.M.C. system was 
based on the establishment of a direct link between 
effort and earnings: to introduce higher rayon
differentials would involve a surrender to the 
irrational principles of the Uniform List. After a great 
deal of wrangling the rayon weaving employers agreed to
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withdraw their proposals, but the problem which had led 
to their formulation persisted.(69)
Rayon weaving firms were mistaken in their attempt 
to reform the C.M.C. List, as the Uniform Lists were the 
real cause of their troubles. In the 1930s six-loom 
weavers had been paid a piece-rate which was 11 per cent 
lower than that for four-loom weavers, but during the 
labour shortage of the 1940s many firms had paid their 
six-loom weavers at the higher four-looms piece-rates. 
In Nelson, in December 1952, five out of nine firms 
running six-loom complements paid the four-looms 
piece-rates. These weavers, many of whom also received 
high rayon differentials, had nothing to gain from the 
C.M.C. system.(70) By 1954 a number of employers were 
pressing for a return to the six-loom piece-rates for 
six-loom weavers, in an attempt to reduce costs in 
response to growing foreign competition. Naturally the 
A.W.A. resisted this change and advocated the abolition 
of the six-loom piece-rates. They maintained that all 
six-loom weavers should receive the four-loom rates, 
arguing that this would increase labour costs and 
encourage firms to adopt the C.M.C. system; however they 
failed to add that it would also have made the C.M.C. 
List less attractive to their own members. In 1956 the 
A.W.A. put its case for abrogation of the six-loom 
piece-rates before the Conciliation Committee. Lord 
Terrington, who presided at the hearing, pronounced in 
favour of the operatives, a decision which was clearly 
detrimental to the further growth of the C.M.C.
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system.(71) The following year the Conciliation 
Committee took an important step to redress the balance 
by accepting the employers' case for a gradual reduction 
in the rayon differentials under the Uniform List. This 
encouraged rayon weavers to vote in favour of the 
introduction of the C.M.C. List at their mills.(72)
Firms had to ballot their operatives before 
introducing the C.M.C. List. In these circumstances 
there can be little doubt that the anomalies in the 
Uniform Lists, which enabled weavers of rayon and fine 
cotton cloths to obtain high wages in return for a 
relatively small amount of effort, were the main reason 
for the slow development of the C.M.C. system. A 
minority of the workforce in weaving continued to be 
paid under the terms of the Uniform Lists in the mid 
1960s. Had the C.M.C. List been more widespread during 
the 1950s, the cost of weaving on the Lancashire loom 
system would have been reduced relative to that on the 
automatic loom system. Consequently fewer firms would 
have engaged in the installation of automatic looms.(73) 
Nevertheless, taking into account both automatic and 
non-automatic loom weaving, output of cloth per 
operative per annum increased by 23 per cent between 
1950 and 1965.(74)
Average labour productivity in the Lancashire 
cotton industry rose by approximately one quarter 
between 1950 and 1965. Although the installation of new 
machinery and the scrapping of obsolete equipment 
contributed to this process, the increasing use of work
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measurement techniques in Lancashire textiles was 
clearly an important factor. But the magnitude of this 
improvement ought not to be exaggerated, for unit labour 
costs in British mills continued to exceed those in 
competitor nations, including Europe and the United 
States.(75)
IV
As the cotton textile industry resumed its decline 
during the 1950s, it was natural that the trade unions 
should devote more time to the protection of their 
members' jobs and the negotiation of adequate redundancy 
payments for those whose jobs could not be saved. But 
little was achieved until 1959, when the Cotton Industry 
Act insisted that firms in receipt of scrapping grants 
should compensate redundant operatives.
The threat to employment was particularly acute in 
the mule-spinning section, which was declining relative 
to ring-spinning.(76) In 1948 the Operative Spinners had 
foreseen this trend and expressed their concern to the 
government: "The movement to replace mules by rings is
gradually gaining ground which can only result in a 
corresponding change-over in personnel from male to 
female. The nett [sic] effect of this development will 
be that skilled men of long experience will be lost to 
the industry".(77) More significantly, the Operative 
Spinners predicted high levels of male unemployment in 
spinning districts. Men would no longer be the main 
breadwinners in many families; obviously this would have 
"unforeseen" and horrifying social consequences. The
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Table 8.4.
Unemployment in cotton, 1950-70.
cotton industry all industries
spinning weaving North West Gt. Bi
(Percentages unemployed)
1950 0.6 0.4 1.6 1.5
1951 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.2
1952 32. 9 22. 3 3.7 2.0
1953 1.5 1. 1 2. 1 1.6
1954 0.7 0.5 1.5 1.3
1955 5.8 3.4 1.4 1. 1*
1956 1.9 2.3 1.3 1.2
1957 0.8 1. 1 1.6 1.4
1958 9.3 6.2 2.7 2. 1
1959 4.7 3.0 2.8 2. 2
1960 3.4 2.8 1.9 1.6
1961 2.3 1.3 1.6 1.5
1962 5.2 4. 7 2.5 2.0
1963 3.8 3.4 3. 1 2.5
1964 2.0 1.4 2. 1 1.6
1965 1.6 1.1 1.6 1.4
1966 1.3 1.0 1.5 1.5
1967 4.8 4.9 2.5 2.4
1968 2.7 2. 1 2.5 2.5
Unemployment figures for cotton apply to May/June each year; 
short-time figures to August. Unemployment figures for North 
West and G.B. are annual averages.
Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette; Annual Abstract of 
Statistics: British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract, 
Table 168, pp. 328-9.
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worst fears of the mule spinners were never realised. 
With the exception of the crisis years of 1952 and 1958, 
unemployment in cotton spinning did not exceeed six per 
cent between 1950 and 1965.(78) It would appear that the 
majority of mule spinners had little difficulty finding 
alternative employment. Table 8.4 shows that 
unemployment in the North West was not not i cab ly** above 
the national average in the 1950s and 1960s. At 
Blackburn, where mule-spinning had been eradicated by 
March 1953, many operatives were retrained for work in 
the ring-spinning section.(79) But retraining often 
involved loss of status, while the most elderly workers 
had genuine problems obtaining other jobs. "It can be no 
consolation whatsever", remarked the Operative Spinners, 
"for a man after spending the whole of his working life 
of 40 years or more to be told by implication that it is 
for the good of the industry that he should resign 
himself to losing his means of livelihood".(80)
In the manufacturing section the fear of widespread 
unemployment was equally strong. Under these 
circumstances the A.W.A. became increasingly reluctant 
to agree to the use of foreign labour in Lancashire's 
weaving sheds. During 1956 the British and Italian 
T.U.C.s asked the A.W.A. to give their views on the 
prospects for the employment of Italian labour in the 
industry. They were told, in no uncertain terms, that in 
a contracting industry it "would be foolish to encourage 
the importation of foreign labour, much less 
Italians".(81) Moreover, following the 1956 Hungarian
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uprising, the A.W.A. made it clear to the Ministry of 
Labour that it would not tolerate the employment of 
refugees in the cotton industry, with the exception of 
those who were already experienced textile 
operatives.(82) In 1957 J.C. Hamer Ltd of Radcliffe 
engaged 20 Indian and Pakistani workers to train as 
weavers. An A.W.A. deputation interviewed the
to
management: it was agreed that these workers, although 
from Commonwealth countries, would be the first to lose 
their jobs if trade slackened.(83)
Possibly the most surprising feature of the unions’ 
campaign to protect their members’ jobs was their 
determination not to launch a campaign against 
redeployment. The unions were adamanant that overseas 
competition was the primary cause of declining 
unemployment in the industry. Lewis Wright, general 
secretary of the A.W.A., argued that Lancashire would 
become even less competitive if action was not taken to 
improve the efficiency of labour utilization. Work study 
must proceed, although it ought to be presented in a 
more sensitive manner at a time of declining 
employment.(84)
By the mid 1950s the cotton unions were beginning
/
to press for an organized scheme of redundancy payments 
to operatives. They resented the fact that, although the 
employers were discussing plans for subsidising the 
elimination of excess capacity and the compensation of 
directors and managers, no thought had been given to the 
fate of the operatives. Workers losing their jobs
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frequently received nothing in compensation for many 
years of service.(85) An approach was made to the 
F.M.C.S.A. in 1956 to request that all redundant
mule-spinners should have the opportunity to retrain for 
work in the card and ring-rooms, but the employers
rejected this initiative on the grounds that it would 
result in the disturbance of the existing staff in those 
sections.(86) Discussions were held between the spinning 
and weaving unions in March 1957 to consider the 
possibility of a joint claim for operatives’ 
compensation, but they decided that it would be 
dangerous to proceed until the pending wage negotiations 
had been concluded.(87) The joint demand for
compensation was put to the spinning and weaving 
employers in April 1947. Compensation would be
administered by a joint committee, and would be financed 
by a levy on the wage bill. It would be paid according 
to a sliding scale: workers with less than five years in 
the industry would receive nothing, but for those with 
longer service the rate of compensation would increase 
up to a maximum of 50 weeks’ earnings.(88) Those finding 
other work within the cotton industry would not be 
eligible for compensation unless their new job involved 
a loss of grade. The employers’ response was firm:
“The protection of workers against the 
effects of unemployment by the payment of 
unemployment insurance benefit and National 
Assistance is a matter for the State; it is 
not a responsibility of an individual 
industry...This does not exclude individual 
firms, which are willing to do so, from making 
special arrangements regarding redundancy, but 
the decision must rest entirely in their 
hands".(89)
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Having failed, to persuade the employers of the need 
for redundancy payments, the unions submitted their case 
to the Ministry of Labour's Industrial Disputes Tribunal 
(I.D.T.) in March 1959. The I.D.T. refused to make a 
formal award, but suggested that the issue of 
operatives' compensation be considered in conjunction 
with discussions on Mr Macmillan's scheme for a 
state-financed scrapping subsidy. This recommendation 
was endorsed by the government, which put pressure on 
the employers to reopen talks with the unions.(90) After 
protracted negotiations, agreement was reached with the 
C.S.M.A. and F.M.C.S.A. in July 1959 on a scheme 
financed by a levy on the industry. Compensation would 
be available to workers who had spent more than five 
years in the industry. The maximum rate of compensation 
(for those aged 65) would be 30 weeks earnings. In most 
cases operatives finding alternative employment would 
still receive some compensation, although this would be 
at a considerably reduced level.(91)
Although this arrangement represented a significant 
improvement over existing provisions for compensating 
redundant operatives, in some ways it was still far from 
satisfactory. The unions were quick to draw attention to 
the fact that while the maximum compensation payable to 
a worker was 30 weeks' wages, directors at one closed 
firm had received £22,500 each. Moreover compensation 
was payable only at firms which shed labour under the 
terms of the 1959 scrapping subsidy.(92) Between October 
1961 and October 1962 56 weaving mills ineligible for a
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scrapping grant were closed. At 18 of these firms some 
compensation had been paid to the operatives (although 
in one case the maximum was 10 weeks' wages),
negotiations were proceeding at a further 17, while the
employers had no intention of co-operating at the
remaining 21 mills.(93)
During the early 1960s employers showed little 
interest in negotiating a permanent agreement on 
operatives' compensation. But this did not lead to 
widespread unrest in the mills. Between 1960 and 1965 
2.14 per cent of days lost through strikes in cotton 
were the result of disputes over terms of redundancy, 
compared with 5.15 per cent in all industries. The 1965 
Redundancy Payments Act introduced a statutory 
redundancy scheme for British industry. Somewhat 
surprisingly, this legislation was associated with an
increase in the proportion of days lost through strikes 
due to redundancy: to 3.77 per cent in 1966-9 in cotton, 
compared with a decline to 1.77 per cent in British 
industry as a whole.(94)
Union leaders largely failed in their attempt to 
obtain compensation for operatives made redundant after 
1950. Fortunately this was not too diasastrous, for few 
redundant cotton operatives experienced protracted 
periods of unemployment. Apart from the most elderly 
workers, those who suffered most from the industry's 
decline were the leaders of the trade unions. In 1960 
the cotton unions were deprived of one of their two 
seats on the T.U.C. General Council, while from 1968
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there was only one seat for all textile workers.(95)
V
Cotton textile unions experienced a large decline 
in membership during the 1950s and 1960s. At first 
glance, their lack of militancy during this period 
appears remarkable. Despite the spread of shift-working 
and a gradual increase in machine complements there were 
no major strikes in cotton after World War Two. In fact 
the unions proved amenable to these developments, 
recognising that increased labour efficiency was 
essential to cotton's short-term survival. Lancashire's 
operatives had little to gain from confronting their 
employers. Strikes would merely have hastened the 
industry's demise. Unemployment was low, so that 
operatives who were unhappy with wages and conditions in 
the mills could easily find a job elsewhere. Perhaps 
quitting was less traumatic and risky than striking.
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IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE: THE COTTON INDUSTRY, PRICE-FIXING 
AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR PROTECTION, 1950-65.
An industry which is struggling to survive in a 
climate of increasing foreign competition has two 
options. Either it can attempt to reduce costs by 
modernizing its fixed capital stock and labour 
practices, or else it can retreat behind a wall of 
restrictive agreements and protectionist rhetoric. Most 
industries adopt a combination of these responses, but 
the gravity of the difficulties confronting Lancashire 
in the interwar decades, and again during the 1950s, 
forced the cotton industry increasingly to concentrate 
on defensive measures.
This chapter examines various schemes for the 
maintenance of prices and margins which were discussed 
(and occasionally implemented) by the cotton industry 
during the 1940s and 1950s. Consideration will also be 
given to Lancashire's vociferous campaign for the 
protection of domestic and colonial markets during the 
fifties and sixties. The chapter will be divided into 
four sections. Section I looks at the rationale for the 
collective regulation of prices and margins, and 
examines a number of unsuccessful experiments in price 
maintenance in the cotton industry between 1920 and 
1945. Section II considers postwar price-fixing 
agreements in the spinning section, notably the Yarn 
Spinners' Association (Y.S.A.), which fell foul of the 
Restrictive Practices Court in the late 1950s. Section 
III examines the abortive attempts tc establish an
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equivalent to the Y.S.A. in the weaving section, and 
provides a brief consideration of price control in the 
finishing section. Section IV discusses the growing 
protectionist movement in Lancashire after World War 
Two, while Section V contains some concluding comments.
I
During the 1950s and 1960s the study of restrictive 
practices attained a temporary popularity. A wealth of 
literature was published dealing with price-fixing 
agreements and the activities of the Restrictive 
Practices Court.(1)
In the absence of a price maintenance agreement, a 
fall in demand could lead to an uncontrollable spiral of 
price-cutting, resulting in serious damage to the 
financial structure of the industry. Firms would 
undercut one another in a desperate scramble to obtain 
orders. Wholesalers, retailers, and export merchants 
would deliberately delay orders to effect further 
reductions in price. Elementary micro-economic theory 
suggests that, in the short-term, firms would be 
prepared to trade at a loss, namely at prices between 
average total costs and average variable costs.(2) Some 
firms, expecting an early revival of trade, and wishing 
to retain the goodwill of their customers, would even 
offer goods at prices below average variable costs. This 
behaviour, known as 'weak selling', was prevalent in the 
cotton industry during the 1920s and 1930s. Competitive 
price-cutting creates immense financial difficulties for 
firms. Marginal producers would exhaust their credit
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during a prolonged recession and be forced to abandon 
the industry. Losses sustained during the price—war 
would also significantly reduce the financial reserves 
of the remaining firms.
The primary function of a price maintenance scheme 
is to avoid panic during periods of slack demand. Price 
instability leads to chronic uncertainty and detersto
investment.(3) An organized pricing scheme would not 
eliminate losses, but it would ensure that they were 
less than those accompanying an unrestrained price-war. 
Moreover, wholesalers would not engage in ploys to 
intensify the reduction in demand if they were convinced 
that the pricing agreement would hold. Consequently the 
financial pressure on firms would be brought under 
control, and the capacity of marginal producers would be 
preserved to enable the satisfaction of demand during 
the recovery.(4) But, as with all forms of cartel, 
individual firms have an incentive to undercut the 
agreed price to acquire greater orders.(5) Consequently, 
price-fixing schemes have a greater chance of success 
where cheaters can be penalised, either by joint action 
to put them out of business, or through a regime of 
legally enforceable fines.
However price maintenance schemes are not a 
panacea. They assist industries to protect their 
productive capacity and financial reserves during 
temporary fluctuations in demand, but are ineffective in 
cases where the fall in demand is permanent. If the main 
pressure to cut prices is from outsiders, such as
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low-cost overseas producers, price maintenance 
agreements can do nothing to limit the losses of 
domestic firms. Under these circumstances price 
regulation would only succeed if it had the backing of 
import controls.
The remainder of this section will consider price 
maintenance schemes in Lancashire before ^ 1945.
Calamitous declines were experienced in all Britain's
staple industries, cotton, steel, shipbuilding, and 
coal, during the interwar period. Lancashire's cotton 
textile employers reacted to the collapse in demand by 
attempting to introduce minimum price schemes, with the 
intention of limiting the damage caused by 'weak 
selling'. But defensive price schemes were not confined 
to the cotton industry. For instance, the Coal Mines Act 
of 1930 established district boards of colliery owners 
with powers to fix minimum prices; while there were also 
important agreements for regulating prices in the iron 
and steel, chemicals, sheet-glass, and tinplate
industries.(6)
In the early 1920s the coarse spinners introduced 
short-time working, an expedient which had been a 
popular remedy for temporary reductions in demand before 
1914. By cutting hours it was hoped that supply could be
brought into equilibrium with demand without the
necessity for a major reduction in price. Short-time 
working was supported by the unions, as it involved 
underemployment rather than outright unemployment for 
their members. But as poor trading conditions persisted,
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the disadvantages of the short-time system were accorded 
greater attention. A uniform reduction in hours made it 
difficult for the spinning section to adjust to secular 
changes in the demand for different types of yarn. Lower 
rates of machinery utilization resulted in higher unit 
fixed costs. Moreover short-time working forced 
efficient producers to reduce their output at the same 
rate as marginal firms. Efficient firms and those 
spinning specialist yarns for which demand remained 
strong had an incentive to cheat; consequently the 
short-time system collapsed in 1926.(7)
In November 1926 J.M. Keynes approached the 
F.M.C.S.A. with a scheme for establishing a 'cartel' in 
the coarse spinning section.(8) Similar proposals had 
been under discussion within the Federation since the 
abandonment of short-time working. In fact a Cotton Yarn 
Association (C.Y.A.) was formed to fix production quotas 
and set minimum prices, but it failed to gain the 
support of more than three-quarters of the coarse 
spinning companies. Demand continued to fall during 
1927. Outsiders succeeded in undercutting the C.Y.A. and 
its functions were terminated. Keynes complained that 
the C.Y.A had set prices too high in a misguided attempt 
to guarantee the profits of the least efficient firms. 
He argued that voluntary agreements were difficult to 
enforce and suggested that it might be necessary to seek 
Board of Trade authority for a compulsory minimum price 
and quota scheme, or else implement retaliatory measures 
against firms who broke ranks.(9)
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While Britain was in the depths of the depression 
between 1928 and 1933, it proved impossible for firms in 
the cotton industry t.o reach any agreement on minimum 
prices, and weak selling became the norm.(10) But 
towards the end of 1933 a number of ' Gentlemens' 
Agreements' were reached, primarily at the behest of the 
industry's largest firm, the Lancashire Cotton 
Corporation, whereby companies undertook not to sell 
yarn at a price below average total cost. When the 
coarse weft agreement collapsed in 1934, many firms 
realised that only a legally enforceable scheme could 
survive. A number of coarse spinners combined to 
establish the 'Royton Agreement', which was legally 
binding upon the signatories. Similar schemes were set 
up in the Egyptian section and proved remarkably 
resilient during the renewed downward pressure on prices 
in 1938.(11)
In July 1937, amid general surprise, the President 
of the Board of Trade, Oliver Stanley, suggested that 
the cotton industry should draw up proposals for a 
comprehensive new price-fixing scheme. Stanley hinted 
that legislation might be forthcoming to enforce such an 
agreement.(12) The Joint Committee of Cotton Trade 
Organisations (J.C.C.T.O.) responded by proposing that 
each sub-section of the industry should be responsible 
for devising a price maintenance scheme. Each scheme 
would be administered by a 'board', consisting largely 
of employers, which would be answerable to the 
government. The J.C.C.T.O. warned that there should be
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no attempt to supplement minimum price schemes with 
production quotas, as this would be unpopular in the 
industry.(13) These proposals were provisionally 
accepted by the government, which began to draft an 
Enabling Bill to give them effect.
It was agreed that the legislation should extend to 
the weaving and finishing sections. The inability of the 
weaving industry to develop a voluntary minimum price 
scheme during the 1920s and 1930s was the result of the 
variety of its output and the large number of very small 
firms in the section. In 1934 the C.S.M.A. produced a 
list of uniform costings to serve as guidelines to the 
industry, while a survey by the Burnley and District 
Cotton Industry Study Group showed that there was 
moderate support for a legally enforceable 'insurance' 
scheme. This would have involved firms paying a levy 
into a pool for the compensation of companies with idle 
looms. It was argued that access to these compensatory 
payments would make it unnecessary for firms to engage 
in 'weak selling'. But nothing came of these preliminary 
discussions. Indeed a statutory scheme offered the only 
realistic hope of price maintenance in weaving.(14)
Over 70 per cent of spinning and weaving firms 
expressed themselves satisfied with the government's 
plans, although a vocal 'opposition' movement emerged, 
claiming that the boards administering the price schemes 
would be puppets of the larger firms.(15) Despite these 
doubts the Cotton Industry (Re-organization) Act came 
onto the statute book in 1939. This Act authorised each
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subsection of the industry to draw up a minimum price 
scheme for submission to a Cotton Industry Board (which 
was dominated by employers). If the Cotton Industry 
Board accepted the proposals it would seek the Board of 
Trade's approval for introduction of the schemes.
The outbreak of World War Two prevented the 
implementation of the 1939 Act. Weak selling was no 
longer a problem and the government's main concern was 
to avoid a rapid rise in the price of textiles. Between 
1940 and 1942 the government established procedures for 
controlling the price of raw cotton and the margins for 
yarn and cloth production, largely through the offices 
of the Cotton Control.(16) Price controls were retained 
for a period at the end of the war, although it was 
always the government's intention to remove them once 
the economic situation had improved, and the price of 
grey cloth for export was freed from control in June 
1948.(17) Then, in April 1949, after gaining assurances 
from the industry that prices would not be raised, the 
Board of Trade secured the abolition of price and margin 
controls on all yarn and cloth, except cloth used in the 
production of Utility clothing.(18) The state-owned Raw 
Cotton Commission continued to control raw cotton prices 
until the Conservative government permitted the 
resumption of private trading in September 1952.(19) The 
period of price control during the 1940s was an 
interesting interlude, although it bore little relation, 
either to what had gone on before, or to what has since 
transpired.
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During the war the industry gave consideration to 
the form of price maintenance which would be most 
desirable once peacetime conditions returned, as there 
was no guarantee that the provisions of the 1939 Act 
would be implemented. In 1944 the Cotton Board Committee 
to Enquire into Post War Problems reported that price 
management was essential to the stability of^  all 
sections of the industry and would be one of the 
cornerstones of any programme for Lancashire's recovery. 
The Committee recommended that such schemes should be 
administered under the auspices of the Cotton Board.(20) 
These proposals met with an extremely frosty response 
from the Board of Trade, where the President, Hugh 
Dalton, feared that price maintenance would merely serve 
to protect inefficient firms. In view of this reaction 
the industry did not press the government to provide 
legislative backing for price support schemes.(21) When 
the Board of Trade established a Tripartite Working 
Party in 1945 to discuss the future of the industry, 
only one member of the commission was prepared openly to 
advocate a system of statutorily enforceable minimum 
prices.(22)
By the end of the war the 1939 Act and its 
principle of the statutory enforcement of price 
maintenance schemes had been abandoned. This did not 
imply a lack of support among firms for price regulation 
through legally binding agreements at the industry 
level, merely extreme reluctance on the part of the 
government to become embroiled in such escapades. The
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next section will consider the fortunes of the movement 
for price maintenance in the spinning section, while 
section III examines developments in weaving and 
finishing.
II
This section will analyze price maintenance in 
cotton and staple rayon spinning between 1945 and 1960. 
Detailed consideration will be given to the 
controversial scheme of the Yarn Spinners' Association 
(Y.S.A.), which was brought to an unceremonious 
conclusion by the Restrictive Practices Court in 1959.
As preparations were made during 1948 and early 
1949 for the abolition of statutory price controls on 
yarn and cloth, the industry began the search for an 
alternative policy. In June 1948 Cotton Board officials 
met representatives of the Board of Trade to discuss the 
possibilities. Sir Raymond Streat expressed an interest 
in a regime of maximum and minimum prices instead of 
fixed prices, but the Board of Trade had little time for 
this idea.(23) Nevertheless both sides accepted that the 
existing system was too inflexible. Bureaucratic inertia 
prevented margins and prices from adjusting at a 
sufficient pace to enable Lancashire to take advantage 
of changing patterns of demand.(24)
In the absence of any positive state involvement in 
planning for a new price maintenance scheme, the matter 
devolved upon the spinning masters themselves. By April 
1949, when statutory price control was abolished, the 
Yarn Spinners' Association had been established to take
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over responsibility for regulating the price of cotton 
yarn. The Y.S.A. had an initial membership of 195 firms, 
representing over three quarters of U.K. spindleage.(25) 
Rayon yarn prices were effectively controlled by the 
major man-made fibre producers, Courtaulds and British 
Celanese.(26)
From the outset the Y.S.A. promised to become one 
of the most powerful organizations in the cotton 
industry. Some spinners feared that it would usurp the 
functions of the F.M.C.S.A.. To avoid conflict a 
demarcation agreement was reached between the two 
associations, in which the Y.S.A. pledged itself not to 
participate in any negotiations with the trade unions 
over wages and conditions, while the Federation 
abandoned any ambitions to intervene in the sphere of 
price regulation.(27)
The Y.S.A. was divided into six sectional 
committees dealing with different types of yarn: coarse
American, medium American, ring American, condenser, 
waste, and Egyptian. Each sectional committee set a 
minimum spinning margin to be added to the cost of raw 
cotton, subject to ratification by the central 
committee.(28) The Y.S.A. claimed that its procedures 
for establishing minimum margins were based upon those 
spscif isd. in the abortive 1939 Act. A detailed 
questionnaire had been sent out to spinning firms to 
obtain accurate data on conversion costs.(29) Given this 
information it was possible to rank mills in each 
section according to conversion cost. The figures for
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the costliest third of mills were disregarded, and the
median mill of the remaining two—thirds was chosen as
representing the minimum allowable margin. Every Friday
the Y.S.A. 's Co-ordinating Committee would study the
raw cotton market and set a price for each type of
cotton. These 'official' raw cotton prices were added to
the minimum margin to give the minimum price for each
*
class of yarn, although special concessions could be 
made for exporters. Once the scheme was in operation the 
Y.S.A. was at liberty to alter its minimum margins to 
take account of changes in costs and the state of trade. 
Further detailed costings were carried out in 1950 and 
1953. Firms caught cheating were fined six times the 
difference between the sale price and the'Y.S.A. minimum 
price per unit sold. If they were unwilling to be judged 
by their peers they had the right to opt for an 
appearance before a civil court.(30)
Controversy surrounded the Y.S.A.'s scheme from the 
moment of its birth. During the 1950s many weaving 
concerns believed that their profits were being squeezed 
between the spinners' cartel and the finishers' cartel 
(which will be discussed in section III). Although the 
weavers were reluctant to speak out in public, their 
resentment was fuelled by the events of 1951—3, when the 
cotton industry experienced its first violent trade 
cycle since the 1930s. The year from mid-1950 to 
mid-1951 had been marked by a level of sales and 
profitability unequalled since 1920. But this prosperity 
was rapidly succeeded by recession, and 1952 brought a
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Table 9.1.
Prices of raw cotton, yarn, and cloth, 1946-64. 
(Averages for 1938 = 100)
AMERICAN AMERICAN
COTTON YARN CLOTH
Jun 30 1946 280 241 244
Dec 31 1946 409 303 296
Jun 30 1947 409 303 296
Dec 31 1947 449 320 310
Jun 30 1948 538 364 370
Dec 31 1948 455 360 346
Jun 30 1949 476 392 391
Dec 31 1949 600 478 444
Jun 30 1950 671 537 552
Dec 31 1950 968 726 694
Jun 30 1951 972 792 775
Dec 31 1951 921 779 635
Jun 30 1952 810 614 502
Dec 31 1952 622 535 454
Jun 30 1953 619 526 436
Dec 31 1953 603 527 472
Jun 30 1954 665 543 485
Dec 31 1954 667 560 489
Jun 30 1955 619 551 472
Dec 31 1955 617 545 466
Jun 30 1956 648 555 501
Dec 31 1956 602 535 514
Jun 30 1957 602 537 521
Dec 31 1957 602 559 539
Jun 30 1958 536 546 514
Dec 31 1958 509 523 474
Jun 30 1959 473 466 454
Dec 31 1959 471 492 514
Jun 30 1960 459 554 554
Dec 31 1960 467 580 579
Jun 30 1961 488 572 581
Dec 31 1961 490 517 537
Jun 30 1962 490 486 509
Dec 31 1962 486 488 510
Jun 30 1963 480 488 510
Dec 31 1963 474 490 531
Jun 30 1964 476 511 566
Dec 31 1964 473 535 599
N.B. The index is on the basis of current prices. 
Source: FW. Tattersall's Cotton Trade Review.
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devastating collapse in both the domestic and export 
markets for cotton textiles. An examination of 
Tattersall’s series of company trading results suggests 
that the spinners weathered the storm far better than 
the weavers. The average net profit of independent 
weaving firms fell from £120,000 in 1951 to £80,000 in 
1952, while the average net profit of independent 
spinners remained constant at £55,000. This evidence is 
all the more remarkable, given the fact that during 
recessions the decline in orders was invariably 
accentuated in the spinning section. Between mid-1951 
and mid-1952 employment fell by 48.5 per cent in 
spinning and doubling compared with 26.4 per cent in 
weaving.(31) Shaw and Turner and Smith attributed the 
resilience of spinners’ profits to the maintenance of 
yarn prices and spinning margins under the Y.S.A. 
scheme. Shaw used Board of Trade data to show that, 
although weaving margins began to fall in August 1951, 
spinning margins remained at record levels until October 
1951.(32) Employing information obtained from an 
unspecified private source, Turner and Smith calculated 
that cotton spinners’ margins fell by a mere 30 per cent 
between mid-1951 and mid-1952, while weavers’ margins 
fell by 56 per cent over the same period.(33) The data 
on American raw cotton, yarn, and cloth prices in Table 
9.1 support this interpretation. Between 30 June 1951 
and 31 Dec. 1952 cloth prices fell by 41 per cent, and 
American raw cotton prices fell by 36 per cent, while 
1 can yarn prices declined by 32 per cent. It would
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appear that the high Y.S.A. margins secured adequate 
profits for the spinners despite the large fall in 
orders, and forced the weaving section, which lacked a 
price maintenance scheme, to bear the brunt of the 
recession.
Indeed the volume of criticism of the Y.S.A. grew
with the passage of time. In 1955 the C.S.M.A. accused
%
the Y.S.A. of artificially increasing prices by debasing 
the quality of the cotton used to produce each class of 
yarn. They also complained that the Y.S.A. did not 
reduce its official raw cotton prices in line with 
reductions in the market price at Liverpool, and warned 
that their members were considering using more imported 
yarn.(34)
Tension in the industry mounted as the Monopolies 
Commission, having secured the abrogation of a price 
ring in the calico printing section in 1954, asked the 
C.S.M.A. for its views on the operation of the Y.S.A.
scheme. The C.S.M.A. set up a special sub-committee to
consider this issue. Although there was considerable
support for the principle of price maintenance, as a
safeguard against ’weak selling’, serious doubts were 
expressed about the way in which the Y.S.A. scheme was 
functioning. It was felt that the Y.S.A. should consult 
the C.S.M.A. before it fixed margins; that margins 
should be more flexible during periods of bad trade; 
that changes should be made in the method of calculating 
spinners’ costs; and that ’official’ raw cotton prices 
should automatically respond to changes in prices on the
Liverpool market.(35) It was resolved that these points 
should be put to the Y.S.A. at an informal meeting. 
Little of value came out of these discussions, although 
the spinners did agree to give the C.S.M.A. a token 
representation on the Y.S.A.’s Co-ordinating 
Committee.(36) In July 1958 the C.S.M.A.’s Central 
Committee concluded that on balance the Y.S.A. exerted a 
stabilising influence on the trade. But although "the 
theoretical basis of the scheme purports to yield no 
more than would provide reasonably efficient spinning 
firms with adequate funds for machinery replacement and 
profit...financial results... achieved by most spinning 
firms - even including some with low machinery activity 
- appear to be disproportionately high".(37) The 
C.S.M.A. resolved to provide written evidence showing 
broad support for the Y.S.A. at the forthcoming 
Restrictive Practices case. However, it was expected 
that individual weaving employers would present their 
views in a less diplomatic fashion. The C.S.M.A.’s 
reluctance publicly to condemn the Y.S.A. was the result 
of a genuine belief that, without some sort of price 
maintenance scheme, ’weak selling’ would return to haunt 
the industry, especially during the depressed market 
conditions of the mid to late 1950s. Lacking the unity 
to introduce a countervailing scheme, the C.S.M.A. felt 
that there was no alternative to tolerating the 
high-handed attitude of the spinners.
After a lengthy period of uncertainty, the Yarn 
Spinners Association was brought before the Restrictive
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Practices Court in October 1958. The Registrar 
maintained that the scheme led to high prices, the loss 
of export markets, and a dangerous misallocation of 
national resources through the preservation of a large 
measure of excess capacity in a declining industry. 
Under the provisions of the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act, 1956, it was the responsibility of defendants to 
prove that their agreement was beneficial to the general 
public interest. The Y.S.A. contended that their 
agreement:
(a) Prevented the permanent loss to the industry 
of labour and productive capacity during recessions. 
These factors of production would be needed to meet 
consumers’ requirements when trade improved, and would 
be essential during a ’national emergency’.
(b) Gave firms the confidence to re-equip, 
thereby leading to the production of cheaper goods of 
improved quality in the future.
(c) Dissuaded struggling firms from trying to 
produce yarn of counts ill-suited to their machinery and 
skills. This phenomenon, known as ’price invasion’ would 
spread overcapacity to other count ranges.
(d) Encouraged spinners to produce yarn for stock 
in times of poor trade, preventing large price rises
during the recovery.
(e) Led to an increase in quality and non-price
competition.
(f) Prevented the emergence of a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market structure. The spinners argued that
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without the Y.S.A. firms would be forced to amalgamate 
to survive.
(g) Led to stable prices.
(h) Was necessary to prevent a serious and 
long-term increase in unemployment in certain areas of 
South Lancashire. (38)
Two economists, G. Prys Williams (British Celanese
*
Ltd.) and D.T. Jacks (University of Newcastle) put the 
Yarn Spinners’ case. They maintained that the spinners’ 
scheme had been instrumental in moderating the effects 
of recessions. In a horizontally organized industry, 
such as cotton textiles, there was a tendency for buyers 
at each stage of production to hold back orders in the 
expectation of further price reductions, behaviour which 
served to amplify the effects of any fall in demand. 
Under these circumstances a fall in price could easily 
lead to a speculative reduction in demand. However, they 
argued, the industry now had confidence in the Y.S.A.’s 
determination not to reduce margins during a slump. 
Consequently demand was maintained at a higher level 
than would otherwise have been the case, minimizing the 
severity of the recession.(39)
A number of spinning masters were produced to 
proclaim their belief in the system. For example, the 
Bolton employer, Mr J.G. Barber-Lomax claimed that "if 
the Yarn Spinners’ Agreement is abolished, we wil earn a 
good deal less in profit...and we are doubtful whether 
expenditure...on new machinery [will be]
justifiable".(40) But their evidence was counteracted by
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an equally impressive display from angry manufacturers. 
Mr. Barker, the managing director of a company weaving 
heavy canvas, claimed to have lost a large Danish order 
to a German supplier because, although weaving costs had 
been pared to the bone, the price of yarn had made it 
impossible for him to quote a competitive price.(41)
S.R. Dennison (Cambridge University) was the main
*
academic witness for the Registrar. He argued that price 
maintenance schemes enabled ineffient units to survive, 
forcing all firms in the industry to work at a 
comparatively low level of capacity utilization. Firms 
would be reluctant to increase their fixed costs by 
installing expensive new machinery if there was little 
opportunity of running it to capacity. Moreover, 
Dennison claimed that there was little possibility of 
long-term unemployment resulting from the abrogation of 
the Yarn Spinners Agreement, as the Lancashire economy 
was becoming increasingly diversified.(42)
The court awarded against the Y.S.A., maintaining 
that it offered no substantial benefits to the public. 
Although the Court ruled that abolition of the scheme 
would lead to a minor increase in unemployment, this was 
considered less harmful than the chronic misallocation 
of resources which would result from its retention.
decision was not as disastrous for the 
spinners as they had feared. By 1959 the Yarn Spinners' 
Agreement was largely irrelevant. The Y.S.A. had 
provided spinners with no more than a temporary 
advantage at the expense of weavers' margins. Minimum
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price schemes stabilised prices during recessions and 
helped dissuade producers from an early resort to 'weak 
selling , but in the long-term they were worthless in 
the face of the inexorable growth of foreign 
competition. After 1952 Lancashire's markets 
increasingly succumbed to cheap Asian wares. The Y.S.A. 
soon realised that it would be suicidal to maintain the 
price of British yarn, and between 1952 and 1958 
acquiesced in the gradual reduction of yarn prices (see 
Table 9.1). A survey conducted by J.B. Heath in 1959-60 
suggested that 87.5 per cent of textile firms (i.e. not 
just cotton spinners) believed that the revocation of 
price maintenance agreements had no effect on prices. 
The evidence suggests that the Yarn Spinners' Agreement 
was outdated long before it was abolished.(43)
III
This section examines attempts to establish price 
maintenance schemes in the cotton weaving, rayon 
weaving, and printing sections. Comparatively low 
concentration levels in the weaving section presented 
particular difficulties. In 1946 the seven largest 
weaving firms controlled a mere one-tenth of cotton and 
rayon loomage, while the seven largest spinning combines 
controlled 38 per cent of the industry's spindleage.(44) 
The proliferation of small weaving firms made the 
formulation of a mutually acceptable pricing policy 
extremely difficult. In this respect conditions in the 
weaving section mirrored those in spinning during the 
1920s, before the creation of the major combines.
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The C.S.M.A. exerted considerable energy in the 
futile search for a workable price maintenance scheme 
the cotton weaving section. In 1947 the weavers gave 
consideration to the formation of a price maintenance 
scheme (like the Y.S.A.), which they hoped would be 
allowed to take over the administration of the Board of 
Trade's Open Quota Licensing System (O.Q.L.S.), ^which 
set maximum prices for certain classes of cloth exports. 
Nothing came of these plans. Members could not agree on 
an appropriate regime of fines, while the Rayon Weaving 
Association (R.W.A.) was reluctant to co-operate for 
fear of becoming a satellite of the C.S.M.A.. Moreover, 
the Board of Trade insisted that it would only hand over 
responsibility for the O.Q.L.S. to a body representing 
all weaving firms. It was impossible for the C.S.M.A. to 
guarantee such a level of support and plans for the 
cloth association were shelved.(45)
Following the abolition of non-Utility price 
controls in 1949, the cotton weavers began to reconsider 
the possibility of starting a minimum price scheme. A 
leading employer remarked that "manufacturers could not 
afford to be pocketed between we11-organized sections of 
trade", i.e spinning and finishing, both of which 
operated a price-fixing scheme. Others regarded price 
maintenance as an essential bulwark against the 
re-emergence of 'weak selling'.(46) Although the 
C.S.M.A.'s local committees favoured such a departure, 
doubts were expressed about the problem of vertically 
integrated firms. Weaving companies with capacity in
406
converting and retailing, were in a position to evade 
any scheme for regulating cloth prices, because it was 
not possible for the cloth association to fix prices at 
later stages of production. If the weaving firm and the 
converter were formally independent, but controlled by 
the same interests, the minimum price scheme could be 
evaded by the use of transfer pricing.(47) Nevertheless 
a questionnaire was sent to member firms to ask their 
views concerning price regulation. Firms owning 13 per 
cent of looms in the industry did not reply, while those 
owning a further 19 per cent of capacity were opposed to 
any scheme. As a result the proposals were quietly 
shelved.(48) This issue was revived during the crisis of 
1952 and also in the run up to the Monopolies 
Commission's successful case against the Federation of 
Calico Printers in 1954, but with similar results.(49)
As fears of increasing foreign competition 
continued to grip the industry during the mid 1950s, a 
further ballot of C.S.M.A. members was held. This time 
only 17 firms said that they were opposed to the 
formation of a cloth association, and the Central 
Committee resolved to draw up detailed proposals.(50) In 
1956 a scheme for setting minimum prices for cotton 
cloth was floated, but failed to obtain sufficient 
support for implementation. It had proved extremely 
difficult to establish accurate costings for the 
multiplicity of different cloth constructions produced 
in Lancashire; the output of the weaving section was 
considerably more diverse than that of the spinning
section. Some manufacturers claimed that the proposed 
prices were too high and would make British cloth 
increasingly uncompetitive, while others argued that the 
prices would be too low to enable firms to make a 
reasonable profit. The C.S.M.A. resolved that the prices 
contained in the proposed scheme should be available for 
firms to use as costing guidelines.(51) This was the 
final attempt to establish a minimum price scheme in 
cotton weaving. The C.S.M.A. had been defeated by the 
inability of its extremely diverse membership to agree 
on a common programme, and in the later 1950s the 
industry turned its attention towards devising schemes 
for eliminating excess capacity.
By contrast the R.W.A. was able to impose a modest 
minimum price regime in the rayon weaving section during 
the 1940s and early 1950s. Far fewer firms were engaged 
in rayon than in cotton weaving, making it much easier 
for a widely accepted policy to emerge, although this 
too broke down during the difficult economic conditions 
of the 1950s. In 1941 the R.W.A. had secured almost 
unanimous support for the formation of a Rayon Cloth 
Agreement (R.C.A.) and a Minimum Margin Price Plan for 
filament rayon cloth (M.M.M.P.). In 1943 this scheme was 
extended to cover spun rayon fabrics.(52) One of the 
original functions of the agreement was to secure an 
improved bargaining position vis—a—vis the government in 
relation to official contracts. Although rayon cloth 
prices were controlled by the state during the war, the 
Board of Trade's Central Price Regulation Committee used
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the R.W.A.'s Minimum Margin Plan as a basis for 
calculating statutory cloth prices.
At the end of the war the rayon weavers appeared 
far better prepared to pursue a policy of price 
regulation than either the cotton spinners or weavers. 
Yet problems were already on the horizon. Courtaulds and 
British Celanese, the largest British man-made fibre 
producers, both possessed rayon weaving capacity, 
enjoyed membership of the R.W.A., and were parties to 
the R.C.A.'s price agreements. Under this scheme, and 
the related Rayon Producers' Agreement, the man-made 
fibre producers would fulfil an important policing 
function for the R.W.A. once official price controls 
were relaxed in 1948-50. Any weaving firm suspected of 
reneging on the price agreements would be liable to find 
its yarn supply discontinued. However Courtaulds and 
British Celanese had not bargained for the creation in 
1948 of a Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Commission. They feared that their activities would fall 
foul of this new legislation and withdrew from the Rayon 
Cloth Agreement in 1949.(53) Consequently the R.W.A. 
faced the abolition of statutory price control in a 
seriously weakened condition, as there were no other 
provisions for the punishment of recalcitrant firms. 
Indeed the absence of effective support from Courtaulds 
and British Celanese hastened the collapse of the 
R.W.A.'s price maintenance schemes.
Panic set in among the rayon weavers during the 
1952 recesssion. Members of the R.W.A. complained that
409
Table 9.2.
Rayon cloth prices, 1952-64.
(JUNE 1949 = 100)
Jan. 1952 129.0 Dec. 1958 117.7
June 1952 123.7 June 1959 117.7
Dec. 1952 115. 6 Dec. 1959 126.4
June 1953 115. 1 June 1960 133. 2
Dec. 1953 117. 1 Dec. 1960 142. 7
June 1954 117.0 June 1961 133. 7
Dec. 1954 113. 3 Dec. 1961 133. 7
June 1955 112. 8 June 1962 132.2
Dec. 1955 112.0 Dec. 1962 130.6
June 1956 113.5 June 1963 129. 4
Dec. 1956 113.6 Dec. 1963 130.8
June 1957 117.0 June 1964 133.8
Dec. 1957 117.7 Dec. 1964 139.0
June 1958 117.7
N.B. The index is on the basis of current prices.
Source: F.W. Tattersall's Cotton Trade Review.
they were being undercut by vertically irvtegrated firms, 
and warned that the system could not survive unless
prices were reduced.(54) Eight more firms gave notice of 
withdrawal from the R.C.A. in the summer of 1952, and an 
accountant was appointed to produce a report on the
future of price maintenance in filament rayon weaving.
This report recommended the replacement of the 
prevailing regime of minimum prices by a price-formula. 
Each firm would apply the formula to its costs to derive 
an appropriate minimum price. It was hoped that this 
would provide greater flexibility. Firms insisted that 
use of the price formula should not be compulsory. After 
interminable discussions the price formula, which
applied to both automatic and Lancashire loom weaving, 
came into operation in July 1953.(55) It was clear that 
a voluntary agreement would have no impact and by early 
1954 R.W.A. leaders were warning that "the present 
situation was dangerously reminiscent of the prewar
days”.(56) A final attempt was made to devise a minimum 
price scheme for filament weaving with adequate 
sanctions during 1954 and 1955, but this failed to 
achieve widespread support. After 1952 the R.W.A.'s 
schemes for regulating both filament and spun rayon 
cloth prices gradually disintegrated, and by 1956 they 
were little more than lists of recommended prices.(57) 
Table 9.2 outlines the course of rayon cloth prices 
during the period from 1952 to 1956, showing that the 
R.W.A. was unable to prevent a general price reduction. 
The R.W.A. ’s failure to find a stable price maintenance
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policy was partly the result of unfavourable economic 
circumstances, and partly the result of the withdrawal 
of the man-made fibre producers. In the long run the 
R.W.A. had achieved little more success than the 
C.S.M.A., and as the decade progressed it too became 
primarily concerned with schemes for the elimination of 
surplus capacity.
A frequent complaint made by the weaving employers 
was that they were being sandwiched between restrictive 
price agreements in both the spinning and the finishing 
sections. The Federation of Calico Printers (F.C.P.), 
which was dominated by a large combine, the Calico 
Printers' Association (C.P.A.). During the interwar 
decades the calico printing section had suffered from
the same problems as the rest of the industry. A minimum 
price scheme had been introduced in 1922, but its
collapse in 1931 was followed by an extended period of
'weak selling' and financial chaos.(58)
After World War Two the calico printing industry 
was determined not to allow these difficulties to 
return. With the abolition of statutory price controls 
in 1949 the F.C.P.'s minimum price scheme came into 
force. This system of price maintenance was supported by 
a programme for purchasing and scrapping redundant
capacity, and a Percentage Quantum (P.Q.) scheme, which 
allocated a percentage of the domestic market to each 
company. Firms exceeding their quota paid 20 per cent of 
their excess turnover into a pool, and producers unable 
to fulfill their quota received a subsidy from the pool.
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In other words, successful firms were penalised for 
increasing their market share on the grounds that they 
were contributing to over-production, while unsuccessful 
firms were guaranteed a reasonable income without having 
to resort to 'weak selling'. The whole system was 
overseen by the massive presence of the C.P.A., which 
was in a position to exert immense damage on smaller 
firms in a situation of competitive price 
reductions.(59)
In 1951 the case of the calico printers was 
referrred to the Monopolies Commission. The printers 
argued that their scheme was necessary to maintain an 
orderly market and to reduce the risks associated with 
new processes and designs, but the Commission declared 
that the agreements were not in the public interest. Its 
report, published in 1954, stated that although the 
prices charged by F.C.P. members were no higher than the 
European average, British calico printing prices were 
higher than they would have been in the absence of 
restrictive practices.(60) This led to a storm of 
protest from the printers themselves, but brought relief 
to the weaving section, which felt that the F.C.P.'s 
pricing policy had been far more detrimental to their 
interests than that operated by the spinners'.(61)
If the weaving section had been able to find 
sufficient common purpose to implement and enforce 
effective price management arrangements, it would have 
had little effect on the overall fortunes of the 
industry. The range of acceptable prices was established
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by the world market, so that any increase in weavers’ 
margins would have been at the expense of the spinners 
and finishers. In a declining industry, the spinning, 
weaving, and finishing sections were being pitted 
against one another in the struggle for survival.
IV
Employers and operatives presented a common front 
in the campaign for the protection of domestic and 
colonial markets from imports of foreign, and eventually 
Commonwealth, cotton goods. Protection was regarded as 
essential for the industry's survival. Most employers 
and trade union leaders recognised that Lancashire could 
never compete with Japan and the other Asian producers 
in an unregulated market, although a few managed to 
convince themselves that temporary protective measures 
could be abandoned once the industry had been 
'modernized'. In view of the industry's implicit 
admission that it was beyond redemption, it is hardly 
surprising that successive governments expressed only a 
token interest in the issue of protection. Had a 
significant degree of protection been offered to 
Lancashire during the 1950s, the industry's price 
management schemes would have been more numerous and 
more effective. What is more, the decline of the cotton 
industry would have been delayed, hampering the transfer 
of productive resources into expanding industries.(62)
The spectre of foreign competition had haunted 
Lancashire throughout the prosperous forties. During 
World War Two both the U.T.F.W.A. and the Cotton Board
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produced reports which argued that the future prospects 
of the industry depended upon effective action to 
restrict the exports and prices of low-wage textile 
producers such as Japan.(63) Despite repeated efforts, 
the Cotton Board was unable to convince either the 
British government or the Allied authorities in Tokyo of 
the need for resolute action to restrict the revtval of 
the Japanese industry. Lancashire approached the return 
of free world markets in the early 1950s in fear and 
trepidation. The campaign for protection was about to 
commence. (64)
In terms of the politics of cotton and 
protectionism, 1952 was an extremely busy time. 
Coinciding with the first postwar recession, this year 
was marked by three significant developments: partial
success for the advocates of protected colonial markets, 
an International Cotton Textile Industry Conference to 
discuss the future of the world market, and a clear 
statement by the President of the Board of Trade 
regarding the government's attitude towards protection.
Since the late 1940s the cotton industry had been 
pressing the Labour government, with little success, to 
impose increasingly stringent restrictions on Japanese 
cloth exports to British West Africa and British East 
Africa. The Conservative government elected in 1951 was 
more receptive to these requests, and put pressure on 
the African governments to make concessions. Sterling's 
weakness during 1952 necessitated measures to restrict 
imports; by acting against Japanese cloth exports to
Africa, the government combined financial prudence with
a valuable sop to its supporters in Lancashire. In July
1952 the Tanganyikan government suspended Japanese cloth
imports for six months. Negotiations between the British
cotton industry, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast led to
further progress. In 1953 Nigeria agreed to reduce its
imports of Japanese cloth by 80 per cent, the Gold Coast
*
resolved to cut the value of its foreign cloth imports 
by one half, and Kenya and Uganda decided to give 
priority to increasing cloth imports from Britain.(65) 
These measures were welcomed in Lancashire, but the
cotton industry was outraged when they were abandoned 
under the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Trade and 
Payments of 1954, which increased the colonial 
allocation of Japanese cloth from £17.5 million per
annum to £25 million per annum.(66)
The International Cotton Textile Industry 
Conference, held at Buxton in September 1952, was
largely the result of a personal initiative by Sir 
Raymond Streat, the chairman of the Cotton Board. Streat 
believed that the world cotton textile industry was 
heading for a crisis of over-production, which would 
result in an intensification of export competition, and 
ultimately a general revival of protectionism. He 
invited the leaders of the European, Indian, Japanese, 
and United States textile industries to Britain to 
discuss ways of avoiding disaster. All parties accepted 
that world productive capacity was increasing faster 
than demand, but could not find any solution to this
416
problem. The Indian delegation attempted to promote a 
tri-partite agreement between Britain, Japan, and India, 
establishing a maximum level of exports for each 
country, but no-one else was prepared to go that far. 
Indeed the British delegation appears to have been far 
more intransigent than the Japanese, insisting on an 
export allocation of 1350 million sq. yds. per annum, 
approximately 500 million sq. yds. above actual cloth 
exports at the time. The policy of the British 
delegation was primarily directed towards proving to 
their own supporters that they intended to take a tough 
line. At the end of the Conference it was resolved that 
each industry would follow a "responsible’ marketing 
policy.(67)
After the drama and high hopes of the Buxton 
Conference, the cotton industry was soon brought down to 
earth by Peter Thorneycroft, the President of the Board 
of Trade. In October he told Cotton Board members that 
the government had no intention of introducing 
protective measures for the benefit of Lancashire: "No 
Government can in fact sustain your industry unless you 
yourselves put yourselves into the best competitive 
situation...the Government has no feather-bed to offer 
you and very little shelter in the harsh winds of 
competition which are blowing through the world 
to-day."(68) Non-interventionism was the basis of 
government policy towards Lancashire over the following 
five years. Britain could not afford to exclude imports 
from the sterling area for fear of retaliation by India,
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Pakistan, and Japan against the engineering industry.
As the decade proceeded the protectionist lobby 
became increasingly vociferous. Between 1950 and 1960 
British exports of cotton and rayon cloth declined by 63 
per cent, while imports of cotton and rayon cloth, 
primarily from India, Hong Kong and Pakistan, increased 
by 130 per cent.(69). The threat of British domestic and 
export markets being over-run by Japanese and 
Commonwealth cloth had been made manifest. Cyril Lord, 
later to achieve fame as a carpet manufacturer and 
salesman, was the unofficial champion of the extreme 
protectionists. He regularly criticized the Cotton Board 
for being too sheepish and condemned Streat for inviting 
the ’Japs' to the 1952 Conference. As the hopelessness 
of his cause became apparent, Lord resorted to 
increasingly flamboyant gestures of protest, describing 
Thorneycroft as “the hangman of Lancashire", and sending 
M.P.s gramophone records of "anguished Lancashire 
operatives declaiming against the injustice of 
low-priced imports".(70)
Other spokesmen for the industry adopted a more 
gentlemanly approach, but this too met with rebuff. When 
Cotton Board delegates met Thorneycroft in February 1954 
to complain about the new trading treaty with Japan, 
they received a lecture from the Minister on the 
industry’s failure to re-equip and the need to extend 
arrangements for shift-working.(71) As imports of cloth 
from India increased, a further joint delegation was 
despatched to visit the Prime Minister. The delegation
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called upon the government to impose tariffs on cotton 
textile imports from the Commonwealth and introduce 
quotas on all retained imports of grey cloth. Churchill 
made no significant concessions and succeeded in 
overawing the employers. Streat described the scene in 
his diary: "It was all like a charm. The angry anxious
spinners and manufacturers were not any longer angry or 
anxious."(72)
While the Cotton Board was presenting its petitions 
to Churchill and Thorneycroft, the (J.T.F.W.A. and the 
Labour Party were working towards an even more radical 
solution of the import problem. Harold Wilson had been 
commissioned by the trade unions to prepare a plan for 
the development of the cotton industry. He recommended 
the establishment of a state buying agency, which would 
be the exclusive importer of yarn and cloth. This policy 
was adopted by the Parliamentary Labour Party and the 
U.T.F.W.A. in March 1955 and became the cornerstone of 
Labour’s policy for cotton.(73) The unions hoped that 
the threat of such a scheme would be sufficient to force 
the Asian producers to accept voluntary quotas. 
Initially these proposals were ridiculed, both by the 
government and the employers, while Streat described 
Wilson’s scheme as "totalitarian"(74).
Further approaches were made to the Board of Trade 
in the spring of 1956. This time the Cotton Board 
attempted to gain wider publicity by publishing its 
submission to the President. Unfortunately the central 
thesis of the Cotton Board’s pamphlet was
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self'-defeating: it warned that even a fully modernized 
Lancashire cotton industry could never compete with the 
products of cheap Commonwealth labour. These were 
strange grounds on which to argue for the retention of a 
major cotton textile industry in Britain. The pamphlet 
went on to argue that it would be dangerous to rely on 
India and Hong Kong for textiles, since India was 
tending towards a centrally planned economy and might 
adopt a policy of retaining its cloth production for 
domestic consumption, while Hong Kong was likely to be 
invaded by China.(75) These puerile defences of the 
cotton industry were indicative of the panic-stricken 
state of Lancashire's leaders during the mid 1950s.
Although the government summarily rejected this 
initiative, the growing rebelliousness of its 
traditional supporters in the Lancashire constituencies 
between 1955 and 1958 forced Conservative leaders to 
reconsider their posture towards the cotton industry. In 
1955 Mr and Mrs Taylor, Tory members of Darwen 
Corporation, resigned from the Party to protest against 
government policy; while at the North West regional 
conference of the Conservative Party in 1956 a 
resolution calling for import controls was overwhemingly 
carried, and the government was warned that unless 
action was taken the Tories might as well “wrap up" in 
Lancashire.(76) Councillors defected to the Liberals and 
there were rumours of a new right-wing party being 
established to put the views of the cotton interest.(77) 
The Barnoldswick Conservative Club was emboldened to
420
write to the Prime Minister withdrawing their support 
from the government, until such time as its "policy is 
adjusted to meet the needs of Lancashire in such measure 
as to guarantee a brighter future for the textile 
industry.(78)
Even the spinning masters, normally staunch 
supporters of the Conservative Party, were exhibiting 
signs of increasing impatience. The F.M.C.S.A. issued a 
strong rebuke to the Government in its annual report for 
1957:
"The Federation...is a non-political 
organization...[but a] modern Government has 
the duty to protect the standard of living of 
its own people by putting some check on 
imports from countries with unduly low living 
standards... The cotton industry's case against 
the present Conservative Government is that it 
has adopted doctrinaire policies which are 
endangering the very existence of the cotton 
industry and which will lead to the 
destruction of valuable capital investments 
and to unemployment in Lancashire".(79)
In the same report the Federation declared that it
would now be necessary to take the Wilson Plan more
seriously, for although it contained many
impracticalities, it would form the basis of the next
Labour Government's policy and at least offered some
hope for the industry.(80)
Lancashire was awash with angry Conservatives whom
the government could not afford to ignore in the run up
to the 1959 general election. During 1957 the Cotton
Board had unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate
voluntary quota agreements with the leaders of the Asian
cotton industries. The Hong Kong cotton masters were
implacably opposed to the limitation of their cloth
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exports to Britain, while the Indians and Pakistanis 
were only willing to come to terms if Hong Kong 
capitulated. British Ministers had distanced themselves 
from these talks, believing that intervention would 
damage their standing in the Commonwealth. Consequently 
stalemate ensued. However, as Lancashire Tories became 
increasingly irate during the winter of 1957-8, the 
position of the British government changed. In March 
1958 Sir Frank Lee, the Permanent Secretary to the Board 
of Trade, was despatched to Hong Kong to apply pressure 
to the colony's textile producers.(81) Negotiations were 
reopened with India and Pakistan during the summer and 
agreement was reached in December 1958.
Lancashire had mixed feelings about the terms of 
the final settlement. Lord Rochdale, chairman of the 
Cotton Board, described the voluntary ceilings on cloth 
imports as "substantially higher than any of us had ever 
contemplated".(82) This was a considerable
understatement. Moreover Commonwealth cloth was still 
imported duty free, and no restriction was applied to 
imports of yarn or made-up goods. Lancashire resumed its 
campaign for protection as soon as it became clear that 
these measures would be inadequate. The continuing 
increase in imports dissuaded many firms from taking 
advantage of the re-equipment subsidies offered under 
the 1959 Cotton Industry Act. Indeed the F.M.C.S.A. 
argued that re-equipment grants would not have been 
necessary "if the Government had been prepared to take 
the responsibility for fixing a definite ceiling on
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imports .(83) During the early sixties the existing 
voluntary agreements were supplemented by a series of 
official bilateral arrangements, limiting cotton cloth 
imports from Malaya, Japan, Taiwan, Spain, China, and 
the Comecon countries. These arrangements were easily 
evaded: overseas producers could substitute exports of 
garments for cloth, or send cloth to a third country for 
re-export to Britain.(84)
In 1963 George Brown promised that Labour would set 
up an Imports Commission to supervise, and if necessary, 
regulate imports of cheap cotton textiles, but this 
commitment was soon forgotten when Labour was returned 
to power.(85) The cotton industry was no more satisfied 
with the Labour government than it had been with the 
previous Conservative administrations. A Courtaulds 
spokesman criticised the retention of tariff-free 
imports from the Commonwealth: "We have the ridiculous
state of affairs whereby the U.K. cotton industry is the 
only industry in any developed country of the world to 
have zero protection against a major supplier(86) 
Under the provisions of the G.A.T.T. Long Term 
Arrangement on cotton textiles, in 1966 the Government 
introduced a system of global quotas for all Third World 
imports of cotton yarn, cloth, and made-up goods, but 
this did little either to reduce imports or to placate 
Lancashire. Labour was attacked at the 1967 T.U.C. 
Conference by the leader of the Amalgamated Weavers for 
following a policy of 'laissez faire’ towards the 
industry.(87) As the decade drew to a close the Textile
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Council produced a report advocating the replacement of
quotas by tariff protection, but by that time there was
hardly any cotton industry left to defend.(88)
Lancashire clearly failed to persuade successive
Tory and Labour governments the cotton industry an
effective level of protection. Although this left many
industrialists and trade union leaders intensely bitter,
*
it was immensely to the credit of the Ministers, who 
showed great skill in concluding quota agreements which 
had little impact on the level of imports.
V
Between 1950 and 1965 Lancashire's leaders 
conducted a belligerent defence of their industry. 
Initially the employers attempted to hold prices at 
profitable levels by the implementation of price 
maintenance agreements. But price management schemes 
have never been an effective barrier against foreign 
competition, and it soon became clear that import 
controls would be necessary to protect those with vested 
interests in the industry. Although both sides of the 
industry collaborated in a vigorous campaign for 
protection, they were unable to elicit more than a token 
response from the government. The state was singularly 
unimpressed by proposals for import controls during a 
period of low unemployment. Price-fixing and 
protectionism were always forlorn hopes, and the fact 
that Lancashire was prepared to advance them as serious 
policies was indicative of the industry's despair.
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Chapter 10.
CONCENTRATION IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY, 1950-70.
I saved Viyella by my efforts and the textile 
industry by my example".(1)
Joe Hyman, Apr. 1966.
"It's just not possible to run a
market-orientated company from Wigan".(2)
Joe Hyman, Oct. 1966.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
the Lancashire cotton industry exhibited a highly 
atomistic industrial structure. A myriad of small firms 
were engaged in each section of the industry. The 
processes of spinning, doubling, weaving, finishing, 
converting, and merchanting were usually carried on by 
separate firms. Relatively few companies possessed 
productive capacity at more than one stage of the 
production process. Concentration levels gradually 
increased during the twentieth century, but rapid 
centralization had to await the 1960s, when the man-made 
fibre producers intervened in Lancashire to secure the 
market for their products.
This chapter examines the movement towards greater 
concentration and vertical integration in the postwar 
cotton industry. Section I considers the reasons for 
growing concentration and vertical integration in the 
economy as a whole, providing a conceptual framework for 
the rest of the chapter. Section II analyzes trends in 
concentration levels in the cotton industry before the 
late 1950s. Section III examines the merger boom of the
436
1960s, a development which was particularly pronounced 
in the textile industry.
I
Rising levels of concentration are far easier to 
describe than they are to explain. In the U.K. the share 
of the largest 100 firms in manufacturing net output 
increased from 15 per cent in 1907, to 23 per cent in
1939, and 41 per cent in 1978.(3) This section has three
objectives: firstly, to set out a theory of increasing
industrial concentration; secondly, to examine the
empirical evidence on concentration in the U.K. economy;
and thirdly, to provide a theoretical perspective for 
the analysis of vertical integration. It should always 
be borne in mind that an increase in concentration need 
not imply a reduction in the number of firms in the 
industry. The concentration level will also rise where 
the relative size of the largest companies increases 
within a constant population of firms.
Conventional static micro-economic theory has 
comparatively little to say about industrial 
concentration. As in the analysis of industrial decline, 
it is necessary to return to the early chapters of The 
Wealth of Nations for guidance.(4) Adam Smith enunciated 
the principle that specialization is a function of the 
extent of the market. The division of labour in the 
factory proceeds as sales increase. Mechanization 
becomes technically feasible once the production process 
has been split into a number of relatively simple tasks. 
There must be a further growth in the market before the
43 7
machinery is installed, as it is beneficial to spread 
large fixed capital costs over a large output. Where 
successive stages of the production process are 
mechanized, the overall size of the firm must increase. 
But the management in a relatively new industry may not 
be able to cope with a revolution in the scale of the 
firm's activities. There will be variations in the 
lowest level of output associated with minimum costs at 
each stage of the manufacturing process. Given these 
managerial constraints, firms will specialize either in 
a single process or a narrow product range.(5) As 
specialization proceeds, the technical and commercial 
skills required by managers at different stages in the 
production process will diverge. The work of Allyn Young 
and Nicholas Kaldor is consistent with the view that 
specialization will be greatest in industries enjoying 
an extensive demand.(6) One would expect an industry 
exhibiting a high degree of specialization to be 
characterised by a large number of firms, each of which, 
although possibly of a considerable absolute size, is 
small in relation to the total market.
Rising levels of concentration can be regarded as 
symptoms of decay. A reduction in the rate of increase 
in demand restrains further specialization. Firms find 
themselves unable to work to full capacity. The forces 
working for stagnation have a cumulative effect: a lower 
rate of growth in demand results in a reduction in the 
rate of advance in productivity.(7) In an expanding 
industry firms did not have to worry about getting
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enough orders, but now they are inclined to combine into 
larger groups, to reduce uncertainty, eliminate excess 
capacity, maintain prices, and secure a steadier level 
of work. In an open economy, such as the United Kingdom, 
rising levels of concentration reflect a defensive 
response to deteriorating market conditions.
Recent years have seen the publication of a number 
of important empirical studies dealing with changes in 
concentration in the British economy. Several
interpretations of rising concentration levels have been 
put forward. These are discussed in a useful survey
article by Curry and George, which concludes that 
concentration has risen fastest in industries exhibiting 
stagnant or slowly growing demand and low initial levels 
of concentration; the potential for economies of scale 
among larger firms was of secondary importance.(8)
During the mid twentieth century Lancashire's cotton 
industry was marked by falling demand, while it had 
inherited a low initial level of concentration.
S.J. Prais emphasizes financial factors and 
'spontaneous growth' in his analysis of the growth of 
large firms in Britain.(9) Since the mid 1950s financial 
institutions (i.e. insurance companies, unit trusts, 
investment companies, and pension funds) have 
dramatically increased their ownership and control of 
Manufacturing industry. These institutions have been 
anxious to avoid unnecessary risk, and therefore have 
largely eschewed involvement with small firms, unless to 
promote their amalgamation into larger and more
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diversified groups. Although Prais makes no mention of 
it, the role of banks and other financial institutions 
in increasing the centralization (i.e. concentration) of 
capital, constitutes a crucial element in the Marxian 
analysis of the growth of monopoly capitalism.(10)
However Prais maintains that 'spontaneous drift' 
was the major factor behind the increase in 
concentration in U.K. manufacturing during the twentieth 
century. Gibrat's Law introduces a stochastic element 
into the process of rising concentration. This is a
purely statistical phenomenon with no basis in formal 
economic theory, although it may help to elucidate the 
process of rising concentration. Consider an industry in 
which there are no mergers, and all firms are of the 
same initial size. In any given year, x per cent of 
firms (chosen at random) grow by r per cent, y per cent 
of firms (chosen at random) decline in size by s per
cent, while z per cent of firms (chosen at random) 
remain constant in size. Over a number of years it will 
be discovered that a few lucky firms avoid periods of 
contraction, and increase their share of the industry's 
output - hence concentration increases as a result of 
'spontaneous drift'.(11)
Hannah and Kay argue that the version of
'spontaneous drift' employed by Prais exaggerates the
Gibrat effect: "A more plausibly constrained model of
the Gibrat process indicates that...it cannot by itself 
account for more than a fifth of the concentration 
increase which has actually occured".(12) By judiciously
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varying r, s, x, y, and z, it is possible to manipulate 
the model to give a wide variety of outcomes. In place 
of the Gibrat effect, Hannah and Kay advance the more 
conventional view that mergers were the primary cause of 
increasing concentration in the CJ.K. economy. Indeed for 
the period from 1957 to 1969, which is particularly 
relevant to our study of the cotton industry, this 
interpretation is difficult to challenge. Even 
Aaronovitch and Sawyer, whose conclusions are more
cautious than those of Hannah and Kay, estimate that
mergers accounted for 54 per cent of the growth in 
concentration of the top 100 firms between 1958 and 
1967.(13)
Mergers in the British manufacturing sector reached 
a peak in the late 1960s. Several hypotheses have been
advanced to explain the merger movement. Mergers could
be regarded as aggressive acts, designed to increase
firms' power to exploit the consumer and achieve
supernormal profits. But the evidence does not appear to 
bear out this interpretation. Authors such as Singh and 
Meeks, who have conducted detailed studies of merging 
firms, have concluded that amalgamation typically 
resulted in a decline in profitability.(14) This could
be due to managers pursuing a growth maximizing rather 
than a profit maximizing policy (the salaries and 
prestige of managers are mainly functions of size), or 
to the failure of management to develop new structures 
to cope with running a much larger firm. It could also 
reflect the possibility that mergers may constitute a
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defensive reaction to a deteriorating market environment 
rather than an attempt to increase firms'" stranglehold 
over an expanding market. Hart , Utton, and Walshe 
suggest that, in contracting sectors, such as the flax 
industry, mergers have taken place for primarily 
defensive purposes: to reduce cut-throat competition and 
secure the elimination of surplus capacity.(15) Of 
course the managerial and defensive explanations of 
merger are not mutually exclusive; indeed the 
Courtaulds" experience provides a degree of support for 
both.(16)
Although the evidence is by no means unambiguous, 
it is possible to come to some tentative conclusions 
about the causes of rising concentration in mid 
twentieth century Britain. Mergers appear to have 
contributed more than internal growth to increasing 
concentration. As mergers did not lead to improvements 
in profitability, it is reasonable to assume that many 
were of a defensive nature. This interpretation is 
consistent with the theoretical discussion earlier in 
this section.
Rising concentration levels have been accompanied 
by increasing vertical integration. This trend was 
particularly pronounced in cotton during the 1960s, when 
the man-made fibre producers secured the formation of a 
number of large multi-process textile groups. Vertical 
integration has received less attention than industrial 
concentration from economists and historians. 
Nevertheless economic theory can shed some light on the
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likely advantages of uniting several stages of the 
production process under the control of a single firm.
R.H. Coase introduced the analysis of transaction 
costs to the literature during the 1930s.(17) Firms 
specializing at a particular stage in the production 
process incur costs when they trade with firms at other 
stages in the chain of production. It may be costly to 
obtain accurate information about the state of markets. 
Contracts may be expensive to negotiate and enforce, and 
could be rendered inappropriate by unexpected changes in 
prices. Moreover, one of the parties to the arrangement 
may use superior information to conclude a deal which is 
unfair. Firms will choose vertical integration if 
transaction costs exceed the costs of organizing 
successive processes within a single firm. Oliver 
Williamson has extended the Coasian analysis to suggest 
that transaction costs are likely to be greater in 
oligopolistic markets, which are characterised by high 
levels of uncertainty, and therefore offer more 
opportunities for foul play and bad decision making. (18)
Coasian theory implies that rational employers will 
combine and divide their operations in accordance with 
fluctuations in the ratio of transaction costs to the 
costs of internal organization. But Lazonick argues that 
such behaviour would be undesirable. Successful firms 
must follow consistent policies and not react to every 
transitory change in transaction costs.(19) A further 
criticism of this type of theory is that it presents a 
static model, and says little about the causes or
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direction of long-term trends in the ratio of 
transaction costs to the costs of internal organization. 
G.J. Stigler has provided an interpretation of the 
dynamics of vertical integration which has many 
parallels with our previous analysis of industrial 
concentration. There will be a steady increase in the 
extent of specialization by process in expanding 
industries, but “when the industry begins to 
decline...subsidiary, auxiliary, and complementary 
industries begin also to decline, and eventually the 
surviving firms must begin to reappropriate functions 
which are no longer carried on at a sufficient rate to 
support independent firms".(20) Similarly, as demand 
slackens in a declining industry, uncertainty and 
ungentlemanly behaviour will increase in the markets for 
intermediate products, impelling firms to adopt a 
strategy of vertical integration in the hope that this 
will reduce risk.
The foregoing analysis suggests the forces working 
for vertical integration and increasing industrial 
concentration have much in common. Indeed both of these 
phenomena are symptoms of industrial decline. Horizontal 
and vertical mergers are stimulated by a reduction in 
demand. They are defensive responses to the increasing 
uncertainty and rising transaction costs which prevail 
in an industry with chronic excess capacity. In fact the 
links may be even closer. Horizontal amalgamations at 
each stage of the production process will make 
intermediate product markets increasingly oligopolistic
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and risky; this in turn will act as an incentive for 
firms to proceed with mergers along vertical lines. 
Having established a framework for the analysis of 
industrial concentration, we can proceed to the 
consideration of concentration in the cotton industry 
itself.
II
Until the man-made fibre producers became involved 
in the promotion of mergers and take-overs during the 
1960s, the Lancashire cotton industry was characterised 
by a plethora of small firms. This section traces the 
emergence of the cotton industry’s distinctively 
atomistic structure in the nineteenth century and 
analyzes the forces responsible for the gradual increase 
in concentration levels during the twentieth century.
Taken as a whole, the nineteenth century was a 
period of increasing specialization in the British 
cotton industry. The capacity of the average spinning
firm in Lancashire increased from 8161 spindles in 1811 
to 11,818 spindles in 1850 and 38,618 spindles in 1890. 
Although this rate of increase is superficially
suggestive of rising concentration, it is instructive to 
note that in 1890 the average cotton spinning company
employed a mere 155 workers.(21) In fact there was 
probably a reduction in concentration in spinning during 
the nineteenth century: total spindleage increased from 
7.0 million in 1819-20 to 44.5 million in 1890, a faster 
rate of growth than that in the spindleage of the
average firm.(22)
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The growth in the size of the average firm was 
slower during the period from 1811 to 1850 than in the 
following period. Gatrell indicates that between 1925 
and 1850 firm size was limited by managerial 
constraints.(23) After 1850 the development of the joint 
stock company, and in particular the famous ’Oldham 
Limiteds’, reduced these managerial and financial 
limitations on the growth of the firm. (24) A further 
distinction can be made between the pre-1850 and 
post-1850 eras: the vertical integration of spinning and 
weaving increased until mid-century and thereafter 
declined. Between 1819 and 1850 over 75 per cent of the 
increase in the industry’s spinning and weaving capacity 
can be attributed to vertically integrated firms. But 
this trend was soon reversed and the number of combined 
firms fell from 698 in 1860 to 597 in 1878. C.H. Lee 
argues that spinning firms invested in powerlooms as a 
defensive reaction to declining rates of profit. In 
years of good trade firms built extensions to their 
mills in anticipation of further increases in demand. 
They intended to await the achievement of full-capacity 
working in their old buildings before equipping the 
extensions with mules. However, when trade slackened, 
the existence of empty buildings led to a substantial 
increase in average fixed costs. Firms would then 
install powerlooms (which were relatively cheap) in the 
extensions, permitting fixed costs to be spread over a 
larger output.(25) Changes in the popularity of vertical 
integration seemed to follow changes in the demand for
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yarn. Total yarn sales grew at 3.0 per cent per annum 
between 1827 and 1849, compared with 5.6 per cent per 
annum between 1850 and 1874.(26) The significant 
improvement in demand conditions after 1850 could have 
reduced the proportion of years in which there were 
surplus buildings in the spinning section, thereby 
removing the need for spinners to install powerlooms. 
Indeed one would expect an increase in the rate of 
growth of demand to result in greater specialization and 
vertical disintegration.
In the later nineteenth century the rate of growth 
of demand for Lancashire's products commenced its 
secular and ultimately irreversible decline. U.K. 
imports of raw cotton increased by 132 per cent in 
volume between 1859-61 and 1879-81, while between
1879-81 and 1899-1901 raw cotton imports rose by 109 per 
cent.(27) Although this was a period of relative rather 
than absolute decline, it was marked by a very
significant departure, namely the emergence of several
large spinning and finishing combines. In 1898 over 60 
spinning companies united to form the Fine Cotton 
Spinners and Doublers Association Ltd. The next year 32 
English and 14 Scottish companies, comprising 85 per
cent of the British calico printing industry, united in 
the Calico Printers Association (C.P.A.). Both 
amalgamations followed periods in which firms had been 
scrambling for a share of dwindling markets. Initially 
the Fine Spinners and C.P.A. were remarkably loose 
organizations, in which the constituent firms retained a
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substantial degree of independence. In essence they were 
more like highly formalised cartels than typical modern 
corporations. However, after 1900 power within the 
C.P.A. became increasingly centralized and 20 surplus 
printing works were closed before World War One.(28)
Immediately following World War One the cotton 
industry was the subject of a brief period of wild 
financial speculation. The Amalgamated Cotton Mills
Trust, one of the largest weaving companies, arrived on 
the scene in 1919; another important weaving concern, 
Joshua Hoyle and Sons, came to prominence at this time 
through the acquisition of six smaller firms; while the 
medium-sized spinning combine of Crosses and Heatons was 
formed in 1920.(29)
Falling demand and chronic excess capacity resulted 
in increased risk and severe financial pressure for
firms in the interwar cotton industry.(30) Under these 
conditions one would expect to observe activity directed 
towards securing greater horizontal and vertical 
integration. Such behaviour would be of an explicitly 
defensive nature, having as its objective the reduction 
of uncertainty. Records of the interwar decades contain 
some prominent examples of defensively inspired mergers, 
but, as shall be seen, the large firm remained the
exception rather than the rule throughout this period.
In the late 1920s amalgamations led to the 
formation of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation (L.C.C.) 
in the coarse spinning section, and the Combined
Egyptian Mills (C.E.M.) in the fine spinning section.
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The L.C.C. came into being after pressure from the 
Bankers Industrial Development Corporation, a creature 
of the Bank of England and ultimately of the government. 
Most of the 96 firms (10 million spindles) constituting 
the L.C.C. owed large sums to the banks and were forced 
into the amalgamation against their will.(31) C.E.M. was 
a smaller combine (15 firms) resulting from a private
initiative, although this could well have been inspired
by the events in the coarse spinning section.(32) These 
combines pursued programmes of scrapping surplus
capacity. Like the C.P.A. in the late 1890s, they were 
primarily defensive organizations aiming at the 
management of uncertainty by eradicating competition 
between constituent firms. Only one major amalgamation 
took place in the weaving section between 1920 and 1939: 
in 1929 the highly specialized Quilt Manufacturers Ltd 
was formed, but this was a much smaller concern than any 
of the large spinning combines.
In fact it is essential to avoid exaggerating the 
effect of well-publicised spinning and weaving
amalgamations on the structure of the cotton industry. 
Leak and Maizels have shown that in 1935 there were 33 
trades in which the largest three firms employed at 
least 70 per cent of the total workforce. But the three 
major cotton spinning and doubling firms in 1935 
employed only 22 per cent of the spinning workforce, 
while the three largest cotton weaving firms employed a 
mere 4 per cent of the total labour force in that
section.(33)
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The 1930s generated an increasing volume of talk 
about structural change in cotton, but this did not lead 
to a substantial degree of action. In 1930 the Economic 
Advisory Council's report on cotton advocated the 
development of larger firms, and stronger vertical 
links, especially between the merchanting section and 
the spinners and weavers.(34) Hundreds of small 
merchants with limited financial resources were 
competing for the few orders that were available. 
Hundreds of spinning and weaving firms were helplessly 
waiting for the merchants to pass on inadequate scraps 
of business to them. The creation of larger merchanting 
firms and the development of vertical links between the 
producing and marketing sections of the industry would 
reduce uncertainty about orders and enable longer 
production runs.(35) But very little advance was made 
towards the vertical integration of spinning and 
weaving, let alone between marketing and the rest of the 
industry. Although most of the larger spinning combines, 
such as the L.C.C., inherited a few looms from their 
constituent companies, they made no attempt to extend 
this side of their business. Leak and Maizels suggested 
that the most important vertical links in the cotton 
industry before World War Two involved spinning or 
weaving firms possessing finishing capacity and
vice-versa.(36)
It must be concluded that the twenties and thirties 
exhibited less merger activity than might have been 
expected in a period of declining demand. Several
factors could have contributed to this outcome. The 
sheer extent of the disaster facing the industry may 
simply have created a mood of inertia and resignation. 
Or it may have been that Lancashire's individualistic 
employers were unusually reluctant to abandon family 
businesses to large combines. Lazonick argues that the 
chaotic nature of the merchanting system dissuaded 
spinning and weaving firms from amalgamating. In a sense 
this explanation still begs the question. If the control 
of marketing was crucial, as indeed it was, why couldn't 
large combines take over or by-pass the existing 
merchanting section? Lazonick also claims that 
Lancashire failed to assimilate the modern management 
techniques which were necessary to control large 
enterprises.(37) No doubt there is a certain amount of 
truth in these hypotheses. But it would be extremely 
difficult to decide which, if any, of these factors 
predominated.
During the 1940s governments accepted the view that 
the centralization of power in the hands of half or 
dozen or so large firms was one of the preconditions for 
the revitalization of the cotton industry.(38) Sir 
Stafford Cripps's scheme in 1948 for subsidising 
re-equipment in the spinning section stipulated that 
firms hoping to receive a grant must amalgamate into 
groups of at least 250,000 spindles.(39) This measure 
was a complete failure, partly, but not solely, because 
of firms' reluctance to fulfil the condition that they 
should combine. Robson somewhat cynically concluded that
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certain directors who had substantial interests in a 
number of spinning firms were induced to effect an 
amalgamation, although this may not have meant any 
change in control...In fact, almost all of the eight 
groups formed represented previously existing linkages 
strengthened to qualify for the subsidy".(40)
Ministers were disappointed that their exhortations 
had no appreciable effect on the structure of the 
industry. Between 1935 and 1951 the proportion of the
cotton spinning labour force employed by the three
largest combines increased from 22 per cent to 24 per
cent, while the proportion of the weaving workforce 
engaged in the mills of the three largest manufacturers 
rose from 4 per cent to 6 per cent.(41) Concentration 
levels throughout British industry largely stagnated or 
declined between the thirties and the late 1940s. Leslie 
Hannah offers two possible explanations for this
interlude. Firms may have been preoccupied with the 
development of management structures capable of the 
efficient control of the large businesses formed in the 
1920s. Alternatively, the absence of highly competitive 
conditions during the 1940s may have induced companies 
to delay reorganization.(42)
The 1950s was a decade of renewed contraction in 
the Lancashire cotton industry.(43) Table 10.1 shows 
that this was a period of growing concentration in 
cotton, particularly in the spinning section, where the 
five largest firms' share of total spindleage increased 
from 33.8 per cent in 1939 to 40 per cent in 1958. Given
452
Table 10.1
U.K. cotton industry: size of firm, 1939-58.
(i) SPINNING 
firm size 1939




% of total 
spindleage firms
% of total 
spindleage
< 20 23 0.7 12 0.7
20-40 38 2.6 21 2.2
40-80 78 11.5 41 8.9
80-200 110 33.2 46 18. 9
200-1000 26 18.2 25 29.3
>1000 5 33.8 5 40.0





% of total 
loomage firms
% of total 
loomage
<200 438 7.6 320 10. 1
200-400 194 11.2 120 12.6
400-800 253 29.2 127 25.9.
800-2000 153 35. 4 65 26.6 '
>2000 25 16.6 22 24.8
TOTAL 1063 100.0 654 100. 0
m.e. - mule equivalent
Source: J. Worrall, The Lancashire Textile___Industry
(Oldham: J. Worrall, 1962), p. 158.
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Table 10.2.
Spindles and looms in vertically integrated 
(spinning-weaving) firms as a percentage of total spinning 
and weaving capacity, 1939-56.






N.B. These estimates must be treated with caution, 
m.e. - mule equivalent.
Sources: R. Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain
(London: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 122, 344; C.B.Q.S. R._
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the rapidity of the industry's decline, it might seem 
that this rate of transformation in the industry's 
structure was relatively sedate. Moreover it must be 
borne in mind that some of the increase in concentration 
may have been accounted for by the elimination of small 
firms.(44) On the other hand it would appear that 
changes were beginning to take place. Singh estimated 
that 26 per cent of the cotton textile companies quoted 
on the stock exchange in 1948 had disappeared as a 
result of merger or acquisition by 1960. The equivalent 
figure for deaths through merger or acquisition over a 
wide range of British industries between 1948 and 1960 
was 20 per cent.(45)
A further indication that the industry was on the 
brink of a major increase in concentration levels can be 
observed in the figures on vertical integration in Table 
10.2. Between 1939 and 1956 the proportion of spindles 
controlled by spinner-weavers increased from 15 per cent 
to 22 per cent of U.K. spindleage, while the proportion 
of looms controlled by spinner-weavers increased from 23 
per cent to 40 per cent of U.K. loomage. This was also a 
period of growing links between the weaving and 
merchanting (i.e. converting) sections. The proportion 
of looms owned by firms engaged in converting increased 
from 44 per cent to 63 per cent between 1939 and 
1956.(46) Some firms, such as the William Birtwistle 
Group, extended their involvement up to the retail 
stage.(47) Although weaver-converters operated on a very
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small scale, at least they gave the producing sections a 
slightly greater control over the marketing and 
finishing of their output. In an uncertain market 
environment the advantages of vertical integration 
should have been substantial. Fluctuations in final 
demand were magnified at each intervening stage between 
the merchant and the spinner. Hence an increase in 
vertical integration would result in a steadier level of 
orders, particularly in those for yarn.(48)
In the early 1960s Mr. Allan Ormerod of Ashton 
Brothers cast doubt on the viability of the form of 
vertical integration prevailing during the postwar 
years. He claimed that small vertically integrated firms 
were unstable. For instance, it was difficult for them 
to secure a balance between the output of their spinning 
and weaving capacity. Such firms might merge and divide 
several times over a period of a few years.(49) For 
successful vertical integration it was deemed necessary 
to have a firm large enough to combine long runs of 
production in spinning with variety in weaving. In 1952 
it was estimated that in New England a vertically 
integrated operation should have a minimum of 60,000 
spindles and 1300 looms, a very large firm by Lancashire 
standards.(50) Consequently the further progress of 
vertical integration would have to await the formation 
of more large firms in the spinning and weaving 
sections.
Several broad trends in the structure of the cotton 
industry between its inception and the late 1950s have
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been examined in this section. Cotton was still a highly 
atomistic industry in the 1950s, but change was 
beginning to gather pace. The evidence is difficult to 
come by, and therefore its interpretation must be 
impressionistic, but it would appear that changes in the 
levels of concentration and vertical integration in the 
cotton industry depended upon changes in the long-term 
state of demand. When demand was buoyant there was 
little incentive for firms to combine. But concentration 
tended to increase during periods when demand was 
relatively slack: notably the late nineteenth century, 
the interwar depression, and the 1950s.
Ill
Lancashire’s cotton industry was effectively 
annexed by the man-made fibres industry during the 
1960s. Although it was easy to differentiate between 
cotton and the remainder of the U.K. textile industry in 
1960, this distinction was no longer important by 1970. 
the intervening years were marked by a dramatic increase 
in acquisitions and merger activity.
Changes in five-firm concentration ratios in 
different sections of cotton textile production between 
1958 and 1968 are shown in Table 10.3. In the spinning 
section the share of the five largest firms (in terms of 
sales) rose from 31.9 per cent to 50.3 per cent over 
this period. The five-firm concentration ratio in 
weaving increased even more rapidly, from 11.6 per cent 
to 31.2 per cent. Table 10.4 indicates that textiles 
experienced the fastest growth in concentration of any
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Table 10.3.
Five firm concentration ratios in cotton and allied
textiles, 1959-68.
Five largest firms' 
share of total 
sales (%)
1958 1963 * 1968
Man-made fibres n. a. 99. 9 100.0
Finished thread for sewing, etc. n. a. 81.8 87. 9
Single cotton or m.m.f spun yarn 31.9 37.2 50.3
Doubled cotton or m.m.f. spun yarn 34.9 41.7 47. 1
Woven cotton cloth 11.6 19. 3 31. 2
Woven m.m.f. cloth 21. 1 35.8 51.9
Source: F. Fishwick and R.B. Cornu, A Study of the Evolution 
of Concentration in the United Kingdom Textile Industry 
(Luxemburg: Commission of the European Communities, 1975),
table 17, p. 30.
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Table 10.4.
Concentration in industry groups: shares of five largest 





























45.7 59.5 132 +
29.8 25.3 -
47.2 68.0 57
62. 1 74.2 73
50.4 71.0 125 +
44.2 65. 1 128+
63.8 78.4 50
53. 1 51. 1 -
47. 5 63.2 112 +
British Steel Corporation and* excluding the nationalized 
its constituents.
+ A figure above 100% implies that concentration would 
have declined but for merger activity.
Source: L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy
(London: Methuen, second edition, 1983), table 10.1, p.
144.
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U.K. manufacturing group, other than the drink industry, 
between 1957 and 1969. If no mergers had taken place in 
textiles the concentration ratio would have fallen, for 
most firms were experiencing negative internal growth. 
Therefore merger activity was entirely responsible for 
the increase in concentration during this period. In 
fact mergers and acquisitions in the textile industry 
reached a peak in the mid 1960s. Between 1955 and 1968 
textiles ranked second among British manufacturing 
industries in terms of assets acquired through merger, 
and third in terms of expenditure on acquisitions. More 
quoted firms were acquired in textiles than in any other 
industry between 1955 and 1968.(51) At a time of rising 
concentration throughout British industry, Lancashire 
was in the forefront of change.
Given the industry's measured reluctance to form 
large groupings during earlier periods, the reasons for 
this major switch of direction require careful 
consideration. No doubt the rate of increase in
concentration in textiles can in part be accounted for
by the industry's low base, but it is also necessary to
look for other causes.
Before proceeding to analyze the role of the
man-made fibre producers in the events of the 1960s, it 
is worthwhile disposing of the argument that the 
increase in concentration in textiles was primarily a 
response to the enforcement of restrictive practices 
legislation. During the Yarn Spinners hearing in 1958 
the spinners had told the Restrictive Practices Court
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that their price maintenance scheme was essential to the
survival of small firms, and that without it the
industry would soon be controlled a few monopolistically
inclined combines.(52) Events following the abolition of
the Yarn Spinners Agreement failed to vindicate the
spinners' dire warnings. A survey in 1959-60 revealed
that 87.5 per cent believed that the cessation of
*
price-fixing schemes had had no effect on prices, while 
the remainder thought that prices were higher than they 
would have been under the agreements.(53) Hence there is 
little evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
Restrictive Practices Court forced small firms into 
submission to the large combines. Work by O' Brien et al 
has reaffirmed the view that the Restrictive Practices 
Act had no significant impact on the rate of increase in 
concentration.(54)
Had the Lancashire cotton industry been left to its 
own devices it is doubtful whether there would have been 
a merger movement on such a dramatic scale during the 
1960s. Many firms would have been content to do nothing, 
passively awaiting the inevitable collapse of their 
markets. The initiative for re-organization came from 
interests outside Lancashire, notably from the man-made 
fibre producers. As shall be seen, this activity was 
largely, although not entirely, of a defensive nature.
Arguments in favour of mergers were not solely 
couched in terms of the economies of large-scale 
production. C.F. Pratten estimated that the minimum 
efficient scale for a modern integrated textile factory
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was 60,000 spindles and 1000 looms in the 1960s, 
equivalent to less than two per cent of the industry's 
output.(55) Although this was considerably larger than 
the average size of firm in 1963, roughly 0.3 per cent 
of total output (56), it still left room for a few dozen 
firms of optimum size. It was felt that the 
establishment of large textile groups could lead to more 
significant savings through the introduction of new 
management, the co-ordination of different processes, 
the elimination of surplus capacity, and the creation of 
a countervailing force to the power of the large 
retailers. Small producers had long complained about 
their weakness relative to the major retailers. The 
retail chains allegedly accentuated the inventory cycle 
by holding comparatively small stocks themselves, and by 
using the U.K. textile industry as a marginal source of 
supply, primarily to supplement imports during periods 
of high consumer demand. In 1966 retailers with ten or 
more shops accounted for 25 per cent of the sales of 
household textiles and soft furnishings, 46 per cent of 
sales of mens' and boys' wear, and 40 per cent of those 
of womens', girls', and infants' wear.(57) Large textile 
producers would, at least in theory, have increased 
bargining power relative to these chains.
Courtaulds' involvement in the reorganization of 
the Lancashire textile industry was crucial. During the 
1950s Courtaulds failed either to develop synthetic 
fibres or successfully to diversify into the production 
of non—textile goods. Consequently it continued to rely
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upon sales of cellulosic fibres, for which the market 
was becoming increasingly precarious. In particular 30 
per cent of Courtaulds' U.K. sales of viscose staple 
rayon was processed in the Lancashire spinning industry, 
and the company feared that this vital market could be 
lost as a result of the erosion of the cotton industry 
by overseas competition. In 1955 the Courtaulds board 
appointed a committee to look at the future of the 
Lancashire weaving section. This committee suggested 
that Courtaulds should bolster Lancashire's position by 
supplying it with yarn and fibre at marginal cost, and 
by increasing the vertical links between man-made fibre 
production and spinning and weaving. But at the time 
these recommendations were shelved.(58)
However, as the condition of the cotton industry 
proceeded to deteriorate during the late 1950s, 
Courtaulds decided that there was no alternative to 
intervention. During 1959-60 Courtaulds held talks with 
English Sewing Cotton and Carrington and Dewhurst about 
the possible rationalization of the weaving sector. In 
1961 a Courtaulds director, D.R.B. Myors told the Cotton 
Board Conference that Lancashire would have to reduce 
its reliance on cotton and increase its involvement in 
man-made fibres if it intended to survive. He advocated 
the emergence of a structure dominated by large textile 
groups, which would facilitate the elimination of 
surplus capacity, the injection of fresh management, and 
the stabilization of prices.(59)
After I.C.I.'s abortive take-over bid for
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Courtaulds in 1962, Courtaulds' new chairman Frank 
Kearton unveiled the plan for the famous Northern
Project. This initiative was warmly encouraged by the 
Board of Trade, which believed that the man-made fibre 
producers were the ideal agents to effect structural 
change and rationalization in Lancashire.(60) Kearton's 
plan was that five of the leading cotton spanning
combines - English Sewing Cotton, Tootals, Fine Spinners 
and Doublers, L.C.C., and Combined English Mills -
should either merge with or be acquired by Courtaulds. 
It was estimated that this would cost Courtaulds
approximately £50 million. All five firms agreed to
consider Courtaulds" proposals, and the scheme was
lauded in grandiloquent terms by one Courtaulds 
director: "It is a concept of genius, worthy of
England's best days, that the brains of the new fibres
should assume the responsibility of putting fresh life
into the traditional textiles... if the rescue i'j not 
made now the leading cotton companies will soon become
candidates for the knacker's yard."(61)
I.C.I., also a major supplier of man-made fibres to 
Lancashire, regarded the Northern Project as a threat to 
its own interests in the cotton industry. It was 
conceivable that Courtaulds would use the Northern 
Project to deny I.C.I. a market for its products in 
Lancashire. Consequently I.C.I., which remained a major 
Courtaulds shareholder despite the failure of its 
take-over bid, insisted on a 45 per cent interest in the 
Northern Project. Although Courtaulds acceded to this
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demand, the Northern Project collapsed in April 1963 
after the man-made fibre producers had failed to come to 
satisfactory terms with one of the cotton combines.(62) 
Thereafter events moved at an astonishing pace. 
Courtaulds, I.C.I., and several smaller groups, became 
locked in a dramatic struggle for control of the 
Lancashire textile industry. In summer 1963 English 
Sewing Cotton obtained financial backing from Courtaulds 
and I.C.I. to enable the speedy take-over of Tootals. In 
return the man-made fibre producers obtained minority 
stakes in the new combine, which controlled eight per 
cent of U.K. spindleage by 1968.(63) This was a dramatic 
move in itself, but few realised what was in store for 
Lancashire over the following eighteen months. In the 
words of a leading trade paper: "That the industry's 
"blue chips" would be absorbed, leaving virtually no 
independent spinning combine of any size, would never 
have been forecast at that time".(64)
Courtaulds" campaign started in decisive fashion in 
December 1963 with the purchase of James Nelson, a 
highly respected rayon weaving firm based in Nelson. 
Between August and September 1964 Courtaulds secured 
outright control of several large spinning combines, 
L.C.C., Fine Spinners and Doublers, and Hayeshaws. These 
acquisitions were prompted by fears that other bidders 
were about to pounce and deprive Courtaulds of three of 
its most important customers. As a result of this 
activity, Courtaulds was able to gain possession of 30 
per cent of the Lancashire spinning industry by
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1968.(65)
A slightly different, but no less wide-ranging, 
policy was adopted by I.C.I. Instead of directly 
acquiring its victims, I.C.I. chose to act through 
intermediaries, notably Viyella International and 
Carrington and Dewhurst. Joe Hyman, the ambitious 
chairman of the relatively small Viyella group, which 
had its origins in the textile industries of East Anglia 
and the East Midlands, persuaded I.C.I. that he was the 
man to revitalize the ailing Lancashire cotton industry. 
I.C.I. took a 20 per cent stake in Viyella and provided 
Hyman with the funds to pursue his ambitious scheme. 
Between late 1963 and September 1964 Viyella's major 
acquisitions comprised the cotton textile groups of 
Ferguson Brothers, Clegg and Orr, Bradford Dyers', 
Combined English Mills, Birtwistle and Leigh, and the 
shirt manufacturers British Van Heusen. By 1968 Hyman 
controlled nine per cent of the industry's
spindleage.(66) I.C.I. also fostered the growth of the 
medium-sized filament rayon weaving firm of Carrington
and Dewhurst. Using financial backing from I.C.I. (and
to a lesser extent from Courtaulds) Carrington and 
Dewhurst rose to a position of dominance in its section 
during the mid 1960s.(67)
Consequently, by 1966 Lancashire's cotton industry 
appeared to be under the control of the four majors. 
Courtaulds, Viyella International, English Sewing
Cotton, and Carrington and Dewhurst. But was this merger 
activity really Q- sign of vitality? Obviously
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entrepreneurs such as Hyman were trying to forge new 
empires, but what of Courtaulds and I.C.I.? The evidence 
suggests that the man-made fibre producers were 
reluctant to expand their holdings in Lancashire and 
only did so out of fear that their markets were about to 
collapse or be usurped. In the words of Courtaulds 
director Arthur Knight: "The post-1962 development of
Courtaulds...can thus be seen as a bid to survive as an 
independent business in a situation in which the 
alternatives had, one by one, been eliminated. A move 
forward into textiles was the only course which was seen 
still to be open".(68)
One of the distinguishing features of the merger 
movement in textiles during the 1960s was the emergence 
of strong vertical linkages in all the main groups. 
Table 10.4 indicated that the share in net output of the 
five largest textile concerns increased from 44.2 per 
cent to 65.1 per cent between 1957 and 1969. The merger 
movement was clearly not confined to amalgamations among 
firms within a particular section. In fact the impetus 
for change originated in the need for the man-made fibre 
producers to extend their activities into spinning and 
weaving.
Although Courtaulds' most visible acquisitions were 
large spinning combines such as L.C.C. and Fine Spinners 
and Doublers, they also obtained possession of a number 
of knitwear and hosiery manufacturers, textile 
wholesalers, finishers, printers, weavers, and garment 
manufacturers. Forward integration into knitting and
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weaving was necessitated by Courtaulds’ desire to build 
up a secure facility for promoting a range of products 
using its new acrylic fibre ’Courtelle’. The purchase of 
wholesaling capacity enabled Courtaulds to gain greater 
control over the distribution of its products.(69) By 
1968, in addition to its 30 per cent share in the output 
of the spinning section, Courtaulds accounted for 12 per 
cent of the output of the cotton and man-made fibre 
weaving section. Courtaulds also produced 9 per cent of 
the output of the finishing section, 7 per cent of that 
of the merchanting section, and contributed 35 per cent 
of O.K. warp-knitting production, and 15 per cent of 
O.K. weft-knitting production.(70)
Increasing levels of vertical integration also 
marked the progress of the other textile groups. Viyella 
possessed substantial capacity in the hosiery and
knitwear industries before its venture into the
traditional cotton industry. Carrington and Dewhurst 
acquired firms in the merchant-converting, dyeing, 
finishing, making-up, and knitting sections. When
English Sewing Cotton made its successful bid for 
Tootals, it acquired a group engaged in spinning,
weaving, knitting, and the production of menswear and 
household furnishing. In the ensuing period E.S.C.
diversified into household textiles, dress fabrics, fine 
worsteds, industrial fabrics, and knitted childrens
wear. Finding its profits declining during the 1960s, 
the Calico Printers Association established itself in 
manufacturing and retailing, while the spinning
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and weaving group Vantona extended its operations into 
the production of bedding and bedspreads.(71)
Hyman was quite self-conscious about his 
intentions: "We are trying to establish the greater part 
of our business along vertically integrated lines".(72) 
The development of such a group was central to Viyella's 
strategy of growth maximisation. But others were less 
clear about their aims and drifted into vertical 
integration. Knight sums up Courtaulds' position: "At no 
stage was the objective of... being a fully-fledged 
vertical group explicitly enunciated, and an account in 
retrospect of the development makes it all seem much 
more logical than it appeared whilst it was going 
on".(73) In most cases the large textile and man-made 
fibre producers were impelled to acquire facilities in a 
variety of sections by the need to secure a reliable 
market for their products. Vertical integration, except 
for Viyella, was primarily a defensive response in an 
increasingly uncertain market environment.
Amalgamation was followed by attempts at 
reorganization. In Sept. 1964 Courtaulds appointed one 
of their own men, Mr. G.A. Samuel, to the chair of the 
new Northern Textile Division (N.T.D.). At this time the 
N.T.D. comprised 75 mills, approximately 50 of which 
were cotton spinning units. The N.T.D. was split into 
three subdivisions. Each group was expected to be 
profitable in its own right. Mr. W.T. Winterbottom, 
formerly chairman of Fine Spinners and Doublers, was 
given responsibility for the cotton spinning mills,
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while the former L.C.C. chairman Colonel Whitehead was 
put in charge of the woollen and worsted section. A 
third sub-group was established to oversee weaving and 
converting operations.(74) The much vaunted promises
about the injection of new blood came to nothing. 
Courtaulds lacked expertise in running cotton and 
woollen plants, and was forced to rely on the old hands
a»
whose predecessors had been so viciously pilloried by 
Keynes in the 1940s.(75)
Despite these inauspicious beginnings Courtaulds 
pursued a vigorous policy of rationalization and 
re-equipment. Between 1962 and 1969 it invested £57 
million in buildings and machinery for its northern 
textile business.(76) Plans were hatched for the
scrapping of 19 cotton spinning mills. Some areas 
suffered more than others. For instance, in Aug. 1965 
the N.T.D. announced the closure of the Gt. Lever 
Spinning Mill, near Bolton, and the Wilton Mill,
Radcliffe, together with further redundancies at two 
other Bolton Mills. Around 1000 workers would lose their 
jobs or be transferred to modernized mills in other 
districts.(77) Courtaulds also acquired a number of
weaving mills during the mid 1960s, but most were 
ancient constructions which were quite unsuitable for 
renovation. Consequently a major investment programme 
was instituted to build brand new weaving mills, 
equipped with shuttleless looms, at Carlisle, Lillyhall, 
and Skelmersdale. As a result of these varied efforts 
Courtaulds was able to increase output per operative in
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its cotton spinning mills by 19 per cent per week 
between 1964 and May 1966.(78)
At Viyella International Hyman adopted a policy of 
allowing newly-acquired companies a considerable amount 
operational leeway. But this approach did not always 
work. In the case of Viyella's largest take-over victim, 
Combined English Mills (C.E.M.), Hyman initially 
underestimated the extent of the firm's problems. C.E.M. 
already had a rationalization plan, but seemed incapable 
of closing mills at a satisfactory speed. Moreover 
C.E.M.'s managers, most of whom had been retained by 
Viyella, produced an unrealistically optimistic 
evaluation of future market conditions. In the strictly 
impartial words of Viyella International magazine: "Mr.
Hyman refused to let the situation deteriorate further. 
He treated the crisis as it truly was, and took pains to 
ensure that others also recognised the facts".(79) Hyman 
introduced some new managers, while existing staff were 
retrained. C.E.M.'s product range was rationalized to 
enable the group to concentrate on large orders. After 
reorganization 20 per cent of C.E.M.'s output was 
supplied to other firms in the Viyella empire. 
Loss-making activities such as worsted spinning and 
heating and electrical work were discontinued. C.E.M.'s 
technical department was closed and research was carried 
out at Viyella's Pleasley plant near Mansfield. Seven of 
C.E.M.'s 14 mills were closed between 1964 and 1968, and 
those remaining open were modernized. Considerable 
consternation resulted from the closure of Sir John
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Holden's Mill at Astley Bridge, Bolton. This factory had 
been built in 1926 and was electrically drven 
throughout. But C.E.M. claimed that the introduction of 
shift—working in the group had reduced the optimum size 
of unit: Holden's mill was just too large.(80)
Spindleage at C.E.M. fell from 404,000 to 221,000 
between 1964 and 1968, employment declined from 3983 to 
2318, and yarn produced per operative per annum 
increased by 50 per cent.(81)
Consequently there can be little doubt that genuine 
efforts were made by the large textile producers to 
revitalise the Lancashire cotton section. But hard work 
did not guarantee success and the industry remained 
uncompetitive. On the positive side of the balance 
sheet, the Northern Textile Division enabled Courtaulds 
to maintain its U.K. deliveries of viscose staple fibre 
at 80-85,000 tons per annum between 1962 and 1971.(82) 
On the other hand there was no improvement in 
Courtaulds' profitability. In 1964-5 the Economist 
estimated that Courtaulds made a rate of return of 19 
per cent on its turnover in fibres, compared with a rate 
of return of four per cent on its sales of textiles. Of 
course, these figures can take no account of any 
transfer-pricinng which may or may not have been 
conducted. The Economist thought that Courtaulds should 
have diversified into new fibres instead of becoming 
embroiled in Lancashire's problems: "Helping textiles to
jyggqth always tends to mean that Courtaulds gets the 
worst companies in the worst sectors, even if it gets
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them cheaply .(83) Perhaps it would be better to examine 
Courtaulds' figures over a longer period. Even so, it 
would appear that Courtaulds' net profits before tax on 
all activities declined from 14.6 per cent of sales in 
1964 to 6.7 per cent of sales in 1972.(84) Courtaulds 
had also hoped that the formation of a large vertically 
integrated multi-fibre group would enable them to put 
pressure on the government to increase import 
restrictions on cotton textiles. Once more, they were to 
be disappointed.(85)
The other groups also ran into serious 
difficulties. By 1967 Viyella's astonishing growth rate 
was beginning to slow down: "Buying up companies with 
under-employed assets, and boosting profits by 
ruthlessly wielding the surgeon's knife, had been 
comparatively easy. In future, growth had to come mostly 
from within - and that took time, especially against a 
background of cut-throat competition".(86) Hyman freed 
himself from dependence on I.C.I. and planned to merge 
Viyella with English Sewing Cotton in 1967. He even had
a scheme for purchasing the Liberal Party! Both of these
ventures fell through. Although the Liberal Party's 
reaction is unascertainable, English Sewing Cotton 
responded by effecting a defensive merger with the 
ailing Calico Printers Association, forming the English 
Calico group. When poor trade led to a reduction in 
profits in Viyella's strongest department, man-made
fibres, Hyman's position became untenable and he was 
deposed in 1969. I.C.I.'s remaining client in the
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textile industry, Carrington and Dewhurst (C&D), also 
found itself on the brink of disaster at this time. 
Slack demand at home and growing German competition in 
the European market coincided with an ambitious 
programme of capital spending. C&D's finances simply 
could not take the strain. Fearing the collapse of C&D, 
I.C.I. proposed to acquire Viyella International and 
merge it with C&D. The Board of Trade, which had 
recently stepped in to prevent the take-over of English 
Calico by Courtaulds, warned I.C.I. not to proceed. 
Eventually a compromise was reached to permit Viyella 
and C&D to merge. I.C.I.'s share in the new group 
Carrington Viyella was limited to 35 per cent.(87)
Increasing concentration and vertical integration 
did not save the Lancashire cotton industry, and neither 
did they lead to the enjoyment of monopoly profits. As 
Hannah and Kay so aptly remarked: "Anyone who believes 
that the British textile industry is in danger of 
successful monopolisation cannot see beyond the Straits 
of Dover".(88)
IV
Lancashire's merger mania during the 1960s failed 
to halt the decline of the traditional cotton textile 
industry. Although substantial improvements could be 
made as a result of horizontal and vertical integration, 
particularly in relation to the co ordination of 
production processes and the management of uncertainty, 
these savings were insufficient to offset the forces 
working for the industry's contraction. Instead of
4 7 4
regarding increasing conentration as a forward-looking 
attempt to solve the problem of decline, it is better to 
think of it as a symptom of decline. Contracting markets 
resulted in a reduction in productivity growth in 
Lancashire relative to the growth of productivity 
overseas.(89) Contraction and an increase in 
concentration levels ensued.
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Chapter 11.
THE END OF THE LINE.
"And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider 
the lilies of the field, how they grow; they 
toil not, neither do they spin".
Matthew, Ch. 6, v. 28.
Britain's bread no longer hangs by Lancashire's 
thread. Little remains of the old Lancashire cotton 
industry, other than a collection of industrial museums: 
Helrashore, Quarry Bank, and the Manchester Science 
Museum. The foregoing chapters have provided an 
analytical account of the last years of the industry, 
from the false dawn of the 1940s to the merger movement 
of the 1960s. In this final chapter I intend to come to 
some conclusions about the causes of Lancashire's 
decline, and also to speculate on the relevance of 
cotton to an understanding of the wider problems of the 
British economy. Obviously, much of the following text 
draws upon the earlier discussion of these questions in 
Chapter 1.
It is not difficult to identify the factors
responsible for the British cotton industry's demise.
The fortunes of Lancashire were not dissimilar to those
of textile industries which had attained pre-eminence in
previous centuries. As Phelps Brown remarked:
"The textile industries of Venice, Milan and 
Genoa, flourishing in 1600, were near 
extinction a hundred years later. The cause 
was the loss of foreign markets - through war 
in Germany and economic decline in Spain, the 
raising of tariffs in France and England, but 
above all the competition of the French, the 
English, and the Dutch manufacturers".(1)
484
In the nineteenth century Lancashire dominated the 
world market for cotton textiles, largely as a result of 
the good fortune of Britain's early industrialization. 
But Lancashire possessed no unique advantages as a 
cotton textile producer. It was inevitable that 
production facilities would be established overseas as 
other countries industrialized. Consequently, *by the 
late nineteenth century, Lancashire was only one of 
several major cotton textile producing regions in the 
world. Growing overseas competition resulted in a slower 
rate of growth in demand for the products of British 
mills. Relative stagnation reduced the scope for further 
division of labour and learning-by-doing. Increased 
uncertainty about the future depressed the will to 
innovate and to invest. Productivity growth in 
Lancashire began to lag behind productivity growth in 
other countries and this brought about further losses of 
markets.
In the twentieth century an increasing number of 
cotton mills were established in the less developed 
world. Low wages permitted Japan and India to undercut 
the price of cloth from Europe and North America. To 
some extent high wage levels in the West could be offset 
by the installation of labour-saving machinery. British 
firms, overwhelmed with doubt and uncertainty, failed to 
respond to this challenge. In 1967 the costs of 
producing yarn and cloth in the average British mill 
were still considerably above costs in less developed 
countries.(2) Even extremely modern mills were only
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marginally competitive. It required great courage to 
invest huge sums for long periods in ‘ expensive new 
mills, when there was every chance that further cost 
reductions in less developed countries would soon render 
them unprofitable. Comparative advantage was changing: 
although Western countries could still just about 
compete with less developed countries in cotton textile 
production, it was only at inordinate risk. Moreover, by 
persevering with cotton textiles, developed countries 
denied factors of production to industries in which they 
enjoyed a clear comparative cost advantage.
It should by now be apparent that the Lancashire 
cotton industry was not worth saving. The grandiose 
schemes put forward between the 1930s and 1950s for the 
protection and re-equipment of the industry, largely by 
the trade unions and the Labour Party, would have led to 
a further misallocation of resources.(3) In particular, 
the capital goods industry would have wasted precious 
Capacity in building looms and spinning machinery for an 
industry that would have been better off without them. 
After the 1940s, when Lancashire enjoyed a brief 
renaissance as one of the corner-stones of the export 
drive, cotton had no conceivable role to play in the 
British economy.
During the mid 1950s the cotton textile industry 
provided work for approximately 200,000 operatives. 
Other industries were complaining about the chronic 
shortage of labour, yet the cotton industry claimed that 
it needed even more.(4) Sadly, Lancashire spent most of
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"the 1950s and 1960s hoarding labour which was sorely 
needed elsewhere. Indeed the British economy would have 
benefitted from a speedier rather than a more prolonged 
period of contraction in the cotton industry.
A policy of subsidising imports would have made 
more sense than one of import restrictions. The 
governments of Churchill, Eden, and Macmillan did not go 
far enough in their neglect of the industry. Naturally 
individual directors, trade union officials, and 
managers were unable to assess the situation from such a 
detached perspective. They had vested interests in the 
preservation of the cotton industry. For example, many 
directors of small private firms chose to employ 
themselves as mill managers. They were content to endure 
low dividends provided their firms could still afford to 
pay their salaries. (5) On the other hand, larger
concerns were extremely reluctant either to invest
abroad or to diversify into other industries such as
engineering or electrical goods.(6) I have found no
examples of major diversification programmes among 
cotton textile firms during the postwar period. This 
phenomenon could be explained by several factors. To a 
certain extent management skills were specialized, and 
therefore of little use in other industries. Firms 
possessed imperfect knowledge of the opportunities for 
diversification and were reluctant to face the ensuing 
risk and upheaval. Consequently directors and managers 
were determined that their firms should survive as 
cotton textile producers for as long as possible,
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irrespective of the opportunity cost which this imposed 
on the economy as a whole.
In any mature economy structural change is 
inhibited by uncertainty and vested interests. Perhaps 
it will be instructive to illustrate this with a 
parable. Imagine a series of tram-lines each of which 
represents the lifespan of a particular industry. Tram 
cars travel along each line, carrying managers and 
directors and trade union leaders. But all is not well. 
Some of the tram-lines lead over the edge of a cliff. 
The people in the tram cars suspect that this might be 
the case, but they cannot be certain, because a thick 
fog envelops the scene. It is difficult for the 
passengers to see either to the front, or to the left, 
or to the right. They are fond of their tram cars, and 
know that if they leave them to search for other trams 
on other lines, they risk losing their way and tumbling 
into a crater. If they do manage to find another tram 
there is a reasonable chance that it too will be heading 
for disaster. Consequently many passengers will be 
tempted to stay in familiar surroundings and hope that 
after all their faithful old trams will pull through.
Is there no way of distinguishing between the safe 
lines and the dangerous lines? Perhaps there are 
speculators and bankers travelling above the scene in 
helicopters, but even their searchlights cannot always 
penetrate the fog. It is almost inevitable that 
frightened passengers will ask the government for 
assistance. Civil servants will be sent to the tram
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depot to draw up a map of the transport system. However,
despite their best efforts, the civil servants may omit
to include distant or little used tramlines on the map.
Moreover continuing subsidence on the tracks may render
the map out of date.
The parable of the tramways should not be taken too
far - the point I want to emphasise is that there is no
*
straightforward solution to the problem of Britain's 
economic backwardness. Neither a free market nor a 
planning authority can guarantee an optimal allocation 
of factors of production between industries. Economics 
will never be an exact science so long as there is 
uncertainty.
I have digressed in this final chapter. Perhaps I
ought briefly to return to the cotton industry. I do not
think I have eulogised the past, although I admit that
this failing may have determined my initial selection of
cotton as an area for research. But I cannot resist
closing with a quotation from the work of Mr. B. Bowker,
who in 1928 clearly saw what lay in store for
Lancashire. It is best to let him speak for himself:
"By some Wellsian magic I was transported into 
the House of Commons of a future whose date I 
had no means of fixing. I sat in a great 
throng in the Strangers' Gallery. Westminster 
twilight was falling. The President of the 
Board of Trade was winding up a crucial debate 
on the Lancashire cotton industry. Just before 
he made an end my eyes wandered to the 
Speaker's chair. I started. Ghostlily [sic] I 
seemed to see behind it the greatest of the 
old timers who had brought the cotton industry 
to its hour of unparalleled fortune. Silent 
the spectral figure stood, intent on the 
debate. Awhile I gazed as under a spell. The 
voice of the President of the Board of Trade 
broke through to me again. 'We must give to
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the remnant of the Lancashire industry, whose 
plight my right honourable friend, the Member 
for Oldham, has pictured with so much emotion, 
the fullest measure of protection His 
Majesty's Government can devise.. . . ' . I caught 
no more. Unseen by the assembled House the 
ghost of the great old pioneer, no longer able 
to restrain its fast-rising passion, was 
turning to depart. As it made ready to go its 
eerie way, I seemed to catch the words that 
fell between heartbreak and anger from its 
lips: 'The men are spent. The machine is 
broken. The glory is forever departed".(7)
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A fter being one of the mainstays of the Victorian economy, the British cotton industry rapidly slipped into decline during the 1920s and 
1930s. Cotton cloth production dwindled from 8,453 million square yards in 
1912 to 3,806 million square yards in 1937.2 Exports of cotton piece goods 
fell even more dramatically, from 7,429 million square yards in 1913 to 2,124 
million in 1937.3 Unemployment among cotton operatives was endemic, and 
between 1912 and 1937 employment in cotton spinning, doubling and weaving 
declined from 621,500 to 359,700.4 Productivity was low and new investment 
miniscule. The number of looms installed fell from 786,000 in 1912 to 485,000 
in 1938.5 A similar reduction in capacity occurred in the spinning section, 
where total spindleage dropped from 56-3 million in 1913 to 38-6 million in 
1937.6 The only bright spot in this dismal catalogue of decline was the 
development of man-made fibre production. Rayon cloth was woven in the 
same sheds, on the same looms, as cotton. With the development of rayon 
staple fibre in the 1930s, it also became possible to spin rayon yarn on ordinary 
mules and ring frames.7 Participation in this trade, for which demand was 
relatively buoyant, helped many of Lancashire’s cotton mills to survive 
through these difficult years. All this is fairly well known. The objective of 
the present paper is to bring the story more up to date, by looking at what 
happened to the industry in the 1950s and 1960s.
Section I will examine the industry’s hopes and fears for the future during 
the 1940s, when Lancashire was temporarily shielded from the pressures of 
overseas competition. In section II the main trends in output, employment, 
average labour productivity, exports, and imports in the cotton industry
1 The author is grateful for the comments of V. N. Balasubramanyam, John Channon, John King, Mary 
Rose, Jim Taylor, and Oliver Westall on earlier drafts of this paper. Needless to say they are not responsible 
for any errors of fact or interpretation contained herein.
2 R. Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain  (1957), p. 343. Throughout this paper Robson’s convention 
of converting linear yards into square yards, by adding 5%, is followed.
3 Ibid. p. 333.
4 Board of Trade, Working P arty Reports: Cotton (1946), p. 52.
5 Amalgamated Textile Workers’ Union, Eighth Annual Report (Rochdale, 1982), p. 39.
6 L. A. Sandberg, Lancashire in Decline: A  Study in Entrepreneurship, Technology and International Trade 
(Columbus, Ohio, 1974), p. 123.
7 However, the earlier rayon continuous filament yarn continued to predominate. This could not be 
spun on cotton-spinning equipment and was supplied direct to the weavers by the man-made fibre 
producers. For an account of the inter-war rayon industry, see J. Harrop, ‘The Growth of the Rayon 
Industry in the Inter-war Years’, Yorkshire Bulletin o f Economic and Social Research, 20 (1969), pp. 71- 
84; D. C. Coleman, Courtaulds: A n Economic and Social History (Oxford, 1969), II, pp. 314-74.
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during the fifties and sixties will be outlined. The performance of British 
cloth in selected major export markets will be analyzed in more detail, and 
British cloth imports will be broken down according to their countries of 
origin. This examination of imports and exports is based on data collected 
from the statistical reports of the Cotton Board. Section III uses an accounting 
procedure drawn from the economics of trade and development to estimate 
the relative contribution of trends in exports, imports, domestic demand, and 
average labour productivity to changes in the level of employment in the 
industry. The results suggest that the relative impact of these factors on 
employment varied significantly over the period in question. Between 1950 
and 1955 declining exports made the largest contribution to the fall in 
the employment of cotton operatives. Rising imports were the major factor 
accounting for declining employment between 1955 and i960, while falling 
domestic demand for cloth and yarn was the predominant influence during 
the 1960s. It should be stressed at the outset that these results are subject to 
a considerable margin of error, due to the nature of the technique used. The 
“accounting procedure” is a static technique which is unable to identify any 
dynamic linkages or interdependencies between the factors analyzed. These 
limitations will be discussed in more detail in Section III. The reaction in 
Lancashire to this inexorable decline is described in the final section, which 
also points to the need for further investigation into the underlying causes of 
the cotton industry’s demise. The present paper cannot give a definitive 
solution to this wider problem, but it can set the context within which such 
research could profitably proceed.
I
World War II and the succeeding period of reconstruction gave Lancashire
a brief respite from the process of decline. As long ago as 1926 Keynes had 
identified the growth of Japanese competition and the emergence of indigenous
cotton industries in Lancashire’s third world markets as the immediate causes 
of cotton’s plight.8 These special difficulties were amplified by weak domestic
and overseas demand during the interwar depression.
The outbreak of war soon turned a situation of labour surplus in the mill 
towns into one of acute shortage, as operatives joined the armed forces or went 
into highly-paid munitions work. Demand for cloth was boosted by military 
requirements for canvas, denim and balloon cloth9, but production was held 
back by difficulties in obtaining raw cotton as a result of the shipping shortage.
In 1941 these shortages of labour and raw materials forced the government to 
concentrate the industry by shutting down about 40 per cent of its factories.10 
Production planning was introduced in 1942, under which prices were control­
led and profits virtually guaranteed.11 Compensation was paid to firms closed 
under the concentration scheme. Although cotton and rayon cloth production
8 J. M. Keynes, ‘The Position of the Lancashire Cotton Trade’, in D . E. Moggridge, ed. The Collected 
Writings o f  John M aynard Keynes, XIX, pt. II, Activities, 1922-9: The Return to Gold and Industrial Policy 
(1981), p. 591.
9 R. W. Lacey, ‘Cotton’s War Effort’, Manchester School, XV (1947), p. 39 -
10 Ibid. pp. 38, 56.
11 Ibid. pp. 45-8.
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fell from 3,806 million square yards in 1937 to 1,928 million in 1944,12 firms 
were able to earn satisfactory profits. In spinning the average annual profit 
per firm in 1942-$ was about £8,000, compared with the £4,000 average annual 
loss in 1927-34.13 Lancashire did not do too badly out of the war.
As the war progressed the government, together with the cotton industry’s 
leaders, began to turn their attention towards planning for Lancashire’s future 
prosperity. Allied bombing was crippling the textile industries of Europe and 
Japan. It was fairly clear that British cotton textiles would have a free run of 
the world’s export markets in the immediate postwar years while competing 
nations would be busy rebuilding their mills. This was seen as an excellent 
opportunity to set Lancashire’s industry on a sound economic and financial 
footing. A new spirit of determination pervaded the industry in place of the 
defeatism of the thirties. The Cotton Board Committee to Enquire into Post 
War Problems, meeting in 1943-4, predicted that international demand for 
cotton textiles would steadily increase as world development resumed its 
course. Given “a substantial measure of re-equipment” 14 and improvements 
in the deployment of the workforce, the market should be sufficient to support 
a British cotton industry with the same spindleage as in 1939. However, the 
Report stressed that success was dependent upon the government’s ensuring 
that Lancashire’s export markets were not flooded with cheap foreign (i.e. 
Japanese) cloth. This would necessitate a tightening of the Imperial Preference 
system. “It is clear” , said the Committee, “ that if the very low labour cost 
countries are going to enjoy equal terms of access to markets . . . only a 
limited export trade in specialities will remain to the British cotton industry 
after the world shortage is overcome.” 15
Despite the industry’s good intentions,16 very little was accomplished 
between 1945 and the recovery of Lancashire’s competitors in the early fifties. 
U .K . cotton and rayon cloth production rose from 2,034 million square yards 
in 194417 to 2,123 million in 1950,18 but this was still short of the 3,806 
million square yards produced in 1937. Similarly, although cotton and rayon 
cloth exports improved from 568 million square yards in 194519 to 1,020 
million in 1950,20 the 1937 total of 2,124 million was not approached. This 
inability to regain prewar levels of production and exports was due in part to 
the neglect of machine maintenance during the war, but primarily to the 
continuing shortfall of labour. In January 1946 the Board of Trade Working 
Party estimated that a further 255,000 operatives were needed before cotton 
could work to full capacity.21 Soldiers and munitions workers were reluctant 
to return to the mills, for they remembered the low wages and high unemploy­
ment in cotton during the thirties. Parents, for similar reasons, attempted to
12 Robson, The Cotton Industry in B ritain, p. 343.
13 Ibid. p. 338.
14 Cotton Board, Report o f  the Committee to Enquire into P ostw ar Problems (Manchester, 1944), p- 9 -
15 Ibid. p. 24.
16 Board of Trade, W orking P arty  Reports: Cotton, pp. 157-213.
17 Lacey, ‘Cotton’s War Effort’, p. 64.
18 See Table 3 below.
19 B. Vitkovitch, ‘The U .K . Cotton Industry, 1937-54\  Journal o f  Industrial Economics, III (1955), p. 
244.
20 See Table 3 below.
21 Board of Trade, Working P arty  Reports: Cotton, p. 54.
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dissuade their children from entering such an insecure trade. As a result 
employment in the industry increased by only 63,000 between 1945 and 
1950.22
With production constrained in this manner, the high levels of domestic 
and overseas demand ensured exceptional profit margins for Lancashire. 
Between 1946 and 195° the average annual profit of spinning companies rose 
from £8,243 to £35,166.23 If the industry had used these profits to finance 
large-scale investment in new machinery, it would have been far better 
equipped to face the renewed competition in 1950. Yet this is what Lancashire 
manifestly failed to do. To take spinning as an example, an annual average 
of 300,000 new ring spindles were installed between 194$ and 1951.24 Al­
though this was six times faster than the rate of installation in the period from 
193$ to 1938, it amounted to a comparatively slow process, for in 1946 Britain 
possessed a total of 38 million mule-equivalent spindles.25 Several factors 
hampered investment. It took some time for the textile machinery producers 
to reconvert their factories from armaments production to their peacetime 
role. In consequence new looms and spindles were both scarce and expensive. 
Furthermore, to help relieve the dollar crisis, the Labour government put 
stringent controls on the importation of textile machinery and diverted a large 
proportion of British production abroad.26
Throughout this period the industry’s leaders were constantly looking over 
their shoulders at the reviving textile industries of Japan. The Federation of 
Master Cotton Spinners’ Associations feared that the Allies, who were opposed 
to the reconstruction of Japanese heavy industry, would have no option but 
to assist the recovery of Japan’s textile firms.27 It would appear that the 
Federation guessed the Allies’ policy correctly. In late 1948 the Allied 
authorities in Japan and five Commonwealth nations, including the U .K ., 
signed a trade agreement to exchange essential raw materials for over £16 
million worth of Japanese cotton textiles.28 The stated aim of this agreement 
was to assist the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy. To compound 
matters, Lancashire’s inability to produce enough cloth to satisfy her overseas 
customers during this period led to quantities of Japanese cloth being shipped 
to the U.K. for dyeing, bleaching and printing in British finishing works, 
ready for re-export to the colonies.29 The Japanese were thereby able to gain 
a bridgehead in the markets of British West Africa. Even when finished in 
Britain, Japanese cloth was normally cheaper than wholly British cloth, and 
during the fifties Japan was able to exploit its advantage in these markets to 
great effect.
22 Board of Trade, Working Party Reports: Cotton, p. 52; Cotton Board Trade Letter: Statistical Supplement, 
25 (Manchester, 1952), p. 3. These figures include the doubling section.
23 Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 338.
24 Ibid. p. 341.
25 Cotton Board Trade Letter: Statistical Supplement, 25, p. 3. There were two types of spindle in use at 
this time. Ring spindles tended to have approximately 1 5  times the capacity of mule spindles. The term 
mule-equivalent spindles takes this difference into account to provide an aggregate measure of spinning 
capacity.
26 The Times, 17 Sept. 1947, p. 2, col. 1.
27 Federation of Master Cotton Spinners’ Associations Ltd. Annual Report, 1947 (Manchester, 1948), 
p. 18.
28 Board o f  Trade Journal, 155 (1948), P- 942-
29 Board o f  Trade Journal, 153 ( i 947)> P- 1164-
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By early 1949 Lancashire was becoming seriously worried about what lay 
ahead. Japan had regained full control over its textile industries from the 
Allies, and was suspected of deliberately holding down domestic cloth con­
sumption to free more for export. Bearing these developments in mind, the 
Operative Spinners’ Amalgamation warned that although a return to the pre- 
1939 state of affairs would be “intolerable . . . the signs and portents at 
present indicate that such a situation is not impossible” .30
II
Such fears were well-founded, for after 1950 the long decline of the British 
cotton industry resumed its course. Yarn production (inclusive of man-made 
staple fibre yarn) dropped from 944 million pounds in 1950 to 439 million in 
1970. O utput of cotton and man-made fibre cloth fell from 2,971 to 1,276 
million square yards over the same period. Employment declined apace, from 
244,000 operatives (excluding doubling) in 1950 to 76,000 in 1970.31
As may be imagined, declining output and employment were accompanied 
by a deteriorating balance of trade in cotton textiles. 1959 was the first year 
since the industry’s foundation in which cloth imports exceeded exports. Once 
this gap had been opened it continued to widen throughout the succeeding 
years. British cotton and man-made fibre cloth exports fell from 1,020 to 255 
million square yards between 1950 and 1970. Since exports of rayon, nylon 
and mixture cloth declined by only 80 million square yards, it is apparent 
that cotton cloth exports plummeted by 685 million over this period. These 
figures are reflected in the rapid decline in Britain’s share of global cotton 
cloth exports, from 15 per cent in 1950 to under 3 per cent by 1968.
Table 1. The Share of U.K. Cloth Exports in World Trade 
(Cotton and Allied Textiles)
Total world cotton U .K . share o f  world Total world man- U .K . share o f  world
cloth exports cotton cloth exports made fibre and mixture man-made fibre and
cloth exports mixture cloth exports
M  y d 2 % M  y d 2 %
1937 6,500 29-6 800 10-0
1950 5,500 156 900 21-9
1955 4,700 11 -8 1,700 7-9
i960 6,030 5-3 2,234 2-4
1965 5,588 3-7 2,893 3-3
1968 5,559 2-8 3,555 2-2
Sources: Cotton B oard Quarterly Statistical R ev iew , R. Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain  (1957), p. 
359-
In contrast to the interwar years, Britain’s declining exports after 1950 
cannot be blamed on a falling world total of cloth exports, for over the 1950s 
and 1960s world exports showed no overall tendency to decline. As in the 
thirties, the only encouraging trend was in the man-made sector, where after 
declining during the fifties and early sixties piece goods exports began to
30 Amalgamation of Operative Cotton Spinners and Twiners, Report o f  the Executive Council for the 
quarter ending 31 J a n . 1949 (Manchester, 1949), p. 6.
31 To avoid excessive complication the secondary sections of doubling and waste spinning are excluded 
from consideration in the remainder of this paper.
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mixture mixture
ya m  exports ya m  imports
M  lb M  lb M  lb ’000s lb M  lb
84 3 14 107 8,820 714
80 5 32 n o 8,820 742
45 3 7 87 7,850 551
52 5 3 97 8,750 631
52 4 11 100 8,840 666
47 4 14 9 i 8,450 578
47 5 17 86 8,550 535
48 5 15 86 8,840 550
35 6 15 78 8,660 479
3 i 3 21 71 9,190 445
30 4 39 64 10,060 450
23 3 44 62 9,340 411
22 5 33 54 9,390 352
21 5 37 49 10,440 350
21 6 43 48 11,510 356
15 6 32 45 11,780 336
17 7 36 41 12,010 294
17 6 46 36 11,930 297
18 10 47 34 13,130 303
19 15 48 33 13,460 293
18 18 49 33 13,470 264
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Sources: Annual Abstract o f  Statistics (1955-71); Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical R eview .
regain ground. During the fifties imports of cotton cloth rapidly increased 
from 287 million square yards in 1950 to 728 million in i960, while the level 
of man-made fibre and mixture cloth imports was fairly stable, only rising 
from 55 million square yards to $8 million. These trends were reversed in the 
sixties, when it was imports of man-made fibre and mixture cloth that forged 
ahead to 164 million square yards by 1970. Imports of cotton cloth actually 
declined, from a peak of 731 million yards in 1961 to 467 million in 1970. 
This turning of the tide of cotton cloth imports coincided with the imposition 
of a more comprehensive system of quotas by the British government, which 
will be described later. It is interesting to note that between i960 and 1970 
the deficit on Britain’s trade in man-made and mixtures cloth increased by a 
comparatively small amount, from four million square yards to 47 million. 
Britain was almost holding its own in the man-made sector. Exports of yarn 
spun from man-made staple fibre dramatically increased from 3 million 
pounds in 1950 to 18 million pounds in 1970. Moreover, despite the rapid 
increase in world output of man-made staple and continuous filament fibres 
during these years, Britain’s share of global production did not decline at all 
rapidly, falling from 10*3 per cent in 1950, to 8-1 per cent in i960, and to 7-2 
per cent in 1970.32 British involvement in the initial establishment of man- 
made fibre producing and processing capacity overseas had been substantial.
32 In 1950 U .K . production of all man-made fibres was 173,400 metric tons out of a world figure of 
1,676,000 metric tons. By i960 U.K. output was 268,560 metric tons, compared with a world production 
of 3,305,000 metric tons. In 1970 U.K. output was 559,400 metric tons out of a global total of 8,340,000 
metric tons United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 10 (1958), pp. 199-201; 18 (1967), pp. 263-7; 24 (1973), 
pp. 256-60.
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Table 3. The U.K. Weaving Industry (Cotton and Allied Textiles), igso-70
Cotton cloth M an-m ade Cotton cloth M an-m ade Cotton cloth M an-m ade W eaving Cloth
output fibre &  
mixture 
cloth output








employment output per 
worker
M  y d 2 M y d 2 M y d 2 M y d 2 M  y d 2 M y d 2 ’000s y d 2
1950 2,229 742 823 197 287 55 137 21,670
1951 2,312 797 864 218 376 99 140 22,150
1952 L 775 631 711 152 180 29 118 20,330
1953 1,957 807 710 177 99 44 124 22,260
1954 2,094 820 637 175 267 67 127 22,930
1955 1,870 733 555 134 300 65 118 22,070
1956 1,693 737 474 121 306 74 108 22,430
1957 1,710 692 458 112 416 74 104 23,210
1958 1,500 631 384 84 387 47 93 22,990
1959 1,404 620 343 64 537 39 85 23,850
i960 1,359 648 321 54 728 58 81 24,700
1961 1,296 638 282 49 7 3 i 70 80 24,250
1962 1,099 594 232 55 575 67 75 22,610
1963 1,065 588 223 80 636 64 68 24,300
1964 1,086 641 210 9 i 766 93 67 25,930
1965 1,066 656 205 95 588 88 65 26,590
1966 961 647 171 65 587 93 61 26,500
1967 782 556 144 7 i 659 125 5 i 26,230
1968 767 583 156 78 707 147 47 28,450
1969 759 618 142 IOI 545 155 46 29,780
1970 720 556 138 i l l 467 164 43 29,670
Sources: A nnual Abstract o f  Statistics (1955-71); Cotton B oard Quarterly Statistical R eview .
Until the 1930s Courtaulds dominated the world rayon scene and had large 
subsidiaries in Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland and the U .S.A .33 It also 
had strong links with firms in India, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Poland, the 
U .S.S.R ., Japan, and Holland. However, the pre-eminence of British capital 
was no longer in evidence after 1945; it was the American firm, Du Pont, that 
led the way in the development of the world nylon industry.34
Discussion of Lancashire’s trading difficulties is illuminated by an examina­
tion of particular markets and suppliers. In 1950 the three largest markets for 
British cotton cloth were the two main West African colonies of the Gold 
Coast and Nigeria, taking 121 million square yards; South Africa (117 million 
square yards); and Australia (105 million square yards). British cotton cloth 
exports to these three areas fell by 430 million square yards over the following 
20 years. Thus these markets alone accounted for 63 per cent of the total 
decline in British cotton cloth exports between 1950 and 1969-70 (Table 4 
shows that these losses were not offset by increased exports of man-made fibre 
cloth). Ultimately Lancashire lost these vital markets because it was unable 
to produce cloth cheaply enough. For instance, in January 1962 British drill 
3110 cloth could be obtained on the domestic market at 23d. per yard. Drill 
3110 imported from Hong Kong could be had for i8*75d., that from India at 
i8-25d., and that from China at i6-75d.35 These prices apply to cloth sold in
33 R. Robson, The M an-made Fibres Industry (1958), pp. 51-4.
34 W. J. Reader, Im perial Chemicals Industries, II, The First Quarter Century, 1926-1952 (1975), pp. 369- 
79 -
35 Cotton Board, The Implications for the U .K . Cotton Industry o f  Britain’s Entry into the E .E .C . 
(Manchester, 1962), p. 30.
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Table 4. Major Export Markets for U.K. Cloth, 1937-70
B r i t i s h  W e s t  A f r ic a :  Nigeria and the Gold Coast
(i) Imports of cotton cloth (M yd2)
99
1937 1938 I 9SO 1955 i960 1965 1969
From U.K . 163 66 121 89 61 17 2
Total 231 100 234 319 314 313 247
(ii) Imports of man-made fibre and mixture cloth (M yd2)
1938 1950 1955 /960 1965 1969
From U.K. 2 17 6 1 1 2
Total 9 30 152 140 38 7
South Africa
(i) Imports of cotton cloth (M yd2)
1938 1950 19SS i9 6 0 1965 1970
From U.K. 152 117 75 57 27 11
Total 191 195 197 234 113 52
(ii) Imports of man-made fibre and mixture cloth (M yd2)
1938 1950 1955 i960 1965 1970
From U.K. 9 44  20 14 6 3
Total 27 136 172 138 113 IOI
Australia
(i) Imports of cotton cloth (M yd2)
1938 1950 195s i960 1965 1970
From U .K . 138 105 100 36 13 10
Total 209 197 272 355 317 358
(ii) Imports of man-made fibre and mixture cloth (M yd2)
1938 1950 1955 i960 1965 1970
From U.K . 20 51 20 5 1 1
Total 76 71 47 25 45 67
Source: Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical Review .
the British market where transport costs for domestically produced cloth were 
relatively low. In export markets British cloth was handicapped by much 
higher transport charges, making its price even less competitive. In west 
Africa the colonial and successor governments further undermined the British 
position, by refusing to take part in the system of Imperial Preference. As a 
result, Japanese and European cloth could enter these markets at the same 
rate of duty as British cloth, hastening their loss.36 Even in Australia, where 
Imperial Preference was in operation, the preferential duties did not favour 
British cloth alone, but also that from other commonwealth countries includ­
ing India and Hong Kong. In addition, G .A .T.T. and other trade agreements 
gradually eroded the margin between full and preferential tariffs. Adjustments 
to the preferential margins usually failed to keep pace with inflation, reducing 
their effectiveness still further.37 The net result was that British cotton cloth 
exports to Australia fell from 10$ million square yards to 10 million over the 
period 1950-70, while Japan increased its cotton cloth exports to Australia 
from 8 million square yards to 102 million. British exports to South Africa 
were increasingly hampered by protectionism and state subsidies to local 
firms. In the early 1960s one Lancashire company, Cyril Lord (later to
36 Economist Intelligence Unit, The Commonwealth and Europe (i960), p. 17.
37 D. MacDougall and R. Hutt, ‘Imperial Preference: A Quantitative Analysis’, Economic Journal, 
LXIV ( 1954), PP- 233 -57 -
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manufacture carpets), responded to this situation by closing two of its British 
mills and setting up production at East London in the Cape.38
Table 5. U.K. Cloth Imports, 1938-69
(i) Imports of cotton cloth 
1938 1950 7955
(M yd2) 
i9 6 0 1965 1969
Hong Kong - 5 51 123 123 97
India 1 76 137 231 157 119
Japan 19 91 64 52 28 10
Pakistan - - - 40 43 76
People’s Rep. of 
China _ _ 5 25 35 48
Others 32 115 43 257 203 195
Total 52 287 300 728 589 545
N ote: Figures include imports for re-export after finishing.
(ii) Imports of man-made fibre and mixture cloth (M yd2)
1938 *95° m s i9 6 0 196s 7969
Austria - 5 13 1 3 22
Germany (West) 6 4 6 10 11 10
Hong Kong - - - - - 13
Italy 3 22 15 11 16 15
Portugal 2 - - - 3 14
Switzerland 2 4 - - 2 14
U.S.A . - 1 - 15 14 13
Others 11 19 31 21 40 54
Total 24 55 65 58 89 155
Note: Figures include imports for re-export after finishing.
Source: Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical R eview .
India, Hong Kong and Pakistan were the main suppliers of cotton cloth to 
Britain between 1950 and 1970.39 The alarm caused in Lancashire by the 
rapid advance of these imports led to the conclusion of voluntary quota 
agreements in 1959. However, these were not very restrictive; Hong Kong 
acquired a ceiling of 164 million square yards per annum, over 40 million 
more than its exports to Britain in 1958.40 In fact the liberality of these quotas 
was the main reason for their acceptance by the Asian producers. In the 
early sixties these voluntary industry-level arrangements were extended and 
supplemented by official bilateral agreements, limiting cotton cloth imports, 
with Malaya, Japan, Taiwan, Spain, China, and the East European countries.41 
The trend was now to evade these controls by supplying made-up articles. 
Weaving firms in Hong Kong, China, Japan, and Taiwan sent amounts of 
cloth to Macao to be made-up and re-exported to the U .K .42 Under the 
provisions of the 1962 G.A .T.T. Long Term Arrangement, designed to 
manage the developed world’s imports of cheap cotton textiles, Britain intro­
duced a global quota for cotton cloth imports in 1966. Only India and Hong 
Kong retained separate quotas.43 Global quotas had been advocated by the 
industry’s planning body, the Cotton Board, for several years and by the end
38 Economist, 15 Sept. 1962, p. 1038.
39 The overwhelming majority of cloth imported from Japan in the fifties was for finishing and re-export.
40 Cotton Board, Cotton Board Conference Papers, 7959 (Manchester, 1959), pp. 5-6.
41 G .A .T .T ., A  Study on Cotton Textiles (Geneva, 1966), p. 83.
42 Economist, 12 Mar. 1966, pp. 1039-40.
43 Economics Advisory Group, The Cotton and A llied  Textiles Industry: A n E .A .G . Profile (1973), p. 
33 -
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of the decade cotton cloth imports appeared to have been brought under 
control, although Lancashire’s industrialists argued that by then the damage 
had been done. Even these apparently more stringent controls were quite 
easily evaded. During the latter half of the 1960s Hong Kong began to develop 
a trade in man-made cloth.44 Table 5 shows that British imports of man-made 
and mixtures cloth increased from a negligible quantity in 1965 to 13 million 
square yards in 1969.
I ll
Employment in the spinning section fell by 74,380, and that in the weaving 
section fell by 94,050, between 1950 and 1970. It would be useful to possess 
some means of measuring the relative contributions to this reduction in 
employment of such factors as rising imports, falling exports, increasing 
labour productivity, and declining home demand. This is what the accounting 
procedure seeks to estimate. The procedure can be used to examine changes 
in employment within a single industry or over a group of industries. The 
variant of the technique used here is similar to that applied by Cable to the 
analysis of declining employment in the British textile and clothing industries 
during the 1970s.45 It is based on the following identities:
(1 ) D  =  Q -  X + M
(2) P  =  Q/E
(3) therefore E =  ( i /P) [D+X -  M]
(4) A E =  f [ A P , A D ,  A X ,  AM]
(5) A E  =  ( i /P0) [ A D + A X  -  AM  -  Et. AP]  
where D  is domestic demand
E  is employment
M  is imports
P  is average labour productivity
Q is output
X  is exports
O and t are the beginning and end years of the exercise.
The first identity defines domestic demand (D) as output (Q) minus exports 
(X) plus imports (M). Identity (2) defines average labour productivity (P) as 
output divided by employment (E). Combining (1) and (2) we derive identity 
(3), which defines employment in terms of domestic demand, exports, imports, 
and average labour productivity. In identity (4) we see that the change in 
employment over a discrete interval of time (t years) depends upon changes 
in these same factors: domestic demand, exports, imports, and average labour 
productivity. Identity (5) gives the final form of the procedure.46
44 T. Geiger and F. M. Geiger, The Development Progress o f Hong Kong and Singapore (1975), p. 71.
45 See V. Cable, ‘ “Cheap” Imports and Jobs: The Impact of Competing Manufactured Imports from 
Low Labour Cost Countries on U .K . Employment’, in P. Maunder, ed. Case Studies in Development 
Economics (1982), pp. 54-83; and 'British Protectionism and L.D.C. Imports’, Overseas Development 
Institute R eview , 2 (1977), pp. 29-48. For an application of the principle to German textiles, see F. Frobel 
et al. The N ew  International Division o f  Labour (Cambridge, 1980); and for the United States, A. O. 
Krueger, 'The Impact o f Foreign Trade on Employment in United States Industry’, in J. Black and B. 
Hindley, eds. Current Issues in Commercial Policy and Diplomacy (1980), pp. 73-98.
46 A more detailed algebraic exposition of the technique can be supplied on application to the author, 
at the Department of Economics, Gillow House, University of Lancaster, Lancaster.
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Data collected by the Cotton Board enable the changes in E, X,  M,  and P  
to be calculated, which leaves D  as a residual. The next step is to take each 
of X,  M,  P , and D  in turn and, holding the other three elements constant, 
calculate the number of jobs lost over the period in question as a result of the 
variation in that factor. For weaving this is relatively straightforward, but 
when applying the technique to spinning it is necessary to take into account 
the effects of changes in exports, imports, and domestic demand for cloth on 
the demand for yarn and consequently the employment of spinning operatives. 
The weight of yarn consumed by the weaving section in each year can be 
obtained from Cotton Board statistics. Since the output of cloth is already 
known, the weight of yarn required to produce one square yard of cloth in a 
given year can be calculated. Holding this quantity constant over the period 
to be examined, it becomes possible to measure the effect of changes in 
exports, imports, and home demand for cloth on the consumption of yarn, 
and consequently upon employment in the spinning sector.47 Once this has 
been done the analysis is complete.
At this point it is worth mentioning some of the defects of this technique. 
Martin and Evans have criticized the accounting procedure on several import­
ant grounds.48 They suggest that the choice of D  (or indeed of X,  M,  or P) 
as the residual term is in essence an arbitrary one. Furthermore, the technique 
is unable to measure the proportion of employment decline due to the 
interaction of X,  M,  P ,  and D.  The procedure assumes that these four factors 
are strictly independent. In the real world this is almost certainly not the 
case. For instance, although employment in cotton will be directly reduced 
by an increase in imports, there are likely to be further ramifications in 
succeeding time periods. Increased competition from imports will induce 
surviving firms to reduce their costs by installing new equipment. As this will 
raise labour productivity it will (at least in the short term) result in a second 
crop of redundancies. W ith a static model this problem is insoluble. One 
answer would be to develop a dynamic model capable of incorporating these 
effects, but this may lead to further problems in estimating the best form of 
time lag. In practice, the shorter the period of the exercise, the less importance 
these inter-relationships will have, particularly in an industry such as cotton, 
which was not renowned for its speed of adaptation.
The results in Table 6 suggest that the fifties and sixties can be divided into 
three distinct phases: 1950 to 1955, 1955 to i960, and i960 to 1970.49 From 
1950 to 1955 employment in spinning and weaving fell by 34,820. Given the 
assumptions of the accounting procedure specified above, the main factor 
accounting for this decline was falling exports of yarn and cloth. If exports
47 The quantity of yarn required to produce a given length of cloth introduces a further factor to the 
model, and the effect on employment of variations in it must be measured. Holding exports, imports, and 
domestic demand for cloth constant, the effect on employment in spinning of changes in the weight of 
yarn needed to produce a unit of cloth is calculated. As there were no major technical developments to 
influence this factor over the relevant period, any consequent variation in employment can be put down 
to changes in the use of cotton and man-made staple fibres relative to that of man-made continuous filament 
fibre yarn.
48 J. P. Martin and J. M. Evans, ‘Notes on Measuring the Employment Displacement Effects of Trade 
by the Accounting Procedure’, Oxford Economic Papers, 33 (1981), pp. 154-64.
49 The rows in the tables do not add up to the final (1950-70) column, because of the use of separate 
base years for each five-year period.
1950-5 i 95S-(>o 1960-s 1965-70 (1950-70)
-4 ,143 -2 ,0 1 0 - U 3 I5 1,307 (-5 ,8 2 2 )
54 -2 ,917 646 -1 ,4 0 9 (-3 ,8 8 0 )
3,851 -12,108 -7 ,6 8 2 -4 ,6 9 0 (-17 ,213)
-9 ,015 -8 ,248 -1 ,6 7 3 - 7 4 6 (-20 ,836)
-6 2 4 -11 ,063 2,456 745 (-7 ,8 6 9 )
-5 ,4 0 2 570 - 5,035 1,257 (-4 ,8 7 8 )
-381 3,643 -7 ,1 3 2 - 7,372 ( - 1 7 ,4 5 0
-4 0 4,493 865 -1 ,2 6 2 (3 ,569)
-15 ,700 -27 ,640 -18 ,870 -12 ,170 (-74 ,380)
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Table 6. Factors Accounting for the Decline in Employment in the U.K.  
Cotton and Allied Textiles Industry, 1950-70
(i) Spinning
Effect on employment in spinning
Change in:





Use of man-made continuous filament fibre 
yarn in weaving 
Home demand for cloth woven in U.K.
Home demand for yarn spun in U.K. (except 
yarn used in weaving)
Total change in employment in spinning
(ii) Weaving
Effect on employment in weaving 
Cloth exports -15 ,272  -14 ,229  -3 ,0 3 7  -1 ,6 9 2  (-35 ,296)
Cloth imports -1 ,0 5 7  -19 ,087  4,485 1,692 (-13 ,329)
Labour productivity (weaving) -2 ,1 3 9  -9 ,6 7 7  -4 ,975  ~ 4,973  (-15 ,865)
Home demand for cloth woven in U.K. -6 4 2  6,283 -12 ,973 —16,727 (-29 ,560)
Total change in employment in weaving -19 ,110  -36 ,710  -16 ,500  -21 ,700  (-94 ,050)
had remained at their 1950 level, there would have been 28,430 more jobs in 
the British cotton industry in 1955 than in the event was the case. Changes in 
employment due to imports and home demand were relatively slight, and 
labour productivity in spinning actually declined. The second period, from 
1955 to i960, saw rising imports become the major element in employment 
decline, although by a less decisive margin. Employment fell by 64,350 
between 1955 and i960. The level of employment in i960 would have been 
33,067 higher if imports had not risen over the previous five years, 24,487 
higher if exports had not fallen, and 21,785 higher if productivity had not 
increased. During the 1960s declining home demand for cloth and yarn took 
over as the main contributory factor in employment decline. Between i960 
and 1965 employment in spinning and weaving fell by 35,370. The 1965 figure 
for employment would have been 19,240 higher if home demand had not 
declined, 12,657 higher if productivity had not risen, and 6,025 higher if 
exports had not fallen between i960 and 1965. Declining home demand was 
by far the largest single factor in the later 1960s. The net reduction in spinning 
and weaving employment was 33,870 between 1965 and 1970, with falling 
home demand for yarn and cloth accounting for 25,361 job losses over this 
period.
It appears, under the restrictive assumption that X , M , P , and D are wholly 
independent of one another, that the loss of Lancashire’s export markets was 
the most important factor accounting for declining employment in British 
cotton and allied textiles between 1950 and 1955; the rising tide of imports 
was the major element between 1955 and i960; while falling home demand 
dominated the sixties.
Several special factors come into play in the discussion of home demand. 
First, some of the decline in domestic demand for domestically produced 
cloth was due to competition from the rapidly expanding warp-knitting
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industry. U .K . production of warp-knitted fabric increased from 8 million kg 
in 1961 to 35 million kg in 1970.50 This impressive rate of growth was mainly 
at the expense of woven cloth, and was primarily the result of the technical 
superiority of warp-knitting over weaving, especially after the introduction of 
double-jersey knitting in 1954. Continuous filament fibre yarn did not weave 
very well, but it knitted excellently, so that warp-knitting firms were at an 
advantage in the production of man-made fabric for use in the clothing 
industry.51 W arp-knitting also produced fabric at a higher speed than weaving. 
In 1970 warp-knitted shirtings could be made 25 per cent cheaper than similar 
quality woven shirtings. As a result by 1969 50 per cent of men’s shirts and 
80 per cent of women’s lingerie and nightwear were made using fabric 
produced by warp-knitting.52 A second factor determining the demand for 
British cloth was the state of the clothing industry. Between 1958 and 1963 
British imports of cotton dresses rose from 727,000 to 2,768,000, while imports 
of cotton shirts increased from 529,000 to 1,264,000.53 Yet despite increasing 
import penetration in these and other lines, and rising imports of such items 
as cotton/polyester shirts as overseas producers attempted to circumvent 
quotas on cotton cloth imports, it would not be accurate to describe clothing 
as an industry in retreat. Indeed, production of stockings and socks (from all 
types of fabric) increased from 33-5 to 50-5 thousand dozen pairs between 
1958 and 1966. Over the same interval the output of underwear and shirts 
rose from 14-6 to 17-3 thousand dozen items, and outerwear production 
increased from 7-7 to 9-1 thousand dozen items.54 Thus the decline in home 
demand for cloth during the 1960s cannot be attributed to the difficulties 
of the clothing industry, and is accounted for by clothing manufacturers 
substituting warp-knitted fabrics for woven fabrics and imported cloth for 
British cloth.
It is interesting to compare the results derived from the present application 
of the accounting procedure with those obtained in similar studies. For the 
West German textile industry between i960 and 1975, Frobel has suggested 
that increasing labour productivity was the main factor accounting for declin­
ing employment. Krueger’s study concludes that the net trade balance in 
textiles had a positive effect on the level of employment in the U.S. textile 
industry between 1970 and 1976. However, Cable posits that in Britain 
between 1970 and 1976 the increase in net imports was the primary factor 
behind the reduction in numbers employed in cotton cloth production.55 
Cable’s results are particularly interesting, for they raise the possibility 
that the dominance of declining home demand as an explanation of falling 
employment in the British cotton industry during the 1960s might only have
50 J. A. Blackburn, ‘The Vanishing U .K . Cotton Industry’, National Westminster Bank Quarterly R eview  
(Nov. 1982), p. 49.
51 A. C. Parsonage, ‘An Economic and Technological Study of the Competition between Knitting and 
Weaving in the United Kingdom Textile Industry’ (unpublished Ph.D . thesis, University of Surrey, 1973), 
pp. 16-7, 68.
52 F. A. Wells The British Hosiery and K nitw ear Industry: Its History and Organization (Newton Abbot, 
1972), pp. 181-2.
53 Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical R eview , 72 (1964), p. 14.
54 Wells, British Hosiery and Knitw ear Industry, p. 179.
55 Greater Manchester Record Office, Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Association, Minutes of 
Central Committee, 1 Apr. 1955.
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been an aberration; that in the long run a deteriorating trade balance in cotton 
textiles might still have been the major factor.
IV
The foregoing analysis suggests that a key question arising from the observed 
decline of the industry during the postwar decades is whether the industry’s 
obsession with the threat of higher imports was justified.
Although the 1940s had seen a certain amount of renewed faith in cotton 
among Lancashire’s employers and trade union leaders, their hopes for pro­
sperity were soon dashed. The fifties and sixties, like the twenties and thirties, 
were decades of falling demand, production, and exports, but they were also 
marred by the new problem of rapidly increasing imports. Once again mill 
closures were an everyday occurrence, the only difference being that alterna­
tive employment was far more readily available than it was between the wars.
Lancashire’s response to these difficulties was persistently to lobby for 
protection. Numerous delegations journeyed from Manchester to Whitehall 
to put the case for action to save jobs and prevent mills from closing. In 
19553 for instance, the Cotton Board Standing Conference on Overseas Trade 
petitioned Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister, for the introduction of 
quotas and eventually tariffs on imports of yarn and retained grey cloth from 
the Commonwealth. When the government failed to respond, the Cotton 
Board angrily issued a statement expressing its “profound dismay” .56 Others 
reacted more belligerently to what they regarded as the government’s plain 
indifference to Lancashire’s plight. During the late fifties there was a spate of 
resignations from the Conservative Party by angry cotton manufacturers and 
even talk of a new party being formed to put their views more forcefully.57 
Bamoldswick Conservative Club wrote to the Prime Minister in 1958 to 
withdraw support from the government until its “policy is adjusted to meet 
the needs of Lancashire in such measure as to guarantee a brighter future for 
the industry.” 58 The measures introduced to restrain imports during the early 
sixties were generally regarded as being too little and too late.
Union leaders viewed the Labour Party’s commitment to cotton with equal 
mistrust. In 1963 George Brown had promised that a Labour administration 
would set up an Imports Commission to supervise and, if necessary, regulate 
the importation of cheap cotton textiles. He would also reopen negotiations 
with G .A .T .T . to persuade other developed countries to take a larger share 
of the Third W orld’s cloth exports.59 At the 1967 T.U.C. Conference, Lewis 
W right of the Amalgamated Weavers complained that these promises had not 
been adequately fulfilled. Instead, the government was pursuing a wholly 
“laissez-faire” policy towards Lancashire, which was resulting in the “undisci­
plined rout” of the cotton industry.60 A resolution was carried, calling upon 
the government to mend its ways.
56 The Times, 5 May 1955, p. 7, col. 1.
57 The Times, 24 Sept. 1957, p. 4, col. 1.
58 The Times, 3 June 1958, p. 7, col. 4.
59 Economist, 27 July 1963, p. 340.
60 Trades Union Congress, Report o f  Proceedings a t the 99th Annual Trades Union Congress (1967), p. 
556.
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It is abundantly clear that, rightly or wrongly, Lancashire felt betrayed by 
successive postwar governments. The industry’s campaign singled out imports 
as the major immediate threat to jobs. The results of the accounting procedure 
used in this paper suggest that this concentration on imports was not wholly 
justified, although it can be explained by the fact that imports were the only 
element that Lancashire felt able to affect through political lobbying. Imports 
were the main factor accounting for the decline in employment in the industry 
during the period from 1955 to i960. But in the earlier period between 1950 
and 1955 declining exports made the major contribution to job losses in cotton, 
and during the 1960s the employment reducing effects of falling domestic 
demand for yarn and cloth predominated.
This paper has sought to analyse the immediate causes of declining employ­
ment in the British cotton industry during the 1950s and 1960s. It is not 
suggested that the accounting procedure can provide definitive answers to the 
broader questions posed by the industry’s overall decline. The value of this 
approach is its ability to identify the main source of Lancashire’s weakness at 
any given time, whether poor export performance, depressed home demand 
or an inability to compete with imported products.
Decline was not arrested by any of the factors which are often assumed to 
have given Lancashire renewed hope in the early sixties, namely the employ­
ment of immigrant labour, the use of computers, and the increasing involve­
ment of the man-made fibre producers in the industry. Net immigration from 
India and Pakistan rose from 8,350 per annum between 1955 and i960 to 
34,812 per annum between 1961 and 1966.61 In 1965 Asians comprised 7 per 
cent of the labour force in the U .K . cotton industry, and by 1968 59 per cent 
of operatives on night shifts in spinning and 36 per cent on night shifts in 
weaving were immigrants.62 It has been estimated that as late as 1975 46-9 
per cent of all Gujaratis of working age in Bolton were employed in the textile 
and clothing industries, mainly as spinners, weavers, and doffers.63 But it 
should not be imagined that these Asian operatives bid down wages or took 
the jobs of indigenous workers. They merely filled vacancies, especially on 
night shifts, that nobody else wanted. Most Asian workers joined the unions, 
indeed trade union membership on night shifts was often compulsory. As 
membership of the main cotton unions increased from 58 per cent to 62 per 
cent of the industry’s workforce between i960 and 1969, the bargaining 
strength of the unions cannot have been weakened by the influx of New 
Commonwealth workers.64
Even the growing use of computers was unable to halt Lancashire’s decline. 
A survey conducted by the National Computing Centre in 1968 estimated that 
12 per cent of textile and clothing firms either owned or had access to a 
computer, primarily for stock control and general management purposes. 
About 90 per cent of these firms had started using computers over the previous 
five years. But there is little evidence that computers were applied to the
61 G. C. K. Peach and S. W. C. Winchester, ‘Birthplace, Ethnicity, and the Under-enumeration of West 
Indians, Indians, and Pakistanis in the Censuses of 1966 and 1971’, N ew  Community, III (1974), p. 389.
62 L. Briscoe, The Textile and Clothing Industries o f  the United Kingdom  (Manchester, 1971), p. 176.
63 K. G. Hahlo, ‘Profile of a Gujarati Community in Bolton’, N ew  Com. VIII (1980), pp. 305-6.
64 Amalgamated Textile Workers’ Union, Eighth Annual Report, pp. 38-41.
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control of the production process itself, hence their contribution to the overall 
reduction of costs was marginal.65
The increasing involvement of Courtaulds and I.C.I. in the cotton industry 
during the 1960s is well known. Courtaulds acquired the large rayon weaving 
concern of James Nelson Ltd. in 1963, and in the following year took over 
three of the major spinning combines: Fine Spinners’ and Doublers’, the 
Lancashire Cotton Corporation, and Hayeshaws.66 This policy was designed 
to secure the market for Courtauld’s product and was accompanied by large- 
scale investment in the industry. Between 1962 and 1969 Courtaulds spent 
£57 million re-equipping its fibre-using operations, and even building some 
new mills.67 Similarly, I.C.I. made loans to Viyella and to Carrington and 
Dewhurst to buy into the industry by proxy. However, this increased concen­
tration of the industry did not succeed in turning the tide, Frank Kearton of 
Courtaulds described the results of this policy as “a little disappointing” .68 
Recently Geoffrey Shepherd has suggested that the heavy-handed strategy of 
Courtaulds and I.C.I. may ultimately have failed because it diverted attention 
from the issues of product design and the need for flexibility in production in 
a market subject to rapid shifts in tastes. He contrasts the experience of the 
British cotton industry during the sixties with that of the much more successful 
Italian industry, where design and marketing were to the fore.69 British 
industry in general appears to have had a poor reputation for design and 
quality in this era.70
Alternatively, it might be that the efforts of the man-made fibre producers 
were too late. Cotton’s investment performance in the 1950s was lamentable. 
In 1954 British cotton firms made new investments of $80 per worker (includ­
ing the hosiery and knitwear industry), compared with $114 in France (exclud­
ing new buildings) and $191 in Holland.71 Why was Britain lagging so far 
behind comparable nations in the race to convert cotton into an increasingly 
capital intensive industry? No monocausal explanation will suffice. Lancashire 
was hampered by a number of factors: a workforce that viewed redeployment 
with suspicion, poor management, outmoded marketing arrangements, defici­
encies in product design, and an atomistic industrial structure which militated 
against the co-ordination of the different stages in the production process. All 
these factors combined to produce a lack of dynamism in the industry. But a 
further crucial influence can be identified. Keynes regarded confidence as the 
primary determinant of the decision to invest. One might speculate that in an 
industry such as cotton, where the disasters of the interwar years were still 
fresh in the collective memory, confidence would have been rather brittle. 
Perhaps that confidence snapped at the first signs of renewed trouble.
University of Lancaster
65 National Computing Centre, Computers in Textiles: A  Survey o f Computer Applications in the Textile 
and Clothing Industries (Manchester, 1968), pp. 4, 11.
66 Coleman, Courtaulds, III, p. 271.
67 Blackburn, ‘The Vanishing U.K. Cotton Industry’, p. 46.
68 Coleman, Courtaulds, III, p. 280.
69 G. Shepherd, Textile Industry Adjustment in Developed Countries (1981), pp. 36-8.
70 A. Singh, ‘U. K. Industry and the World Economy: A Case of De-industrialization’, Cambridge 
Journal o f  Economics, I (1977)5 PP- I3 1'2-
71 O .E .C .D ., M odem  Cotton Industry: A  Capital-intensive Industry (Paris, 1965)5 P- 110.
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